Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
I doubt Lee ever grasped the ability of the U.S. to expand its military logistics system. Lee spent an entire U.S. Army career involved with supply shortages. Perhaps he thought it militarily impossible to subdue such a large area as the Confederate States.
Quote:
Originally Posted by whitworth
A lot of Confederate officers, graduates of West Point, thought that too.
What a great mistake of thinking that the U.S. could not sustain a long war, and eventually enter ever Confederate state with its armies.
Whitworth, good points. The Colonies fought the pre-eminent power of the world, but they were across a big ocean. The United States was right next door. I think that Lee had no illusions about how difficult it would be. Just because something is going to be difficult, doesn’t mean one shouldn’t do what duty suggests, however one understands what one’s duty is. “Duty is the sublimest word in our language.” Reminiscences, pages 74. “Do your duty in all things. You cannot do more, you should never wish to do less.” That is part of what makes the man so remarkable.
Lee saw his duty as being to his family, Virginia, and the constitutional union as “established by our forefathers would continue.” He knew full well that Arlington would be one of the first places seized. Offering his services to Virginia and then the Confederacy was not about personal gain, it was done in spite of impending personal loss. The fact that Mary didn’t leave was probably a comment on her invalid nature, and Lee’s expectation that non-combatants wouldn’t be harassed.
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
Over at Civil War Memory, Kevin Levin cites the following statistics based on an article by Wayne Wei-Siang Hsieh entitled "'I Owe Virginia Little, My Country Much': Robert E. Lee, the United States Regular Army, and Unconditional Unionism", which appears in Crucible of the Civil War: Virginia from Secession to Commemoration, edited by Ed Ayers, Gary Gallagher, and Andrew Torget:
"Of all Southern officers connected to a seceded state, 60 out of 300 stayed in the Union leaving 200 in Confederate service. Of the 487 graduates of West Point who were affiliated with a seceded state, 173 stayed loyal to the Union and 251 aligned themselves with the Confederacy. If we consider Lee's age, length of service and location in the Upper South, the author concludes that a decision to stay in the Union would have seemed more likely:
"'Twenty-seven of 90 slave-state West Point graduates (30 percent) of the Classes of 1830 and before joined the Confederacy (Lee was in the Class of 1829), while 224 of 397 graduates (56 percent) of the classes of 1831 to 1860 did the same. Even when we look at Virginians, the statistics continue to point to Lee staying with the Union. While 9 of 27 (33 percent) Virginian graduates of West Point classes up to and including the class of 1830 went Confederate, a higher percentage of older graduates stayed with the Union: 13 of 27 (48 percent). Lee's behavior better fit the profile of a younger West Pointer from Virginia. Sixty-one of 99 (62 percent) Virginian graduates of the Classes of 1831 to 1860 went Confederate, while 31 of 99 (31 percent) stayed with the Union. (p. 47)'"
"As soldier Lee did not seem to grasp what the cost would be to Virginia. It was too close to the U.S. Capital. His wife's estate inheritance at Arlington was just across the river from Washington, D.C. The U.S. had the powerful navy. Did he think Arlington really safe. His wife remained there for quite a period.
I doubt Lee ever grasped the ability of the U.S. to expand its military logistics system. Lee spent an entire U.S. Army career involved with supply shortages. Perhaps he thought it militarily impossible to subdue such a large area as the Confederate States.
A lot of Confederate officers, graduates of West Point, thought that too.
What a great mistake of thinking that the U.S. could not sustain a long war, and eventually enter ever Confederate state with its armies.[/quote]
Whitworth, I think Gen Lee understood the Pre-Regualar army better then many people did at the time for he served for 30 years. When Gen Lee was asked to take command of the Union Army he turned it down because Virginia had pulled out of the Union and joined the Confederacy.
Now what I dont get in your post here, is you keep saying "I doubt Lee this and Lee that"
And then at the end, you say "What a great mistake of thinking that the U.S. could not sustain a long war, and eventually enter ever Confederate state with its armies."
If your going to "Guess" what Lee was thinking at the time, its kinda ironic that you would turn it around like Lee had made some type of mistake.
I just find this post absured that you would actually "think" that Lee would have never guessed eventually a Union army would enter Virginia.
If your going to try to belittle Lee try reading more history on Lee.
And by the way, Lee's wife did not stay very long at the Arlington house, she moved around quite a bit. She was already in Richmond at the battle of (2nd) Cold Harbor, for Lee sent her a letter telling her to leave the city. Lee felt the war would just be a matter of time and wanted her to go somewhere else that was more safe. She grew tired of moving around and stayed in Richmond.
After Cold Harbour which was the worst defeat Grant ever had, they started to bury Union dead at the Arlington House in Mary's rose garden, as a "punishment" of some kind. From that day till now there are over 250,000 people buried at Arlington Cemetery.
From the book "Not War But Murder" Cold Harbor 1864, by Ernest B. Furgurson.
The South made many grave errors in its secession. And so did Lee.
Historians seem to have gone easy on the Confederate leadership, because they lost the war.
Well they did lose the war, and how soon was the incline ready for defeat. We've all studied battles and made decisions on when the war was lost.
But in my study in the last couple of years on logistics, I think Margaret Mitchell in Gone With The Wind, made the most poignant statement on the unpreparedness for war and their eagerness to fight the war.
Lee underestimated the citizens of western Virginia, early in the war, by thinking that part of Virginia would greatly support Virginia's secession and fight for ole Virginia as loyal citizens. He was very wrong. And Virginia could never accummulate the troops and logistics to win that part of the state back.
Lee starting after Gettysburg made serious accusations about the desertions of the common Confederate soldier. Even late in the war, Lee questioned loyalty, particularly the loyalty of North Carolina soldiers from the western part of that state, who deserted.
In the end, Robert E. Lee and Jefferson Davis seemed cut from a different piece of cloth, than the common Confederate soldier who fought and then decided that loyalty to state might be too severe a price to pay in the end.
Although, anguished by his decision to stand with Va. Lee did not do too much deep thinking about it, nor was the decision necessarily difficult, it was almost automatic.
Lee consciously modeled his personna and life after George Washington (plus some of the better qualities of his father, 'Light Horse Harry Lee') and all major 'life decision' was viewed through the prism of "What would George Washington do?". Lee seems to have believed that Washington was a Va. Patriot, fighting for the 'rights' of all the colonies and that his, (Washington's) First loyalty was to Va.
As I have stated in other threads, Lee was very conscious of what the history books would say about him, if he should ever come to promenence.
He always measured his decisions and actions on an idealized conception of what Washington would do in any situation of any importance, thus any consequences of his decision outside of what would Washington have done or thought, would weight little.
Lee, within a short time after resigning his U.S. Army commission and becoming General of Virginia forces, indicated to a former U.S. Senator from Virginia, that he was preparing a defense of the western part of Virginia.
Within weeks that proved an impossibility. Was Lee naive or did he not realize how weak the Confederacy would be in western Virginia?
Did Lee give no import to the Ohio River and the fact it layed on the the northwestern boundary of Virginia?
Of course, Lee was not a naval officer. He may not have known how much steamboat construction facilities were available in Pittsburgh Pa., Wheeling Va., Cincinnati Ohio, and Louisville Kentucky. He might not have known the number of foundries in the Confederate States to produce iron sheathing for ironclads. Pittsburgh with its iron plants and foundries was only a short distance, up the Ohio River, from Virginia's western boundary. The U.S. would use the steamboats on that river to sent troops into western Virginia, and maintain a much better supply base for those troops, than the Confederates could, from east of the Allegheny Mountains.
In addition, there was B&O railroad service out of Wheeling to supply U.S. forces in the northern part of western Virginia.
Certainly Virginia did not secede, and automatically accept that the western part of its state was gone from Confederate control. But no one in the Confederate government seem to acknowledge the threat, early in the war. Even the British Foreign Secretary asked the Confederate envoy about the Confederate defense of western Virginia in 1862. I've seen no dispatch, before secession, that warned Virginia of its lack of ability in 1861 or even 1863, to protect the counties in the western part of the state.
It is if it could be said that if Virginia seceded, it could control less than 2/3rds of its land, from the very start of the war, why did Virginia secede? Wasn't this threat preceived in Richmond?
Except for a few raids, Confederate forces were mainly in the far eastern part of western Virginia, in and near the Allegheny Mountains. The region had relatively small battles, the last significant battle, in what became the State of West Virginia, was in Pocohantas County in late 1863. Students and historians mainly ignore West Virginia during the Civil War. But why did Virginia ignore it's lack of strength in the area.
Historians ignore the battles in western Virginia, as they never appoached the Chancellorsville's, the Gettysburg's or the Fredericksburg's of the far eastern battles. But that may well be the answer. The Confederacy never had the ability to supply more troops in the area. Thus, no "important" battles for historians.
Quite simply, Whitworth, I don't believe the leaders of the Confederacy had any realistic concept of what they had started -- I'm convinced that they truly believed the north would not resort to arms. When it did, their movements were hobbled by their collective pants restricting their collective knees.
One would logically assume that Virginia could effectively have been threatened from the west. In fact, attention was quickly diverted from that offensive advantage to the priority of defending Washington -- a mistake an experienced military man wouldn't have made, but then, there were none. As a result, small mobile forces in the Shenandoah Valley effectively precluded any threat from that quarter. (It didn't hurt that the least capable Union pretenders to the rank of General, were assigned to that arena.)
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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