Was Slavery On the Way Out?

[Alabaman]

Unionblue:
In answer to your question, which people with influence were on Cleburne's side regarding the arming of slaves for duty:
Gen. Govan, Gen. J.E. Johnston (I think he didn't desired to lose his best Divisional Cmdr. & 'quieted' the Proclamation before it could destroy P.R.C.'s career? instead of the 'other' reason), Gen. Lucius Polk, Gen. Lowrey, Judah P. Benjamin, Gen. R.E. Lee, Gen. John H. Kelly, Col. Sam Adams, 33rd Ala., etc...I'm looking for others, which are there, if I can locate my notes. From your last reply, it seems I can add Pres. Jefferson Davis to the list?

I think Gen. W.H.T. 'ol Shotpouch' Walker & Sen. Wigfall robbed the South of victory through their actions against the idea, behind the backs of some honorable men. To me, Honor is everything!

Yours, etc.,
Rob Adams (Alabaman)

[unionblue]

Alabaman,

My own research on the subject of Cleburne's plan to use freed slaves to increase the fighting forces of the South indicate there was no other reason for General Johnston to deny his plan and cover it up other than the huge objection to consider the use of slaves in such a role.

President Davis (whom you may add to your list) on down the military chain of command in the AOT, almost in its entirety, objected to the proposal by the Irish-born General Cleburne. I did find that Thirteen officers, including three brigadier generals, had previously endorsed Cleburne's speech on the subject. Several more at the meeting also agreed with the idea.

But remember what Cleburne was proposing, the central core of his idea of enlisting black slaves into the Confederate army, the emancipation of every slave who would risk "his life in defense of the State," and the liberation of that slave's wife and children too. If Cleburne had found the support of the majority of the AOT's commanding officers, I think there would have been a good chance of his proposal being brought forth for public discussion within the South.

But it was NOT supported by a majority, even within his own Army of the Tennessee. Many of his fellow officers looked down on his suggestion and called it monstrous, hideous and objectionable. Jeff Davis squashed the idea, ordered it suppressed and hidden from the people of the South, because he feared the reaction of Southern leaders and citizens of freeing slaves to carry guns, kill whites (even Northern ones) and learn the arts of war. My own experience as a military instructor is once you learn a thing, it is very hard to undo a thing.

And if I find the web site again, I will provide you a link that shows not only Walker and Wigfall robbed the South of a chance to obtain victory, but they also did not go behind the backs of honorable men to do so, as they were in the majority on this question and felt no need to go behind the backs of anyone. They considered themselves the honorable ones, and did so until the death of the 'cause'.

Honor may be everything, but it must be viewed in the context of the times. These men did not view slavery as wrong, but Cleburne's view of using slaves as wrong, because he was foreign born and didn't understand slaves like they did. General Lee was a great military leader, but he was a military man and just didn't understand the political and social implications of what he was asking when he suggested the use of freed slaves as soldiers.

You simply cannot expect a society who has the institution of slavery fixed in its mind and its social landscape to shift mental gears on the subject overnight. And this is why Cleburne did not stand a chance, even though he had not been captured by the social system of slavery (as a 'foreign' outsider), there was no way he could change the mindset of those who had been born, raised and had come to believe in that social system that considered slavery a moral good and a social blessing.

And to keep that system, the slave had to fit in his proscribed place, a creature that could not bear arms, understand tactics, who would not fight. He could only keep his place as a creature of labor, a piece of property, not a thinking, breathing man with hopes of freedom.

Again, Rob, in my opinion, Cleburne's idea came to too little, too late and no hope of understanding.

Sincerely,
Unionblue

[elektratig]

In his book Origins of Southern Radicalism: The South Carolina Upcountry 1800-1860, Lacy Ford, a Professor of History at the University of South Carolina, has done some extremely detailed research on socioeconomic trends in the pre-War South Carolina Upcountry.

During the 1850's, railroads came to the Upcountry. Railroads and rising cotton prices significantly altered agricultural and business patterns in the Upcountry. Cotton production rose and production of staple crops and meat declined. Businesses such as dry-goods stores expanded; for the first time, banks and cotton brokers opened local offices. The value of both real property and personal property -- including slaves -- soared.

One thing that did not occur between 1850 and 1860 was significant expansion of manufacturing. As of the late 1840s, there were in the Upcountry two basic sorts of what we would call manufacturing (as opposed to small craft industries such as shoemaking or furnituremaking or local operations such as milling): the production of cotton textiles and iron production.

While there were certainly other factors at work, Professor Ford identifies a shortage of labor -- including slave labor -- as a central factor in the failure of manufacturing to expand. For example, discussing the iron foundries he concludes:

"All three companies relied heavily on slave labor, often hiring slaves from nearby planters on a part-time basis, and used whites only as supervisors or in a few skilled positions. Thus both the rising cost of hiring slaves and the growing opportunity costs of holding slaves out of agricultural labor hurt the iron companies tremendously."

As to the textile industry:

"The value of cotton goods manufactured in South Carolina declined by almost 40 percent during the same decade [1850-60]. Much of the decline was the result of the closing of a number of textile mills in the lower and middle districts of the state. These black-belt mills used mostly slave labor, and with slave values skyrocketing and agricultural profits high, the use of slaves in cotton mills became prohibitively expensive."

In short, Professor Ford's detailed analysis strongly supports the conclusion that slavery was a viable and indeed thriving institution immediately before the War. In times of high cotton prices, the demand for slaves for agricultural work was so high that it sent slave prices soaring. Moreover, South Carolinian whites had already demonstrated that they were ready to employ slaves in unskilled and/or semiskilled manufacturing work. There is every reason to believe that, if the price of cotton were to drop again, enterprising South Carolinians were ready, indeed eager, to absorb excess slave labor that became available in manufacturing work.

The more I think about these issues, the harder it is for me to imagine how the deep south would have rid itself of slavery.

[elektratig]

Here's another antebellum historian who agrees that slavery was not on the way out:

"Especially during [the 1850s], the Transportation Revolution expanded markets, spread commercial agriculture, fostered manufacturing, extended mining, and, not the least important, reinvigorated slavery's economic position. Wherever dynamic market forces made an appearance, slavery accompanied them, and, far from verging on extinction on the eve of the Civil War, the peculiar institution in Virginia remained adaptable, viable and modernizing. The evidence of slavery's resiliency can be found not only in rising slave prices but also in the use of slave labor for various enterprises."

William A. Link, Roots of Secession: Slavery and Politics in Antebellum Virginia (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press 2003), at 29.

[whitworth]

It would have been a political move to end slavery in the 19th century by the Confederacy, not economics.

First, slavery was valuable. Slaves were highly priced in 1860. Wealth was made by slaveowners and farms with slaves were more productive, than family farms without slaves. The reasons that made slavery productive in 1860, were still present in 1900.

While the South had the cotton gin in 1860, the invention of the mechanical cotton picker, in the field, was not made until the 1930's. From an economic viewpoint, change for economic reasons would not have ended slavery. Slavery was what the South knew and it worked very economically for those farmers who owned slaves.

Only for social, moral or political reasons would the Confederacy have ended slavery before 1900, imo.

We should remember that any state in the Confederacy could not ban slavery, or the right of citizens of other slave states in the Confederacy, from bringing slaves into their state. The Confederacy would have required amendments to end slavery in the Confederacy and not the beginning decision of one Confederate State.

[ole]

It would have been a political move to end slavery in the 19th century by the Confederacy, not economics.

You are adding a factor that was not originally intended: the gradual elimination of slavery in a Confederacy.

Were the confederacy established successfully without the war, I would consider it quite possible that slavery would have died out much quicker in an independent south than it would have in the original Union.

Let's take an over-generalized look at that possibility. In the pre-war south, there were those who believed (silently) in the basic immorality of slavery. There were those who were convinced that free labor would be equally profitable. There were those who agitated for investments in industry and infrastructure. For the most part, they were ignored.

Aside from getting his cotton to a seaport and getting his imported evidence of status, the planter didn't care about roads, schools, or industry -- that is, anything other than what would add to his wealth and that of his associates.

Remove Northern influence and trade. Northern industry is hurt, but not crippled. British industry enjoys (temporarily) unhindered access to southern markets. Southern industry remains undeveloped (status quo, after all, was a real goal of those in political power).

So now the Brits see a somewhat captive market and start to jack up the prices a bit. Meanwhile, the cost of government is placed on a smaller population, so taxes and tariffs start to rise. Instead of being dependent on northern shipping, the burden shifts to English shipping. Shipping costs go up as England has to try to replace the enormous US merchant fleet. Southern shipbuilding remains undeveloped (status quo, after all, was a real goal of those in political power).

I'm basing this thought on the tragicomic, wartime Confederate government. I would expect it to have been a bit more deliberate and cooperative in peace-time, but I would not count on enough amity to guide a country into any sort of prosperity, given the disproportionate representation of the planter.

Southern wealth was predomininantly based on the value of land and slaves as collateral. It was becoming apparent that a continuing acquisition of more land and cheaper slaves was the only way to maintain southern prosperity. What would it take to stymie that whole dream? A couple of bad years.

Another factor: The greediest planters relied on others to provide fodder and food grains for their animals and human property. For the most part, cattle, corn, wheat, oats and vegetables were crops grown by the slaves for their own well-being (many instances of slaves selling their produce to their masters and others) and by the yeoman farmer. Much of their staples was imported from the north -- especially sugar, molasses, flour, salt, hay, butter, and many other products -- much of which could have been produced on the plantation but for the attention and ground it would remove from cotton production. Would this condition have changed significantly in an independent south? I doubt it.

Interesting thought, Whitworth. Thanks for bringing it up.
Ole