Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
'...he acuratly predicted what would happen to Pope'
But doesn't that, in essence, become a self-fulfilling prophecy?
Stephen Sears writes in his biography of McClellan about an exchange of messages on Aug. 29, 1862:
"In midafternoon President Lincoln, following events at the War department telegraph office, wired McClellan for the latest news of the fighting. In his reply, McClellan was blunt. Reports from the front were unreliable, but he was clear enough as to the choice that must be made: '1st To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope — 2nd, To leave Pope get out of his scape & at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer...It will not do to delay longer.' In fact, that choice had been made two days earlier, when Halleck first ordered him to send out Franklin's corps; McClellan's telegram was simply his latest attempt to overturn the decision. He wrote Ellen a few minutes later, 'Two of my Corps will either save that fool Pope or be sacrificed for the country...I am heart sick with the folly & ignorance I see around me.'..."
In the line that I italicized, Sears said that it was a favorite figure of speech that McClellan used and mostly without malice. But that's not how Lincoln interpreted the telegram: "He said it really seemed to him that McC. wanted Pope defeated,' John Hay wrote in his diary. I don't think Lincoln could have taken it any other way.
Sears offers his own opinion on the matter:
"It is too much to say (as his detractors later said) that George McClellan was deliberately conspiring to have the Army of Virginia beaten at Bull Run, if for no other reason than his strong sense of feeling for the men of his own army fighting on that field. What can be said, however, is that his bruised sensibilities and his unreasoning contempt for Pope convinced him that general (Pope) would be — and deserved to be — defeated. Nor can it be doubted that he (McClellan) would have acted for more vigorously at Alexandria had one of his favorites, such as Fitz John Porter, commanded the Army of Virginia. Instead, the captive of his delusions, he put his own interests and his messianic vision ahead of doing everything possible to push reinforcements to the battlefield."
'...he acuratly predicted what would happen to Pope'
But doesn't that, in essence, become a self-fulfilling prophecy?
Stephen Sears writes in his biography of McClellan about an exchange of messages on Aug. 29, 1862:
"In midafternoon President Lincoln, following events at the War department telegraph office, wired McClellan for the latest news of the fighting. In his reply, McClellan was blunt. Reports from the front were unreliable, but he was clear enough as to the choice that must be made: '1st To concentrate all our available forces to open communication with Pope — 2nd, To leave Pope get out of his scape & at once use all our means to make the Capital perfectly safe. No middle course will now answer...It will not do to delay longer.' In fact, that choice had been made two days earlier, when Halleck first ordered him to send out Franklin's corps; McClellan's telegram was simply his latest attempt to overturn the decision. He wrote Ellen a few minutes later, 'Two of my Corps will either save that fool Pope or be sacrificed for the country...I am heart sick with the folly & ignorance I see around me.'..."
In the line that I italicized, Sears said that it was a favorite figure of speech that McClellan used and mostly without malice. But that's not how Lincoln interpreted the telegram: "He said it really seemed to him that McC. wanted Pope defeated,' John Hay wrote in his diary. I don't think Lincoln could have taken it any other way.
Sears offers his own opinion on the matter:
"It is too much to say (as his detractors later said) that George McClellan was deliberately conspiring to have the Army of Virginia beaten at Bull Run, if for no other reason than his strong sense of feeling for the men of his own army fighting on that field. What can be said, however, is that his bruised sensibilities and his unreasoning contempt for Pope convinced him that general (Pope) would be — and deserved to be — defeated. Nor can it be doubted that he (McClellan) would have acted for more vigorously at Alexandria had one of his favorites, such as Fitz John Porter, commanded the Army of Virginia. Instead, the captive of his delusions, he put his own interests and his messianic vision ahead of doing everything possible to push reinforcements to the battlefield."
In case anyone ever wants to figure out McClellan's sense of priorities, they only have to look at his telegraph records. During the fighting on the Peninsula in 1862, he would telegraph his wife with news of the battle before he telegraphed his superiors in Washington. While I can understand a man's desire to tell his wife he was alive and still kicking, this is improper behavior for the commanding general of an army. (Some might say use of the military telegraph for communications with his wife was, in itself, improper.)
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
Your anti Mac, and distort his comments, he acuratly predicted what would happen to Pope, and his own return to command and save the Union, Lincoln would actually ask Mac to save the Union when what Mac predicted came to pass, no wonder he thought as he did.
No, I think McClellan was a man promoted beyond his capacity, a brave soldier insofar as physical courage went. He had a good grasp of the technical details of his profession and inspired his men when they needed it. He simply was not suited to command a large army in the field and made lots of bad choices.
For example, during the last 2 days of the Seven Days battles in 1862, McClellan managed to be 5-10 miles away from the scene of battle. On the day of Malvern Hill, he was onboard the ironclad Galena, 5-10 miles off down the river, searching for a site to make his new base. On both days, Fitz-John Porter ran the battle. So what you have is McClellan deliberately choosing to be absent from the field of battle to do work that would normally be delegated to a staff officer. Bad choices.
He deliberately inflated interlligence reports (increasing the overblown numbers Pinkterton gave him). He blamed his superiors for every problem (nothing was ever McClellan's fault). He moved very, very slowly (to be charitable); or he deliberately moved so slowly his troops could not reach Pope in time to help him. The attitude he expresses in private letters, in campside conversation, and in official communications is that of an officer who can, at best, be called a "bad comrade" for a fellow commander. If you don't think the complaints about his lack of support for Pope, pay attention to the complaints of his subordinate Rosecrans in 1861 instead, or the hatchet job McClellan did on his commanding officer, Scott a little later in 1861.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
geneva convention pre dates the 1863 lieber code, it helps to actual know what yopur posting about sonny. Double-check your dates on the real Geneva Convention.
Your mistake here is to type in first geneva convention and look at what wikki tells you is its date, the geneva conventions were in place and used before Lieber, but as wikki describes achieved a large ratification at a later date.
Hanny,
1) the "Lieber Code" is issued as General Order #100 on April 24, 1863 in the United States.
2) the First International Conference (of what we call the Red Cross) convenes in October of 1863 in Switzerland. Representatives of 14 nations attend. A list of ten resolutions is produced, but has no authority of law or treaty. The resolutions are to be considered by the representatives governments for later action. In the deliberations of the conference, the delegates study the "Lieber Code" that had been issued several months before.
3) a diplomatic conference is convened in August and the First Geneva Convention is adopted by 16 nations on August 22, 1864.
This seems to refute your claim. If you think not, please post a specific list of events and dates when whatever you are referring to was adopted by treaty or law.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Yes, I know and agree with you. Hanny seems to be claiming something else. I'd like to see if he actually has something verifiable in mind, but I doubt he does.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
'...he acuratly predicted what would happen to Pope'
But doesn't that, in essence, become a self-fulfilling prophecy?
There is an element of that, but after Pope gave his speach about LOS and lines of retreat not being necesarry etc, Mac made his prediction on what that would entail when Lee got hold of him, its work noteing that Pope could not even recogohnise L-street was on his flank and was ordering a corps to expose istelf to a rolling enfaliade, had the corps commander cashierd to boot, and post war finaly vindicated. Or to put it another way, Pope when writing that he expected no help from Mac, got no help from Mac, and coments about one officer about another are common, just as are politcal comments by cabinet members on POTUS, all thought him incompetent and wanted his job and thought they could do better.
McPherson in his work on Antietam covers this kind of thing with many a quite but concludes Mac was not guilty of anything, for cmaparison ill paste a few pages in for you to read over.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
In case anyone ever wants to figure out McClellan's sense of priorities, they only have to look at his telegraph records. During the fighting on the Peninsula in 1862, he would telegraph his wife with news of the battle before he telegraphed his superiors in Washington. While I can understand a man's desire to tell his wife he was alive and still kicking, this is improper behavior for the commanding general of an army. (Some might say use of the military telegraph for communications with his wife was, in itself, improper.)
Tim
Er Mil comms were encryted before dispatch, private correspondence was not, so that expalian the why telgraph mesaages to his wife clear before mil ones did.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
No, I think McClellan was a man promoted beyond his capacity, a brave soldier insofar as physical courage went. He had a good grasp of the technical details of his profession and inspired his men when they needed it. He simply was not suited to command a large army in the field and made lots of bad choices.
And yet put more more CSA men out of action than anyone else could manage, from a CSA Army larger than anyone else ever faced.
Quote:
For example, during the last 2 days of the Seven Days battles in 1862, McClellan managed to be 5-10 miles away from the scene of battle. On the day of Malvern Hill, he was onboard the ironclad Galena, 5-10 miles off down the river, searching for a site to make his new base. On both days, Fitz-John Porter ran the battle. So what you have is McClellan deliberately choosing to be absent from the field of battle to do work that would normally be delegated to a staff officer. Bad choices.
If your going to start makeing comments without putting comparisons, you points not going to be made, Grant was where when his Army was overun?.
Quote:
He deliberately inflated interlligence reports (increasing the overblown numbers Pinkterton gave him). He blamed his superiors for every problem (nothing was ever McClellan's fault). He moved very, very slowly (to be charitable); or he deliberately moved so slowly his troops could not reach Pope in time to help him. The attitude he expresses in private letters, in campside conversation, and in official communications is that of an officer who can, at best, be called a "bad comrade" for a fellow commander. If you don't think the complaints about his lack of support for Pope, pay attention to the complaints of his subordinate Rosecrans in 1861 instead, or the hatchet job McClellan did on his commanding officer, Scott a little later in 1861.
Tim
Thats Mac who replaces Scott, who madea very public comment on what he thought of Mac, not a personal letter, but made in public, amnd it was Mac who replaced Scott, and since no one else was signiofictly better at estimating CSA strength, the often used comment also has no actual relavence because no one else was doing it better. AOTP was actually very fast moveing under Mac, but again why let facts get in teh way of bias.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
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