Quote:
Originally Posted by elektratig Uh, no. The interesting thing about the Fugitive Slave Clause is that it does not explicitly state that the federal government must seek out and return slaves. The Clause is carefully worded in the passive voice:
"No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be delivered up on claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due."
"Delivered up," but by whom? |
By the time of the Civil War, the US Supreme Court had already ruled on this issue in
Kentucky v. Dennison (for return of Willis Lago, who had helped a slave escape, from Ohio to Kentucky, Dennison being the Governor of Ohio at the time):
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Syllabus
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
65 U.S. 66
Kentucky v. Dennison
Argued: --- Decided:
1. In a suit between two States, this court has original jurisdiction without any further act of Congress regulating the mode and form in which it shall be exercised.
2. A suit by or against the Governor of a State, as such, in his official character, is a suit by or against the State.
3. A writ of mandamus does not issue in virtue of any prerogative power, and, in modern practice, is nothing more than an ordinary action at law in cases where it is the appropriate remedy.
4. The words "treason, felony, or other crime" in the second clause of the second section of the fourth article of the Constitution of the United States include every offence forbidden and made punishable by the law of the State where the offence is committed.
5. It was the duty of the Executive authority of Ohio, upon the demand made by the Governor of Kentucky and the production of the indictment, duly certified, to cause Lago to be delivered up to the agent of the Governor of Kentucky who was appointed to demand and receive him.
6. The duty of the Governor of Ohio was merely ministerial, and he had no right to exercise any discretionary power as to the nature or character of the crime charged in the indictment.
7. The word "duty," in the act of 1793, means the moral obligation of the State to perform the compact in the Constitution when Congress had, by that act, regulated the mode in which the duty was to be performed.
8. But Congress cannot coerce a State officer, as such, to perform any duty by act of Congress. The State officer may perform it if he thinks proper, and it may be a moral duty to perform it. But if he refuses, no law of Congress can compel him.
9.
The Governor of Ohio cannot, through the Judiciary or any other Department of the General Government, be compelled to deliver up Lago, and, upon that ground only, this motion for a mandamus was overruled.
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This was a common attitude about the relationship of the US and the individual states in those days: that the states had a
duty to obey the law, but that the Federal government had no ability to
compel them to do their duty.
The decision was delivered by the Taney Court on 14 March 1861, only ten days after Lincoln entered office, and less than a month before Ft. Sumter was assaulted by the Confederacy. It clearly represents the current legal position at that critical time.
This
Kentucky v. Dennison decision stood until overturned by
Puerto Rico v. Branstad in 1987 (Branstad was Governor of Iowa).
ADDITION:
Taken to its' logical conclusion, this should also mean the Taney Court would have held the same thing for the 1850 Fugitive Slave Act. IMHO.
Tim