Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
It would be a case of "What If" again however, if there was the heavy hand of the Government and or Military Discipline; many of those to whom began to squirrel away/steal US Government property; be hunted down and caught--tried, and--if Military Justice was in jurisdiction, e.g. military personnel ... firing squads could have wiped out many a 'Confederate General' to be -- to include General Robert E. Lee, Longstreet, Hood, Gregg, Beauregard, Johnson, T. "Stonewall" Jackson, Bragg, etc.
I do believe it would have been a much different 'Civil War' if the career Army officers and men remained.
Could these future CSA Officers face death before the rebellion got to the stage of departing from the Union? [Smiles]
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
Would you (or anyone) have some tangible events that you could ellaborate on where you think Fillmore should have acted more like a Jackson, or maybe a Washington?
Cedarstripper
In the what I have read these three Presidents avoid such event that would cause them to draw a line in the sand on the issue of slavery -Vs- preserving the union.
These guys would rather move the line then have a confrontation with the Southern Slavers.
A big issue in the 1850's was Cuba but it was over expanding slavery but not about secession.
These three Presidents detested the Abolitionist and had sympathy of the slave owners and again none of these guys were from southern states.
Peirce had an opportunity in Kansas like sending troops forcing the locals to support his "popular sovereignty" instead of killing each other. Peirce, it seems he mishandle this issue too.
These guys seemed to ignore the northern sentiment on the issue of slavery...
It seems to them avoiding conflict or confrontation was always the goal not resolving the issue.
Come down to poor Leadership....Hind sight is wonderful!
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Confining myself to poor Millard Fillmore, I think the assertion is plainly wrong. I recently posted the following:
Was the Compromise of 1850 a Good Thing or a Bad Thing?
In defending Millard Fillmore’s performance in helping to engineer the Compromise of 1850, I have encountered flack on several occasions. The objections do not focus on Millard or the efficacy of his efforts. Rather, the complaints are, in effect, that the Compromise was a Bad Thing, not a Good Thing; therefore, Fillmore should be blamed, rather than praised, for his actions.
The proposition that the Compromise was a Bad Thing, in turn, appears to rest upon two assertions. First, if the North had held firm, and not appeased the South, the South would have capitulated. There would have been no war, and indeed, a firm, uncompromising position might have utterly discredited the proto-secessionists, eliminating the threat of war in the future. In short, if the North had not caved, not only would there have been no war in 1850-51, there might have been no war in 1860-61, or ever.
The second sub-assertion is that, even if war would have resulted, well, that was a risk worth taking. The North defeated the South when the South foolishly seceded in 1860-61, and the North would have won if the crisis had come to blows ten years earlier.
Both of these are, in effect, “what if” questions, and as such not susceptible of definitive response. Nonetheless, I’m in the midst of rereading David M. Potter’s The Impending Crisis, and I’m sure that I can do no better that he in discussing these issues. (Also, I’m sure that Professor Potter’s opinions are far more persuasive than mine.) So here, brief, is Professor Potter.
On the first sub-issue, Professor Potter clearly believes that, if the Compromise had not been reached, war would likely have resulted. Professor Potter noted, with apparent sympathy, that “Daniel Webster was not alone in believing that ‘if General Taylor had lived, we should have had civil war.’” Several pages later, he made his position clear (emphasis added):
"No historian can declare with certitude [whether war would have resulted if the North had held firm]. What then can he say? He can say that in 1832 and again in 1861, people also faced crises in which some thought the danger of disunion was exaggerated, that it would die down if firmly handled and not encouraged by 'appeasement.' In 1832 this proved at least partially right, though concessions were certainly made; in 1861, it turned out to be wrong. Were the dangers of 1850 more like those of 1832 or of 1861? In my opinion, the evidence, on balance, indicates that by 1850 southern resistance to the free-soil position was so strong and widespread that if the Union were to be preserved, the South had either to be conciliated or to be coerced. It is true that disunionists in the South began to lose ground to the southern moderates long before the Compromise was enacted, but I believe this was because compromise was confidently expected and the South distinctly preferred compromise to disunion."
On the second sub-issue, Professor Potter is more equivocal, but he clearly has doubts as to whether the Union would have prevailed in a military conflict in 1850-51:
"If [Zachary Taylor] was wrong, his policy would have forced the North to face the supreme test of war for the Union before it had attained the preponderance of strength, or the technological sinews, or the conviction of national unity which enabled it to win the war that finally came in 1861.
* * *
"[T]he decade of delay was also a decade of growth in physical strength, cohesiveness, and technological resources which enabled the Union to face the supreme challenge far more effectively."
More fundamentally, Professor Potter points out that that, when war ultimately came, it was the concept of Union that bound the North together. He doubts whether an uncompromising stance in 1850, which sacrificed Union before all other options had been exhausted, would not have been fatal to the North – and to the goal of ultimate abolition:
"Even as for antislavery, it is difficult to see that the Compromise ultimately served the purpose of the antislavery idealists less well than it served those who cared primarily for peace and union, though it is easy to see why antislavery men found the medicine more distasteful. If, as Lincoln believed, the cause of freedom was linked with the cause of Union, a policy which dealt recklessly with the destiny of the Union could hardly have promoted the cause of freedom."
The Compromise of 1850 was a bad thing as you put it. In that moment of history it may have keep the union together to only plants the seeds of dissolution for later.
It is like the treaty of Versailles that ended WWI just to plant the seeds of WWII later.
If The Compromise of 1850, was just about how to divide the lands out west and ending the slave trade in Washington D.C., It would have been a good thing.
It was the Fugitive Slave Act part that makes the Compromise of 1850 a bad thing. This one law radicalised the North against slavery.
The Fugitive Slave law embolden the Abolishion moment.
The Fugitive Slave law invaded all parts of Northern society driving many people into the anti-slavery moment. Who wouldn't have other wise.
The Fugitive Slave law was like forcing Southern slavery values on the Northern people.
The Compromise Of 1850 with the attached Fugitive Slave Act radicalised the North against slavery as much as the south was radicalised for slavery. In ten years with both sides radicalised an unwilling to find a compromise anymore the only choices left was either dissolution or slavery had to go.
If you look at it the Compromise of 1850 with that one attachment ignites the fuse of our Civil War in the 1860's.
The radicalisation of the North is what led to the Civil War and the three Presidents and congress of the 1850's did not realize it. Their only concern was to appease the Southern Salve interest and ignoring Northern anger....
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
Obviously, I agree that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was a Bad Thing. If I'd been a legislator in 1850, I would have voted against it, or at least skulked in the hallways while that vote was taken (which is what many northern legilators did).
But I stand by my post: from a long-term, strategic standpoint, it was probably a Good Thing that the Compromise passed, because it is more likely than not that, otherwise, (a) a number of southern states would have seceded, and (b) the North would have been unwilling or unable to force them to return.
Jackson had serious doubts about making any concessions to the nullifiers. In hindsight he felt he should have told them to take it or leave it with the tariff and used the Force Bill to put down any nonsense by Calhoun and company. I think Jackson was right, but I also think he was not the same man who saved New Orleans and defeated the Creek and Seminoles. As Washington had to lead an army during the Whiskey Rebellion Jackson could settle for the nullifiers backing down over secession. If they had ever attempted it I am confident Jackson would have crushed them.
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"Those who forget to remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.
But I stand by my post: from a long-term, strategic standpoint, it was probably a Good Thing that the Compromise passed, because it is more likely than not that, otherwise, (a) a number of southern states would have seceded, and (b) the North would have been unwilling or unable to force them to return.
I think the Compromise of 1850 without the Fugitive Slave act would have done on harm, resolve the issue of the day but not resolve bigger problem of slavery and westward expansion.
I argue that Compromise of 1850 along with Fugitive Slave Act was a good thing not because it adverted secession and preserve the union.
The Compromise of 1850 was a good thing because it force the people of the Northern states to face up to slavery and take a position on it.
The Compromise of 1850 consolidates Northern opinion and made the people of the Northern states to come to a consensus on Slavery.
I can argue the the Compromise of 1850 unified the Northern States around anti-Slavery with this unification prepared them to fight the our Civil War as one nation.
The Compromise of 1850 was the KEY STONE of the Civil War.
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"States Rights are about States Wrongs" - Jesse Jackson
We need to remember that the nation was still getting used to the idea of democratic procedure. (I'm not sure that we are now all that comfortable with it.) The lack of foresight that 5fish bemoans is with us today. A hundred years from now, a forum of geeks will be wondering, "What were they thinking?"
ole
Ole, I like what you said here, because it is what I think is a key to the whole issue. If one wants be to really generic, you can divide United States history into two categories: before the Civil War and after the Civil War. This is, in fact, what most history classes do. But it is really, I think, a great idea, because the two periods are quite different.
The antebellum United States was still a nation politically trying to define itself. The government formed by the founders was one that had never been attempted before and was wholly different from anything else previous. The question still remained to be answered who had more power: the people, the states, these two combined, or the national government. It can be said that prior to the Civil War, the States had a far greater amount of say, than after. The national government became much more powerful after the war and has remained that way ever since. States still have rights, but they are far more defined, though there will always be issues pertaining to states rights.
But one issue that most likely faced all three of these presidents was states rights. And while I think that the presidents from Fillmore to Buchanan were practically failures, it isn't to say that things weren't done. You have the Compromise of 1850. The Compromise of 1820 isn't working anymore, so they try to revamp it a little bit. The issue of slavery in Kansas and popular sovereignty (power to the people!) becomes an issue, and the Kansas-Nebraska act is signed. The government was still trying, I think, to find that balance between national and state power to solve this issue. Buchanan I think is the worst of the three, because he basically did nothing to stop the final schism that split the nation. He left it all in Lincoln's lap, for him to solve. Much like Clinton did to Bush, I think. We had chances to destroy one of the most dastardly terrorists, and we didn't take them. Clinton leaves, Bush comes in, and we get 9/11.
But to reiterate my point, it isn't necessarily failed leadership, though they did a pretty bad job and are three of the unknowns to most Americans, but an example of the American system still trying to define itself and find that perfect balance between state and national they were so desperately looking for.
__________________ "The unity of government which constitutes you one people is also now dear to you. It is justly so, for it is a main pillar in the edifice of your real independence, the support of your tranquility at home, your peace abroad; of your safety; of your prosperity; of that very liberty which you so highly prize." George Washington, Farewell Address, 1796
It was faulty leadersyhip of those Presidents that led directly to the Civil War. The mistakes of one fed into the mistakes of the others.
The basic problem, was the lack of political acumen and personalizing their administrations, to the detriment of the nation as a whole. They saw their administrations as the fount of eventual reconcilliation of the increasingly sectionalized polity of the country. When, in fact, they were actively trying to lead the United States against the their time. The march of western civilizations (or drift, if you will) Including the majority of the states and citizens of the U.S.A was towards increasing freedom. But the president's were looking to the past and trying to salve southern slave owners worries over the future of slavery, by trying to find ways to project (by protecting) slavery into the forseeeable future.
In retrospect, it is now obvious that to assuage the very real fears of one section without exciting the very real fears of the others. There was no middle ground, as Lincoln realized, when he gave voice to the truth that A house divided could not statnd.
Many people always like to think that Lincoln was a middle of the roader concerning slavery, he was not, he was on one of the extremes, Slavery must be extinquished. He was middle of the road only as to the means slavery was to be extinquished.
Neither were Lincoln's predecessors really middle of the roaders, they detested abolition (the wave of the future) and favored southern interests over national interests (the ebb tide) as an impossible panacea, for solving an increasingly virulent action-reaction division of America's society caused by slavery.
Lincoln's predecessorts bear a considerable load of the ultimate responsibility for the actions that led directly to war. They looked to the past rather than the future.
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