Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
Some items of interest concerning Ft. Sumter before the events of April.
From the book, "Allegiance," by David Detzer, Chapter 8, page 109:
Christmas, 1860, in Charleston, South Carolina.
"At Fort Moultrie tensions fluttered like windblown tinsel. A distinguished old lawyer from the city, James Louis Petigru, had recently visited. South Carolina's best-known opponent of secession, Petigru was a gentleman of such reputation that Lincoln was considering him for a high judicial appointment. Petigru mad no secret of his disgust over the recent proceedings in Charleston, and he got away with his contrary position only because the city's leaders liked and respected him--and perhaps because they viewed him simply as a crank with little influence. He told Fort Moultrie's officers he deeply sympathized with their plight. HE WARNED THEM THEY WOULD BE ATTACKED SOON if Washington did not soon surrender this place, and he literally wept that South Carolina had reached this level of insanity."
"Just before Christmas one of the garrison's officers told Anderson that MILITA UNITS FROM OUTSIDE CHARLESTON HAD RECENTLY BEGUN ARRIVING IN TOWN, AND SCALING LADDERS WERE BEING PREPARED. (Assistant Surgeon) Crawford, after his return from town on December 24, wrote his concerns into his diary: "COUNCIL OF WAR IN THE CITY. TROOPS TO MAKE THE ATTACK SELECTED." South Carolina's engineering officers came to Sullivan's Island AND QUITE OPENLY SURVEYED A SITE AT WHICH TO PLACE A BATTERY OF ARTILLERY."
"Events were clearly moving toward a crisis. A Carolinian, Charles S. Bull, wrote a friend on DECEMBER 19: "EVERYBODY SEEMS TO BE TALKING ABOUT TAKING FORT MOULTRIE AND NOTHING ELSE." At West Point, a young cadet from South Carolina asked permission to withdraw from the Military Academy. He was an only son, he said, and he felt he had better go home "to protect my mother in time of danger."
"The rambunctious Robert Barnwell Rhett, Jr., went to see Gov. Pickens about this time. He had, he told the governor, just received a letter from a friend in Washington, a person who was in a position to know what was going on there. Major Anderson was on the verge of seizing Fort Sumter; PICKENS OUGHT TO ACT IMMEDIATELY AND GRAB FORT SUMTER NOW AND NOT WAIT FOR THE COMMISSIONERS NEGOTIATIONS."
From chapter 9, page 125, concerning events that transpired when Anderson moved his men from Fort Moultrie to Fort Sumter.
Gov. Pickens sent two representatives to speak with Anderson, Colonel Johnston Pettigrew and Major Ellison Capers, both dressed in formal uniforms.
"Pettigrew said that Gov. Pickens was astonished that the major had chosen to 'reinforce' Fort Sumter. On the contrary, Anderson responded, he had simply moved his command here, something that he had a perfect right to do."
"Pettigrew said that when Pickens had been chosen governor a few days earlier, he had been told that President Buchanan had promised South Carolina there would be no changes in the harbor, especially to the status of Fort Sumter. The governor had hoped to effect a transfer of all federal properties in the state without any resort to arms, but Anderson's transfer had made bloodshed likely: (There it was, an open threat, a virtual guarantee that South Carolina was about to attack. And presumably, shortly.)"
"Anderson said he knew of no such agreement between the president and ex-Governor Gist. So far as he had been able to observe, he said, South Carolina's soldiers had been preparing to attack Fort Moultrie, and that was why he had moved."
"Young Capers could no longer hold himself back. How, he said, could Anderson have thought himself threatened? The major replied that he had been worried about the armed steamers that passed Moultrie every day. He had become concerned, he said, that they were about to drop off an assault force north of Moultrie, which would then take over the high sand hills within easy range of its walls. This, he said, was why he had made the move, to avoid bloodshed. He had done this entirely on his own responsibility."
Interesting reading, no? Even before the month of April and before Anderson's move to Fort Sumter, South Carolina had been planning to use military force against federal troops, no matter where they were in the harbor.
And how strange that Anderson would remove his troops to Sumter to avoid a fight. Strange, isn't it?
Sincerely,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Just how dangerous was Fort Sumter to South Carolina? How much of a military threat did it really present?
Lets see what a description of the Fort and its weaknesses.
The fort's basic structure had a 'footprint' of two and a half acres. The fort was intended to accommondate ALMOST a thousand men to man its 140 cannon, placed in three tiers.
The fort contained two large barracks and, standing between them, a three-story building with offices and living quarters. Each structure had its own water supply in catch basins and cisterns, designed to capture and hold the area's frequent downpours. Around the fort's exterior walls on all sides, stretching out for a dozen feet or more, depending on the tide, wrapped a girdle of crushed rocks. One could rather easily walk entirely around the fort for a leisurely look up at its walls, stretching overhead about fifty feet (at low tide). These walls appeared to be formed of solid brick, but in fact were constructed mostly of slabs of concrete, then coated with bricks. At the top of the walls was the parapet, coped with massive bricks, each a foot and a half thick. The parapet jutted out more than a foot from the rest of the wall, and was held in place by fine 'corbels'--small buttresses--the only real decorative touch to the fort's exterior.
Casual observers had a sense that the fort was a basic pentagon because it had five main sides. In fact, there were ten sides, the five main walls would have otherwise butted awkwardly against each other. Each wall had a specific designation, and the names were revealing. To engineers, Sumter had a 'left' side signed to look 'out' toward the harbor's mouth, to face out to sea, to be ready to fight invading fleets out on the water. Its weakest side was its back--the 'Gorge,' they called it--321 feet from side to side, facing south by southwest, toward Morris Island. The engineers had assumed that, during a battle, the fort would get supplies and reinforcements from Charleston, so they had built a 171-foot stone warf on the Gorge side, directly opposite the main gate. The water around Fort Sumter was quite shallow. Deep-sea vessels could not approach the fort or its wharf, but smaller boats from Charleston could get there in fifty minutes.
But, despite its imposing facade, the fort screamed out its weaknesses. Although it had 15 guns mounted, these would have offered the garrison scant protection against a determined assault. ALL BUT ONE AIMED TOWARD THE ATLANTIC, and none could adequately defend the Esplanade or the wharf. Not only were the cannon pointed in the wrong direction, they were mounted for long-range fire and few could have been depressed sufficiently to hit an assault party at the base of the walls. An attack force could land at one of the undefended sides and spread out to search for weak spots. AND THERE WERE MANY OF THESE. The embrasures (the window-like openings for cannon) on the first tier were only chest high above the rocks surrounding the fort. Most were covered with simple wooden shutters or a layer of bricks, but ANYONE WITH A HAMMER COULD KNOCK HIS WAY INSIDE IN NO TIME. The embrasures on the second tier were even more accessible to those with ladders, consisting of yawning openings, each eight feet by eight feet.
The fort also had several other weaknesses. The large building just inside the Gorge wall had been designed, among other things, to house officers apartments, and the ground level of each three-storied apartment had a door that opened on to the wharf side. In theory each apartment would eventually have its own paito on the Esplanade, separated from the rest by wooden fences. When Anderson's command arrived, the workmen had not yet gotten around to erecting the privacy fences for the patios, and the loopholed backdoors of each apartment were invitations for attackers, who could bash them in with simple battering rams.
The main gateway had two four-inch-thick wooden doors, held in place by wooden crossbars, but a single barrel of gunpowder would blow them open. Even more than this, Anderson's tiny garrison would have to stretch itself thin simply to stand atop the walls, to say nothing of blocking every access route to the forts interior. They could hardly expect it to hold back an assault party for long--especially if Gov. Pickens sent one in.
So again, how was this fort a threat to South Carolina? Certainly not a military one. But a political one? More the latter than the former, in my humble opinion.
Sincerely,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
“And William, if you are of the opinion that logic and thoughtful contemplation are keys to understanding the American character of the 1860's, I might suggest you review current American foreign policy of late.”
An excellent point, which is well made. Yes, of course, history is as much about emotion as it is about cold logic – and it is all the more interesting for it. Having said that, I still fail to see a scintilla of evidence to suggest that the Confederate Government approached the Fort Sumter crisis in anything other than a rational collective state of mind which precluded its desiring war with the United States.
“And secession did not garuntee slavery and those in the South knew it did not.”
After the establishment of the Confederacy, slavery within that country could only be threatened by either (a) an act of domestic policy or (b) the consequences of invasion by the U.S.A.
“Why prepare for war?”
Because of the (correct) anticipation of the violent response of Washington to the establishment of the Confederacy.
“As for your Northern backbone argument, dear William, I can assure you that enough of the original volunteers from '61 on, stayed the course and saw the job through.”
Yes, I know. My comments were tongue-in-cheek. But the fact remains that the substitute system and the practice of kidnapping foreigners into the armed forces of the “last, best hope on earth” were both abominations. J. Pierpoint Morgan should have been given a shoddy blue uniform and a musket, and the fact that he wasn’t underlines the fact that America has always had a social system which is every bit as aristocratic as that of the Old World: its just that yours is an aristocracy of wealth rather than of blood. The fact that vulnerable immigrants and impoverished native-born Americans were fed into the meat-grinder, whilst rich Northerners got on with their plans for the Gilded Age, leaves a very unpleasant taste in the mouth.
Neil, I was under the impression that the ownership of All Federal property was mainly about that "Amore Propre" of all Southeron Cavaliers, "Honor".
It seems that the presence of "foreign installations and troops" on S.C. soil was an intolerable affront to the mint new honor and dignity of a freshly independent state.
I suppose one could argue that S.C. wanted to start a war because of piqued egos, inflated by self importance.
"Yes, I know. My comments were tongue-in-cheek. But the fact remains that the substitute system and the practice of kidnapping foreigners into the armed forces of the “last, best hope on earth” were both abominations. J. Pierpoint Morgan should have been given a shoddy blue uniform and a musket, and the fact that he wasn’t underlines the fact that America has always had a social system which is every bit as aristocratic as that of the Old World: its just that yours is an aristocracy of wealth rather than of blood. The fact that vulnerable immigrants and impoverished native-born Americans were fed into the meat-grinder, whilst rich Northerners got on with their plans for the Gilded Age, leaves a very unpleasant taste in the mouth."
WEll spoken William, though I would suggest that the same kind of thing was goin on in the South w/ the Conscription of both the young and the old. many who pushed hardest for secession never saw the sharp end and were quick to flee before the war came to them. politicians... North & South... gotta love their integrity and courage. At least Lincoln had the courage to visit the troops on the firing lines, whatever can be said about LIncoln ,noone can say he lacked the courage of his convictions.
__________________ Few take the trouble to understand or to view the American scene with perspective. And we Americans love to find ourselves guilty of something. However, it is never I who am guilty, but those other Americans, the past or present government or the other political party. Americans almost never find other countries guilty. It is always ourselves or our fancied influence in other countries. Louis L'amour
Neil,
I have considered your posting begging the question how was the threat of Sumter a military one. I just have to ask, how was it a military threat to the Union if it was in Southern hands?
Ever feed a stray cat? It keeps coming back for more, doesn't it?
Why encourage boldness, hot-headed, fire eaters, by giving up something to them? Why stroke the egos of men who are looking for a fight?
What did I read at one time? 'A man holds a gun to my head, demands my money and then says I will be responsible for murder if he kills me if I resist. That is cool.'
Sincerely,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Boldness, fire eaters, giving up something.....Well...that sounds like the abolitionists, immigrant aid, Jim Lane, Sherman, Helper, Lincoln, John Brown, losing the territories to all the above, etc, et al, ad infinitum.....
Since the South was being told the gun was to their heads in Lincoln's 1st inaugural speech if they did not pay taxes I can relate to your quote.
But nice to know the South was just a wretched feline depending on handouts though eh?
Sorry if the example disturbed you, but in South Carolina at the time of the Fort Sumter crisis, there were many men in positions of power and government who were emboldened to push as far as they could and get away with. They needed no provocation and planned to take all of the forts in Charleston well before Anderson's move to Fort Sumter.
The forts were clearly federal property but South Carolina could not leave them there in that state as it would threaten their plans to involve other states who watched to see if South Carolina had the courage to oust federal troops from a federal fort and really mean to go through with its secession.
The threat came from the state, not the fort.
Sincerely,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
Some have pointed out on this thread the Major Anderson had 'no right' to move his men to Fort Sumter. To that observation, I present the following:
On December 7, 1860, Don Carlos Buell, one of a handful of officers connected to the Adjutant General's Office, visited Secretary of War Floyd and was ordered to undertake a delicate assignment. He was to review the situation at Charleston's forts, and to give Major Anderson a message. The content of this message was so delicate that the secretary did not wish to put it in writing. Buell was to memorize it, then verbally pass it on to Anderson. Buell was to remind Anderson to avoid confrontations. If one occurred, however, Anderson was ordered to hold the federal position in the harbor. Buell later recalled that he was supposed to tell Anderson that "The duty of maintaining defensively the authority of the Government was distinctly affirmed." This sentence is awkward, but it seemed to imply that President Buchanan's administration expected Anderson to do whatever was necessary to maintain the federal presence there.
Buell arrived in Charleston two days later, and had to spend the night in a hotel. During his few hours in the city he heard much talk about grabbing the federal forts, words that persuaded him that South Carolina's authorities would soon find themselves unable to prevent mob action. The next day he made a quick tour of all three forts and came away convinced of the obvious: Moultrie by itself was much too vulnerable to count on, but Fort Sumter was potentially almost invulnerable. Having made his tour about the harbor's installations, Buell relayed Floyd's message to Anderson. No doubt the two majors chatted about Anderson's precarious status.
The following morning, as Buell prepared to leave, he admitted to Anderson, "You ought to have written evidence of these instructions." A very precise and cautious man, Buell understood how tenuous Anderson's situation was, and also how verbal instructions had a habit of being misconstrued--or, worse, later denied by Washington. He therefore put Secretary Floyd's orders, for the first time, into writing, and he made a copy of them to take back to Washington. He opened this written "memorandum" with a reminder of how much the secretary wished to avoid a "collision" in Charleston. Floyd wanted Anderson to know that the government had purposely not sent reinforcements or "taken any measures which might add to the present excited state of the public mind." Floyd was confident--unlike Buell--that South Carolina's authorities could restrain acts of popular violence, but if not, if any of the forts was attacked, or if Anderson had tangible evidence of a design to proceed to a hostile act," then--and only then--he could move the garrison to any one of the three forts he chose. And if he were actually attacked, the secretary expected him "to defend yourself to the last extremity." Buell said one more thing to Anderson as he handed him the memorandum: "This is all I am authorized to say to you, but my personal advice is, that you do not allow the opportunity [of moving to Fort Sumter] to escape you."
Buell departed for Washington. There, he verbally reported to Floyd on his trip, and handed over his copy of the memorandum. At some point during the next few days Floyd actually glanced at it, then scrawled across it, "This is in conformity to my instructions to Major Buell," and signed his name.
Floyd did show President Buchanan the memorandum. The president read it. The only part of the note Buchanan commented on was that, if it came to a battle, Major Anderson was being ordered to fight 'to the last extremity.' The president urged Floyd to moderate the meaning. The secretary therefore wrote Anderson that, if his garrison was "invested or attacked by a force so superior that resistance would, in your judgment, be a useless waste of life, it will be your duty to yield to necessity, and make the best terms in your power." To surrender under those circumstances would "be the conduct of an honorable, brave, and humane officer, and you will be fully justified in such action." Floyd also told the major that he was not to share this message with anyone, even his own officers, unless absolutely necessary. Anderson received THIS message on December 23, two days before Christmas.
For your consideration,
Unionblue
__________________ "The American people and the Government at Washington may refuse to recognize it for a time but the inexorable logic of events will force it upon them in the end; that the war now being waged in this land is a war for and against slavery." Frederick Douglass
"Loyalty to our ancestors does not include loyalty to their mistakes." George Santayana
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