Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
Here is the context of the Madison quote. As you will see, Madison was addressing the New Jersey plan to amend the Articles of Confederation, and in particular the idea that the Philadelphia Convention could not propose an entirely new set of rules unless all of the states unanimously agreed to abrogate the Articles. He is opposing the contention that it was improper to introduce the Virginia Plan -- which was not "a federal plan."
In this context, he advanced the idea that the Articles were analogous to a treaty -- in which case unanimity was not required. Under generally recognized international law, a breach of a treaty by one party permitted the other party to declare the treaty void. Here, numerous states -- including New Jersey -- had refused to honor their obligations under the Articles, which permitted other states to declare that they were no longer binding.
Madison's central conception was precisely that the federative treaty model (the Latin "foedus" means "treaty")-- in which participants could only declare a breach -- needed to be replaced by a more unitary model, in which the majority had the power to coerce.
"Mr. MADISON. Much stress had been laid by some gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection.
"One characteristic, was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised not on the people individually; but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must operate immediately on individuals.
"The other characteristic was that a federal Govt. derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect. and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs. were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and the plan of Mr. P. intended no change in this particular.
"It had been alledged [by Mr. Patterson], that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indifinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole, which the Gentn. from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States. What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional requisition of Congs. and yielded no ****her to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands. . . ."
Here is the context of the Madison quote. As you will see, Madison was addressing the New Jersey plan to amend the Articles of Confederation, and in particular the idea that the Philadelphia Convention could not propose an entirely new set of rules unless all of the states unanimously agreed to abrogate the Articles. He is opposing the contention that it was improper to introduce the Virginia Plan -- which was not "a federal plan."
In this context, he advanced the idea that the Articles were analogous to a treaty -- in which case unanimity was not required. Under generally recognized international law, a breach of a treaty by one party permitted the other party to declare the treaty void. Here, numerous states -- including New Jersey -- had refused to honor their obligations under the Articles, which permitted other states to declare that they were no longer binding.
Madison's central conception was precisely that the federative treaty model (the Latin "foedus" means "treaty")-- in which participants could only declare a breach -- needed to be replaced by a more unitary model, in which the majority had the power to coerce.
"Mr. MADISON. Much stress had been laid by some gentlemen on the want of power in the Convention to propose any other than a federal plan. To what had been answered by others, he would only add, that neither of the characteristics attached to a federal plan would support this objection.
"One characteristic, was that in a federal Government, the power was exercised not on the people individually; but on the people collectively, on the States. Yet in some instances as in piracies, captures &c. the existing Confederacy, and in many instances, the amendments to it proposed by Mr. Patterson, must operate immediately on individuals.
"The other characteristic was that a federal Govt. derived its appointments not immediately from the people, but from the States which they respectively composed. Here too were facts on the other side. In two of the States, Connect. and Rh. Island, the delegates to Congs. were chosen, not by the Legislatures, but by the people at large; and the plan of Mr. P. intended no change in this particular.
"It had been alledged [by Mr. Patterson], that the Confederation having been formed by unanimous consent, could be dissolved by unanimous Consent only. Does this doctrine result from the nature of compacts? does it arise from any particular stipulation in the articles of Confederation? If we consider the federal union as analogous to the fundamental compact by which individuals compose one Society, and which must in its theoretic origin at least, have been the unanimous act of the component members, it can not be said that no dissolution of the compact can be effected without unanimous consent. A breach of the fundamental principles of the compact by a part of the Society would certainly absolve the other part from their obligations to it. If the breach of any article by any of the parties, does not set the others at liberty, it is because, the contrary is implied in the compact itself, and particularly by that law of it, which gives an indifinite authority to the majority to bind the whole in all cases. This latter circumstance shews that we are not to consider the federal Union as analogous to the social compact of individuals: for if it were so, a Majority would have a right to bind the rest, and even to form a new Constitution for the whole, which the Gentn. from N. Jersey would be among the last to admit. If we consider the federal Union as analogous not to the social compacts among individual men: but to the conventions among individual States. What is the doctrine resulting from these conventions? Clearly, according to the Expositors of the law of Nations, that a breach of any one article, by any one party, leaves all the other parties at liberty, to consider the whole convention as dissolved, unless they choose rather to compel the delinquent party to repair the breach. In some treaties indeed it is expressly stipulated that a violation of particular articles shall not have this consequence, and even that particular articles shall remain in force during war, which in general is understood to dissolve all subsisting Treaties. But are there any exceptions of this sort to the Articles of confederation? So far from it that there is not even an express stipulation that force shall be used to compell an offending member of the Union to discharge its duty. He observed that the violations of the federal articles had been numerous & notorious. Among the most notorious was an act of N. Jersey herself; by which she expressly refused to comply with a constitutional requisition of Congs. and yielded no ****her to the expostulations of their deputies, than barely to rescind her vote of refusal without passing any positive act of compliance. He did not wish to draw any rigid inferences from these observations. He thought it proper however that the true nature of the existing confederacy should be investigated, and he was not anxious to strengthen the foundations on which it now stands. . . ."
Exactly. Madison was talking about the Federal Union as it existed under the Articles of Confederation, not as it existed under the US Constitution. But then, like the bogus quotes he uses, Battalion knew that and just didn't care that he was trying to be deceptive.
America's Caesar - Online Edition by Greg Loren Durand Part One
Quote:
Originally Posted by OpnDownfall
As noted by others, the Constitution is supreme, all state laws (and constitutions) must bow to this supremacy. If a state law conflicts with the Constitution, the state law, even those parts of it's constitution that conflicts with the US Constitution, is null and void.
If New York or any later state thought clever use words in accepting statehood saved it from accepting the supremacy of the Constitution, they soon learned (and accepted) differently.
Page 283 of the text, Volume One:
"The Constitutional Right of Secession" by James Spence -
from the book: The American Union - its Effect on National Character and Policy - 1862. London - Richard Bentley and Son.
Secession is by no means a novel doctrine. In the first session of Congress under the new Constitution, it was threatened in the first serious contest that arose; and this in the presence of several of the framers of the Constitution. Again, when Washington expressed reluctance to be elected as President for a second term, Jefferson wrote to urge his assent; and the weightiest reason he assigned, in proof that the country required experience at the head of affairs, was this -- that the coming election would involve great danger of a "secession from the Union" of those who should be defeated. It can hardly be supposed that this right would have been openly declared by members of Congress, or that the probability of the event would have been thus urged on Washington had it been regarded by public opinion as an illegal or treasonable act. It seems rather to be inferred that there existed in the minds of those, who with the facts so recent were most competent to judge, a conviction that the right existed and might be exercised -- that able and just government would avoid it -- but still that it was there.
The doctrine, indeed, has been maintained and loudly declared, both in the North and South, at frequent periods in the history of the Union. Jefferson, in his Ana, refers to that occasion of its being first raised in Congress, and observes that it was the Eastern, that is, the Northern States, who especially threatened to secede. He describes a walk with Hamilton, in which the latter painted pathetically the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the States. And the Northern States were the first to raise it practically. The war of 1813 was highly unpopular in that district, and when called upon by the President to supply their quotas of militia, they absolutely declined. In the words of Jefferson to Lafayette: "During the war four of the Eastern States were only attached to the Union, like so many inanimate bodies to living men." But they went far beyond inaction. They called a Convention at Hartford, of which the proceedings were suppressed, but the object is well known; a flag appeared with five stripes, secession was threatened in the loudest terms, nor can there be a doubt in the mind of any one who studies the events of that period, that the New England States would have seceded from the Union had the war continued.
The State of Massachusetts has threatened, indeed, on four separate occasions to secede from the Union. First, in the debates referred to on the adjustment of the State debts; secondly, on the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union; thirdly, during the war of 1813; and fourthly, on the annexation of Texas, when, we believe, one chamber of her legislature actually passed a vote of secession. On these occasions it was no mere act of excited individuals, but the general voice of the community. Yet this State is now the loudest in denouncing it, when inconvenient to herself; and a bastile is now said to be preparing in the vicinity of Boston, for the incarceration of those as political prisoners, who simply utter the opinions which, when it suited, this very State has so often and so vehemently expressed...
... The secession of a single State would be suicidal; it would be surrounded with custom-houses, cramped with restrictions, and crushed under the expenses involved. North Carolina and Rhode Island, after refusing to join the Union, and holding out for more than two years, were at last constrained to accede, by the same causes which will always prevent any State from attempting to stand alone. Practically the right could not be exercised, even if conceded, except by a number of States together, sufficient in resources to enable them to maintain their position, and to endure the heavy cost of a separate government. Indeed, if justly governed, it is by no means clear why there should be any desire to secede.
A much more subtle argument was used by Jefferson, since often repeated. He observed that if one State claimed the right to secede from the rest, the others would have equal right to secede from one State, which would amount to turning it out of the Union. The argument is based on the assumption that a State, claiming the one, and objecting to the other, would exhibit a conflict of principles. But a State would protest against ejection because it involves compulsion; and she claims a right to retire, because if compelled to remain, that is equally a compulsory restraint. Both really involve the same principle; ejection and imprisonment are equally acts of compulsion: and this principle is alike objected to in both cases.
It has been argued that a State would thus claim the right to exercise her will against the others, whilst denying them the right to use their will as against herself. But the case is not one of will within the limit of individual action, but of compulsion extending to, and exercised over, another. A State compelled to go or to remain has a forcible restraint imposed on its will; but in seceding it imposes no restraint on the will of others -- they remain free to follow, or continue as before...
Much stress has been laid on the term "supreme," as applied to the federal laws. In reality their only supremacy is in extent -- in extending throughout the whole country, whilst the action of a State law is confined within its boundaries. Apart from this, the State is as supreme as the federal law. No question exists of relative rank, of any superiority; each is supreme in its own department, both are equally powerless beyond it. The Federal Government has indeed no absolute law-making power; for all its laws are liable to be declared void by the Supreme Court. That court declared null and void the most important law ever passed by the federal legislature -- the Missouri compromise. It sits not merely as the interpreter, but as the judge of the law.
It has been argued that the present Constitution differs in principle from the Articles of Confederation, in enabling the Federal Government to act directly on individuals, instead of doing so through the State governments. The inference is drawn that the sovereignty of the States has been surrendered by this concession. Had such a right been committed to a foreign Government, or to any substantive power, this might have been a natural inference. But the Federal Government has no substantive power, and is only the joint agent of the States. These act directly on their own citizens, each through its special government or agent, in the great majority of cases. They agree to act on them through the Federal or common agent in certain other specified cases. This is simply a more effective manner of procedure, a question of detail, greatly improving the administration, but affecting in nowise the question of sovereignty. Further, it was pointed out by Madison in the Convention that the principle itself was not new, but existed under the Articles of Confederation, in several cases which he specified.
On turning to the Constitution, it causes surprise to find that no prohibition of secession exists in it. Those who framed it were men well versed in public affairs, surrounded by angry passions, employed in the very act of breaking up a Constitution, if, indeed, it may not be said, of seceding from one of the States, for Rhode Island continued to adhere to it. They provided for a State dividing into two or more -- for several uniting into one -- for the admission of States yet to come into existence. Why, then, this remarkable omission? A contingency far more probable than these was that of a State becoming dissatisfied, and desiring to separate. Was such an omission the result of negligence, of inability to foresee so probable an event, or was it the result of design?
It has been contended that it would have been improper to forbid a State to withdraw -- that it would have been "futile and undignified" to have added to a law, "And be it further enacted that the said law shall not be violated." But this is just what all law has to do; and that which does it not, is not law. Who had the powers of a lawgiver over independent, sovereign States, entering into a compact of their own free will? And where is the law, either to be violated or obeyed? There is a provision for a State separating into pieces, and this appears quite as undignified as to provide against a State, whole and intact, separating from the rest. There is provision against the treason of individuals; and if a State can also commit treason, it would be strange law that provided against crime on a small scale, omitting to deal with it when on a large one. The men who framed the Constitution were eminently practical men. It cannot be supposed that they would slight so formidable a danger. Why, then, the omission? For the soundest and wisest reasons, which we have on record from their own lips.
In the first place, had there been inserted in the Constitution a compulsory clause of this nature, it would have been impossible to obtain the ratification of the States. Very difficult, at the present day, would it be to obtain the assent to such a clause even of the Northern States. Theoretically nothing would be easier, but when it came to the point, it would hardly be possible to prevail upon Massachusetts, even at this day, to abandon, for ever, her often-asserted independence and sovereignty, and accept, in reality and truth, that position in which she is said now to exist -- that of the province of a wider power. And if there would now be such practical difficulty, with the State whose present professions are those most favourable to the step, how great would have been the obstacles when all the States were to be included, many hostile to, and jealous of, the rest, and when the task was regarded, and proved to be, all but impossible, without this further and strong element of repugnance?
In the next place, the framers of the Constitution perceived, that should they forbid the retirement of a State, they must provide means to prevent it; otherwise it would be an idle precept, a mere solicitation to remain. Other questions might be referred to the Supreme Court, but a retiring State withdrew from its jurisdiction. Other forms of delinquency could be visited on individuals, but here was the action of a whole community. Goodwill must have died out before it could occur; argument would be vain; there could be no appeal except to force. But no force was to be created, adequate to an undertaking of this nature. The first act under the Constitution for regulating the military establishment, provided for a standing force of only 1,216 rank and file. True, in case of need this might be increased; but a cardinal principle with the people was to distrust standing armies; a subject on which their feeling was jealous in the extreme. It was impracticable to run counter to this, even so far as to provide the framework of an army equal to such an object. The only possible force would be that of the remaining States, to be employed in coercing those that desired to secede. On such a proposition the views of the two chief framers of the Constitution are on record. In the Convention, on the 31st May, 1787, Madison declared that "the use of force against a State would be more like a declaration of war, than an infliction of punishment, and would probably be considered by the party attacked, as a dissolution of all previous compacts; a union of States containing such an ingredient seemed to provide for its own destruction." Again, on the 8th June, he observed: "Any government formed on the supposed practicability of using force against the unconstitutional proceedings of the States, would prove as visionary and fallacious as the government of Congress."
Hamilton, in that great authority the Federalist, after showing the futility of employing force against a State, concludes thus:
When the sword is once drawn the passions of men observe no bounds of moderation. The suggestions of wounded pride, the instigations of resentment, would be apt to carry the States against which the arms of the Union were exerted, to any extreme to avenge the affront, or to avoid the disgrace of submission. The first war of this kind would probably terminate in a dissolution of the Union.
In one of the debates in the New York State Convention, Hamilton made use of these words: "To coerce a State would be one of the maddest projects ever devised. No State would ever suffer itself to be used as the instrument of coercing another." His far-seeing description in the Federalist is but too applicable to the events of the present day; and remarkable it is that he, the master spirit of the Unionists, should have denounced as "madness" that coercion which is adopted by his followers at the present day.
But there was a consideration of still higher import. The Constitution was a voluntary act, framed on the principles of free, mutual assent, and common belief in its advantages. To introduce force as a means of maintaining it, would be repugnant to these principles. It would be a commencement on the voluntary system, to be continued under compulsion. Force is an attribute of monarchy; the throne represents and wields the strength of the nation. Each part is subservient to the whole, and none can revolt without foreknowledge of this force to encounter and overthrow. But the basis of a Federal Republic is the reverse of all this. It stands upon consent, which is the abnegation of force. In place of submission of part to the whole, the parties are co-equal. Compulsion is not only inapplicable, but opposed to the principle of the system. And the men of that day were too logical to be unaware of this; they declined to incorporate with the structure they were rearing a principle directly antagonistic to it.
There is another great constitutional authority, the fountain head of American politics -- the Declaration of Independence -- of which the first clause bears directly on this question:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable rights; that amongst these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that whenever any form of government becomes destructive to these ends, it is the right of the people to alter, or abolish it.
These are the constitutional principles for the guidance of every citizen. When the people of Georgia, left in doubt by the silence of the Federal compact on the subject of secession, refer to these to enlighten them, to what conclusion must they come -- what hesitation can they feel? They are told that the "pursuit of happiness" is "an inalienable right of man"; they feel that the government over them has become "destructive of this end"; they read that thereupon "it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it." It will, indeed, be said that the people referred to, are the whole people of the whole country, but this is not the fact. That, indeed, may promote the happiness of Georgia, which produces woe in California, at a distance of three thousand five hundred miles. By what arithmetic can the balance of happiness be adjusted between them? Further, the Declaration of Independence did not speak for all the people under the rule it denounced, but for a small portion of them only; nor did it speak for the people of the United States as a single people, but as separate colonies now claiming to be independent, the respective, original States. Clearly, then, this language is adopted by the people of each separate colony now a State, having a form of government over it of which it is to judge, and which, whenever so disposed, it may abolish.
Again, governments are unjust unless their powers are based on the "consent of the governed." Here the same question arises, Who are the governed who are to consent? Are the people of the State of Georgia to refrain from dissenting until they agree with the people of Oregon, more remote than England from Arabia? But this principle also was enunciated, like the last, for the guidance of each separate, distinct community. Upon these principles we can arrive at no other conclusions than these -- that according to the Constitutional doctrines of America, whenever a State decides by the vote of a majority of its people, that the government over it has become destructive to the ends of its welfare and happiness, and no longer exists in its consent, such State has a right to abolish that government, so far as it concerns itself, or, in other words, has a right to secede from the Union.
This article was extracted from James Spence, The American Union: Its Effect on National Character and Policy (London: Richard Bentley and Son, 1862).
Page 283 of the text, Volume One:
"The Constitutional Right of Secession" by James Spence -
from the book: The American Union - its Effect on National Character and Policy - 1862. London - Richard Bentley and Son.
Spence was a proslavery, proconfederate Englishman. He was even employed as an agent by the confederates for awhile.
Another source with no credibility.
I counter him with Lincoln's claim that there is no right to secede, and Lincoln has more credibility simply because he was the President of the United States, not an agent of the traitor so-called "government."
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Originally Posted by Beowulf
Secession is by no means a novel doctrine. In the first session of Congress under the new Constitution, it was threatened in the first serious contest that arose; and this in the presence of several of the framers of the Constitution. Again, when Washington expressed reluctance to be elected as President for a second term, Jefferson wrote to urge his assent; and the weightiest reason he assigned, in proof that the country required experience at the head of affairs, was this -- that the coming election would involve great danger of a "secession from the Union" of those who should be defeated.
Such a phrase does not appear in any of Jefferson's writings that I could find. So apparently, Spence manufactured the quote. I'm not surprised.
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Originally Posted by Beowulf
It can hardly be supposed that this right would have been openly declared by members of Congress,
Such a right was not openly declared by members of Congress until the southern secessionists made their fallacious claims.
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Originally Posted by Beowulf
or that the probability of the event would have been thus urged on Washington had it been regarded by public opinion as an illegal or treasonable act.
The alleged urging appears to be manufactured by Mr. Spence.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Beowulf
The doctrine, indeed, has been maintained and loudly declared, both in the North and South, at frequent periods in the history of the Union. Jefferson, in his Ana, refers to that occasion of its being first raised in Congress, and observes that it was the Eastern, that is, the Northern States, who especially threatened to secede. He describes a walk with Hamilton, in which the latter painted pathetically the danger of the secession of their members, and the separation of the States.
I'd like to see where Jefferson wrote this. I suspect it's another manufactured incident.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Beowulf
And the Northern States were the first to raise it practically. The war of 1813 was highly unpopular in that district, and when called upon by the President to supply their quotas of militia, they absolutely declined. In the words of Jefferson to Lafayette: "During the war four of the Eastern States were only attached to the Union, like so many inanimate bodies to living men." But they went far beyond inaction. They called a Convention at Hartford, of which the proceedings were suppressed, but the object is well known; a flag appeared with five stripes, secession was threatened in the loudest terms, nor can there be a doubt in the mind of any one who studies the events of that period, that the New England States would have seceded from the Union had the war continued.
Completely false. The Hartford Convention had nothing to do with secession, and its proceedings were published a few years afterward.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Beowulf
The State of Massachusetts has threatened, indeed, on four separate occasions to secede from the Union. First, in the debates referred to on the adjustment of the State debts; secondly, on the purchase of Louisiana and its admission into the Union; thirdly, during the war of 1813; and fourthly, on the annexation of Texas, when, we believe, one chamber of her legislature actually passed a vote of secession. On these occasions it was no mere act of excited individuals, but the general voice of the community. Yet this State is now the loudest in denouncing it, when inconvenient to herself; and a bastile is now said to be preparing in the vicinity of Boston, for the incarceration of those as political prisoners, who simply utter the opinions which, when it suited, this very State has so often and so vehemently expressed...
Wrong on all counts. Now, it is true that single individuals had made such threats, but they were never speaking for the state and had no authority to speak for the state.
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Originally Posted by Beowulf
Much stress has been laid on the term "supreme," as applied to the federal laws. In reality their only supremacy is in extent -- in extending throughout the whole country, whilst the action of a State law is confined within its boundaries. Apart from this, the State is as supreme as the federal law.
Completely false. Federal law passed in accordance with the Constitution is supreme over state law in every case where the two conflict.
"The constitution is perpetual, not provisional or temporary. It is made for all time--'for ourselves and our posterity.' It is absolute within its sphere. 'This constitution shall be the supreme law of the land, anything in the constitution or laws of a state to the contrary notwithstanding.' Of what value, then, is a law of a state declaring its connection with the Union dissolved? The constitution remains supreme, and is bound to assert its supremacy till overpowered by force. ... It would have been puerile for the constitution to say formally to each state, 'Thou shalt not secede.' The constitution, being the supreme law, being perpetual, and having expressly forbidden to the states those acts without which secession is an impossibility, would have been wanting in dignity had it used such superfuous phraseology. This constitution is supreme, whatever laws a state may enact, says the organic law. Was it necessary to add, 'and no state shall enact a law of secession.' To add to a great statute, in which the sovereign authority of the land declares its will, a phrase such as 'and be it further enacted that the said law shall not be violated,' would scarcely seem to strengthen the statute. It was accordingly enacted that new states might be admitted; but no permission was given for a state to secede. Provisions were made for the amendment of the constitution from time to time, and it was intended that those provisions should be stringent. A two-thirds vote in both Houses of Congress, and a ratification in three quarters of the whole number of states, are conditions only to be complied with in grave emergencies. But the constitution made no provision for its own dissolution; and if it had done so, it would have been a proceeding quite without example in history. A constitution can only be subverted by revolution, or by foreign conquest of the land. ... The reserved and unnamed powers are many and important, but the state is closely circumscribed. Thus, a state is forbidden to alter its form of government. 'Thou shalt forever remain a republic,' says the United States constitution to each individual state. A state is forbidden, above all, to pass any law conflicting with the United States constitution or laws. Moreover, every member of Congress, every member of a state legislature, every executive or judicial officer in the service of the Union or of a separate state, is bound by solemn oath to maintain the United States constitution. This alone would seem to settle the question of secession ordinances. So long as the constitution endures, such an ordinance is merely the act of conspiring and combining individuals, with whom the general government may deal. When it falls in the struggle, and becomes powerless to cope with them, the constitution has been destroyed by violence." [John Lothrop Motley, "The Causes of the American Civil War: To the Editor of the _London Times,_ May 23-24, 1861]
Okay, Hoss. Let's look at this thing for a minute, in the light of day...
Which country would YOU rather belong to? The one I describe in these writings, or that one you describe?
I choose mine. It sounds more like that fond warmth of richness that the kids are taught in fourth grade, about how our country differs from (and is better) than anyone else's in history...
Okay Hoss. Let's look at this thing for a minute, in the light of day...
Which country would YOU rather belong to? The one I describe in these writings, or the one you describe?
If we are talking about the light of day, then fine, let's look at it in that light.
If we are talking about the fantasy described by Spence, then we are not talking seriously about any kind of serious light to examine that fantasy.
The simple fact of the matter is, Beowulf, you and I live in THIS country. Wishing it were something else from false facts and twisted history doesn't generate a false sense of the "warmth of richness" instead it denies actual historical facts that those fourth-graders need to make an informed decison about the future of this nation.
And they can't do that based on the historical fiction put forth by Spence or what someone else wishes it should have been, only on what actually occured.
(Cue the music to stop so the voices can be heard above the din...)
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Which country would YOU rather belong to? The one I describe in these writings, or that one you describe?
The one that is the envy of the rest of the world. That would be my country: the country of George Washington:
Washington was a great believer in a strong central government.
"A survey of this correspondence and of his official career indicates that the dominant note in the political thinking of Washington, both before and after 1789, was his unwavering belief that only a strong central government, able to determine and enforce national policies, would enable the United States to assume its appropriate position among the nations of the world." [Harold W. Bradley, "The Political Thinking of George Washington," _Journal of Southern History,_ Vol XI, No. 4, Nov, 1945, p. 472]
"As commander of the army, Washington felt a natural sympathy for the plight of his unpaid men, and while counseling them against rash measures he urged Congress and the states to recognize the services of the army by making provision for the payment of the money due the soldiers. It was the states, he believed, which were delinquent in this matter rather than Congress, and he felt for the states the same distrust that he felt for private debtors who refused to honor their obligations." [Ibid.]
Washington wrote to Alexander Hamilton, "No man in the United States is, or can be more deeply impressed with the necessity of reform in our present Confederation than myself. No man perhaps has felt the bad effects of it more sensibly; for to the defects thereof, & want of Powers in Congress may justly be ascribed the prolongation of the War & consequently the Expences occasioned by it. More than half the perplexities I have experienced in the course of my command, and almost the whole of the difficulties & distress of the Army, have their origin here." [Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 31 Mar 1783]
So he clearly saw the necessity of a strong, central federal government. Three months later he repeated this theme in his "Circular to State Governments," in which he wrote, "There are four things, which I humbly conceive, are essential to the well being, I may even venture to say, to the existence of the United States as an Independent Power:
"1st. An indissoluble Union of the States under one Federal Head.
"2ndly. A Sacred regard to Public Justice.
"3dly. The adoption of a proper Peace Establishment, and
"4thly. The prevalence of the pacific and friendly Disposition, among the People of the United States, which will induce them to forget their local prejudices and policies, to make those mutual concessions which are requisite to the general prosperity, and in some instances, to sacrifice their individual advantages to the interest of the Community."
"Yet it will be a part of my duty, and that of every true Patriot, to assert without reserve, and to insist upon the following propositions, That unless the States will suffer Congress to exercise those prerogatives, they are undoubtedly invested with by the Constitution, every thing must very rapidly tend to Anarchy and confusion, That it is indispensible to the happiness of the individual States, that there should be lodged somewhere, a Supreme Power to regulate and govern the general concerns of the Confederated Republic, without which the Union cannot be of long duration. That there must be a faithfull [sic] and pointed compliance on the part of every State, with the late proposals and demands of Congress, or the most fatal consequences will ensue, That whatever measures have a tendency to dissolve the Union, or contribute to violate or lessen the Sovereign Authority, ought to be considered as hostile to the Liberty and Independency of America, and the Authors of them treated accordingly."
"I could demonstrate to every mind open to conviction, that in less time and with much less expence than has been incurred, the War might have been brought to the same happy conclusion, if the resources of the Continent could have been properly drawn forth, that the distresses and disappointments which have very often occurred, have in too many instances, resulted more from a want of energy, in the Continental Government, than a deficiency of means in the particular States. That the inefficiency of measures, arising from the want of an adequate authority in the Supreme Power, from a partial compliance with the Requisitions of Congress in some of the States, and from a failure of punctuality in others, while it tended to damp the zeal of those which were more willing to exert themselves; served also to accumulate the expences of the War, and to frustrate the best concerted Plans." [George Washington, "Circular to State Governments," 8 June 1783]
The country of James Madison:
In describing the deliberations on the Constitution to Thomas Jefferson, who was in Paris at the time, James Madison wrote, "It was generally agreed that the objects of the Union could not be secured by any system founded on the principle of a confederation of Sovereign States." [James Madison to Thomas Jefferson, 24 Oct 1787]
"The essential difference between a free Government and Governments not free, is that the former is founded in compact, the parties to which are mutually and equally bound by it. Neither of them therefore can have a greater right to break off from the bargain, than the other or others have to hold them to it. And certainly there is nothing in the Virginia resolutions of -98, adverse to this principle, which is that of common sense and common justice. The fallacy which draws a different conclusion from them lies in confounding a SINGLE [emphasis in original] party, with the PARTIES [emphasis in original] to the Constitutional compact of the United States. The latter having made the compact may do what they will with it. The former as one only of the parties, owes fidelity to it, till released by consent, or absolved by an intolerable abuse of the power created. In the Virginia Resolutions and Report the PLURAL [emphasis in original] number, STATES [emphasis in original], is in EVERY [emphasis in original] instance used where reference is made to the authority which presided over the Government. As I am now known to have drawn those documents, I may say as I do with a distinct recollection, that the distinction was intentional. It was in fact required by the course of reasoning employed on the occasion. The Kentucky resolutions being less guarded have been more easily perverted. The pretext for the liberty taken with those of Virginia is the word RESPECTIVE [emphasis in original], prefixed to the 'rights' &c to be secured within the States. Could the abuse of the expression have been foreseen or suspected, the form of it would doubtless have been varied. But what can be more consistent with common sense, than that all having the same rights &c, should united in contending for the security of them to each.
"It is remarkable how closely the nullifiers who make the name of Mr. Jefferson the pedestal for their colossal heresy, shut their eyes and lips, whenever his authority is ever so clearly and emphatically against them. You have noticed what he says in his letters to Monroe & Carrington Pages 43 & 203, Vol. 2, with respect to the powers of the old Congress to coerce delinquent States, and his reasons for preferring for the purpose a naval to a military force; and moreover that it was not necessary to find a right to coerce in the Federal Articles, that being inherent in the nature of a compact. It is high time that the claim to secede at will should be put down by the public opinion; and I shall be glad to see the task commenced by one who understands the subject." [James Madison to Nicholas Trist, 23 Dec 1832]
"It will hardly be contended that there is anything in the terms or nature of the compact [the Constituion], authorizing a party to dissolve it at pleasure." [James Madison to Nicholas Trist, 15 Feb 1830] In a letter to Daniel Webster, Madison called secession "a violation, without cause, of a faith solemnly pledged." [James Madison to Daniel Webster, 15 Mar 1833]
Akhil Reed Amar, who is a professor of Constitutional Law at Yale University, wrote a book on the Constitution called _America's Constitution: A Biography._ In it, he devotes several pages to discussing why secession is unconstitutional.
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The prominence of the Preamble (of the Constitution) also made it a perfect place to renounce the basic structure of the Articles (of Confederation). Although states would enter the Constitution as true sovereigns, they would not remain so after ratification. The formation of a "more perfect Union" would itself end each state's sovereign status and would prohibit future unilateral secession, in plain contrast to the decidedly less-than-perfect union under the Articles. True, the Preamble did not expressly proclaim that its new, more perfect union would be "perpetual"--and for good reason: Why borrow a word from the Articles of Confederation that did not quite mean what it said in that document, a word that was being thrust aside by the very act of constitution itself? Thus, the Constitution signaled its decisive break with the Articles' regime of state sovereignty and false federal perpetuity in other ways.
One notable Preamble word marking the metamorphosis was "Constitution." Not a "league," however firm; not a "confederacy" or a "confederation"; not a compact among "sovereign" states--all these high-profile and legally freighted words from the Articles were conspicuously absent from the Preamble and every other operative part of the Constitution. The new text proposed a fundamentally different legal framework. Henceforth America would have a written "Constitution" deriving from a continental people, unmistakably styled after earlier state prototypes, like the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780. As these state constitutions, exalted texts in confederate America, had exemplified state-based popular sovereignty under the Articles, so now a new United States Constitution--the new supreme law of the land--would shape a new continental nation whose sovereign would be a truly continental people. Lest there be any doubt, later parts of the document precisely defined the status of "this Constitution," a self-referential phrase that appeared several more times--most importantly in Articles V and VI (the only places where the phrase popped up more than once) and in Article VII, the Preamble's matching bookend.
Article VI specified how "this Constitution," once ratified, would stack up against current and future state constitutions. For example, what should happen if the people of South Carolina, having adopted "this Constitution" in 1788, reconvened at some later time to amend their state constitution, and in that convention adopted an amendment purporting to repudiate the federal Constitution in whole or in part? In a subsequent lawsuit, which law would a state judge be obliged to follow? If the people of South Carolina were sovereign, the answer would plainly be the state constitution as amended. The sovereign people's right to alter or abolish their government at any time would remain a core attribute of their sovereignty, and their judicial agents--state judges--would be bound to enforce their will and judgments even if their amendment might be alleged by other sovereigns to violate an earlier treaty under international law. Yet the Article VI supremacy clause explicitly compelled even state judges to disregard the attempted amendment--a rule plainly inconsistent with the post-ratification sovereignty of the people of each state: "This Constitution...shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding."
Surrounding Article VI and reinforcing its plain meaning, Article VII and V conspicuously contrasted the rules for constitutional ratification with the rules for subsequent constitutional amendment--a contrast that made it plain that the new Constitution spelled the end of state sovereignty for all states that might choose to join. As of mid-July 1788, ten states had ratified the Constitution, thereby guaranteeing that the document would go into effect in those states under Article VII. New Yorkers had yet to ratify, and Article VII made it clear that the people of that state were a distinct sovereign entity free to vote down the new Constitution and ignore it. Yet Article V put New Yorkers on clear notice: If they chose to ratify the Constitution in convention, they would lose their freedom to disregard subsequent constitutional proposals agreed to by convention of three-fourths of the states, whose ratifications would suffice to make future amendments "valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution" even in nonratifying states. Nowhere was the Constitution's break with the Articles of Confederation and all other purely confederate regimes more dramatic. Simply put, Article VII recognized the sovereign right (or at least the sovereign power) of different states in a flawed confederacy to go their separate ways; but Article V and VI extinguished the right and power of unilateral secession for each state populace that joined the Constitution's new, more perfect union, thereby merging itself into the continental sovereignty of the American people.
Anti-Federalists across the continent got the message and sounded the alarm. In Massachusetts, Samuel Nasson pointed to the Preamble as proof that the Constitution would effect a "perfect consolidation of the whole Union" that would "destroy" the Bay State's status as "a sovereign and independent" entity. The influential Federal Farmer warned that when a state populace "shall adopt the proposed constitution, it will be their last and supreme act" qua sovereign. New York's Brutus complained that the Constitution would not be "a compact" among states but rather would create a "union of the people of the United States considered" as "one great body politic." Pennsylvania Anti-Federalists put forth a similar reading of the Preamble. Meanwhile, Maryland's Luther Martin advised his audience of the strongly nationalist logic of the Constitution's treason clause, which made allegiance to the United States paramount over the allegiance to a single state in the event of armed conflict between the two.
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Secession: Always Viewed As A Right? 
