Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
Henry A. Wise, Va. Secession Exchange hotel meetings, April 1861
John,
These are based on David Detzer's new book "Dissonance", third in his series on the opening of the Civil War. This volume mainly covers events in Virginia, Maryland, and Washington, D.C. from about the time of the attack on Ft. Sumter to the Virginia secession plebiscite of May 23rd.
Three things are noted about Henry A. Wise, ex-Governor of Virginia, as this time starts. One is that he loathed John Letcher, the current governor. Second is that Wise's he felt contempt for not only Lincoln, but for the entire Republican leadership, feeling they were spineless, would not fight, and could be safely ignored. Third was that he had been contemplating the future and felt: "He and men like himself ought to consider methods that would give Virginia hegemony over America, if that was still possible, or at least over the South. He was initially unenthusiastic about secession, but warmed to it about February of 1861.
Wise had begun thinking of seizing the three big Federal military installation in the state (Ft. Monroe, Harpers Ferry, Norfolk Navy Yard) by then, possibly attending a meeting on the topic in December of 1860. Why he was suddenly swinging to an ardent secessionist is unclear. Some speculate it was caused by the collapse of his national political ambitions in April of 1860, or the declining health of his beloved wife, or to hthe avid secessionist position of his son Jennings Wise.
Jennings Wise, described as a rabid secessionist, was editor of the Richmond Enquirer. He had been calling for the seizure of the three Federal posts since SC seceded. His father used his press to print the circulars for the "Spontaneous People's Convention" in Richmond scheduled for April 16. (The irony of a scheduled spontaneous event seemed lost of the secessionists issuing the call .)
News of Ft. Sumter being attacked arrived on April 12. Wild rumors circulated as mobs crowded around the telegraph office. By the 13th: "During the afternoon Richmond grew palpably tense. Saloons became jammed. Mobs milled about. Men who had drifted into town to attend Monday's Spontaneous secessionist convention added to the stew. ... [news of Sumter's surrender arrives, emotions reach a crescendo, delagates snap at one another on the floor] ... Governor Letcher was scheduled to confer with a few of the conventions' unionist delegates that evening, but the men of the committee were too nervous to brave their way through the the frenzied crowds, which included countless armed drunks who did not want to hear anything negative about secession. The governor cancelled that evening's conference."
This is the situation leading up to the events you say I was making too dramatic. Hard to imagine it as anything other than dramatic: impromptu bands marching in the streets, fervid speeches, processions across the city to Tredegar, where the workers were unfurling a Confederate banner, while orators claimed that it was Tredegar guns that shattered Ft. Sumter's walls. Guns dragged out of the armory and used to fire a hundred-gun salute. A Confederate banner raised on the capitol and rockets sent flying into the night sky. Sunday was quieter and the convention did not meet.
This brings us to the 15th, Lincoln's proclamation calling for troops, and Henry Wise at the Exchange hotel. Wise was still claiming Lincoln and the Republicans were too spineless to act, despite the rumors of a call for troops. The convention adjourned. Richmond sat in tense wonder, waiting to see what would happen.
In this nervous and dramatic uncertainty, Wise held a meeting at the Exchange to consider how the convention was going to react. His son Jennings was present, among others. It was as a result of this meeting that the telegram Imboden refers to at the beginning of his account was sent, calling him to Richmond to confer. Receiving the message, Imboden left before nightfall.
From Detzer: "... Henry Wise knew Imboden and respected his grit. This admiration was reciprocated. Two months earlier, Imboden had written a friend: 'Gov. Wise is the only real living embodiment of the true spirit which should animate Virginia at this time.'"
By the time Imboden got to Richmond on the 16th, Lincoln's call for troops had been received and rejected by the Governor. The city was again in a frenzy. This is when Imboden runs into Wise on his way to the Exchange Hotel. Wise brings him in to the hotel and points out how useful a man like Imboden could be in the crisis. Detzer: "... He wanted the younger man to return home and gather together his battery company, then take them to Harpers Ferry. There, Wise said, he must capture the United States arsenal. But it would take more than a few pieces of artillery to carry the arsenal, probably much more, so Wise also told Imboden to scour Richmond this afternoon and contact as many potential military leaders from the Valley as he could find. Wise said he wanted them in his hotel room at seven o'clock that evening. He was planning a war conference."
That gets us to the meeting you described as an ordinary political session to prepare a "Southern Rights canvas" for an election. Your picture is erroneous. This is a clandestine meeting by a group of self-selected revolutionaries planning to use armed force to seize federal property, as time when Virginia was still -- even by their own beliefs -- a part of the United States of America. Although the definition of treason in the United States Constitution is regarded as the narrowest and hardest to prove in the world, this appears to qualify if witnesses to it had been willing to come forward.
That concludes the background on the meeting you said was so innocuous. I'll try to continue with more soon.
Detzer, as I said, uses a style of footnoting I dislike. It is hard to pin down any specific part, in my view. However, references here include articles in the Baltimore Sun, Philadelphia Public Ledger, Washington Star, Richmond Dispatch, Harper's New Monthly Magazine and the Washington Evening Star from the 1860s. A number of diary references and letter collections are also given. There is a reference to Hagans Brief Sketch of the Erection and Formation of the State of West Virginia. More modern references include:
Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis
Woodward, Defender of the Valley: Brigadier General John Daniel Imboden, C. S. A.
In this nervous and dramatic uncertainty, Wise held a meeting at the Exchange to consider how the convention was going to react. His son Jennings was present, among others. It was as a result of this meeting that the telegram Imboden refers to at the beginning of his account was sent, calling him to Richmond to confer. Receiving the message, Imboden left before nightfall.
From Detzer: "... Henry Wise knew Imboden and respected his grit. This admiration was reciprocated. Two months earlier, Imboden had written a friend: 'Gov. Wise is the only real living embodiment of the true spirit which should animate Virginia at this time.'"
By the time Imboden got to Richmond on the 16th, Lincoln's call for troops had been received and rejected by the Governor. The city was again in a frenzy. This is when Imboden runs into Wise on his way to the Exchange Hotel. Wise brings him in to the hotel and points out how useful a man like Imboden could be in the crisis. Detzer: "... He wanted the younger man to return home and gather together his battery company, then take them to Harpers Ferry. There, Wise said, he must capture the United States arsenal. But it would take more than a few pieces of artillery to carry the arsenal, probably much more, so Wise also told Imboden to scour Richmond this afternoon and contact as many potential military leaders from the Valley as he could find. Wise said he wanted them in his hotel room at seven o'clock that evening. He was planning a war conference."
That gets us to the meeting you described as an ordinary political session to prepare a "Southern Rights canvas" for an election. Your picture is erroneous. This is a clandestine meeting by a group of self-selected revolutionaries planning to use armed force to seize federal property, as time when Virginia was still -- even by their own beliefs -- a part of the United States of America. Although the definition of treason in the United States Constitution is regarded as the narrowest and hardest to prove in the world, this appears to qualify if witnesses to it had been willing to come forward.
That concludes the background on the meeting you said was so innocuous. I'll try to continue with more soon.
Detzer, as I said, uses a style of footnoting I dislike. It is hard to pin down any specific part, in my view. However, references here include articles in the Baltimore Sun, Philadelphia Public Ledger, Washington Star, Richmond Dispatch, Harper's New Monthly Magazine and the Washington Evening Star from the 1860s. A number of diary references and letter collections are also given. There is a reference to Hagans Brief Sketch of the Erection and Formation of the State of West Virginia. More modern references include:
Crofts, Reluctant Confederates: Upper South Unionists in the Secession Crisis
Woodward, Defender of the Valley: Brigadier General John Daniel Imboden, C. S. A.
Furgurson, Ashes of glory: Richmond at War
Regards,
Tim
Tim, thanks for posting this. I have not read Dissonance, but I do own Allegiance (but have not yet rad it). I will get a copy of Dissonance when it is published in paperback this fall.
Looking back at my post #60 in the Lee's views of secession thread, I wrote, "A 'Spontaneous Southern Rights Association' (consisting of Wise, and Imboden and others) did meet in Richmond on the night of the 16th to form a Southern Rights canvas for the upcoming Virginia local elections, but took no action."
To correct the record, they did plan on the seizure of Harper's Ferry, and issued orders for certain militia units to assemble, and drew weapons from the State arsenal to arm them, but they did what they did with Gov. Letcher's approval, and were forbidden to take further action until the Convention voted no secession. As events played out, they took no action that could be considered treasonable (even by the unconditional unionist standard) until Virginia's Convention did in fact secede, and even then, only with the express authorization from the Governor. Thus, your characterization in post #53 of that thread painted a false image. Using Waitman Willey's and James McGrew's account (Hagan's source) of what happened in the Convention (which must be the ultimate source for what transpired in the Convention) is fraught with dangers, since both men voted no to secession, and went on the participate in the western (pro-union) Convention later. They are likely to paint a picture that justifies their subsequent irregular actions.
Respectfully,
John Taylor
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
Tim, thanks for posting this. I have not read Dissonance, but I do own Allegiance (but have not yet rad it). I will get a copy of Dissonance when it is published in paperback this fall.
Looking back at my post #60 in the Lee's views of secession thread, I wrote, "A 'Spontaneous Southern Rights Association' (consisting of Wise, and Imboden and others) did meet in Richmond on the night of the 16th to form a Southern Rights canvas for the upcoming Virginia local elections, but took no action."
To correct the record, they did plan on the seizure of Harper's Ferry, and issued orders for certain militia units to assemble, and drew weapons from the State arsenal to arm them, but they did what they did with Gov. Letcher's approval, and were forbidden to take further action until the Convention voted no secession. ...
Nope. It is nice to see you say that at least part of what you insisted upon before in your attack upon what I had said was wrong, though. I'll take it as a partial apology.
In my 1st post, I left you at the point where Wise had asked Imboden to round up militia officers for a meeting at 7PM in his hotel room. Again from Detzer:
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... The men there agreed on the importance of the critical factors: speed and timing. They knew the United States had a few soldiers guarding the place. It would be vitally important to reach the arsenal and capture it before its garrison could be reinforced, or alternatively, could destroy the facility. (It is not certain whether Wise revealed to the others in his room the full extent of his ambitions. Actually, he planned to use the thousands of muskets reportedly stored at the arsenal to arm militiamen, and he imagined them attacking Washington right away.
For this coup to work, several elements needed to be in place -- by the next afternoon at the latest. State militiamen must be involved -- perhaps thousands of them. One of the plotters -- perhaps Imboden -- suggested the only way to guarantee success was to move quickly, and that meant trains. Messages were immediately dispatched to two railroad presidents living in Richmond. Sometime before Midnight both businessman arrived and agreed to collaborate. Their trains, they said, would be made available to rush Imboden and others towards the Valley. Tomorrow, more trains could be used to take the Valley volunteers up toward Harpers Ferry.
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Whether you wish to see it or not, this is a small group of conspirators -- all citizens of the US -- planning to launch a strike against the Federal government. This is conspiracy to commit treason. All of this is in Imboden's account which you had referenced, so you knew it before we started down this road, back while you were claiming this was just a political meeting.
More from Detzer:
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But this left a problem. Officially, militiamen took orders from the governor -- that is, John Lectcher. Would Honest John agree? After all, his home was in the Valley. The members of the cabal might influence some militiamen, but maybe not enough. Letcher's support would greatly improve the chances of the coup's success. Even though it was already late at night, a committee of three -- led by Imboden, a personal friend of the governor's -- went to the gubernatorial mansion. They awakened him and laid out their plans. He rejected their request. He reinterated what he had said many times during the past two months: he would await the decision of the convention. If, or when, the convention passed an ordinance of secession, only then would he give the necessary orders.
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That is, of course, slightly different than what Imboden states, but not very much. Looking at this, my guess would be that Lectcher, awakened sometime past Midnight by three men who wanted to start a war, mainly wanted to get them the heck out of his house. He turned them down and said what he had always said: that he would await the decision of the convention.
More from Detzer:
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The three-man committee returned to the Exchange, where they relayed the governor's irksome response. Henry Wise assured the cabal he would personally see to it that when the convention met the next morning (that is, in a few hours), it would vote immediately for secession. (Wise had gall; less than two weeks earlier the delegates had voted overwhelmingly against secession.)
The conspirators were still discussing their options when they received a wire that Washington had ordered a regiment of Massachusetts volunteers to go to Harpers Ferry. This message was inaccurate, but it spurred the energies of the men in the room. They frantically hammered out more details. They were now determined not to wait for Governor Letcher. Although Wise had no legal authority, he scribbled out some orders. With this slip of paper in his hand, Imboden and several other men left to take the first steps toward what they hoped would be total success. They hurried to the city's armory and requisitioned guns and ammunition. The armory's superintendant agreed. The Harpers Ferry assault was under way.
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That is still pretty close to Imboden's own account. The only real difference is that Imboden's account leads you to believe the governor had authorized these initial movements -- but then he gets quite upset at Harman later on the 17th for telling people in the Valley that the governor had authorized all this when he has not.
Wise had, on the afternoon of the 16th some time before the 7PM meeting in his room, telegraphed Norfolk, saying that the ships in Norfolk Navy Yard must be stopped from leaving. While the meetings at the Exhange on the night of the 16th-17th were going on, the men in Norfolk he contacted acted. Led by William H. Parker (a state inspector of vessels and a Wise political appointee), they sank three hulks in the channel attempting to block the entrance.
Wise also sent a message to South Carolina, asking the new Governor there, Francis Pickens, to send troops immediately. Understanding that Wise had no authority for this, Pickens refused to do so unless Governor Letcher made the request.
A few hours later, Wise walked to the meeting of the secession convention. Here he brandished his pistol as he spoke, telling the convention that Virginian troops were already hurtling towards a conflict with Federal troops and that they must act immediately. One delegate ran to him and grabbed his hand. "I don't agree with you; I don't approve of your acts, but I love you, I love you." Minutes later, the convention voted for secession, borne on the wave of emotion of Wise's dramatic speech.
What we have here is deliberate political manipulation by a man who had become an extremist. He arranges armed confrontations and acts of rebellion/war -- then launches into an impassioned speech about how the convention must act because of his acts. Since you have quoted from several other speeches by Wise in that convention and omitted this, I suspect you already know all about this as well, and knew it when you claimed I was over-dramatizing his course. if anything, I downplayed it.
Nope. It is nice to see you say that at least part of what you insisted upon before in your attack upon what I had said was wrong, though. I'll take it as a partial apology.
I would not call it an apology in any case, just a clarification. After your first fallacious outburst, I did what you should have done: I went back and read the records to which I had access. Imboden’s account (in B&L) was most readily available. I also read The Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861. These are primary sources. You ought to look into them, instead of neo-consolidationist hacks like Detzer.
Quote:
Originally Posted by trice
That is still pretty close to Imboden's own account. The only real difference is that Imboden's account leads you to believe the governor had authorized these initial movements -- but then he gets quite upset at Harman later on the 17th for telling people in the Valley that the governor had authorized all this when he has not.
Imboden’s account would indicate that he is addressing the cover story of moving forces toward Gosport. Imboden was annoyed that Harman had telegraphed Staunton that Gov. Letcher had approved the Augusta militia’s seizure of Gosport, when Imboden knew that Gov. Letcher had not approved that. In fact, by that point, Gov. Letcher had approved only the assembly of the Staunton Artillery and the West Augusta Guard at the Staunton train station.
Quote:
Originally Posted by trice
What we have here is deliberate political manipulation by a man who had become an extremist. He arranges armed confrontations and acts of rebellion/war -- then launches into an impassioned speech about how the convention must act because of his acts. Since you have quoted from several other speeches by Wise in that convention and omitted this, I suspect you already know all about this as well, and knew it when you claimed I was over-dramatizing his course. if anything, I downplayed it.
I would say that the Convention could just as easily have not approved the secession ordinance, despite the militia movements that Wise had told them of. The Governor had not authorized any movement other than the assembly at the Staunton depot (mentioned above), and it would have taken no great effort for the Convention to verify what exactly the Governor had ordered. The Governor’s mansion was a couple of blocks away and the Convention did on several occasions ask the Governor for information to aid in deliberations.
Your failing (and apparently Detzer’s) is taking the reports of anti-secessionist delegates at face value. Of course delegates like Willey and McGrew are going to paint facts to support their conclusion to oppose secession.
At the end of the day, your recounting of the story: “In Virginia, there was a vote in the convention against secession on April 8, IIRR (false). When the time came for the next vote, the ex-governor had already sent militia off to seize Harpers Ferry (false). (illegally, since the current governor had said no and this man had no authority) (false). He walked into the convention and slammed a pistol down on the table to start the meeting (false), demanding (false) an immediate vote” presented a false impression of what happened.
I knew that was bovine scatology as soon as I read it.
Henry Shanks The Secession Movement in Virginia 1847 – 1861 was my source for the idea that the proceedings of the Virginia Convention did not record the secret proceedings. On reviewing Shanks’ book, I saw that it was first published in 1934. Virginia did in fact publish the entire proceedings (including the proceedings in secret session) in 1963. On April 16th, Mr. Scott of Fauquier had proposed that the Commonwealth hold a referendum in which the people of the State would vote on either (a) a middle State conference to work out some compromise or (b) immediate separate secession. Those would be the only two choices for the people under Scott’s proposition. Every delegate knew that this was the last alternative prior to an up or down vote on immediate secession in the Convention. Scott’s proposition was defeated 64-77. Wise’s first comments of the day (below) came minutes after the defeat of Scott’s proposition, when the only issue left was to hold a vote on immediate secession (or not, as the Convention should decide). Here is precisely what Wise said, on April 17th: “I know the fact, as well as I can know it without being present at either the time or place, that there is a probability that blood will be flowing at Harper's Ferry before night. I know the fact that the harbor of Norfolk has been obstructed last night by the sinking of vessels. I know the fact that at this moment a force is on its way to Harper's Ferry to prevent the reinforcement of the Federal troops at that point. I am told it is already being reinforced by 1,000 men from the Black Republican ranks. I know the fact that your Governor has ordered reinforcements there to back our own citizens and to protect our lives and our arms. In the midst of a scene like this, when an attempt is made by our troops to capture the navy yard, and seize the Armory at Harper's Ferry, we are here indulging in foolish debates, the only result of which must be delay, and, perhaps, ruin.” Wise then moved the previous question. (Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861, vol. 4, pg. 124) No talk of threatening delegates with a pistol.
A few minutes later, during a speech by John Baldwin of Augusta, Wise said, “I will state to the gentleman that it is to protect his people from being cut to pieces by the Wide Awakes—his people, who have marched to Harper's Ferry, I hope, in time to prevent the Wide-Awakes from getting the 20,000 arms at that place—that he (the Governor) has ordered out reinforcements. This has been done at the instance of a gentleman from this city. It is now too late to recall these people, if the gentleman could, and I hope he never would recall them, if he could. The Augusta troop are acting nobly in this matter, and I only wish my people had the honor of taking that stronghold.” (Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861, vol. 4, pg. 127)
After saying this, Wise moved the previous question, which, according to the rules of the convention, meant that each delegate then had one chance to speak, and then only for ten minutes, before the vote as taken. He did not demand immediate secession, he merely employed a procedural rule that would limit debate to a few hours.
Debate that day had started at 10:00 a.m. (on page 75 of volume 4), and concluded at 11:10 p.m. (page 183). Thus, one can estimate when events happened during the day. Scott’s proposition was defeated about 3:00 p.m. and the secession resolution was adopted around 5:00 p.m. Wise’s speech occurred in the mid-afternoon, hours into the day’s business. Thus, The Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861 show your characterization to be false in every particular.
QED,
John Taylor
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
I would not call it an apology in any case, just a clarification. After your first fallacious outburst, I did what you should have done: I went back and read the records to which I had access. Imboden’s account (in B&L) was most readily available. I also read The Proceedings of the Virginia Convention of 1861. These are primary sources. You ought to look into them, instead of neo-consolidationist hacks like Detzer.
Let's begin with this.
Having, as you say, read Imboden's Battles & Leaders account (written years later, after the war), you proceded to tell me that the meeting at the Exhange Hotel on the evening of the 16th was an innocent political meeting about a Southern Rights canvas for the next election. IIRR, you cited Imboden in that post, so I have to assume you had already read it -- and your most recent post seems to say that you had.
Here's the problem. The very first two sentences of Imboden's article say: "THE movement to capture Harper's Ferry, Virginia, and the fire-arms manufactured and stored there was organized at the Exchange Hotel in Richmond on the night of April 16th, 1861. Ex-Governor Henry A. Wise was at the head of this purely impromptu affair. ..." So, how in the world, having read that, could you tell me this was merely a political meeting about something unrelated to Harpers Ferry? Did you somehow miss the first two sentences or the description of the meeting and events that follows over the next 13 paragraphs? Or were you, to borrow a colorful phrase from your last post, spreading a bit of "bovine scatology" about here to discredit my posts? Please explain exactly how you made this totally fallacious statement when you had the evidence before you.
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Henry A. Wise, Va. Secession Exchange hotel meetings, April 1861 
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