Was Braxton Bragg Really That Bad?

[elektratig]

Along with everyone else, I've read a bunch of books that take it for granted that Braxton Bragg was a disaster -- the ridiculous Kentucky campaign resulting in Perryville; Stones River; the "empty victory" at Chickamauga; the disaster at Chattanooga. I was intrigued, however, when I recently read Steven Woodworth's book, <u>Jefferson Davis and His Generals: The Failure of Confederate Command in the West</u>. Woodworth argues that Bragg, while certainly not a great general, was not terrible. He suggests

* that the failure of the campaign that led to Perryville was in large part due to (a) the bad and confusing intelligence that Kirby Smith and Leonidas Polk provided, (b) Polk's insubordination, and (c) the mistaken assumption that Kentuckians would rally to and enlist with the Army, an assumption shared by Jefferson Davis and virtually everyone else.

* that Bragg's plan at Stones River to assault the Federal right was quite good and almost succeeded, and indeed almost certainly would have succeeded had Davis not stripped the Army of troops.

* that through insubordination Bragg's commanders squandered several opportunities to defeat the Union army in detail in the days before Chickamauga.

* that the dissention in the Army that was the core reason for the disaster at Chattanooga was caused principally by Leonidas Polk, who was an insubordinate malcontent who conducted a lengthy campaign to undermine Bragg and over time infected the entire army (and then found a kindred spirit in Longstreet). More generally, he suggests that Bragg, while certainly *****ly, responded for some time with (for him) reasonable moderation to blatant provocations by Polk, et al., until he could take it, and almost open insubordination, no more.

As Woodworth summed up his view of Bragg in North and South Magazine's on-line Ten Worst Generals article: He was "an excellent strategist, organizer, administrator, and disciplinarian, and an average tactician. His lack of political skills was a serious flaw, reducing an otherwise good general to the level of mediocrity. Others, including Jefferson Davis, Leonidas Polk, William S. Rosecrans, and Ulysses S. Grant, were far more responsible for the defeats of the Army of Tennessee than was Bragg. He definitely does not belong in the bottom ten."

Woodworth apparently did not convince his fellow "Ten Worst" panelists, for every one other than Woodworth listed Bragg. However, because of the format they did not directly address Woodworth's arguments. I'd be very interested to hear your views about Bragg. Was he really the pits, or do you think that Woodworth's arguments have any merit?

[larry_cockerham]

Nathan Bedford Forrest apparently thought the pits choice was appropriate. That should be given some consideration. Forrest earned duty in the western theatre for his trouble.

[johan_steele]

Sam Watkins in his Co Aytch gives a pretty consistant view of what the average soldier in the CS Army thought of the man. He was arguably the worst general on either side.

[gary]

Bragg was talented at organizing and planning. His communication skill (he met Jeff Davis' need to be informed) was good. However, as a battlefield leader he was way over his head. He should have been a Chief-of-Staff to a more competent battlefield leader.

[30th_il]

Bragg did pretty well at Shiloh but he wasn't commanding an entire army at the time. When he did become the commanding general of the Army of TN I think it was beyond his scope of understanding.

[pvt gauss]

Sounds to me like Woodworth had a little Bragg in himself. Blame everybody else. I agree with Larry C.as to what Bedford Forrest thought of him and was not afraid to say it to his face. Don`t believe he ever "crossed" his path again. Bragg looked at Forrest as a partisan and not a "pointer", as did others, until it was far too late to use this fine asset correctly. He was Bragg-afied.

[ole]

The definition a good general includes the ability to command and defuse dissention. He was unable to overcome the dissention and was, therefore, not a good general.

All commanders have that problem but they get over it. It is true that Davis hampered his ability to deal with it, but I submit that the good generals managed to minimize, if not eliminate, the bad effects. He did not. Pit city.
Ole

[elektratig]

Pvt Gauss and Ole,

Thanks for reviving this topic, which continues to fascinate me.

Since my original post, I’ve read Woodworth’s “Six Armies in Tennessee” and “Lee and Davis at War” (the latter is not relevant to the discussion on Bragg but is itself a fascinating analysis of the differing assumptions and resulting strategic visions of Lee and Davis). In my view, Woodworth is one of the most interesting Civil War historians writing today. I’ve finished battle and campaign histories and have not had a clue as to what the commander’s options were or whether the author thought his actions were reasonable in light of the available options. Woodworth, in contrast, does precisely that. He provides the facts, but then he is not afraid to set forth his understanding of the options and his opinions about the choices made. To give but two examples, both of which go against conventional wisdom, Woodworth argues (a) that Bragg’s dispositions and plans to counter Rosecrans during the Tullahoma campaign were not unreasonable, and (b) that the decision to send Longstreet to Knoxville after the establishment of the “cracker line” during the siege of Chattanooga was perhaps as good an option as any. If a historian as thoughtful and perceptive as Woodworth is willing to give some credit to Braxton Bragg, it makes me sit up and take notice.

In response to your recent comments concerning Bragg’s alleged inability to get along with others, I think that Woodworth would answer as follows. Bragg’s problems began with Leonidas Polk, certainly one of the worst generals of the war. Polk was repeatedly insubordinate and worked to undermine Bragg’s plans and convert other generals to his anti-Bragg position: he was openly insubordinate during the Perryville campaign; during the Tullahoma campaign he undermined Bragg’s plan to turn Rosecrans’s right; during the Chickamauga campaign he refused Bragg’s orders to attack Crittenden’s corps on September 13; and on the night after the first day of Chickamauga, he took no steps to comply with Bragg’s orders to prepare for a dawn assault on the Federal left (which was crucial to Bragg’s plan to cut the Federals off from, rather than drive them back to, Chattanooga).

Unfortunately, although Polk was a terrible general, he was a charmer. After a year of badmouthing and conspiring against Bragg, he had won over many of the other commanders. For differing reasons, when D.H. Hill and Longstreet joined the army they were only too happy to join the anti-Bragg cabal. Hill refused to attack an isolated portion of George Thomas’s corps at McLemore’s Cove on September 10, 1863, claiming that Cleburne was sick and unavailable when that was not the case. Longstreet was responsible for the sector that included Brown’s Ferry and ignored orders and suggestions to guard against Federal movements in that area, leading to the opening of the “cracker line.”

Ironically, for all Bragg’s reputation as a nasty curmudgeon, the argument can be made that his biggest fault was that he tried to be too reasonable and accommodating. Knowing the relationship between Jefferson Davis and Polk, and not realizing the extent to which Polk was poisoning the other commanders, Bragg did not take firm steps against Polk after the Perryville campaign, but instead turned the other cheek. Arguably, he should have brought charges against Polk immediately after that campaign; if Jefferson Davis objected (as he certainly would have), Bragg should have been prepared to say, “Him or me.”

I am not arguing (and I don’t think Woodworth is arguing) that Bragg was a great general. He had many faults, and he failed, and for that as commander of the army he is responsible. I am, however, just not convinced that he is the utterly incompetent caricature that most make him out to be.

[ole]

electratig:

Yours and Woodworth's attempts to find some good in Bragg are laudible, but fruitless. To be sure, he had enough skills and diplomacy to gain the position, and I'm equally certain he neither beat his wife nor kicked his dog. As a Major General, however, he was well above his level of incompetency.

What did good commanders do with their difficult lieutenants? They shipped them off to another post where they could no longer interfere, or mitigated their ill effects by teaming them with trusted lieutenants. Thus, the quarrelsome D.H. Hill found himself in the Carolinas after the Peninsula Campaign; the slow George Thomas was send to Nashville where his foot dragging would not impede Sherman.

But this only highlights the sad fact that Davis was not Lincoln. Bragg did not have the freedom that his Union counterparts did. You are right in assigning some blame in knuckling under and not laying down the "him or me" ultimatum.

Unfortunately, Bragg will remain in history as one of Davis's gravest mistakes.
Ole

[ewc]

I too agree that Bragg has been too much a whipping post for Confederate failures, too easy a target, and too easily dismissed to the ranks of the 'Worst Generals' category. Bragg possessed very definable and desirable qualities, as has been mentioned, a master strategist, organizer and logistician, and ability to interact with President Davis, (also a secret of success of RE Lee.) I have not read Woodworth's works, but am moving him up my list.

Bragg's real problem seems to me to be one of battlefield confusion. Not quite the 'fog of war' , more like once the battle started, he did not seem to be able to grasp goings on. His retreat from Kentucky and later Murfeesboro I have seen described as 'mercurial', and agree with that statement. He would seem to be a perfect candidate for Sherman's statement praising Grant- 'He don't care a **** sight for what the enemy does out of his viewing, but it scares me like hell!' Bragg, on the battlefield, seemed almost to be paralyzed with what was going on outside his viewing. But as to planning his campaigns and moving and positioning accordingly, he belongs, I believe, in the highest ranks of Confederate commanders.

I also agree with elektratig in saying that Bragg was not culpable for being forced out of Tennessee in Rosecrans's masterful Tullahoma Campaign, and in sending Longstreet to invest Knoxville. However, an error in which biographers are prone to fall is overly defending their protagonist and blaming (or pointing out the faults of) everyone else. Some of Woodworth's claims seem to be special pleading of this order, though I cannot say for sure till I read for myself. It was Bragg's decision, not Kirby Smith's or Polk's, to withdraw after Perryville; Bragg did not oversee the flank attacks at Stones River and Chickamagua. At Chickamauga, he knew the dilatory and recalcitrant Polk was making the attack, yet he stayed at headquarters waiting for the attack to take place as ordered instead of being on the scene and seeing that all was in order. He thus lost the wonderful opportunity of crushing the Yankee army.

His too many critics and too many defeats and retreats however along with his enduring unpopularity will keep Bragg from being elevated from his place on the Civil War poop-list. A last irony of an irony-laden man is that most certainly Bragg would have accepted History's judgment of him if it meant winning the war.