Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
Hey JT, I just looked at your namesake's book. 650 pages???!!!! No wonder Joseph Story didn't read it (at least according to one of the Amazon comments). Is there a Reader's Digest version (just kidding)?
Hey JT, I just looked at your namesake's book. 650 pages???!!!! No wonder Joseph Story didn't read it (at least according to one of the Amazon comments). Is there a Reader's Digest version (just kidding)?
ET, what can I say? John Taylor was obviously writing in an era before television. Ever read Clausewitz? If he could make his point in a sentence, he woudl do it in a paragraph. If he could make it in a paragraph, he would do so in a page. Taylor is a bit the same way.
I wouldn't recommend that you buy anything by John Taylor. You can get almost any of his works (except Arator) for free on line.
Enjoy.
Respectfully,
Jon Taylor
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
Earlier this week I finished Jack Rakove's magnificent Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution -- many, many thanks to John Taylor for recommending it.
Although virtually every page of the book contains stunning insights -- it's the densest book I've read in a long time -- I've been haunted for days by a beautiful passage in which Professor Rakove contemplates the relationship between James Madison, slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment. I thought I'd pass it on.
By way of background, Madison believed that the States posed a greater threat to liberty than a properly constituted federal government would. He therefore proposed that the Constitution include a provision that would give the federal legislature the power to negative (veto) state laws. The Convention declined to adopt Madison's suggestion; the provision that became the Supremacy Clause in effect took its place.
After noting that Madison "cited 'the case of Black slaves in Modern times' as an example of 'the danger of oppression to the minority from unjust combinations of the majority'", Professor Rakove then speculates about the relationship between Madison's thought and the Fourteenth Amendment:
"But Madison's carefully guarded thoughts on slavery expose a further puzzle in his thinking. Among the many objections that militated against an unlimited veto on state laws, the criticism it must have sparked in his native region would have doomed the Constitution once his fellow planters grasped that it would extend to the law of slavery. Could Madison possibly have overlooked this implication? Or might he have hoped that the pressing need to reconstitute the Union would somehow carry the veto in its wake, and thereby provide an entering wedge to weaken the hold of slavery and its evil effects? If he at least glimpsed this possibility, can we not speculate whether the Civil War amendments -- especially the Fourteenth -- are the most Madisonian elements of the American Constitution? For on what other basis did the federal government acquire the authority that Madison sought for it in 1787: to act as an umpire mediating the various forms of injustice that he expected to flourish within the states?
"So it is that an original intention is sometimes fulfilled long after its author has outlived even himself."
Earlier this week I finished Jack Rakove's magnificent Original Meanings: Politics and Ideas in the Making of the Constitution -- many, many thanks to John Taylor for recommending it.
Although virtually every page of the book contains stunning insights -- it's the densest book I've read in a long time -- I've been haunted for days by a beautiful passage in which Professor Rakove contemplates the relationship between James Madison, slavery and the Fourteenth Amendment. I thought I'd pass it on.
By way of background, Madison believed that the States posed a greater threat to liberty than a properly constituted federal government would. He therefore proposed that the Constitution include a provision that would give the federal legislature the power to negative (veto) state laws. The Convention declined to adopt Madison's suggestion; the provision that became the Supremacy Clause in effect took its place.
After noting that Madison "cited 'the case of Black slaves in Modern times' as an example of 'the danger of oppression to the minority from unjust combinations of the majority'", Professor Rakove then speculates about the relationship between Madison's thought and the Fourteenth Amendment:
"But Madison's carefully guarded thoughts on slavery expose a further puzzle in his thinking. Among the many objections that militated against an unlimited veto on state laws, the criticism it must have sparked in his native region would have doomed the Constitution once his fellow planters grasped that it would extend to the law of slavery. Could Madison possibly have overlooked this implication? Or might he have hoped that the pressing need to reconstitute the Union would somehow carry the veto in its wake, and thereby provide an entering wedge to weaken the hold of slavery and its evil effects? If he at least glimpsed this possibility, can we not speculate whether the Civil War amendments -- especially the Fourteenth -- are the most Madisonian elements of the American Constitution? For on what other basis did the federal government acquire the authority that Madison sought for it in 1787: to act as an umpire mediating the various forms of injustice that he expected to flourish within the states?
"So it is that an original intention is sometimes fulfilled long after its author has outlived even himself."
eleftratig,
Madison was a firm moderate, in my view. He was firmly in favor of a stronger Federal government with more powers at a time when centrifugal forces seemed to be the main threat to the prosperity and longevity of the United States. Later, when a Federal government which seemed to respect no limitation on its powers but what limits the Federal government itself imposed, he was in favor of strengthening the limitations on Federal powers, this time by maintaining the power of the States to counterbalance the Federal government. But in this, he never went as far as Jefferson, and, at heart, I believe he was always a moderate (but firm) Federalist. Would Madison have approved of the XIV Amendment and an expansive interpretation of its provisions? I dare say he would have. But Madison's was one voice, a primus inter pares, perhaps, but still one voice. A more interesting question would be whether the Union could have been founded in 1787 on that basis. On this point, I believe that most Americans would not have agreed to Union on that basis. The record simply does not support the contention. The delegates of 1787-1790 were simply too jealous of State power to go that far. So, having met defeat in Philadelphia, Madison accepted the decision of his peers, and even went to bat for the more limited interpretation on Federal powers during the Virginia Convention.
Respectfully,
JT
PS: The local library inter-library loan folks came through with a copy of the Fairman article, all 134 pages. I am plowing now, but have other irons in the fire at work, so it is slow going.
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
I have always wondered how both the 13 and 14th could be legitimate. I do not see how.
I assume that you mean, how can a State be in the Union for the purpose of ratification of the XIII Amendment (how can it count in both the numerator and the denominator to determine 3/4 of the States for ratification) and out of the Unionuntil it ratifies the XIV Amendment (it counts in neither the numerator nor the denominator to determine 3/4 of the States)? Good question.
__________________ "In this Constitution, the citizens of the United States appear dispensing a part of their original power in what manner and what proportion they think fit. They never part with the whole; and they retain the right of recalling what they part with." James Wilson of Pennsylvania, October 28th, 1787
I assume that you mean, how can a State be in the Union for the purpose of ratification of the XIII Amendment (how can it count in both the numerator and the denominator to determine 3/4 of the States for ratification) and out of the Unionuntil it ratifies the XIV Amendment (it counts in neither the numerator nor the denominator to determine 3/4 of the States)? Good question.
Madison was a firm moderate, in my view. He was firmly in favor of a stronger Federal government with more powers at a time when centrifugal forces seemed to be the main threat to the prosperity and longevity of the United States. Later, when a Federal government which seemed to respect no limitation on its powers but what limits the Federal government itself imposed, he was in favor of strengthening the limitations on Federal powers, this time by maintaining the power of the States to counterbalance the Federal government. But in this, he never went as far as Jefferson, and, at heart, I believe he was always a moderate (but firm) Federalist. Would Madison have approved of the XIV Amendment and an expansive interpretation of its provisions? I dare say he would have. But Madison's was one voice, a primus inter pares, perhaps, but still one voice. A more interesting question would be whether the Union could have been founded in 1787 on that basis. On this point, I believe that most Americans would not have agreed to Union on that basis. The record simply does not support the contention. The delegates of 1787-1790 were simply too jealous of State power to go that far. So, having met defeat in Philadelphia, Madison accepted the decision of his peers, and even went to bat for the more limited interpretation on Federal powers during the Virginia Convention.
JT,
I don't disagree with your major conclusions. In particular, I tend to think that a Constitution with Madison's veto provision would have met with significantly more resistance in the conventions. Then again, one thing that Rakove emphasizes is how interconnected various provisions were in Madison's mind. The executive and Senate would have been very different animals, there would have been a council of revision, the powers of the government would have been described in general terms rather than enumerated, etc. It's hard to know how such a different document would have been received.
Madison himself is a fascinating figure. I agree that he was more "nationalist" than Jefferson, but if anything I think that understates his early nationalism c. 1787. The veto he really wanted was an unlimited one, not the limited one contained in the Virginia Plan. Now that's radical! Even after his conversion in the early 1790's, he never went as far down the states' rights path as Jefferson did, witness the differences between the Virginia and the Kentucky Resolutions. Later on, he even endorsed the chartering of the Second Bank!
For those who may be interested in the incorporation debate, here is another article (actually, a draft of the first two chapters of a book-in-progress) of interest: Bryan Wildenthal, Nationalizing the Bill of Rights: The Rise, Fall and Rise of the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporation Doctrine. Chapter 2 reviews the evidence concerning the original understanding of the "privileges or immunities" clause, confirms yet again the analysis of Professors Crosskey, Curtis and Amar, and administers a vicious beating to the reputations of Professor Fairman and Raoul Berger.
By way of background, Madison believed that the States posed a greater threat to liberty than a properly constituted federal government would. He therefore proposed that the Constitution include a provision that would give the federal legislature the power to negative (veto) state laws. The Convention declined to adopt Madison's suggestion; the provision that became the Supremacy Clause in effect took its place.
The presidents veto comes from Madisons proposals that were not adopted.
__________________ "Democracy is two wolves and a lamb voting on what to have for lunch.
Liberty is a well armed lamb contesting the vote."
Benjamin Franklin, 1759
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