Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
There are several Sumter threads, so I'm not sure which one to use. I'm arbitrarily picking this one to try to take the discussion in another direction.
I'm no expert on the outbreak of the War, but it seems to me that the decision to fire on the fort was, in retrospect, a colossal blunder from the southern standpoint. Right or wrong, it initiated the War in such as way that many previously passive northerners became aroused and perceived the south to be the aggressor. It initiated the War in such a way that the south ultimately lost it.
What I'd like to discuss and understand is whether the seceding states wouldn't have been better off, in terms of their own goal of independence, if they had simply let the fort be? De facto, they had their own country. The north would deny it, but the north was unlikely to launch an invasion unless the south started armed hostilities first. Wouldn't the confederacy have been better served by the standoff, using the time to establish its own institutions and infrastructure, initiate diplomatic relations with England, etc., and meanwhile present the north with a fait accompli? And if war did break out anyway, let the north appear the aggressor. Perhaps northern blockaders would fire on southern ships engaged in peaceful trade. Whatever. But then the south could portray the north as the aggressor. Why wouldn't that have been the better course for the confederacy to take if independence was its goal?
On a related note, what were the countervailing considerations that led the south to initiate armed hostilities? I've assumed that it was to force Virginia to jump one way or another. Is that right? And if so, was that a gamble worth taking? Were there other considerations that led to the decision?
What I'm trying to avoid is whether the Confederacy had a "right" to the fort, whether the north's occupation of the fort was an outrage or illegal occupation of southern soil, "sovreignty," etc. Assume it did. There were still choices. Rather, I'm trying to understand why the Confederacy chose such a risky (and ultimately disasterous) option when there was another option available that had so many advantages.
Putting it somewhat differently, southern advocates here seem to complain in effect that Lincoln artfully maneuvred the south into firing first by baiting them. Ok, but even accepting that premise, why did the south accept the bait?
On a related note, what were the countervailing considerations that led the south to initiate armed hostilities? I've assumed that it was to force Virginia to jump one way or another. Is that right? And if so, was that a gamble worth taking? Were there other considerations that led to the decision?
IMHO, the act of secession was driven by politicians and bravado, and sufficient support for the act was apt to evaporate by the same means. Bringing a little violence to the game tends to forge a southern patriotism that would keep latent unionist sentiment from rearing its head. Nothing like a little bloodshed to seal the deal.
Yes, I use statements, reports, facts and figures from the 1860s.NO sir, you just lay them out w/ no explanation expecting others to go... "My what a brilliant point!" Sorry, doesn't fly. Far more relevant than what the Glorious Unioners of 2006 have to say.
Actually the term reasoned statements along with solid research I believe would catagorize either Trice or Unionblues posts. Instead of "laugh..." or other snide one word replies when you appaer unable or unwilling to repy w/ a thought out answer or rebuke.
If Charleston & Mr Davis really believed 18 guns & 200 men on four ships, only two of which can even remotely thought as warships... a provacative invasion force. Does that not speak volumes of their belief in their own ability to defend themselves? As well perhaps to the thought that a legitimate US Naval force entering Charleston Harbor might be viewed as a show of force that might well calm some of the hotheads... hardly what Davis wanted.
How many unionists/anti CSers were robbed, abused and even murdered prior to the firing on of FT Sumter? Do some checking; it might just open your eyes to the fact that the CS was being quite provocative, brutal and less than polite (to what might conceivebly be viewed) as its own people.
Repeatedly taking quotes completely out of context while the entire quote or document pointedly has another meaning than you intend... does nothing for your position but further weaken your credability as well as call into question all of your earlier cut and pastes.
Something might well be learned from looking at scholars like Larry, John Taylor, Steven Cone and others who I might view as true scholars of the CS. Honesty, integrity along with a penchant for solid research. Not just cutting, pasting and expecting all others to agree w/ you.
Incidently as to the cuts & pastes completely out of context... I believe Trice has done the job of showing what is being spoken of.
Good Luck
__________________ Shane Christen
American Legion Post 352
SUVCW Camp Abernethy# 48
Lifetime NRA member
3rd MN VI
For in much wisdom is much grief: and he that increaseth knowledge increaseth sorrow. Eccl 1:18
I can only assume that it seemed like a good idea at the time, quite possibly as cedar said: Bravado and the grossly mistaken conviction that the mudsills and merchants would take the slap and let it ride. I've never completely bought into the idea that the shooting was designed to bring in the wavering states and particularly Virginia. Although it worked, it seems that would have been a longer-odds gamble than betting on northern reaction.
I'm in the same boat with ET here. Nothing about Sumter makes any sense. It was a symbol; nothing more. Leaving it be would have gained time for the Confederacy -- time that could have been put to good use in refining the new coalition. I'll agree that something else might have eventually touched off a shooting war, but it was in the Confederacy's best interest to get the Union to start it. Choosing when and where to be a fly on the wall at a moment in history would have to include being in JD's office when he ordered PGTB to open fire.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Every state had a militia of sorts -- some more prepared than others. As recent posts have shown, each drew on an allotment of materiel supplied by the federal government. Many areas had military-style organizations that would qualify as militia. The Washington Artillery comes to mind, as well as the firefighting companies in the larger cities.
That any state governor could offer 5,000 men equipped to fight is no indication that anyone was preparing for war before war broke out. It simply shows that the state took its militia more seriously than others.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Actually the term reasoned statements along with solid research I believe would catagorize either Trice or Unionblues posts. Instead of "laugh.. or other snide one word replies when you appaer unable or unwilling to repy w/ a thought out answer or rebuke.
...
Incidently as to the cuts & pastes completely out of context... I believe Trice has done the job of showing what is being spoken of.
...etc...etc...
Good Luck
The quotes are not out of context. They treat the relevant part of what is being discussed. There is no need to post the text of an entire letter.
~
All you are is a clique of backslapping hacks that reject anything that doesn't fit your romanticized view of the Glorious Union.
You congratulate each other on your supposed in-depth research and analysis.....which is nothing more than a load of self-serving/self-glorifying bull----.
Every state had a militia of sorts -- some more prepared than others. As recent posts have shown, each drew on an allotment of materiel supplied by the federal government. Many areas had military-style organizations that would qualify as militia. The Washington Artillery comes to mind, as well as the firefighting companies in the larger cities.
That any state governor could offer 5,000 men equipped to fight is no indication that anyone was preparing for war before war broke out. It simply shows that the state took its militia more seriously than others.
Ole
But on of your buddies (trice) claimed South Carolina having a force of "8,000" (an exaggerated number and many without arms) was preparation for war.
So how is 5,000 -ALL armed, equipped and ready to go- in Massachusetts not preparation for war?
Baltimore, Md., and several incidents in St. Louis, Mo.
Battalion, you seem to like to distort events into unrecognizable one-sided accounts, and you do so frequently.
In Baltimore, troops moving peacefully through the city from one train station to another in horse-cars were attacked by a mob stirred up by secessionists. When they could not travel further that way, they got off the horse cars and tried to continue on foot. The mob swarmed around them, throwing stones and breaking store windows; many members of the mob were armed. After taking casualties, some soldiers fired back at the mob. Four soldiers and 12 civilians were killed; large numbers on both sides wounded. This isn't even a particulary surprising or unusual event, because the city of Baltimore was a place famed for gangs and riots, widely referred to as "Mobtown" in newspapers North and South during the 1850s because of the frequent and widespread violence there.
In St. Louis on May 10, Nathaniel Lyons had arrested General D. M. Frost and 669 pro-secession "Minute Men" at Camp Jackson, named after the pro-secessionist Governor of the state. Lyons had discovered these men were planning to attack and seize the St. Louis Arsenal that he had just occupied with the 2nd US Infantry. As he marched the prisoners back escorted by the predominantly German Home Guard through the city,a mob formed, hurling insults, rotten fruit, rocks and paving stones at the escort. Accounts vary about what happened then, and what exactly sparked the shooting; the most common involves a drunk who staggered into the escort.
Soldiers and civilians alike pulled weapons and started shooting. No one can say who shot first for sure. Three militiamen were killed, the soldiers fired into the crowd in response. A large number of men, women, and children were struck. Lyons then disbanded the Home Guard that had been escorting the prisoners and sent them home. The city burst into riots and arson. Lyon had to recall the Home Guard to restore order. At least 28 people died, with an estimate of another 100 injured.
If you wish to make some slighting comment about the mobs throwing rocks and paving stones, I suggest you try standing out in a field some time and letting people throw them at you. Paving stones were frequent weapons in street warfare, used in the revolutions in Europe from 1830-1850, and would fit anyone's idea of a deadly weapon. Getting hit by one would either kill you outright or put you in a hospital if you survived, often with a lifelong crippling injury. In Europe, the professional military practiced street warfare for dealing with mobs armed this way.
By the date of these riots, the Confederacy was actively attempting to suborn both Maryland and Missouri into secession, and were inciting their citizens to use force against the US government. Virginia had dispatched arms to the secessionist movement in Maryland, many of which came from stocks captured from the Federal government (VA wanted them back when Maryland did not secede). Jefferson Davis had dispatched arms captured in Louisiana, including 2 12-pdr howitzers and 2 32-pdrs, to secessionists in Missouri. The cannon were disguised as crates of "Tamoroa Marble" to account for their weight. Davis authorized this on April 23, 1861 (17 days before Lyon surrounded Camp Jackson) and his letter makes it clear they were intended to be used in capturing the Arsenal at St. Louis. The South played a duplicious part in all this, and you seem to want to sweep all that under the rug.
In addition, the Confederacy was actively seeking to move troops to capture Washington, DC in mid-and-late April of 1861; they were also attempting to block access to that city via the Potomac River. The secessionists in Maryland were wrapped up in that plan as well.
Presenting these events, as you do, as a slaughter of innocent "Southern civilians" by evil Federal troops is a distortion. It simply shows your intent to spin this situation into propaganda for your own purposes, and your desire to hide from the parts of history you do not wish to see. IMHO, of course.
But on of your buddies (trice) claimed South Carolina having a force of "8,000" (an exaggerated number and many without arms) was preparation for war.
Battalion,
You appear to be claiming that the entire South Carolina force was the 2,000 men General Whiting on Morris Island reported to General Beauregard in this letter:
HEADQUARTERS MORRIS ISLAND, S.C.,
April 11, 1861.
Brigadier-General BEAUREGARD, Commanding:
MY DEAR GENERAL: It is absolutely necessary that some assistance be sent here, in the Adjutant-General's Department--I mean of the kind that will be useful. I am expected to be engineer and everything else, The regimental organization (mixed up of infantry and riflemen, without bayonets)cannot be preserved. Cannot you take charge, or at least come here and see the state of affairs? We must have a clerk experienced. Must have an order book, stationery, &c. Transportation is wanted. Horses are required for officers, staff, and orderlies (at least, half a dozen}, especially if you come down.
Colonel Gregg has 1,100 men; Colonel Cunningham, 418; Colonel Kershaw, between 300 and 500--in all, 2,000, exclusive of artillery. Orders have been issued for all the batteries to be in readiness, but with the exception of Colonel Gregg's I find great confusion in the new re-enforcements.
Very truly, yours,
W. H. G. WHITING.
However, Whiting himself tells us he is not counting the artillery manning his batteries -- the guns that would soon help to reduce Ft. Sumter -- and Whiting does not control the entire SC Army. He is the commander out on Morris Island and reports to others.
Major General Bonham actually commanded the South Carolina Army. One month before the assault on Ft. Sumter, his Adjutant and Inspector General, States Rights Gist, sent him this report:
=====
HEADQUARTERS, STATE OF SOUTH CAROLINA,
March 6, 1861.
M. L. BONHAM,
Major-General, Commanding Volunteer Forces of S. C.:
GENERAL: The number of companies organized and received under the act of general assembly of 17th December, 1860, is one hundred and four--in the aggregate amounting to 8,835, rank and file, constituting ten regiments of ten companies each. The force is divided into four brigades, constituting one division.
Respectfully,
S. R. GIST,
Adjutant and Inspector General of South Carolina.
=====
That is 8,835 officers and men actually under arms and serving the state. The Massachusetts figure of 5,000 represents what that state could call up, arm and equip on short notice -- but they had not yet been called.
Amazing, isn't it, that you want to claim less than one-quarter of that SC force as being in existence? That when I told you 8,000 I was actually 10% below the official figure for the South Carolina Army? This is yet another example of how you try to misrepresent history. I suggest strongly you stop doing this and concentrate on research to assure you have a complete and accurate picture of the real situation. If you do not, your approach will always damage, and eventually destroy, your credibility with anyone who reads what you say.
Quote:
Originally Posted by Battalion
So how is 5,000 -ALL armed, equipped and ready to go- in Massachusetts not preparation for war?
Again, that is not a standing army. It is the state militia, who were civilians living at home until called to service. When the call came, Ben Butler borrowed funds from a banker (secured by a note on his company stock) and loaned it to the state to transfer his regiment (6th MA) without delay. (Being Ben Butler, he made sure he got a Brigadier General commission out of it.) That is how the 6th MA got to Washington so quickly -- the state otherwise had no funds to move the men and would have had to wait on the legislature.
Butler himself was in court defending a client when the call to arms came after Ft. Sumter was attacked.
The SC Army, of course, was also the State Militia called to service. But they had been called up months earlier. They were the ones building the batteries and occupying the forts around Ft. Sumter from December of 1860 onward -- and they were largely the ones shooting at Ft. Sumter on April 12-13 as well. Isn't that right?
...What I'd like to discuss and understand is whether the seceding states wouldn't have been better off, in terms of their own goal of independence, if they had simply let the fort be? De facto, they had their own country. The north would deny it, but the north was unlikely to launch an invasion unless the south started armed hostilities first. Wouldn't the confederacy have been better served by the standoff, using the time to establish its own institutions and infrastructure, initiate diplomatic relations with England, etc., and meanwhile present the north with a fait accompli? And if war did break out anyway, let the north appear the aggressor. Perhaps northern blockaders would fire on southern ships engaged in peaceful trade. Whatever. But then the south could portray the north as the aggressor. Why wouldn't that have been the better course for the confederacy to take if independence was its goal?
...
It is my personal opinion that the seceding states stood an excellent chance of achieving successful separation and independence by proceeding peacefully.
The Supreme Court seeems to have been split about 4-4 (the Virginia Justice dying at this point) on the issues around secession. They had traditionally supported the rights to slave property, and had recently ruled against the right of a Federal government to compel a state official to carry out a clear duty under Federal law. I suspect that if pressed into a decision they would have had what appears to be the largest single public opinion on a "right of secession": that there was no such right, but that the Federal government had no "right" to use force to make the state stay.
It also seems clear to me that a united Democratic Party in 1860 would have been a better foe to the Republicans -- and in any case the Republicans were still a minority in each house after the 1860 election. Yet the Fire Eaters of the South seem to have deliberately attempted to split the Democratic Party in order to electa Republican President. The only realistic way I can understand that is they wanted to use that to whip up "secession fever".
Even as a minority, a "Solid South" could have crippled and frozen all legislative action in 1861-62. There is no immediate threat of drastic Republican action getting through (particularly if the South would work with other states politically).
There are clear Constitutional avenues to try to separate from the country: the Court, Congress, the Amendment process. The South refused to even try them. I think any or all of them would have offered a better route than what they did.
CivilWarTalk.com -
A free and friendly Civil War community. 
Linear Mode
