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Woodworth doesn’t hesitate to criticize Bragg. For obvious reasons, I’ve emphasized those portions of his discussion that are more positive about Bragg than the conventional view. For example, regarding the Perryville campaign, Woodworth accuses Bragg of going into it without a clear purpose. Bragg should not have allowed himself to get dragged into Kirby Smith’s harebrained and half-baked scheme, at least without (a) thinking through and setting up clear goals and purposes, and (b) clearing up the chain-of-command issue. In terms of the campaign itself, Woodworth thinks that Bragg made a fatal mistake in failing to go straight for Louisville after Munfordville, rather than diddling around in Eastern Kentucky. Perhaps if Bragg and Kirby Smith had taken Louisville, some of the pro-Confederate Kentuckians might have enlisted and put to use all those extra rifles that the Confederates dragged up with him.
In terms of his conduct during battles, Bragg seems to have gotten worn down and lacked the ability to improvise. At Stones River, when the first day plan came so near to success but fell short, he didn’t know what to do next. At Chickamauga, Woodworth suggests that Bragg began the battle dispirited because D.H. Hill, Hindman and Polk had, contrary to orders, missed some of the best tactical opportunities of the War to inflict significant damage on isolated Federal corps on September 10, 11 and 13. Then, particularly when Polk failed to have his men in position to attack the Federal left on the morning of the second day of Chickamauga, Bragg basically threw up his hands in disgust and wrote off the whole mess. Psychologically understandable, but you just can’t do that as commander.
As I think I’ve said clearly, I’m certainly not claiming greatness for Bragg. I do wonder, however, whether he was any worse than Joe Johnston.
- Each won one battle (if you give Joe credit for First Bull Run and Bragg credit for Chickamauga);
- Each was responsible for a major debacle (Joe for the loss of Atlanta, Bragg for Chattanooga);
- Each was capable of coming up with good battle plans (Joe at Seven Pines and Cassville, GA [aborted by Hood], Bragg at Stones River and repeatedly on September 10, 11 and 13 before Chickamauga);
- Each executed a masterpiece of transportation logistics (Joe’s transfer of his army to Bull Run, Bragg’s transfer of his army from Northern Mississippi to Chatanooga);
- Each seemed to lose control of battles (Joe at Seven Pines, Bragg as stated above);
- Each had fatal personality flaws (Joe’s almost pathological sense of pride and perfectionism, Bragg’s lack of “people skills”).
Yet even Joe’s detractors usually are willing to admit that there were positives mixed in with the negatives. I find it curious that discussions of Bragg do not involve similar careful weighing and analysis.
Last edited by elektratig; 04-14-2005 at 07:13 AM.
Now I'm going to have to dig out my copy of Woodworth's book and re-read it.
We (I'm assuming almost all of us) tend to reserve our time for subjects that interest us most. Hence, we don't look into the fine points (like this one) which does put a grey area between the dismissive black and white views into which we shovel annoying thoughts. I'm guilty. Bragg was bad. Lee was good. Nevermind the grey areas.
These discussions tend to shed more light than I've ever known on minutia I've never thought about. So Bragg was bad, but he had his good points. Grant was good, but he had his bad points.
Maybe now I can start reading up on Vicksburg (8 books). I'll never finish before the muster. Thank you very much!
Ole
I hope you realize that my tongue is not between my teeth.
I was just telling someone last night that I need to go back and re-read some of the books I read early on in my exploration of the Civil War. Now that I've got a firmer grounding in the subject, I'll probably get a lot more out of them, picking up points I missed or didn't appreciate the first time round.
elektratig,
I have but a couple more comments on Bragg and then I shall let him peaceably moulder. My knowlegde is not overly great on this subject but what strikes me is:
1. Why "diddle" around with Govenors and the like when the race to Louisville was the key?"God may be on thier side but Kentucky MUST be on ours" A. Lincoln ,this should haved weighed more than a nice parade.
which leads to-
2. In louisville it would have shown the people in that area of KY that he meant to stay or least help them defend thier homes- i`ll bet he would of found quite a few more"rifles" in that case.
which leads to-
3.Perryville, a perfect example of his ability to turn a stalemate into a defeat along with being able to turn a victory into stalemate ie; Chattanooga
4. as mentioned by someone else his people skills seemed to be shall i say, somewhat lacking ie;The treatment of Forrest by taking away two of his commands, that he had raised from pups, while at the same time sending him on impossible missions [dec62/jan63] and recruit as you go.his thought of that man as no more than a guerrilla was one of his worse "people" calls. ie#2 Sending Longstreet to Knoxville undermanned and under equipped and expecting miracles.
5. From reading a few of the comments am I to gather that all his subordinates were in some sort of a "vast" conspiracy lead by "the deacon" Polk? I would prefer to see it as reasonable men reaching a resonable conclusion.
6. On the otherside of the "crick" Who else was there to put in command?
I appologize for being somewhat simplistic in my comments and agree with ole that more often than not the "gray" area[no pun intented] is often discounted. Hindsight is great isn`t it?
It's clear that Bragg did his side no favors in his conduct of the war. We might also reasonably conclude that he did not, singlehandedly, give away the entire Western Theater. Whatever his good points, it is also clear that he was in way, way over his head.
Can we put it away with the idea that he was not a good general, whatever complications might have beset him? Not a bad man (although quarrelsome and apparently nasty at times) but not a good general. As simple as that?
Grant was not perfect, nor was Sherman, Sheridan, Meade, Thomas or any of the others. The only perfect one I know of was Lee, and the jury is still out on him. But they won their battles. That's kind of a benchmark for a general isn't it? Beat your wife, kick your dog, but win your battles.
Getting back to Bragg. He did not win his battles. 'Nuff said. History will be unkind to him, and that's too bad. You don't win your battles, you're not a good general. Period. End of story. The man had his demons, and that's regrettable. But all the others had theirs as well. The measure of the man is his ability to rise above them. He could not. Bad general.
I may not have time to respond to all your points, which aren't simplistic in the slightest.
So far as I can tell, the basic problems with the Perryville campaign were two-fold:
First, the entire premise of the campaign was that Kentuckians, given the opportunity, would rise up in great numbers and flock to the Confederate Army. If that didn't happen, the entire campaign served no purpose and was doomed to fail, unless it was transformed into a giant raid. But the Confederates weren't prepared to "raid" what they considered their home turf. Bragg may be faulted for this delusion, but then again so should all of the Confederate leadership, from Jefferson Davis and Breckenridge on down.
Second, the command structure was never resolved. Kirby Smith informally agree to place himself under Bragg, but in practice he never did. Bragg may be faulted for failing to get a directive from Jefferson Davis sorting out the situation before he engaged in such a far-flung campaign. Then again, neophyte generals repeatedly had this sort of problem, naively believing in and relying on non-binding protestations of cooperation. Even Robert Lee allowed Jefferson Davis to send him to Western Virginia early in the War without clear authority, resulting in a mess.
After Munfordville, Bragg was due north of Buell and could likely have marched straight into Louisville. In retrospect (since what he actually did didn't work), he clearly should have done so. As you say, maybe, just maybe, more Kentuckians would have turned out. In Bragg's defense, it appears that he turned northeast, toward the Frankfort area, for two reasons. First was intensely practical. He wanted to hook up with Kirby Smith, and the only way to do so was for Bragg to go to Smith (see the Second Point). Second, the hope was that installation of a Confederate governor at the state capital would either produce recruits or at least allow the Confederates to colorably argue that the Confederate conscription laws were in force and effect in Kentucky as a Confederate state. That obviously didn't work, but Bragg couldn't have known that at the time.
After the battle of Perryville, I can't blame Bragg for retreating. The previously-made mistakes, already identified above, had already borne fruit. There were insufficient recruits. The supply line was already long and tenuous. Bragg either had to (a) risk his army in a showdown battle in what was proving to be a distant and unfriendly location, (b) keep moving, raiding and devastating Kentucky as he went, or (c) retreat to Tennessee. So long as the South was not prepared to execute option (b) (just as Lee was not willing to devastate Maryland in September 1862), it seems to me that option (c) was preferable to option (a), which entailed huge risks.
In all of this, Bragg is by no means blameless. I just don't see, however, how it transforms Bragg from a mediocre general into the absolute pits. I must say that in many respects Bragg's Kentucky campaign resembled Lee's Maryland (Antietam) campaign. Both went into border states under mistaken assumptions and with unformed strategic purposes. Both discovered that it is far more difficult to maintain and fight with an army over attenuated supply lines away from one's native soil. Both concluded that under the circumstances that retreat was the best option.
elektratig,Ole, compliments,
Perhaps I have too hasty in my negative opinions of Gen. Bragg. Now don`t get me wrong I am not handing my sword over to ya`ll nor will I go outside and fall on it but having mulled this over in my mind for a spell and I am inclined to believe that the place[Kentucky} had a great deal to do with his, and others failings. I don`t wish to travel to far from the intent of this thread but KY, was at that time very unique in its standing among territory refered to as "border states". From the proclaimed neutrality, which works for no one even the Swiss, to the almost 50/50 split in union or secesh leanings of the inhabitants, which I have even today witnessed myself ie: when looking for a butternut cemetery in PeeWee Valley the graves there were refered by the local librarian as "our boys" to the clerk in the Marion Co. courthouse who through me out for mentioning that I had a relative that rode with Morgan. The point to be made I believe is that neither Blue nor Gray ever "controlled" Ky. and no matter who was of a mind to Bragg, Buell whomever it was not to be and no matter how they tried never could all the populace be placated or made safe from the other. So bottom line yes Bragg made mistakes, but what ever was attempted would have been a mistake in someones eyes be it right or wrong in mine eyes or yours.
Not a mea-culpa, I still think he was a twit.
I`m sorry I know I said I`d leave old Bragg alone but I saw that horse twitch an gotta kick e`m one more time. While in search of something else I ran across this quote.
" I know Mr. Davis thinks that he can do a great many things that other men would hesitate to attempt. For instance, he tried to do what God had failed to do. He tried to make a soldier out of Braxton Bragg, and you know the result. It couldn`t be done."
Gen. Joseph Johnston. Now take with with whatever grains of salt you wish it was a Un-foot noted quote so I can`t even tell you when or where. Just thought it rather aprapoe{spelling?}
Paul
I was just telling someone last night that I need to go back and re-read some of the books I read early on in my exploration of the Civil War. Now that I've got a firmer grounding in the subject, I'll probably get a lot more out of them, picking up points I missed or didn't appreciate the first time round.
I do think that when I re-read a book on the war that I have read a few years back, I get new things out of it. Now that I no more about the march to Appomatox, I would like to revisit that site.
pvt gauss -- I think the Joe Johnston quote is accurate and was made after he was relieved of command in July 1864, when he was pretty bitter. I think it says more about Joe Johnston than it does about Braxton Bragg. Poor Jeff Davis -- he couldn't make a soldier of Joe Johnston either.
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