Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
Er Mil comms were encryted before dispatch, private correspondence was not, so that expalian the why telgraph mesaages to his wife clear before mil ones did.
No, Hanny. McClellan dictated the messages to his wife first, which is why they were sent first.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
No, Hanny. McClellan dictated the messages to his wife first, which is why they were sent first.
Tim
mil traffic and civilian traffic are subject to different modes of operation, its not when they sent, its when they get there that counts.
Linoln removes Mac, sends it by telegraph, its in the papers with 24 hours, friends of Mac read it and make him aware of it, 24 more hours pass and he gets the telgraph, just as he lost Blenkers formation when Lincoln ordered it directly and sent Mac the orders and an explanation, which he got 72 hours after the event, just as Mac lost 40k of troop on the eve of setting out for the penninsula camapign, and got the news of teh closeing of the recruitment offices which he had arranged to feed existing formations with, all occuring 24-72 hours after thevent.
Others examples are halleck to grant/Buel etc, s Foote makes these points in his acount.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
Last edited by ole; 06-21-2008 at 01:05 PM.
Reason: Avoiding a dustup.
McPherson in his work on Antietam covers this kind of thing with many a quite but concludes Mac was not guilty of anything, for cmaparison ill paste a few pages in for you to read over.
Before Lincoln turned to Grant, he placed his faith in McClellan. While McClellan excelled at creating a viable army from a diffuse collection of forces, he failed at harnessing that army to its best advantage. McClellan faced Lee in Virginia during the Peninsular Campaign in the spring of 1862, where the Confederate quickly took McClellan's measure as a man and a general. Sadly for his reputation, McClellan had a penchant for overstatement and megalomania, not to mention bouts of projection straight out of a Freud 101 textbook -- his opinion of Lee, for example: "Cautious and weak under grave responsibility ... likely to be timid and irresolute in action." As McPherson points out, "A psychiatrist could make much of this statement, for it really described McClellan himself. It could not have been more wrong as a description of Lee."
Sadly for the country, McClellan had a paranoiac's willingness to grossly overinflate Confederate strength and to treat criticism as conspiracy, which generally rendered him inert even when he enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority over rebel armies. Such would be the case at Antietam, when he let slip several chances to end the war in a single day. Think of the thousands of lives that might have been saved, had McClellan acted, rather than procrastinated! After months of frustration, Lincoln would relieve the general in November 1862. The president famously likened spurring McClellan to fight to trying to "bore with an augur too dull to take hold."
Such would be the case at Antietam, when he let slip several chances to end the war in a single day.
Someone observed some time ago on another thread that McClellan's problem was that "he fought not to win, but to not lose."
I'm anxious to see where McPherson claimed that McClellan did nothing wrong at Antietam. Nevermind. On re-reading the statement, I see that in was in his book on Antietam that he said McC did nothing wrong in his response to Pope's pridicament. Somethings need to be read twice, or thrice to see what is meant.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
"Remember, General, I command the last reserve of the last Army of the Republic."
I think we can blame Porter for that one Ole!
Has a very foreboding ring to it. If my subordinate said something like that to me, it would give me pause too.....Plus he had Burnside stumbling over minor bodies of water!
Before Lincoln turned to Grant, he placed his faith in McClellan. While McClellan excelled at creating a viable army from a diffuse collection of forces, he failed at harnessing that army to its best advantage.
During the period of Mac control the AoP caused more CSA than any other time. Hardly fits your picture, what is more he invariable found that trhe CSA attacked him in posistions of strength, repeatidly, another mark not of using your forces to best advantage, but the opposite.
Quote:
McClellan faced Lee in Virginia during the Peninsular Campaign in the spring of 1862, where the Confederate quickly took McClellan's measure as a man and a general.
Yes that where Lee and l-Street co9mment that Mac was the only union commander that worried them, lets look at what lee etc did to Pope, Burnside and hooker, under whom the AoP was thrashed, compared to the damage to the ANV Mac inflicted.
Quote:
Sadly for his reputation, McClellan had a penchant for overstatement and megalomania, not to mention bouts of projection straight out of a Freud 101 textbook -- his opinion of Lee, for example: "Cautious and weak under grave responsibility ... likely to be timid and irresolute in action." As McPherson points out, "A psychiatrist could make much of this statement, for it really described McClellan himself. It could not have been more wrong as a description of Lee."
Indeed, Mac read lee wrong.
Quote:
Sadly for the country, McClellan had a paranoiac's willingness to grossly overinflate Confederate strength and to treat criticism as conspiracy, which generally rendered him inert even when he enjoyed overwhelming numerical superiority over rebel armies.
He was a target of a conspircay, or rather a number of them, which kinda makes a handy excuse for him. By inerert you mean he acted when he wanted, not when the politicians wanted him to do so right?.
Quote:
Such would be the case at Antietam, when he let slip several chances to end the war in a single day.
No one ever had that oportunity in that war, it was simply beyond the limits of the time to do so, the age of wars ending in a Cannae were gone, never to return.
Quote:
Think of the thousands of lives that might have been saved, had McClellan acted, rather than procrastinated!
Mac did act, here and elswhere, had he not been starved of rienforcement in the Penn, and had his flank stripped of units on the eve of setting out, he may well have ended the war as excepted he would do so, but politics or a conspircay to prevent him from doing so, stopped that. It was at Antietam that Mac/lee lost the highest hourly rate of casulaties of the war, and was the high mark of CSA efforts to end the war, here, not G-Burg.
Quote:
After months of frustration, Lincoln would relieve the general in November 1862. The president famously likened spurring McClellan to fight to trying to "bore with an augur too dull to take hold."
Licoln had chosen to remove him some months before and was casting around for a replacement, B-Side refusing on grounds of his own incomptence to commnad, but Lincoln ordered him to take command, just like lincoln orchestrated the efforts to take out jackson in the valley and made clear to all he was simply not up to the job, much like B-side was to show, Pope and hooker were to show, and Meade ( with 50k losses) got to the same posistion that Mac got, and ended teh war from teh same popsostion and siege that Mac hads set up to end the war.
You want lives saved in war?, leave it to the mil and dont let politicians take over and attempt to direct ops, Mac was better at inflicting losses and minimising his own that any other union commander, his problem was he was fighting to save the union, not advance repulican party wishes.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
Someone observed some time ago on another thread that McClellan's problem was that "he fought not to win, but to not lose."
One of the first things you are taught at Mil academys, is that you must not lose, win if you can, but you must not lose, this maxim is as old as you can get.
To Mac a siege was a sure thing, ie the end result wasa given, it was only the time taken that was an issue, and a siege effected less loss of life in general, and since he wanted to reunite the states in union, this wasa high priority, to make post conflict attitudes easier, he did not want a war that would see 25% of CDSA males as casulaties because tht would breed a generation of hatred. Claswitz was not widely read, but Mac was one who had and knew that when you goto war, you must understand what it is you want/expect to achieve from the use of force, in this he was com-letly at odds with Abe/Grant who saw each problem as seperate and to be solved one after another, rather than the whole problem solved together, ie the mil conflict was one problem, the problems this threw up were another problem to be solved later, as oposed to solving it all at one time by taking into acount the cause and effect on what was ment to be the goal.
Quote:
I'm anxious to see where McPherson claimed that McClellan did nothing wrong at Antietam. Nevermind. On re-reading the statement, I see that in was in his book on Antietam that he said McC did nothing wrong in his response to Pope's pridicament. Somethings need to be read twice, or thrice to see what is meant.
ole
Ill post where Mac predicts Popes defeat, well in advance of any measure anyone takes, on Thurs as it may intrest you to see the sequence of predictions, actual measures taken, comments of i told you so!, now they will turn to me to save them and so on.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
No, Hanny. McClellan dictated the messages to his wife first, which is why they were sent first.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Hanny
mil traffic and civilian traffic are subject to different modes of operation, its not when they sent, its when they get there that counts.
Linoln removes Mac, sends it by telegraph, its in the papers with 24 hours, friends of Mac read it and make him aware of it, 24 more hours pass and he gets the telgraph, just as he lost Blenkers formation when Lincoln ordered it directly and sent Mac the orders and an explanation, which he got 72 hours after the event, just as Mac lost 40k of troop on the eve of setting out for the penninsula camapign, and got the news of teh closeing of the recruitment offices which he had arranged to feed existing formations with, all occuring 24-72 hours after thevent.
Others examples are halleck to grant/Buel etc, s Foote makes these points in his acount.
Yes, I understand all that. Once again, McClellan dictated the messages to his wife first, which is why they were sent first. The point is not the mechanics of traffic over the military telegraph. It is McClellan's personal priorities, which clearly show he put informing his superiors in second place. You post as if you have military experience: what would your military traditions say about a commander who acted that way?
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
One of the first things you are taught at Mil academys, is that you must not lose, win if you can, but you must not lose, this maxim is as old as you can get.
To Mac a siege was a sure thing, ie the end result wasa given, it was only the time taken that was an issue, and a siege effected less loss of life in general, and since he wanted to reunite the states in union, this wasa high priority, to make post conflict attitudes easier, he did not want a war that would see 25% of CDSA males as casulaties because tht would breed a generation of hatred. Claswitz was not widely read, but Mac was one who had and knew that when you goto war, you must understand what it is you want/expect to achieve from the use of force, in this he was com-letly at odds with Abe/Grant who saw each problem as seperate and to be solved one after another, rather than the whole problem solved together, ie the mil conflict was one problem, the problems this threw up were another problem to be solved later, as oposed to solving it all at one time by taking into acount the cause and effect on what was ment to be the goal.
Grant saw himself as subordinate to the President and government. McClellan had trouble with the concept.
In the US tradition, generals do not make policy -- yet you are describing McClellan as doing so.
Lincoln's actions are completely contradictory to your description of them.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Grant saw himself as subordinate to the President and government. McClellan had trouble with the concept.
You don't think McClellan at least respected the chain of command. I think the problem was McClellan not particularly liking his superiors than any lack of respect for the fact that they were his superiors.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
