Congressional Debate on Secession.

[unionblue]

To All,

In a previous post, friend Hanny made the following statement.

"Webster and Hayne in Congress fought out the nullification and secession issue, Hayne won IMO with his Jan. 1830 retort, Congress approved the right of secession as a right by vote,..."

Fellow board members, it is the last part of Hanny's quote that has my interest.

If Congress had already approved the concept of secession, what was all the fuss about in 1861?

I invite all to comment and to bring along any sites or sources that prove or disprove this statement.

Now, I myself am well aware of the debate in the United States Senate on the Compromise of 1850. But I am not too up on the period Hanny has quoted above.

Hopefully, we will open up a new line of research here.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[OpnDownfall]

It is only Hanny's opinion, based on nothing except his already settled opinion that nullification and secession were legal (based apparently, on English Law, because James I, granted the colonies the right to secede from the crown and parliament.)
Hayne, was Calhoun's stalking horse in Congress, trying to gain acceptance of his 'nullification' theory.
IMO, the significance of the debate, was it pretty well shows that SC viewed nullification as a defense for slavery (whatever the disclaimers of Calhoun).

[Hanny]

Originally Posted by unionblue

To All,

In a previous post, friend Hanny made the following statement.



Fellow board members, it is the last part of Hanny's quote that has my interest.

If Congress had already approved the concept of secession, what was all the fuss about in 1861?

I invite all to comment and to bring along any sites or sources that prove or disprove this statement.

Now, I myself am well aware of the debate in the United States Senate on the Compromise of 1850. But I am not too up on the period Hanny has quoted above.

Hopefully, we will open up a new line of research here.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

Hayne v Foot, pasaes to hayne v Webster, passes to calhoun V webtser. Webster a lige long beloiever in the Union is a single sovriegnty, hops ship and becomes astste righer after corespondence with Madison, argument wioth Calhoun, and Congress votes up calahouns resolutions i mentioned. Webster spends the rest of his life strengtthenming the FSA to deny any breach of comapact and allow a secesion based onm breach of compact.,


it starts with a proposed resolution y Foot on Dec 29, 1829 reply to by Hayne in Jan 19 30 and contiunes through Jan as debate in congress gets into if secesion is ok, looks the hartford Vonvenmtion, the nature of the Union, is it a single sovriegnty, or many eqaul sovrioegntys. Hayne wins. Moves on to Calhoun and webster, and congresss votes up calhouns resolution that the Union is seperate sovriegns etc as i mention.

this is all factual history and you can look it up for your self, Congess in the 1830 acepted the right of secesion, based on the Union being composed of a compact of seperate sovriegns, its only the with rise of the republican party that secesion is wrong even occurs.

Haynes best retort.

"Sir, I will put the case home to the gentleman. Is there any violation
ofthe constitutional rights of the States, and the liberties of citizens,
which, if sanctioned by Congress and the Supreme Court, he
would believe to be the right and duty of a State to resist? Does he
contend for the doctrine of passive obedience and non-resistance?
Wouldhe justify an open resistance to an act of Congress, sanctioned
by the courts, which would abolish trial by jury, or destroy freedom
of religion, or freedom of the press? Yes, sir, he would advocate
resistance in such case, and so would I, and so would all of us. But
such resistance would, according to his doctrine, be revolution: it
would be rebellion. According to my opinion, it would be just, legal,
and constitutional resistance.

Calhoun offered a set of resolutions in the Senate on January 22, 1833, of
which the first two read,
"Resolved, That the people of the several States, composing these
United States, are united as parties to a constitutional compact, to
which the people of each State acceded as a separate sovereign community,
each binding itself by its own particular ratification, and that
the Union, of which the said compact is the bond, is between the
States ratifying the same; and
"Resolved, That the people of the several States, thus united by the
constitutional compact, in forming that instrument, and in creating a
general government to carry into effect the objects for which they were
formed, delegated to that government, for that purpose, certain definite
powers, to be exercised jointly, reserving, at the same time, each State
to itself, the residuary mass of powers to be exercised by it own separate
government; and that, whenever the general government assumes
the exercise of powers not delegated by the compact, its acts are unauthorized,
and are of no effect; and that the same government is not
made the final judge of the powers delegated to it, since that would
make its discretion, and not the constitution, the measure of its powers;
but that, as in all other cases of compact among sovereign parties,
without any common judge, each has an equal right to judge for itself,
as well of the infraction as of the mode and measure of redress.,,42
Here laid out was classical Jeffersonian theory in the Kentul
Resolutions of 1798 and 1799, which gave legitimacy to the ordinance
nullification passed by the South Carolina Convention on November
1832. In the sense ofthese resolutions, a State was to be understood as
people thereof in convention, being its sovereign power.
It is in respect to sovereignty, consisting of the power to make:
unmake constitutions and governments, as distinguished from the distril
tion of the powers of regular governance from day to day, that the Un
was built to rest entirely upon a constitutional compact between the se,
al States, that the several States had the right to adjudge infractions of f
damentallaw by the Union, and that the several States were not subjec
the authority of the legislative, executive, or judicial power of the UniO1
It was not the legislatures ofthe several States which had a right to r
lify acts of, and secede from the Union. The public corporations and p
lie officers of the republican governments in the several States wen
substantial degree subject to the legislative, judicial, and executive po'
of the Union.
Be it so, yet the people in convention in and of each of the several S1:<
remained ever sovereign, and, therefore, could not be commanded by i
Federal government or any department thereof on any pretext whate~
This Federal government was only a public corporation with a republi~
form of government, a mere creature of the sovereign powers of the se~
al States. The Federal government embodied and had power over the Unii
but was a mere instrument of the people in each of the several States. A
such was John Calhoun's message to the President of the United Sta1
Daniel Webster answered in the Senate on February 16, 1833:
"The constitution does not provide for events which must be preceded
by its own destruction. Secession, therefore, since it must bring
these consequenceswith it, is revolutionary,and nullification is equally
revolutionary.What is revolution?Why, sir, that is revolutionwhich
overturns or controls or successfullyresists the existing public authori.
ty, thdat which arrests the exerchise .of ,t,h43e supreme power, that which
mtro uces a new paramount aut onty.
The Senator from Massachusetts was awakening to the meaning,!
events. The constitution of England certainly provided for revolution, I
the principles were put into action in 1688 and 1689 when James 11'
pushed off the throne, and as William and Mary were invited to sit u]
it. Yes, the occasion was revolutionary, and it was also lawful, peacea
bloodless, orderly, necessary, beneficial, and glorious.
210 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF SECESSION
And likewise the United States Constitution, as it was given to posterity
by its framers, certainly provided for such revolution, taking the forms of
nullification and secession.The underlying principles were put into action
in 1832 and 1833,as Calhoun and Clay restored proper order to the Union.
Meanwhile, in the Senate, Webster answered Calhoun with his own
thesis:
"1. That the constitution is not a league, confederacy, or compact,
between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacities,
but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and
creating direct relations between itself and individuals.
"2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these relations;
that nothing can dissolve them but revolution; and that, consequently,
there can be no such thing as secession without revolution.
"3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of one constitution ofthe
United States, and acts of Congress, passed in pursuance of it, and
treaties; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the character of a
suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally interpret the
supreme law, so often as it has occasion to pass acts oflegislation; and,
in cases capable of assuming and actually assuming the character of a
suit, the supreme court of the United States is the final interpreter.
"4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify an act
of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the ground
that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct usurpation
on the just powers of the general government, and on the equal
rights of other States, a plain violation of the constitution, and a proceeding
essentially revolutionary in its character and tendency.,,44
Webster stipulated that the whole dispute, with its many minute ramifications,
reduced in the end to but one question: - whether, as his adversary
maintained, the constitution of the Union was a compact between the
peoples of the several States, each acting in her sovereign capacity, and
retaining her sovereign attributes, or, on the other hand, as he maintained,
an irrevocable charter of permanent government for a single and unified
whole consisting of one people of the United States and considered as an
indivisible Nation. Calhoun agreed that the whole debate revolved around
this sole issue.
Webster stipulated that the constitution of the Union was ratified by
conventions of the people in the several States, the same as the constitution
in each State was framed by a convention of the people such State in
j
The Nullification Crisis 211
convention. He had no choice but to acknowledge this much, for this fact
is not only known to everyone who has personally studied the details, but
is expressly announced in Article VII of the United States Constitution.
Webster then grounded and rested his entire case by saying, "The constitution,
sir, is not a contract, but the result of a contract." He went on to
explain,
"We say habitually that one house proposes a bill, and the other
agrees to it, but the result of this agreement is not a compact but a law.
The law,the statute, is not the agreement, but something createdby the
agreement, - something which, when created, has a new character,
and acts by its own authority.So the constitution of the United States,
founded in or on the consent of the people, may be said to rest on compact
or consent, even if it is not itself the compact, but its result. When
the people agree to erect a government,and actually erect it, the thing
is done, and the agreement is at an end. The compact is executed,and
the end designated by it attained. Henceforth, the fruit of the agreement
exists, but the agreement itself is merged in its own accomplishment.
There can be no longer a subsisting agreement or compact to
form a constitution or government, after that constitution or government
has been actually formed or established.,,45
If this notion held for the Union, it held even more for every State.
Webster's principle was that the people gave their assent, whereupon the
government delineated in the constitution was established: the agreement
was consummated and merged into the resulting work of fundamental
law, which continued thereafter, and could not be changed save as
expressly provided in clauses for working amendments, nor could it be
dissolved except by extralegal means. On this theory Webster's whole
case against South Carolina was founded. Was his principk an authentic
portrait of the republican ideals of the American Revolution?
Rather t!Ian retrace again the whole tedious course of constitutional
formation in the early days of the United States, or review any part of the
many historical facts and legal authorities which were diligently canvassed
by Calhoun in his reply, it is sufficient to look at the seventh article
in the first part of the Massachusetts Constitution as adopted on
October 25, 1780, where it was ordained by the sovereign power of
Webster's own State, that "the people alone have an incontestable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government, and to reform,
alter, or totally change the same when their protection, safety, prosperity,
and happiness require it."And so also, in adopting the third article of their
Bill of Rights on June 12, 1776, the sovereign power of Virginia said that
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[Hanny]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

It is only Hanny's opinion, based on nothing except his already settled opinion that nullification and secession were legal (based apparently, on English Law, because James I, granted the colonies the right to secede from the crown and parliament.)
Hayne, was Calhoun's stalking horse in Congress, trying to gain acceptance of his 'nullification' theory.
IMO, the significance of the debate, was it pretty well shows that SC viewed nullification as a defense for slavery (whatever the disclaimers of Calhoun).

No its your own history, aparantly there are those like you unaware of it, since hayne spoke 3 years before on a completly different matter, its clear you dont know your own history at all.

[Hanny]

210 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF SECESSION

And likewise the United States Constitution, as it was given to posterity
by its framers, certainly provided for such revolution, taking the forms of
nullification and secession.The underlying principles were put into action
in 1832 and 1833,as Calhoun and Clay restored proper order to the Union.
Meanwhile, in the Senate, Webster answered Calhoun with his own
thesis:

"1. That the constitution is not a league, confederacy, or compact,
between the people of the several States in their sovereign capacities,
but a government proper, founded on the adoption of the people, and
creating direct relations between itself and individuals.

"2. That no State authority has power to dissolve these relations;
that nothing can dissolve them but revolution; and that, consequently,
there can be no such thing as secession without revolution.

"3. That there is a supreme law, consisting of one constitution ofthe
United States, and acts of Congress, passed in pursuance of it, and
treaties; and that, in cases not capable of assuming the character of a
suit in law or equity, Congress must judge of, and finally interpret the
supreme law, so often as it has occasion to pass acts oflegislation; and,
in cases capable of assuming and actually assuming the character of a
suit, the supreme court of the United States is the final interpreter.

"4. That an attempt by a State to abrogate, annul, or nullify an act
of Congress, or to arrest its operation within her limits, on the ground
that, in her opinion, such law is unconstitutional, is a direct usurpation
on the just powers of the general government, and on the equal
rights of other States, a plain violation of the constitution, and a proceeding
essentially revolutionary in its character and tendency.,,44

Webster stipulated that the whole dispute, with its many minute ramifications,
reduced in the end to but one question: - whether, as his adversary
maintained, the constitution of the Union was a compact between the
peoples of the several States, each acting in her sovereign capacity, and
retaining her sovereign attributes, or, on the other hand, as he maintained,
an irrevocable charter of permanent government for a single and unified
whole consisting of one people of the United States and considered as an
indivisible Nation. Calhoun agreed that the whole debate revolved around
this sole issue.
Webster stipulated that the constitution of the Union was ratified by
conventions of the people in the several States, the same as the constitution
in each State was framed by a convention of the people such State in

j

The Nullification Crisis

211
convention. He had no choice but to acknowledge this much, for this fact
is not only known to everyone who has personally studied the details, but
is expressly announced in Article VII of the United States Constitution.
Webster then grounded and rested his entire case by saying, "The constitution,
sir, is not a contract, but the result of a contract." He went on to
explain,
"We say habitually that one house proposes a bill, and the other
agrees to it, but the result of this agreement is not a compact but a law.
The law,the statute, is not the agreement, but something createdby the
agreement, - something which, when created, has a new character,
and acts by its own authority.So the constitution of the United States,
founded in or on the consent of the people, may be said to rest on compact
or consent, even if it is not itself the compact, but its result. When
the people agree to erect a government,and actually erect it, the thing
is done, and the agreement is at an end. The compact is executed,and
the end designated by it attained. Henceforth, the fruit of the agreement
exists, but the agreement itself is merged in its own accomplishment.
There can be no longer a subsisting agreement or compact to
form a constitution or government, after that constitution or government
has been actually formed or established.,,45

If this notion held for the Union, it held even more for every State.
Webster's principle was that the people gave their assent, whereupon the
government delineated in the constitution was established: the agreement
was consummated and merged into the resulting work of fundamental
law, which continued thereafter, and could not be changed save as
expressly provided in clauses for working amendments, nor could it be
dissolved except by extralegal means. On this theory Webster's whole
case against South Carolina was founded. Was his principk an authentic
portrait of the republican ideals of the American Revolution?
Rather t!Ian retrace again the whole tedious course of constitutional
formation in the early days of the United States, or review any part of the
many historical facts and legal authorities which were diligently canvassed
by Calhoun in his reply, it is sufficient to look at the seventh article
in the first part of the Massachusetts Constitution as adopted on
October 25, 1780, where it was ordained by the sovereign power of
Webster's own State, that "the people alone have an incontestable,
unalienable, and indefeasible right to institute government, and to reform,
alter, or totally change the same when their protection, safety, prosperity,
and happiness require it."And so also, in adopting the third article of their
Bill of Rights on June 12, 1776, the sovereign power of Virginia said that

\

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212 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF SECESSION
the people have "an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right to
reform, alter, or abolish" their government "in such manner as shall be
most conducive to the public weal." Such phrasing has always been as
American as the 4th of July.
The people of Massachusetts retained their attributes of sovereignty,
never alienated them to any government on earth, and nearly exercised
their omnipotence in 1815 in exactly the same way the people of South
Carolina had used their supreme authority in ,1832.The Union was created
by a compact made by the sovereign powers of the several States, And
each of those sovereign powers retained the means to unmake the Union
for good cause, as they had used their authority to make the Union for
good cause.
Webster's house, therefore, was built on a foundation of sand. But he
had one exceedingly powerful argument. Suppose in abstract theory that
Jefferson and Calhoun were technically right. Would not their theory be
hopelessly impractical? Webster drove home this point like a general
throwing an attack and rolling up the flank of the enemy:
"Nullification, if successful, arrests the power of the law, absolves
citizens from their duty, subverts the foundation of both protection
and obedience, dispenses with oaths and obligations of allegiance,
and elevates another authority to supreme command. Is not this revolution?
And it raises to supreme command four and twenty distinct
powers, each professing to be under a general government yet each
setting its law at defiance at pleasure. Is not this anarchy as well as
revolution? Sir, the constitution of the United States was received as
a whole, and for the whole country. If it cannot stand together, it cannot
stand in parts; and, if the laws cannot be executed everywhere,
they cannot be executed anywhere. The gentleman very well knows
that all duties and imposts must be uniform throughout the country.
He knows that we cannot have one rule or one law for South
Carolina, and another for other States. He must see, therefore, and
does see, and every man sees that the only alternative is a repeal of
the laws throughout the whole Union, or their execution in South
Carolina as well as everywhere.And this repeal is demanded because
a single State interposes her veto, and threatens her resistance!,,46
Webster thus painted a picture of inane debility in the government of
the Union, if nullification were deemed reserved to the several States. But
his thinking did-not calculate the grievous extremity of agitation which
must exist before it should be politically possible even to contemplate,
much less to form, through a special election on call by the legislature of
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The Nullification Crisis 213
a State a convention of the people, including enough delegates who would
actually vote for an ordinance of nullification. Such an event may hardly
ever be anticipated in a well-run confederacy.
The temptations of ambition are considerable, and those temptations,
if allowed to run wild without fear of reprisal, are likely to produce the
warped laws and policies which nullification was designed to address.
Such ambitions caused the tariff of abominations in 1828, made worse in
1832. And, if the real possibility of nullification had then been remembered
as a lawful response for corruption and usurpation in the Federal
government, there never would have been such sectional abuse of protective
imposts, nor would there ever have been a need to call the people of
South Carolina in convention in 1832.
But now suppose that the attempt of South Carolina to nullify the tariff
of abominations should not have induced the repeal thereof by
Congress. Would there be, as Webster proposed, one rule for South
Carolina and another rule for the other twenty-three States then within the
Union? No, not at all, because then South Carolina would have seceded
from the United States. The primary legal sanction for nullification was
thought to be secession, as was plainly stated in the ordinance of the
South Carolina Convention on November 24, 1832.
It was supposed from the beginning of the new Union that secessionwas
constitutionally secure, and, therefore, would not produce a civil war.
Indeed, well-directed reflection will reveal that, in a properly built system
such as the American framers set up, such a separation may fairly be supposed
to have a contrary and sanguine effect, for events of this kind, when
consummated,must surely induce sobriety of thought which, as all experience
shows, encourages reconciliation, since Union enhances capacity for
survival,and survival is among the strongest of all drives in human nature.
Why, then, were nullification and secession, as inherent in the work of
the Philadelphia Convention, not destabilizing? The answer to this
quandary is simply that there were too many heavy counterweights built
into the system set up by the founding fathers of the United States.
Answering Webster on February 26, 1833, Calhoun noted the objection
that, if the will of the Union did not prevail, "the peace of the country
should be destroyed." He asked, "But what if it should prevail? Would
there be peace? Yes," he answered, "the peace of despotism: that peace
which is enforced by the bayonet and the sword,the peace of death, where
all vital functions of liberty have ceased." But he went on to say, "For my
part, I have no fear of any dangerous conflict, under the fullest acknowledgment
of state sovereignty: the very fact that the States may interpose

[Hanny]

214 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF SECESSION
will produce moderation and justice." He added, "Moderation and justice
will produce confidence, attachment, and patriotism; and these, in turn,
will offer most powerful barriers against the excess of conflicts between
the States and the Union.,,47
Calhoun then noted the "objection that the doctrine" of nullification
"will be a source of weakness." He answered,
"If we look to mere organization and physical power as the only
source of strength, without taking into the estimate the operation of
moral causes, such would appear to be the fact; but, if we take into the
estimatethe latter,we shall find that those governmentshave the greatest
strengthin which powerhas been most efficientlychecked.Thegovernment
of Rome furnishes a memorable example. There, two independentanddistinctpowersexisted,-
the peopleactingby tribes,in
which the plebeians prevailed,and by centuries, in which the patricians
ruled. Thetribuneswerethe appointedrepresentativesof the one power,
and the senate of the other; each possessed of the authority of checking
and overruling one another, not as departments of the government,as
supposedby the Senator from Massachusetts,but as independentpowers,
- as much so as the state and general governmentsof this country.
A shallow observer would perceive, in such an organization, nothing
but the perpetual source of anarchy, discord, and weakness; and yet
experience has proved that it was the most powerful governmentthat
ever existed. This power was derived from the very circumstances
which hasty reflection would consider the cause of weakness.'.48
Calhoun proceeded to deliver his crushing blow:
"I am not surprised that, with the idea of a perfect government which
the Senator from Massachusetts has formed, a government of an
absolute majority, unchecked and unrestrained, operating through a representative
body, he should be so much shocked with what he is pleased
to call the absurdity of the state veto. But let me tell him that his scheme
of a perfect government, as beautiful as he conceives it to be, though
often tried, has invariably failed, - has always run, whenever tried,
through the same uniform process of faction, corruption, anarchy, and
despotism. He considers the representative principle as the great modern
improvement in legislation, and of itself sufficient to secure liberty.
I cannot regard it in the light he does. Instead of modern, it is of remote
origin, and has existed, in greater or lesser perfection, in every free
state, from the remotest antiquity. Nor do I consider it as of itself sufficient
to secure liberty, though I regard it as one of the indispensable
means, - the means of securing the people against the tyranny and
oppression of their rulers. To secure liberty, another means is still
il
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The Nullification Crisis 215
necessary, - the means of securing the different portions of society
against the injustice and oppressions of each other, which can only be
effected by veto, interposition, or nullification, or by whatever name the
restraining or negative power of government may be called.'.49
Well, then, was this sterling performance of oratory in the face of the
amassed wealth and power of the Union unavailing? Let the facts of the
matter be consulted.
The new tariff bill passed the House on February 26, 1833 and the
Senate on March 1, 1833.This bill was meant and understood as an effective
repealer of that~whichhad been declared unconstitutional by the people
of South Carolina. The. force bill, it is true, passed the Senate on
February 20, 1833, and the House on March 1, 1833, and would have
given Jackson a chance to use his sword. But, with a new schedule of
imposts, there was no longer a tariff of abominations to enforce. The two
bills were placed on the presidential desk at the same time. Grudgingly,
Jackson signed both bills on March 2, 1833. His second inauguration was
only two days away. It was no time for marching off to war.
The People of South Carolina in Convention resumed their business on
March 11, 1833.An ordinance was passed on March 15,1833, reciting the
new tariff law, and repeal of the obnoxious acts, then repealed the ordinance
of nullification.50 And another ordinancewas passed on March
18,1833, reciting the force bill, and, even though it was a law with nothing
to enforce, the convention adopted an ordinance nullifying the act.5!
Thereupon, the proud convention adjourned. The Union waxed strong.
And, in due course, with the aid of the South, a more moderate and balanced
system of protective tariffs was enacted by Congress.
As a study of human character, it is interesting to observe the reactions
of personalities in the drama during its aftermath. August Fitch, one of the
President's men, wrote from Columbia, on March 16,1833, informing
Jack.$onof the repeal of the nullification against the tariff of abominations.
Old Hickory got out his pen and scribbled across the bottom of
Fitche's letter, not a description of others as he thought, but a gauge by
which history might judge the calibre of his own mind: - "The ordinance
and all law under it repealed. So ends the wicked and disgraceful conduct
of Calhoun, McDuffie, and their co-nullies. They will only be held up to
scorn by everyone who loves freedom, our glorious constitution, and government
of laws."s2
As one might expect, Webster and Calhoun long served in the public
life of the Union. They were ever on cordial terms. They held each other
in highest respect. It so happens that, on December 28, 1837, Calhoun
216 A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORYOF SECESSION
introduced, and on January 3, 1838, the Senate passed a resolution which
proclaimed, "That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the States
adopting the same acted severally as free, sovereign, and independent
States",S3- from whenceit follows,if due attentionis paid to the full
meaning of this premise, that everything Calhoun said in reply to Webster
on February 26, 1833, was correct.
It is no surprise that the Senator from Ma~sachusetts did not vote for
this resolution, but some years later Congressman Alexander Stephens of
Georgia said of him, "One of the highest exhibitions of moral sublime the
world ever witnessed was that of Daniel Webster."s4Which shows how
well he was regarded by the South.
f..,.
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NOTES
CHAPTER V
1

[OpnDownfall]

Proof that I am wrong will depend on more than Hanny's opinion.
Historically, Hanny, what was the 'direct' result of this debate in 'actual' law or legislation?

[timewalker]

The entire argument appears to come down to this quote "and on January 3, 1838, the Senate passed a resolution which proclaimed, "That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the States adopting the same acted severally as free, sovereign, and independent
States"

The rest of the argument is that by adopting this resolution, the Senate was adopting Calhoun's position and thereby approving secession.

However:

I have not yet found any independant evidence of this Senate Resolution. The official record of actions on January 3, 1838 does not appear to contain such a resolution:

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/hlaw:@filreq(@band(@field(DATE+18380103,18380111,1 8380117)+@field(FLD003+@1(llsb+c25+s2)))+@field(CO LLID+llsb))

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/hlaw:@filreq(@band(@field(DATE+18380103)+@field(FL D003+@1(llsb+c25+s2)))+@field(COLLID+llsb))

Perhaps it is somewhere else?

Let us assume, however, that such a resolution was passed. Even if it was, the a Resolution by the Senate is not an "Act of Congress." It does not have the force of law.

Second, the resolution as worded does not approve secession. It merely states a fact: that the states in approving the Constitution acted as free, sovereign and independant states. Leaving aside that the Supreme Court states that this is not the case (it was the action of the people of the various states acting in conventions assembled, not the act of the states themselves), the alleged Resolution says nothing about the status of the states following the adoption of the Constitution. It is the settled case that the complete and independant sovereignty of the states was surrendered, in part, to the Federal government.

South Carolina, in the nullification crisis, argued that as a sovereign state it was not bound by the laws of the Federal goverment and it could simply nullify those laws. As Hanny's post itself shows, it was forced to back down did not nullify the federal laws.

Short answer, Hanny post does not show that Congress approved secession. That is simply his interpretation of an alleged resolution by one of the two houses of Congress of which I can find no official record.

[OpnDownfall]

That this resolution was not shouted to the rooftops by the secessionists of 1860, would indicate that whatever the results of the debate, the secessionists themselves did not consider it as furthering their claims of legality.

[cash]

Originally Posted by timewalker

The entire argument appears to come down to this quote "and on January 3, 1838, the Senate passed a resolution which proclaimed, "That, in the adoption of the Federal Constitution, the States adopting the same acted severally as free, sovereign, and independent
States"

The rest of the argument is that by adopting this resolution, the Senate was adopting Calhoun's position and thereby approving secession.

However:

I have not yet found any independant evidence of this Senate Resolution. The official record of actions on January 3, 1838 does not appear to contain such a resolution:

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/hlaw:@filreq(@band(@field(DATE+18380103,18380111,1 8380117)+@field(FLD003+@1(llsb+c25+s2)))+@field(CO LLID+llsb))

http://memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/S?ammem/hlaw:@filreq(@band(@field(DATE+18380103)+@field(FL D003+@1(llsb+c25+s2)))+@field(COLLID+llsb))

Perhaps it is somewhere else?

Let us assume, however, that such a resolution was passed. Even if it was, the a Resolution by the Senate is not an "Act of Congress." It does not have the force of law.

Second, the resolution as worded does not approve secession. It merely states a fact: that the states in approving the Constitution acted as free, sovereign and independant states. Leaving aside that the Supreme Court states that this is not the case (it was the action of the people of the various states acting in conventions assembled, not the act of the states themselves), the alleged Resolution says nothing about the status of the states following the adoption of the Constitution. It is the settled case that the complete and independant sovereignty of the states was surrendered, in part, to the Federal government.

South Carolina, in the nullification crisis, argued that as a sovereign state it was not bound by the laws of the Federal goverment and it could simply nullify those laws. As Hanny's post itself shows, it was forced to back down did not nullify the federal laws.

Forced to back down, we must stress, because nobody else believed there was a right to secede or to nullify.

Originally Posted by timewalker

Short answer, Hanny post does not show that Congress approved secession. That is simply his interpretation of an alleged resolution by one of the two houses of Congress of which I can find no official record.

You didn't expect accuracy from his post did you?

Regards,
Cash