Was War Necessary After Secession?

[ewc]

A question which has bedeviled me since I became interested in the Civil War as a lad was whether this war had to be fought.

The outgoing Buchanan administration, the incoming Republican administration, and the country at large had to deal with this issue. Could not have the 7 Deep South states formed their Confederacy and remained apart for the nonce and the Northern and upper tier slave States remained apart without war?

What thinkest all?

[tulip]

We whites can ponder that question and in the end will probably figure no, there was a better way.

However, I think the descendants of slaves will take a different view. Without the war, their ancestors would have continued to live under the burden of toil and trouble, misery and humiliation, abuse and sadness well into the 20th century. So for them, I say, the war happened none too soon.

[yankeewoman]

In order to give meaning and strength to the government which the American colonies eventually formed, it had to be shown that it was NOT a mere will-o-the-wisp; it had to be shown that it would, could, should survive; that declarations are not made, and constitutions are not brought to fruition for the pleasure of a few, but for the benefit of all. It was not a "gentlemen's club" which was formed; it was a government.

I am not sure that slavery would have existed into the 20th century, however. By the late 1850's, there were cracks forming in that institution. Also, the Missouri Compromise promised to keep slavery below 36/30; if slavery were to be kept in the South, that designation wouldn't leave much room for the expansion of slavery.

I feel that slavery took away initiative. With it, the "property" had no reason to do anything more than the minimal amount of work required for food and shelter, as it was impossible for a slave to better himself when bound as property. Without it, an individual would be able to express their initiative.

[unionblue]

Dear Ed, at no time could the South let there be peace. The North, as shown by her people and her government, had the attitude to let the South go in peace, at the very least, most of the North's citizens had this attitude. But Lincoln COULD NOT let the South go her own way. He had no choice as the Constitution told him he had to defend the nation from enemies from without and within. Then there is that little matter of the South firing on Ft. Sumter. No way could the North let that go by without some kind of response.

Just don't think it could be that the South could leave without some sort of fuss.

Unionblue

[iron_brigade]

Ed,

I'm not trying to be rude but what secession have you been contemplating for the years since you have been a lad?! The Historic record is very clear, in every aspect, that the southern secession of 1860 turned violent in April of 1861.In all seriousness I gotta ask Ed. Just how in the hell could the Federal or common Government have IGNORED... THE... ****............. FIRING...... ON... SUMTER?!?!

Greg

(Message edited by iron_brigade on December 05, 2002)

[ewc]

The time from the election by the whole people which elevated Mr Lincoln to the presidency to the bombardment upon Ft Sumter was a period of over 5 months. It is, I believe, safe to say that this was the most fluid and active political time of the nation's history. And yet all efforts at conciliation, mediation, and discourse failed at a time when noone, (save the extremes of the ultras- and there is everywhere always a lunatic fringe,) wanted peace.

During this time, Buchanan, buffeted continually by events and abandoned by his southern friends, sought desperately for a status quo. Northern Democrats and the Upper Slave states equally desperately sought some kind of compromise. Lincoln and the Republicans wanted no fighting war- they wanted to enjoy their new situation in Washington and fight the war of words and ideas in the political arena- their element and where they now liked their chances. The country as a whole voted by a large margin for candidates (Douglas, Breckinridge, and Bell) who would not precipitate a terrible falling out. (I would some day love to discuss what a Douglas or Bell Presidency at this time would have meant.) And lastly, the departing lower south states preferred to be left in peace to embark upon their experiment as an independent slave empire.

Yet despite the earnest desire of the entire nation less a few a catastrophic war came. Connie says the war had to happen to remove the scourge of slavery. Neil says the South would have precipitated the war sooner or later. For Rose, the war was necessary to prevent the Balkanization of the country into weak nationettes. And Greg will simply look at the historical record.

My point in this discussion was to examine decisions made and not made, acts, and choices made by the nation's leaders at this most critical time. After South Carolina's secession, war could have been had at any time, yet 4 months passed. Major Anderson's Christmas Night move of his command from Ft Moultrie to Ft Sumter sent the Palmetto hotheads into a frenzy. What if his efficient and stealthy move had been intercepted? The 'Star of the West' 's relief expedition to Ft Sumter was fired upon by South Carolina batteries in January '61. Captain McGowan's decision to withdraw and Anderson's decision not to fire kept this incident from escalating into war. The taking of the forts, arsenals, customhouses, lighthouses, the mint in New Orleans, and revenue cutters, all belonging to the federal government could have inaugurated war if a curator soldier had resisted or the Buchanan administration demanded their return. What if General Twiggs or the regulars patrolling Texas' frontier had refused surrender to the makeshift Texas secessionist state government? Federal garrisons held Ft Pickens in Pensacola Bay, and Fts Taylor and Jefferson in the Keys, all steadfastly refusing to budge. War could have started over any of these situations, yet the professional soldiers all resisted taking to hostilities and gave the politicians chance and again to work out a settlement. The Buch-aneers continued to look for a middle way.

The attack upon Ft Sumter and its reduction thrust the issue of a fighting war squarely upon Lincoln's lap. He had set up this scenario so that if the shooting started, it would be the Confederates who began the shooting. Now how to proceed depended upon his worthy consideration. Looking back in time at the great Civil War, how can one not see what is so prominent- this most bloody and frightful war? How can one consider that it could not have happened, or not have been so great or so horrible? It is hard to ignore and hard to contemplate a time before it took place and think of what might have been. Remember at the time of Ft Sumter's fall, the loyal Union included New England, the Great Lake states, the North West and Pacific states (and a non-slave Kansas,) border Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland, and Delaware, as well as Virginia (the whole of), North Carolina, Tennessee, and Arkansas. As of April 16, 1861- the Confederacy is a ribbon of Gulf and Lower Atlantic seaboard states and a shrimp dwarfed by the Union colossus. This belligerent act of the Confederacy to take Ft Sumter by force places the Union on the moral high ground as the victim of aggression. An aggression which compromised the sympathies of the upper slave-holding states- states sitting on the fence hoping, praying for moderation and conciliation.

Could not President Lincoln have accepted war yet not moved on the Confederacy, thereby avoiding for the nonce 'coercion' and worked at keeping the upper belt of slave states in the Union as he so successfully did later with the border states? Remember that before his inauguration, he offered WC Rives, a Virginia Unionist, a deal to withdraw the Sumter garrison for assurances that Virginia's secession convention would go home. Secretary of State WH Seward was hard at work trying to reconcile the South, and making assurances to certain Southerners that Ft Sumter would be evacuated. Had he his way, that is what would have been done; that is what Lincoln's top military men (Generals Scott, Wool, and Totten) were telling him was necessary, though not what was necessarily desirable.

Many things before the bombardment of Ft Sumter, (as well as considerations after,) could have avoided or at least delayed the start of war so that some different outcome could have been in the offing. We can't know, it is all surmise; as Greg says- there is the historical record. But for our imaginations, it is a wonderful area for exploration and conjecture- a magnificent 'What if...'

Regards all, ewc

[unionblue]

Ed, been reading over your last response and I must say you give me much to ponder on. I agree with your line that almost everyone wanted peace. The attitude of most people in the North was of that vein and I agree that the Upper South wanted no war. I'll even go with you that if the lower South thought they could, they would like to go their way in peace and develope their new Slave empire.

What would have happened if Lincoln had just let his erring brethern go? He would have been impeached or forced to resign eventually. Or perhaps he might have been permitted to hold office for one term, I can't really say.

What if the South had not fired on Fort Sumter? What if the "Star of the West" had got through and reinforced the fort? I really think the whole harbor was a giant powder keg waiting to explode and no matter how much restraint was shown by the North, eventually the South would have taken action. I think the South HAD to take action to get those Upper Southern States to get on board and leave the Union. And I do think it was a "lunatic fringe" in the South that wanted war at almost any price.

My reasoning is that the "fire eaters" did not want any backsliders back into the Union fold, that anything was worth preserving the institution of slavery, even war.

As for the notion that Lincoln set up the Fort Sumter 'scenario' attack by prior planning, it just doesn't wash with the man, at least from what I have read. I really belive that Lincoln was just as shocked and horrified at the bloody results of the war as anyone else was and thought the confilict would be resolved quickly.

As for Lincoln accepting a war and NOT moving on the enemies of the Union so quickly, that was not possible if the South was truely determined not to rejoin the Union. Your own statements make it plain that the administration was working very hard to keep states within the Union by compromise and repeated reassurances to the men in charge of the South.

But Lincoln never put aside the idea that the Union and the preservation of same was the ultimate goal. Gen. Scott, Wool and others may have lost sight of the political goal by becoming emeshed in military details, but Lincoln did not.

Sorry Ed, no matter how you slice, between Southern hot heads and Lincoln's determination, war was the only result.

Sincerely,
Unionblue
PS I like the idea of discussing the idea if Douglas had won the 1860 election if war could have been avoided. Maybe on another thread?

(Message edited by unionblue on December 13, 2002)

[ewc]

Neil

You raise very good points. I will not tackle them all just now, but will start. I should first say that I should have introduced this topic more concisely. I originally made no mention of Ft Sumter and only secession so as to discuss choices, actions, and events up to that fateful day, which could only inaugurate war. But up until that time, there was no shooting war, and each such day might lead to another, then another- and until the shooting started, well perhaps it could be avoided for just another day, and perhaps, just perhaps every day!.

Yes, for survival doubtlessly the Confederacy needed the upper tier of slave states, and fully expected them to join. The Southerners considered the Ohio River and the Mason-Dixon Line to be the natural frontier. Many of the actions of the Provincial Congress were taken with just such a thing in mind. They wrote a ban on the importation of slaves into the Constitution, (to the dismay of the fire-eaters who maintained such an act blighted the right to property in slaves, a right for which they left behind the ****ed perfidious Yankees to uphold in the first place.) They elected Jefferson Davis president, a man well known for upholding Southern values in the Senate and well regarded in the upper South, but who cried at the breaking up of the Union. They elected Alexander Stephens vice-president, a man who opposed secession to the last, spoke against it at every turn, and who voted against it in Georgia's convention. Besides honoring the South's most acclaimed statesman with high office, this selection of a moderate and nationalist was obviously a move to woo the border states and it served to show the North that, after all, we're not rabid down here. However, the rabid element went fairly ballistic over this, no doubt the wild wailing and gnashing of teeth was truly epic to behold. They sent emissaries to their brethren slave-holding states to talk, soothe, and cajole. They sent commissioners to Washington to treat of questions pertaining to peace as one civilized nation does with another. The selection of these 'ambassadors' by Davis is interesting; they were Martin Crawford- a moderate of the Stephens stamp and latecomer to secession,-John Forsyth, an outspoken Douglas Democrat, and AB Roman, a Louisiana grandee with strong economic ties to the North. No fire-breather among them. The Confederate Congress also proposed favorable trade offers and blandishments on Mississippi River traffic.

So such were some attempts at moderation and seeking a peaceful way by the Confederates. The Confederacy was not then, (in fact, never was at any time,) a monolith. It had its divisions, and President Davis was going to have just as difficult and aggravating a time as President Lincoln in appeasing, cajoling, and managing the disparate and exasperating factions within his borders. Generally, the Southern attitude was one of wishing to be left in peace. But at the same time, they managed to make very aggressive if not war-like statements and fit actions to words. So wilfully or not, the Confederacy moved towards war.

Lincoln's situation in many ways was much messier and tumultuous than Davis's. His was a new administration by a new party new to governance. The Republicans themselves represented many disparate elements, a good many of whom did not like nor trust the other. Then there were the Douglas men, the Buch-aneer men, the border and Union slave states- some with sitting secession conventions. There were the reconciliation committees in Congress and the Peace Convention; there were the Crittenden and other peace proposals. And there were guns pointed at United States soldiers serving their country. Whatever the men at the top were going to do was not going to be easy and was not going to pacify somebody and very likely make them blistering mad. It was all Buchanan could do to hold the fort (in a manner of speaking) and hand over a functioning government not at war to the incoming administration. Lincoln had his hands full immediately and sooner. (Many of his countrymen would liken it to be more like over his head!) Basically, what Lincoln would do with every breath would determine the fate of the republic.

As to Lincoln's handling of the Ft Sumter crisis, what I meant was that his decision was to send only supplies to the garrison and not land troops. He thus showed that he would hold his ground, feed his soldiers, and not otherwise antagonize the Southerners. If shots were to be fired , it would be not he the aggressor nor transgressor, but an official doing his appointed duty. In other words, for a shooting war to break out, it would not be him doing the shooting, but only his men rightly defending their flag. By saying Lincoln 'set it up', I merely mean that he maneuvred the Southerners thus into firing the first shots of any war. He himself would be, and needs be, blameless of such an act. Here again is Lincoln at his finest. He succeeded here as well as he did in most of his undertakings. Where that left him is an issue I would like to take up at a later time.

As to the Union top military men, by the time Lincoln assumed the presidency, they felt that as much as they would prefer to hold on to Ft Sumter- aye, all the forts in their possession- there was no way for it to be done in practicality and the logical course to pursue was its evacuation. This was so because to reinforce or relieve Ft Sumter, ships would have to run batteries commanding the harbor, now an unlikely proposition. This was not the case with the other Southern forts in Union hands- all could be supplied by sea, and General Scott had already taken measures to secure them. Scott is an interesting study during this time frame. He is a Virginian of nationalist sentiment. For him, it was country and country only. Secessionists ****ed him because they knew he would never be with them. (If only Lee had thought like him, what! But Lee for all his service had not the scope, experience, and clarity of vision as Scott, who at this time was by far and all America's greatest soldier.) His headquarters were in New York, so he was out of the picture during the days of cabinet infighting in Buchanan's White House. With South Carolina's secession, he asked Buchanan what shall we do to protect the public weal, but Buchanan did not know his right from his left just then and deferred to consensus in his cabinet. Secretary of War Floyd deliberately kept Scott out of the loop so as to keep Scott and the Army out of political questions where his nationalist sympathies could upset the apple cart. Finally with Anderson's transfer of his command and an increasingly alarmed Buchanan, Old Buck brought him back into the picture. He came to Washington to make sure his voice would be heard. He strongly promoted reinforcing the garrison, and urged it be done immediately. That led to the 'Star of the West' expedition, which rebuffed at Charleston, chugged back to New York, to the immense displeasure of General Scott. He outfitted a new expedition which was not to turn back, but Buchanan had by this time decided it was best to keep Anderson in the harbor, but to not further antagonize the Carolinians. While Buchanan searched for some balance, Scott saw his chances slipping away until there was no way to get into the harbor without very great risk. Thus happened his considered opinion that by the time Lincoln arrived on the scene, his military duty was to present Lincoln the risks and recommend withdrawal in Charleston harbor; the time for reinforcement had passed and for Major Anderson and his men to be brought out of a useless situation. He personally wanted no abandonment, and said so. Lincoln, in the same boat himself, understood.

I've written enough for one night. I'm tired. I will continue this theme later.

ewc

[tulip]

Edward:

I am on my first cup of coffee so may have missed something, but it seems to me that you answered your initial question quite effectively with your last post. To summarize my interpretation of your post: No, the CSA could not be left to its own, because the understanding that Unionists placed on the essence of the American revolution was perpetual union. In the northern mindset, states could not pick up their marbles because they disagreed with the outcome of a legitimate election. Therefore, the act of secession made war inevitable. The only question left was to decide whether that secession was irreversible and I believe it was.

Since Lincoln's ill-conceived "Any people anywhere . . . have the right to rise up" speech during the 1848 presidential campaign, perpetual union was Lincoln's constant and unaltered message to the country. Instead of hearing the message, however, the southern leaders chose to concentrate on Lincoln's rather weak and vague stand on slavery.

IMO the South was well aware of Lincoln's perpetual union position and seceded after the 1860 election knowing that Lincoln would not and could not let them go in peace. While arguments continue to this day as to whether the Founding Fathers designed the Union as "perpetual," the fact remains that Lincoln believed it and designed both his actions and public utterings to express this belief. In essence the timing of secession was a deliberate thumbing to the north, a kind of "We dare you." Naturally, we know today that the south grossly underestimated the obscure and ungainly man they considered a rube and a rude westerner who would take office in March of 1861.

In 1858 William Seward described the two prevalent views in America of the developing sectional conflict. He reported that some, "think it is accidental. unnecessary, the work of interested or fanatical agitators and therefore ephemeral . . ." <u>Ephemeral: </u>short-lived, fleeting, transitory, momentary. In other words, many had a bad case of tunnel vision and chose to believe the trouble would go away with the passage of time.

Those who viewed it this way were simply avoiding the reality that Seward and many like-minded men (remember in the prewar Senate Davis and Seward were close friends) saw more clearly, "It is an irrepressible conflict between opposing and enduring forces. . ."

Seward himself was not advocating war. He felt war was unnecessary and to be avoided at all costs. It was Seward after all who proposed the ludicrous device of declaring war on Spain to reunite the states. Nonetheless, Seward recognized the growing chasm and was simply saying that the ideas and institutions, which divided North and South, were both intense and extensive resulting in a natural debate and conflict.

Seward defined the irrepressible conflict as arising from "two radically different political systems; the one resting on the basis of servile labor, the other on the basis of voluntary labor of free men." Seward believed that collisions were bound to occur as the country grew and addressed evolving issues such as westward expansion, railroad building, urban growth, international trade treaties, and of course the ubiquitous slavery question.

Lincoln agreed with Seward and saw the widening breach as irrepressible requiring a resolution. In what many believe was Lincoln's greatest speech, the second inaugural, Lincoln announced, "All knew that this [slave] interest was somehow the cause of war. . . To strengthen, perpetuate, and extend this interest was the object for which the insurgents would rend the Union even by war." While Lincoln was speaking in hindsight, it is certain that his words reflected what he believed in early 1861.

In the 20th Century Edward Channing argued that slavery created two "irreconcilable sections" in the antebellum years resulting in the South becoming a nation within a nation, "War for Southern Independence" Channing said resulted from the two sides being unable, "to live side by side within the walls of one government."

Allan Nevin's agreed and took it further, "the main root of the conflict . . . was the problem of slavery," along with a related problem of "race adjustment," concluding that "South and North . . . were rapidly becoming separate peoples. . . With every passing year, the fundamental assumptions, tastes, and cultural aims of the two sections became more divergent." These differences created a climate, "in which emotions grew feverish; in which every episode became a crisis, every jar a shock."

David Potter another 20th C historian, however, took a variant view, believing that a compromise allowing slavery to expand and therefore survive would have been "better than war." He agreed that emancipation was a "good thing," but pondered, "A person is entitled to wonder whether the slaves could not have been freed at a smaller per capita cost." Potter felt that the Crittenden Compromise guaranteeing slavery where it existed was the best alternative to war and that slavery had reached its natural limits anyway and would eventually disappear. Therefore to Potter the war was a waste and completely unnecessary as a solution to a strictly political question.

Now if you assume that time created by a stalemate would have allowed peaceful men to come to a resolution, you must also assume that during the standoff, abolitionists would have expanded their work up North and that leaders below the M-D Line would have continued to pursue independence. Therefore how could the work of peace bear fruit in such an unstable and volatile climate? I don't believe that it could. To effect a compromise there has to be a middle ground where there is agreement. IMO by 1860, the national soil connecting the two sides had been richly plowed for several decades with the combustible nutrients of conflicting goals, societal disagreements, rampant fanaticism and tenacious determinism, which eroded the middle ground, dropping it into the chasm. Stated another way, there was not ground for compromise. The USA would not and could not abandon perpetual union. The CSA would not and could not abandon their bid for independence.

Finally when the Ft. Sumter crisis began heating up, Davis tried to compromise with the Union by compensating the USA for the forts and sent a peace mission to DC. This attempt at peaceful secession ignored Lincoln’s stand on perpetual union . Lincoln could not receive the commission without recognizing the legitimacy of the Confederacy. Thus the Davis peace commission resulted in another impasse, but all the while the pot kept boiling.

Unwilling to accept the standoff, and totally ignoring Lincoln's determination for perpetual union, Davis acted. In his first erroneous misreading of the North, Davis listened to reports that the Republicans were coming apart and based his actions on this wrong conclusion. He therefore forced the issue by demanding that Sumter be evacuated. He agreed with radical South Carolinians that the CSA could not lose, by reasoning that if the “We dare you” worked, the CSA would exist in peace and if the North took the dare, the Upper South would tumble into the CSA and reinforce its existence with its numbers and resources. Firing on Sumter, of course, worked in the short term. "The thrill of action and triumph rushed through the Confederacy. In the Upper South where secession had been stymied, reconsideration proceeded promptly." [Cooper pg 366]

In his book <u>The Imperiled Union</u>, Kenneth Stampp says: "There still remains the question of the evitability or inevitability of the Civil War itself - a question that will probably continue to be, as it is now (1980), unanswerable. It may well be that the country reached a point sometime in the 1850s when it would have been almost impossible to avoid a violent resolution of the sectional crisis. . ." Stampp suggests that during that decade both sides hardened their resolve and set their goals and at some point, "the point of no return" was reached and passed.

I believe that Stampp adequately answers your question in the only way possible: <font color="ff0000">"The irrepressible conflict of antebellum years made the war, if not inevitable, at least an understandable response to its stresses by men and women no more or less wise than we."</font> [pgs 225 &amp; 245]

(Message edited by tulip on December 15, 2002)

[ewc]

Connie- I have been waiting for you to join in. I was thinking this question was the sort of thing which appealed to you. You too raise very interesting points. It is very hard to see how it is war could have been avoided by 1861. Your quotes of Stampp come to the very heart of the matter. It is true that by 1860 the quest for accord between the two sides of the questions of slavery, states- rights, and secession and union had become less and less tenable. Through the '50s, the issues became less amenable through debate and discourse and more a source of misunderstanding and stubbornness which led to wounded feelings, bitter words and acts, obnoxious behavior which again led to more tensions, misapprehensions, and muleheadedness so that finally precious little ground existed for much understanding and improvement at all! By 1860, each side viewed the other as intransigent, surly, and obnoxious, unable to listen to reason. Each side defended the right- and the other side persisted in error through a sheer perversity of spirit! The American political arena and genius for compromise had only delayed and not answered these questions, and as the tug tightened, the pull of the extremes at either end became more and more pronounced until these were the dominant voices. As well did the stance of the moderates become more and more hardened. The middle ground became quite thin ,and so by 1860, events had led to dissolution, secession, and the threat of war.

However there were still moderates, represented in 1860 election by Tennessee's John Bell, who received a significant number of votes. Bell's people of course did not expect to win the election, but believed no candidate might receive enough electoral votes so as to throw the selection of a president into Congress where a compromise might be reached. Bell's whole platform consisted of basically let us not concentrate on these sectional differences, but live and let live. A significant amount of the citizenry felt this way, North and South. Was this wrong or short-sighted? How can anyone be blamed for wishing to put calm and reason to the forefront and allow tempers to cool? That it didn't or couldn't happen is a reason a civil war did happen.

As Connie so well points out, things came to such a pass because of a divergent understanding of the fabric of the nation. One side maintained that slavery is acceptable and therefore extendable to the breadth and width of the country. The other side maintained that slavery is not acceptable ,though it exists where it is, but must not extend throughout the country. One side says secession is an inherent right; the other that Union is paramount. The one is exemplified by secession and the Confederacy which came to be; the other in a Northern president maintaining the Union. From the beginning of the question till the end of the war, the differences were not much amenable to reconciliation. One or the other understanding of Union and secession was going to have to prevail. It's a shame that the issue could not be decided in the political arena, but must needs have subjected the nation to a dreadful war.

I haven't touched all your points, Connie, but that's all I can do for now. Regards, ewc