Civil War History - Secession and PoliticsWas it Slavery, or was it States Rights? Perhaps it was the election of Lincoln? What were the real reasons for Southern Secession and what were the political issues in this time of war? Find your answers here in the Secession and Politics Disussion.
First off, let me preface this with the statement that it is long and involved. I started out to write a shorter version but couldn't resist the details. Second, it is not exactly on topic with this board but it has to do with secession so........
On November 6, 1811 a tall thin young man for Abbeville, South Carolina took his seat in the House of Representatives. The young man was 29 years old and the son of a prominent figure in South Carolina politics, Patrick Calhoun. The son, John C. Calhoun had started his collegiate career at Yale. After graduating from Yale, he had continued in his legal training at Tapping Reeve's Law School in Litchfield, Connecticut where he was an outspoken supporter of Jefferson's Democratic party in a Federalist stronghold. Graduating from the law school he had served a brief apprenticeship under Henry W. de Saussere in Charleston before leaving to seek his fortune in Abbeville. Finding the practice of law to be somewhat of drudgery, he early on determined to seek a career in the political arena and was soon in the South Carolina State Legislature. Calhoun's career in the state legislature of South Carolina was relatively short as he was soon nominated for the House of Representatives and found himself on the way to Washington where he was to serve in different capacities for much of the next forty years.
Taking his seat in the House the young Calhoun was a picture of energy and strength. Some six-feet two inches tall with an unruly shock of dark hair that seemed to stand out from his head and fierce dark eyes. He was a second generation Scot. Word of his strong grasp of political realities had preceded Calhoun to Washington for the young Speaker of the House, Henry Clay, chose him to sit on the Committee on Foreign Relations. The head of the committee soon withdrew from Congress for personal reasons and Calhoun was to take first place on the Committee. Congress was embroiled in a controversy concerning the warlike posturing between Madison's Administration and the British Government over the impressments of American sailors on British ships and the British attempts to stop the westward expansion of the new country. Madison's message to Congress had been unmistakably warlike and preparations were underway to bolster the US Navy and Army. An Appropriations Bill was soon under discussion to build new ships, retrofit existing commercial ships, and raise additional manpower in the form of recruits for the armed forces. John Randolph of Roanoke, Virginia had arisen to give a speech against such measures in the ridiculing manner in which Randolph was especially suited to administer. On December 12, 1811 Calhoun arose to give his first speech in the House of Representatives. This speech was a ringing endorsement of the Madison Administrations policy and the protective tariff program needed to initiate the buildup toward war. Ironically, the first speech Calhoun gave in the House was for a tariff, the issue against which his legacy was to find its most enduring legacy. Nevertheless, Calhoun was squarely behind the administration in 1811 as this excerpt will show:
"I believe it was said that the nation will not pay taxes because the rights violated are not worth defending, or that the defense will cost more than the profit. Sir, I here enter my most solemn protest against this low and calculating avarice entering this hall of legislation. It is only fit for shops and counting houses, and ought not to disgrace the seat of sovereignty by its squalid and vile appearance. Whenever it touches a sovereign power, the nation is ruined. It is too short-sighted to defend itself. It is an unpromising spirit, always ready to yield a part to save the balance…..
Sir, I know only one principle to make a nation great, to produce in this country not the form but the real spirit of union, and that is to protect every citizen in his rightful pursuit of his business. He will then feel he is backed by the Government; that its arm is his arm. Protection and patriotism are reciprocal. That is the road that all great nations have trod. Sir, I am not versed in the calculating policy, and will not, therefore, pretend to estimate in dollars and cents the value of national independence, or national affection. I cannot dare to measure, in shillings and pence, the misery, the stripes, and the slavery of impressed seamen; not even to value our shipping, commercial and agricultural losses, under the orders-in-council and the British system of blockade."
John Calhoun's speech against Randolph and ringing endorsement of national sovereignty and the necessity for protective tariffs was to endear him to the party leaders. As preparations for war continued and the political arena became more divided for and against the coming war, Calhoun became one of the most ardent defenders of the Administration.
On June 1, 1812 Madison sent a confidential message to the Congress. The House was cleared of spectators and the message read in closed session. Madison maintained that Britain was already in reality in a state of war against the United States. The only question remaining to be answered was whether the United States would answer in kind or "remain passive under these progressive usurpations." Madison pointed out in his message that the Constitution "wisely confides" this question to the Congress and asked for their early deliberation and answer to such a vital question.
The message was immediately referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs where Calhoun sat. The Committee responded with a long list of wrongs suffered by the United States at the hands of England and concluded with the following: "Your Committee recommend an immediate appeal to arms." This recommendation was committed to the House as a whole where it was put to a vote. The vote was 79-49 in favor of declaring war on England. With the Senate's approval the United States found herself at war with England. The United States Navy at the time of the Declaration of War consisted of exactly three large frigates of forty-four guns and four smaller frigates of some 32-38 guns, and a number of smaller sloops and brigs mounting from 16-18 guns. The British Navy on the other hand, was the most powerful force on the seas and contained some 1000 ships listed upon the British Naval List.
The war was not looked upon with favor in New England. The non-importation agreements had already damage shipping interests there for several years and there was growing unrest with the policies of the government that openly favored relations with France over Great Britain. Great Britain was the trading partner to New England and such policies were seen as ludicrous to many in this area of the country. There were ringing speeches against the war from many areas of the North including one Daniel Webster. He declared:
"We are from principle and habit attached to the Union, but our attachment is to the substance and not to the form. If the time should arrive when this Union will be held together by nothing but the authority of the law….We shall look upon that hour as the closing scene of our country's prosperity. If separation of the States should ever take place, it will be when one portion of the country undertakes to control and regulate and sacrifice the interests of another."
The Reverend Timothy Dwight, head of Yale University, went even further in his depredations against the decision. He preached a sermon from his pulpit openly submitting that the time was ripe for New England to secede, "Come ye out from among them."
As Congress adjourned and its members returned home for the summer the war seemed a distant reality. Madison had early on favored keeping what little there was of the American fleet in port as a guard for the larger harbors but he was being urged to carry the war to the British. Small privateers were being outfitted to destroy British commercial shipping interests. Jefferson was urging such actions from Monticello with the logic that it was more merciful in warfare to punish the enemy by taking their property than by taking their lives. He further expounded that it made little difference to the enemy whether a private vessel took their property or a national vessel from a nation with whom they were at war. He followed this logic up with some further advice that was to be used to great advantage by the British later in the war, whether they took it from Jefferson or not:
"War, whether on land or sea, is constituted by acts of violence on the persons and property of individuals, and excess of violence is the grand cause that brings about peace."
Jefferson's statement stands to the argument that there has never been such a thing as a Gentlemen's war, only personal and national survival.
The next year saw the war continue as largely a war of navies with the British attempting to enforce a blockade with various degrees of success but by 1813 preparations that had been underway combined with England's freedom from entanglements in Europe allowed her to concentrate her power on the United States. Previously, the British had been content to support the Indians to the west in their harassing of Western settlements and make sporadic raids on the eastern coast of the United States but forces were massing for the invasion of the United States. Raiding parties had pillaged Delaware and Chesapeake Bays. Georgetown and Frederickstown, Maryland were attacked and plundered. Hampton, Virginia was attacked and much of the city destroyed. Houses were burned, outbuildings decimated, and slaves were stolen and shipped to the West Indies.
A special session of Congress was called in May to discuss problems arising from the failing war effort. Amidst accusations from opposition to the war effort that there had been no such violations by the British on the high seas, Calhoun defended the administration. It was during this session that Timothy Pickering presented the Massachusetts Remonstrance against the war. This paper, speaking of "the powers reserved to the State Sovereignties," maintained that the "states as well as the individuals composing them are parties of the national compact." Pickering was an inveterate enemy of Jefferson and Madison who had earlier attempted to organize a forcible secession by Northern states in protest of the Louisiana Purchase. He had been Secretary of State under Adams until Adam's dismissed him for his involvement in attempts to insure a war against France. The disillusioned Pickering had then attempted to interest Hamilton in a military takeover and later Aaron Burr in such a project before realizing there was little support for such an action. His Remonstrance against the war attempted to defend the British impressments of sailors under the doctrine of national allegiance and declared that the war against England was against the peace and independence of all nations for the purposes of substituting in its place certain visionary notions to which the French Revolution gave birth. Calhoun quickly expressed his displeasure against the paper, which attempted to bring the states in open conflict with each other over the war. He arose and made a speech deprecating the paper and its ideals and asserted that he would certainly "never countenance what might be considered a declaration of war by one State against another."
In April of 1814 Napoleon was forced to abdicate in Paris and England became finally free to bring her full power against the United States. The gains that Americans had made in Canada and along the Northern border were soon reversed and by winter the border all along the Niagara was a burned out shell of what it had been. Youngstown, Manchester (Niagara Falls), and Black Rock had seen the British destroy most of the standing buildings in response to an incident in Canada when American soldiers had burned an Assembly House.
In August British troops entered Washington and burned the Capitol building, the White House, the Library of Congress, and much of the town. The London Times reported; "The ill organized association (America) is on the eve of dissolution, and the world is speedily to be delivered of the mischievous example of the existence of a government founded on democratic rebellion." Some days later the same paper reported; "Next to the annihilation of the late military despotism in Europe (Napoleon), the subversion of that system of fraud and malignity which constitutes the whole policy of the Jeffersonian school is an event to be devoutly wished by every man in either hemisphere who has any regard for rational liberty or the honourable intercourse of nations. It is an event to which we should have bent, and yet must bend, all our energies. The American government must be displaced or it will sooner or later plant its poisoned dagger in the heart of the parent-state."
This exultation in the British press was to be short lived. American victories at Lundy's Lane and Fort Erie, as well as victories at Lake Champlain and Provost's retreat into Canada gave Americans control of the Great Lakes. Cooler heads prevailed and a group of American statesmen were soon in negotiations at Ghent with the British for a settlement. The American group included Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, and John Quincy Adams. The Treaty of Ghent was signed with neither side being aware of the greatest American military victory of the war.
Andrew Jackson and a group of some 5000 militia from the state of Tennessee had set out earlier through Alabama and Georgia to quell an uprising of Creek Indians who it was believed were being supported by the British. Jackson marched his men to Fort Barrancas in Pensacola to confront the British there who it was believed were arming the Creek Indians and encouraging their warfare against Americans. The British blew up the fort on hearing of Jackson's approach and sailed for Mobile bay. After a failed attempt to take Fort Bowyer in the bay the British sailed to New Orleans to join forces with the invasion force assembling there under Sir Edward Pakenham.
Jackson hurried to New Orleans to oppose this force and arrived to find the city in a state of complete excitement. Jackson summoned Coffee and his 2000 men from Mobile and asked the Governor to call out the militia. He put out an open appeal for help to which many of the free blacks of New Orleans responded. He released all convicts from the local jails and drafted them into service. He came to an agreement with the pirate Jean Lafitte of Barataria Bay to accept his help in the form of men and information. Lafitte had earlier been approached by the British to help in their arrangements to which he responded by going to the Governor and exposing the British plan of invasion. The governor promptly arrested Lafitte and seized his vessels and men for their long-term involvement in the continuation of the illegal slave trade. Jackson arranged for Lafitte's release in exchange for his help in defending the city. Jackson then declared martial law in the area and commandeered much of the labor force in moving 50,000 bales of cotton to a strategic position for breastworks.
Jackson's forces were a combination of many and varied different sorts but he was determined to hold his position in the face of the British regulars approaching. The volunteer force soon learned of Jackson's iron will first hand when several volunteers tired of the adventure and determined to return home. Jackson promptly had several of them apprehended and publicly executed for desertion. In all Jackson had some 7000 troops available at New Orleans by the time of the battle. They were diverse group of Tennesseee militia, Choctaw scouts, Mississippi Dragoons, and black volunteer militia from New Orleans. He was facing some 14,000 British troops.
From the beginning the British plan was fraught with errors. The Lowlands approaching the city were a morass of swamps and mud-flats that bogged the British invasion force down almost immediately. They picked probably the worst approach possible and many of the hastily constructed canals they were counting on caved in. Delays piled up and Admiral Cochran, furious at the muddled group, publicly taunted the British Army by threatening to send 200 of his men to take the city and have the army carry their luggage.
A heavy fog rolled in the day of the battle to further confuse the issue. As the final advance on the American position finally got underway there was further confusion amongst the British when a group who was supposed to bring forward the homemade ladders with which to scale the American works never got word to advance. Pakenham's men advanced into a murderous fire of long rifles and found that they had no way to scale the works after their decimated numbers finally reached the works. They were trapped and died in a brutal slaughter. Pakenham himself was killed in the battle. His last words were the wish that he might "live till tomorrow to hang Mullins" who had failed to bring the ladders.
A day's armistice was called to bury the dead and gather the wounded and the next day the British fleet sailed away. Jackson was the hero of the day and his victory was widely toasted as the greatest American victory in the short history of the country. Unbeknownst to Jackson or Pakenham, the whole battle had been for naught. The Treaty of Ghent that ended the war had been signed on Christmas Eve, the day the battle had officially opened. It made little difference to Americans, who felt a national sense of pride at the victory that has seldom been equaled since.
As for Jackson himself, he soon once again showed his proclivity for controversy by arresting several prominent citizens for violating his order of continuing martial law. When a Federal judge ordered their release he had the judge arrested as well. The whole controversy was smoothed over by the Administration for Jackson was a military hero of the highest stature throughout the country for his actions at New Orleans.
In the years following the Treaty of Ghent, Calhoun continued his service in the House of Representatives and continued to support the Madison administration. The war had convinced many in Congress of the need for a stronger military (the burned out hulks of buildings in Washington being a constant reminder of the fallacy of there being no need for such an arm of the government). Calhoun actively supported national improvements of roads, military academies, and an increased standing army and navy. He joined in the ridicule of Northern interests who had refused to support the war and railed against sectional strife in 1816 with these words before Congress: "What can be more perfect than a perfect unity in every part, in feelings and sentiments? And what can be more powerful to produce it than overcoming the effects of distance?" He encouraged federal spending on roads and canals in various parts of the country in furtherance of these goals. "Your population is largely dispersed…We ought to contribute as much as possible to the formation of good military roads, in emergencies to collect the whole mass of our military means on the point menaced." He further expounded on the needs for a central power in the following speech;
"No country enjoying freedom ever occupied anything so great…but let it not be forgotten, let it forever be kept in mind, that our very vastness exposes us to the greatest of all calamities next to the loss of our liberty, and even to that in its consequence---DISUNION!…..Little does he deserve to be entrusted with the liberties of this people who does not raise his mind to these truths. We are under the most imperious obligation to counteract every tendency to disunion. The strongest of all cements is undoubtedly the wisdom, justice, and above all, the moderation of this House….Let us, then, bind the Republic together with a perfect system of roads and canals. Let us conquer space."
The program that Calhoun and others were pushing for was an expensive proposition. Such improvements cost money and a lot of it. Where was this money to come from? The Chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, William Lowndes of South Carolina, reported a Tariff Measure in the House of Representatives. Lowndes, a close friend and ardent supporter of Calhoun, reported the bill and later made speeches in support of the measure even though the south generally voted against the measure. Calhoun, in support of the measure, made the following speech:
"It is the duty of this country, as a means of defense, to encourage the domestic industry, more especially that part of it which provides the necessary materials for clothing and defense (for the armies). I lay claims of the manufacturers entirely out of view, but on general principles, without regard to their interests, a certain encouragement should be extended, at least to our woolen and cotton manufactures…..This nation is in a situation similar to that of Hercules in his youth, whom the ancient writer represents as retiring into the wilderness to deliberate on the course of life which he ought to pursue. Two goddesses approach him; one recommends a life of ease and pleasure, the other a life of labour and virtue. The hero adopted the counsel of the latter, and his fame and glory are known to the world. May this nation, the youthful Hercules, possessing his form and muscles, be inspired with similar sentiments and follow his example."
To responses that the tariff would enrich the East and help the West by providing for a route for farmers in the West to get their goods to market while not helping the South at all, Calhoun replied:
"Neither agriculture, manufacturers, nor commerce, taken separately, is the cause of wealth; it flows form the three combined and cannot exist without each…. When separated entirely and permanently they perish….When our manufacturers are grown to a certain perfection, as they soon will be under the fostering care of the Government, we shall no longer experience these evils."
The Tariff nor the national improvement program were not well received in the South. Randolph of Virginia vehemently renounced the measures as a "scheme of public robbery," the levying of "an immense tax on one portion of the country to put money into the pockets of another…Who will pay for it? The poor man and the slaveholder." Randolph further raised the flag of an issue that he saw as the inevitable result of such a program; "If Congress can legislate on roads and canals, it can legislate on emancipation."
Calhoun responded, "If gentlemen are of the opinion that our Navy ought not to be improved; that internal improvements should not be persecuted----if these are their sentiments, then they are right in desiring the abolishment of all taxes."
Over the further protests of much of the south, the tariff measures and improvements that Calhoun supported were passed.
In November of 1816 James Monroe was elected as President of the United States. He appointed John Quincy Adams as his Secretary of State, William H. Crawford of Georgia as his Secretary of the Treasury and then began casting about for a Secretary of War. He first tried to give the nomination to Henry Clay who refused the office point blank. Clay had been convinced he was going to be the Secretary of State, which at the time was seen as the stepping-stone to the Presidency since Madison and Monroe had both taken that route to the office. Monroe put out feelers to see if Andrew Jackson was interested but when Jackson turned him down he offered the position to John Calhoun.
By all accounts Calhoun was an excellent Secretary of War. He was well respected within the Army and was in large part responsible for cleaning up an arm of the government fraught with financial problems. He formed a close alliance with John Quincy Adams and they often met to discuss national issues and exchange opinions. The move to the cabinet also allowed Calhoun to move his family to Washington as he now spent he whole year in business there instead of just the sessions of Congress. The move also kept Calhoun out of the strictly sectional quarrel in Congress over the extension of slavery into the new territories.
The rift in Congress that arose over this question was to keep Congress in uproar for over a year. The Missouri Compromise eventually was the result of such fulminations. Under this compromise measure Missouri would be admitted as a slave state while Maine was admitted as a free state. The southern boundary line of Missouri would be extended westwards as the dividing line between future free and slave territories, everything north of this line would be free, everything south of it would be slave territory.
The question in a larger sense was seen by many as a question over whether Congress had the right to legislate on slavery in the territories. When the Compromise bill was submitted to President Monroe for his signature, he seemed to question this authority as well. Monroe called his cabinet into meeting and asked each of them to submit in writing the answer to 2 questions, which he saw as vital. 1) Whether Congress had a constitutional right to prohibit slavery in a territory; 2) Whether the prohibition in the bill forever prohibited slavery within certain limits was applicable only to territories or could extend to the States that might form therein.
When the cabinet reassembled with their answers it was found that all agreed that Congress had the right to prohibit slavery in a territory. On the second question there was a wide divergence of opinions with most of the cabinet agreeing that Congress could not make such a ruling that would apply to the state after it was formed. When Adams argued that it could it was suggested that all the cabinet could agree that the Bill as presented was Constitutional. All affirmed this opinion and Monroe dismissed the cabinet.
As Secretary of War, Calhoun was responsible for relaying the commands of the President to the Army. Calhoun seemed to have carried this duty out with considerable ease and comportment except in his relations with Andrew Jackson. Andrew Jackson was scrupulously sensitive to any encroachments upon what he perceived to be his authority as Commander of the American Army in the Southwest. He responded to one attempt by Calhoun to send a rather insignificant order to one of his commanders by issuing an edict that orders from the Secretary of War were to have no effect unless they came through him. Calhoun responded by making sure all further orders went through Jackson. Congress had formally annexed West Florida between the Pearl and Perdido rivers in 1812. When Louisiana became a state in 1812 the Pearl River was set as a boundary.
In 1817 Seminole Indians along the Georgia border raided Prospect Bluff and killed several settlers before carrying off many of their slaves. This was somewhat of a perplexing development for the Monroe Administration for several reasons. It was widely recognized that an illegal slave trade was being carried out by British and Spanish businessmen in Florida, which had become a sort of staging area where slaves were landed and prepared for their journey north. There was also a group from Georgia who were complaining that many of their escaped slaves were running into Florida where they joined with the Seminole tribes in numbers large enough to organize raids into Georgia to free other slaves. The attack at Prospect Bluff was most likely such an endeavor and it is also more likely that the slaves who were said to be "carried off" by the Seminoles had actually been active participants in the raid.
A month or so later General Edward Gaines under Jackson's command attacked an razed a large fortification at Fowltown under the pretense that it was on land ceded to the United States under the Fort Jackson treaty. The fort was actually a center of activity for Seminoles and escaped slaves who were carrying out such raids in Georgia.
In response to this attack, the Seminoles on November 30, 1817 attacked a hospital ship, killing 34 soldiers, 7 women, and 4 children. They then proceeded to torture the captain to death.
On December 26, 1817 Calhoun sent orders to Andrew Jackson to cross into Florida and put an end to Seminole depredations on US soil. This order was accompanied by a private letter from President Monroe in which he stated; "the movement against the Seminoles will bring you on a theatre where you may possibly have other services to perform….Great issues are at stake." This letter was to have consequences for Calhoun, Jackson, and Monroe that were to reverberate for many years.
Jackson sent a letter in return on January 6, 1818 to Monroe in which he outlined the following plan; "the whole of East Florida should be seized and held as indemnity for the outrages of Spain upon the property of our Citizens". While there is no record of Monroe's response to this letter of even his receiving it, Jackson maintained that Monroe approved the plan in the transmittal of a letter to Tennessee Congressman John Rhea who informed Jackson of Monroe's approval. At any rate, Jackson proved to be even harder to control in Florida than he had been earlier in New Orleans.
In March of 1818 Jackson crossed over into Spanish Florida intent upon seizing the whole area for the United States. On April 6 he forced the surrender of the Spanish fort at St. Marks and captured the Scots trader Alexander Arbuthnot who he accused of fomenting the Seminole raids in Georgia. On April 8 Jackson captured the Seminole prophet Francis and Chief Homollimico and had them both executed. Chief Bowlegs whose camp was nearby managed to escape before Jackson arrived in his camp but Jackson found British Lieutenant Robert Armbrister who was attempting to escape the area and had him arrested as well. Carrying Armbrister back to St. Marks, Jackson determined to try him and Arbuthnot for stirring up the Seminoles to attack American citizens.
Armbrister and Arbuthnot being British citizens didn't seem to faze Jackson who convened a military tribunal and found them both guilty of fomenting insurrection before executing them on April 23. On May 29 Jackson captured Pensacola and when the Spanish Governor fled in his advance he issued orders for his arrest. The governor evidently didn't wish to share in the fate of Armbrister and Arbuthnot and managed to elude capture.
On June 18 Monroe called his cabinet together to discuss Jackson's actions. By this time he had official protests from Spain and England over Jackson's campaign. As much as the American press praised Jackson's campaign, the administration found itself in a delicate position with 2 national powers over Jackson's actions. Both England and Spain were demanding an explanation and Monroe didn't have one.
When Monroe polled his cabinet over what to do with Jackson, all but Adams were for dismissing Jackson; and Calhoun urged his arrest for insubordination. Adams counseled patience and insinuated that Jackson's actions could be used in best interests of the Administration. He insisted that Jackson's actions could be justified in international circles by declaring that it was a defensive response to offencive measures sponsored illegally by Spanish Government officials. The debate continued in the cabinet for much of the week and ended with Monroe's tacit approval of Adam's plan. Jackson, already arguably the most popular military figure in American history at the time, was not a figure that Monroe relished dressing down.
On July 23 Adams wrote a letter to the Spanish ambassador declaring that Spain was in violation of Pinckney's Treaty of 1795 and asserted that further official communications on the subject were forthcoming. At the time Adams was involved in ongoing negotiations with the British over the Oregon question as well as negotiations with Spanish Ambassador Onis regarding East Florida and Texas.
After first releasing its contents to the press, Adams issued a letter to George Erving, the English Ambassador in London. The letter defended Jackson's actions in Florida by declaring the invasion became necessary because Spain failed to control the Seminoles in Florida. It further accused Armbrister and Arbuthnot of being guilty of trading with Seminoles "openly hostile" to the United States. Adams demanded that Spain either control the Indians in Florida or cede the area to the United States. The letter also asked for indemnity payments for the expense involved in subduing the Indians as well as calling for punishment of Spanish officials in Florida who had not controlled the Seminoles in their area. The letter was full of accusatory rhetoric designed to stir American pride and justify Jackson's actions. Armbrister and Arbuthnot were accused of plotting with "savages" and "banditti" to make a "savage, servile, exterminating war against the United States"; thus taking full advantage of the proof that escaped and armed slaves were known to be amongst the Seminoles.
Adams continued to use the incidents in negotiations with Onis over East Florida and even threatened that the United State would also demand Texas if negotiations and agreeable indemnities weren't reached in the near future. Monroe seemed to rein in Adams at this point and the Texas portion of the question was dropped when the Adams-Onis treaty was signed on February 22, 1819.
In 1824 Monroe was approaching the end of his Presidency and his cabinet contained 3 of the 4 top candidates for the office. This led to uncomfortable cabinet meetings and increasing pressure on each man from different elements to distance themselves from the others. Crawford of Georgia had the support of much of the party faithful and fully expected to get the nod from the Congressional Caucus. The Congressional Caucus had elected both Madison and Monroe in the face of little or no opposition from a separate party and Crawford fully expected that he could use such a method himself. Adams, on the other hand, was being pushed by officials in the North and East to put his name in the running. Calhoun, as well, had designs on the office but early on seemed to decide that one of the two senior officials, Adams or Crawford should have the office. He quickly ascertained that his southern support thrown in with Adams would probably be a winning combination and agreed to run as Adams Vice-President.
To make matters even more confusing, Henry Clay and Andrew Jackson were also in the running for the office. This put 4 candidates from the Republican-Democratic party in the same race. Calhoun found himself in a rather unusual position through the planning of his constituents. He was the running mate for both Adams and Jackson. If this was not confusing enough and to add to Adams growing suspicion of Calhoun, who he took daily walks with, the South Carolina delegation began making noises that they would support Calhoun for President only.
As it turned out, all the candidates underestimated the sheer popularity of Andrew Jackson. Although he had little or no support in Washington itself, he was immensely popular in the rest of the country as the hero of New Orleans and, thanks in large part to Adams himself, the hero of the Seminole Wars which had gained East Florida for the country.
When the popular votes were tallied Jackson had received 42% of the popular vote with Adams finishing the closest second with 30%. According to the Constitution, since no candidate had received a clear majority of the electoral votes the election was thrown into the house of Representatives. Jackson had received 99 electoral votes, Adams 84, and Crawford 41, with Clay finishing fourth with 37. According to the guidelines in the Constitution only the top three candidates were elgible for consideration in the House of Representatives so Clay was out of the race. In what was widely known as the "Corrupt Bargain", Clay and Adams came to an agreement whereby Clay would throw his support to Adams in exchange for his nomination as Secretary of State. Whether this "Bargain" actually occurred is a matter of some conjecture but the general acceptance of the theory probably kept Clay out of the White House afterwards and definitely caused him to fight a duel with John Randolph over the imputation.
At any rate, Calhoun was the new Vice-President to Adams and Jackson would have to wait four more years before his chance came to sit in the White House. Calhoun found himself trying to balance his attachment to the Administration's program of national expenditures for regional projects and his native state's obvious disapproval of Clay's whole "American System" which Adams adopted in his inaugural address. As the President of the Senate Calhoun had to make rulings on questions of procedure but he seldom was called upon to state his opinions on the subjects under debate, which suited Calhoun just fine. The growing displeasure with Adam's legislative goals was becoming more obvious, especially in the south. The Tariff measures that Calhoun had helped to pass were weighing heavily on southern interests as was Adam's open disregard for slavery. In response to growing agitation concerning the questions surrounding slavery and its expansion Calhoun arranged to get this quote into the press:
"Believe me, I am not a panegyrist of slavery. It is an unnatural state, a dark cloud which obscures half the luster of our free institutions. But…..would it be fair, would it be manly, would it be generous, would it be just, to offer contumely and contempt to the unfortunate man who wears a cancer in his bosom because he will not submit to cautery at the hazard of his existence?"
While this was probably an accurate description of Calhoun's position it was to differ markedly with his later comments in the Senate concerning the same question. Adams administration was not to be a success. Agitations over the tariff and the national debt being piled up by the administrations spending plans were looked upon with violent disfavor in the south. Calhoun quietly began mending fences in Washington with men he had repeatedly clashed with in his early years in the House. Calhoun also used this time to cement his relationship with Andrew Jackson by correspondence during the ensuing four years.
By 1828 it was apparent that unrest in the country over the tariff issues and government spending were to put Jackson in the White House with Calhoun as his Vice-President. Jackson loudly proclaimed that he was too old and feeble to seek two terms and Calhoun was relatively sure that his turn was next.
Events soon conspired to upset the plans of Calhoun. During the summer of 1827 a Tariff Convention was called at Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The sole purpose of the convention was to draft articles calling for the continued support of a protective tariff for manufacturers. The convention blatantly declared that their support for the next presidential candidate would hinge upon their position on the tariff issue. Adams supporters quickly seized upon the issue as a chance to damage the campaign of the seemingly invincible Jackson. They determined that by adopting the measures espoused in the convention that they could force Jackson to come out in opposition to the tariff and thereby weaken his position in the East and the West. Jackson's supporters simply ignored the question and continued on with their campaign but it forced Adams supporters in Congress to submit a new tariff for the consideration of Congress.
Still refusing to take a position that might harm Jackson, his supporters agreed to consider the issue. In fact, Jackson's supporters basically wrote the tariff themselves. They decided that the best solution to the box that Adams had attempted to put them in was to support the tariff. However, they wrote into the new tariff conditions that they assumed would be objectionable enough to New England interests that they would be forced to vote against it. The tax on manufactured goods was minimal as compared to tax on raw materials used by manufacturers in New England. In the general scheme of things both taxes were exorbitant as compared to what had existed before but the heavy preponderance of duties on raw materials was seen as a way to keep even New England for voting for the tariff. The plan backfired when New England voted for the measure in spite of the high taxes on raw materials.
Calhoun had little to do with the adoption of the measure or its subsequent adoption. However, the measure was roundly criticized in the south and in South Carolina particularly. North Carolina's legislature passed a measure proclaiming the tariff to be unconstitutional. Virginia, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi followed with similar measures. South Carolina's legislature was flooded with letters of protest and Calhoun was instantly dragged into the fray. Calhoun, anxious to placate his constituents without angering Jackson, urged caution and patience as he hoped that he could intercede with Jackson to reverse the measures. He had noted that Jackson's main supporters in Congress voted for the bill and was not exactly sure where Jackson himself stood on the issue. He was also aware of his own earlier statements on record in favor of such a tariff and admonishing the patriotism of those whose sectional interests would come before the interest of the nation.
A delegation of South Carolina legislators prevailed upon Calhoun to suggest solutions to the problem should the tariff stand. Calhoun suggested that there were two possibilities. He surmised that Jackson could control patronage in such a way as to force the duties back down to a respectable level. The second possibility involved the use of veto by the state on laws passed by Congress that they deemed unconstitutional. When asked to amplify his opinions on such a veto in writing, Calhoun agreed on the condition that his authorship of such a measure remain secret. Thus was born the famous "South Carolina Exposition" which touched off the Nullification Crisis.
Calhoun drafted the Exposition in the summer of 1828 before the upcoming elections. He was intimately familiar with the arguments for such a veto from his exposure and arguments against such logic during the protests by New England over the Non-Intercourse Acts during 1811 with the Fanueil Hall Resolutions. He further based his arguments on the arguments put forward by the Massachusetts Legislature in 1809 declaring Jefferson's embargo measure, "oppressive, unjust, and unconstitutional, and not legally binding upon the citizens of this State." He used the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions that had been written in response to the Alien and Sedition Acts as further basis for his argument. Excerpts from the Exposition are below:
. . . [The Federal] Government is one of specific powers, and it can rightfully exercise only the powers expressly granted, and those that may be "necessary and proper" to carry them into effect; all others being reserved expressly to the States, or to the people. It results necessarily, that those who claim to exercise a power under the Constitution, are bound to shew [sic], that it is expressly granted, or that it is necessary and proper, as a means to some of the granted powers. The advocates of the Tariff have offered no such proof. It is true, that the third [sic; eighth] section of the first article of the Constitution of the United States authorizes Congress to lay and collect an impost duty, but it is granted as a tax power, for the sole purpose of revenue; a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or prohibitory duties. . . . The Constitution grants to Congress the power of imposing a duty on imports for revenue; which power is abused by being converted into an instrument for rearing up the industry of one section of the country on the ruins of another. The violation then consists in using a power, granted for one object, to advance another, and that by the sacrifice of the original object. . . .
The committee feel, on entering upon this branch of the subject, the painful character of the duty they must perform. They would desire never to speak of our country, as far as the action of the General Government is concerned, but as one great whole, having a common interest, which all its parts ought zealously to promote. Previously to the adoption of the Tariff system, such was the unanimous feeling of this State; but in speaking of its operation it will be impossible to avoid the discussion of sectional interest, and the use of sectional language. On its authors however, and not on us, who are compelled to adopt this course in self-defence by the injustice and oppression of their measures--be the censure. So partial are the effects of the system, that its burdens are exclusively on one side and its benefits on the other. It imposes on the agricultural interest of the South, including the South West, and that portion of our commerce and navigation engaged in foreign trade, the burden, not only of sustaining the system itself, but that also of sustaining government. In stating the case thus strongly, it is not the intention of the committee to exaggerate. If exaggeration were not unworthy of the gravity of the subject, the reality is such as to render it unnecessary. . . .
. . . The maxim that the consumers pay, strictly applies to us. We are mere consumers, and destitute of all means of transferring the burden from ourselves to others. We may be assured, that the large amount paid into the Treasury, under the duties on imports, is really derived from the labor of some portion of our citizens. The government has no mines. Some one must bear the burden of its support. This unequal lot is ours. We are the serffs [sic] of the system, out of whose labor is raised, not only the money that is paid into the Treasury, but the funds out of which are drawn the rich reward of the manufacturer and his associates in interest. Their encouragement is our discouragement. The duty on imports which is mainly paid out of our labour gives them the means of selling to us at a higher price, while we cannot, to compensate the loss, dispose of our products at the least advance. It is then not a subject of wonder, when properly understood, that one section of country though blessed by a kind Providence with a genial sun and prolific soil, from which spring the richest products, should languish in poverty and sink into decay; while the rest of the Union though less fortunate in natural advantages is flourishing in prosperity beyond example.
The assertion, that the encouragement of the industry of the manufacturing States, is in fact discouragement to ours, was not made without due deliberation. It is susceptible of the clearest proof.
We cultivate certain great staples for the supply of the general market of the world; and they manufacture almost exclusively for the home market. Their object in the Tariff is to keep down foreign competition, in order to obtain a monopoly of the domestic market. The effect on us is to compel us to purchase at a higher price, both what we purchase from them and from others, without receiving a corresponding increase of price for what we sell. The price, at which we can afford to cultivate, must depend on the price at which we receive our supplies. The lower the latter, the lower we may dispose of our products with profit; and in the same degree our capacity of meeting competition is increased; on the contrary, the higher the price of our supplies, the less the profit at the same price, and the less consequently the capacity for meeting competition. . . . The case then, fairly stated between us and the manufacturing States, is, that the Tariff gives them a prohibition against foreign competition in our own market, in the sale of their goods, and deprives us of the benefit of a competition of purchasers for our raw material. They who say, that they cannot compete with foreigners at their own doors without an advantage of nearly fifty per cent., expect us to meet them abroad, under a disadvantage equal to their encouragement. But the oppression, great as it is to us, will not stop at this point. The trade between us and Europe, has heretofore been a mutual exchange of products. Under the existing duties, the consumption of European fabrics must in a great measure cease in our country, and the trade must become, on their part a cash transaction. But he must be ignorant of the principals of commerce, and the policy of Europe, particularly England, who does not see, that it is impossible to carry on a trade of such vast extent on any other basis but that of mutual exchange of products; and if it were not impossible, such a trade would not long be tolerated. We already see indications of the commencement of a commercial warfare, the termination of which cannot be conjectured, though our fate may easily be. The last remains of our great and once flourishing agriculture must be annihilated in the conflict. In the first instance we will be thrown on the home market, which cannot consume a fourth of our products; and instead of supplying the world, as we should with a free trade, we shall be compelled to abandon the cultivation of three-fourths of what we now raise, and receive for the residue, whatever the manufacturers, (who will then have their policy consummated, by the entire possession of their market, both exports and imports,) may choose to give. Forced with an immense sacrifice of capital to abandon our ancient and favourite pursuit, to which our soil, climate, habits and peculiar labor are adapted, we should be compelled without experience or skill, and with a population untried in such pursuits, to attempt to become the rivals instead of the customers of the manufacturing States. The result is not doubtful. If they, by superior capital and skill, should keep down successful competition on our part, we should be doomed to toil at our unprofitable agriculture, selling at the prices, which a single and limited market might give. But on the other hand, if our necessity should triumph over their capital and skill, if, instead of raw cotton, we should ship to the manufacturing States, cotton yarn, and cotton goods, the thoughtful must see, that it would immediately bring about a state of things, which could not long continue. Those who now make war on our gains would then make it on our labour. They would not tolerate, that those, who now cultivate our plantations and furnish them with the material and market for the products of their arts, should, by becoming their rivals, take bread out of the mouths of their wives and children. The committee will not pursue this painful subject, but as they clearly see, that the system if not arrested, must bring the country to this hazardous extremity, neither prudence nor patriotism would permit them to pass it by, without giving warning of an event so full of danger. . . .
No government based on the naked principle, that the majority ought to govern, however true the maxim in its proper sense and under proper restrictions, ever preserved its liberty, even for a single generation. The history of all has been the same, injustice, violence and anarchy, succeeded by the government of one, or a few, under which the people seek refuge, from the more oppressive despotism of the majority. Those governments only, which provide checks, which limit and restrain within proper bounds the power of the majority, have had a prolonged existence, and been distinguished for virtue, power and happiness. Constitutional government, and the government of the majority, are utterly incompatible, it being the sole purpose of a constitution to impose limitations and checks upon the majority. An unchecked majority, is a despotism--and government is free, and will be permanent in proportion to the number, complexity and efficiency of the checks, by which it powers are controlled. . . .
That there exists a case which would justify the interposition of this State, and thereby compel the General Government to abandon an unconstitutional power, or to make an appeal to the amending power to confer it by express grant, the committee does not in the least doubt; and they are equally clear in the existence of a necessity to justify its exercise, if the General Government should continue to persist in its improper assumption of powers, belonging to the State; which brings them to the last point which they propose to consider. When would it be proper to exercise this high power? If they were to judge only by the magnitude of the interest and urgency of the case, they would without hesitation recommend the exercise of this power without delay. But they deeply feel the obligation of respect for the other members of the confederacy, and of great moderation and forbearance in the exercise, even of the most unquestionable right, between parties who stand connected by the closest and most sacred political union. With these sentiments, they deem it advisable after presenting the views of the Legislature in this solemn manner, to allow time for further consideration and reflection, in the hope that a returning sense of justice on the part of the majority, when they have come to reflect on the wrongs, which this and other staple States have suffered, and are suffering, may repeal the obnoxious and unconstitutional acts, and thereby prevent the necessity of interposing the sovereign power of this State.
The committee is further induced at this time to take this course, under the hope that the great political revolution which will displace from power on the 4th of March next, those who acquired authority by setting the will of the people at defiance; and which will bring in an eminent citizen, [Andrew Jackson,] distinguished for his services to his country and his justice and patriotism, may be followed up under his influence with a complete restoration of the pure principles of our government.
But in thus recommending delay, the committee wish it to be distinctly understood, that neither doubts of the power of the State, nor apprehension of consequences, constitute the smallest part of their motives. . . .
With these views the committee are solemnly of impression if the system be persevered in, after due forbearance on the part of the State, that it will be her sacred duty to interpose her veto; a duty to herself, to the Union, to present, and to future generations, and to the cause of liberty over the world, to arrest the progress of a power, which, if not arrested, must in its consequences, corrupt the public morals, and destroy the liberty of the country.
To avert these calamities, to restore the Constitution to its original purity, and to allay the differences which have been unhappily produced between various States, and between the States and General Government, we solemnly appeal to the justice and good feeling of those States heretofore opposed to us; and earnestly invoke the council and co-operation of those States, similarly situated with our own. Not doubting their good will and support; and sustained by a deep sense of the righteousness of its cause--the committee trusts that under Divine Providence the exertions of the State will be crowned with success.
All in all, the South Carolina Exposition was a rather astounding argument. While the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions had been written in protest of actions of Congress that they found unconstitutional and appealed to their sister states to join them in assuring these acts were rescinded, they made no claim that a single state could somehow veto an act of Congress. The exposition contained the claim the implicit claim that a state held the same right of veto over the acts of Congress as the Judiciary or Supreme Court. Calhoun had earlier castigated states that put their own interests above national interests but here he was reversing his field and claiming that a state had the Constitutional right to not only favor their own interests but negate acts of Congress that interfered with these interests.
Calhoun based his argument on the theory that the government was built upon a series of checks and balances. He saw the veto power of a state, even though there isn't a reference to it in the Constitution itself, as a logical extension of this system. A state would serve as a check against the power of the federal government. According to Calhoun's theory the reserved rights of the states was the basis of this power. Since the Constitution implicitly gave the states "all reserved powers" this meant a right to judge whether the delegated powers listed in the Constitution had been exceeded. According to Calhoun this power was a necessity to prevent the encroachment of the majority power upon the minority (the state). This power must necessarily reside in the people of the state and could be used by calling a convention of the people of a state to vote on such a question. If the people voted in favor of such a nullification then the act was to be declared not in effect in the state. This veto action would then be followed, under Calhoun's plan by a convention in the other states to decide upon the Constitutionality of the nullification. If ¾ of the other states voted in favor of overriding the nullification the state would either be compelled to accede to the law or secede from the Union. Calhoun continued;
"But if such amendment should fail of ratification, no alternative would remain for the general Government but a compromise or its permanent abandonment. Nullification would give no ground for a clash of arms; it would be a conflict of moral and not physical force, a trial before courts and juries. The rights of nullification and secession inhere in the sovereign states; but the two programs are poles apart in their purposes and effects. The object of secession is to withdraw as a member of the Union, while the object of nullification is to confine the general Government within it prescribed limits of power in order to perpetuate the Union on an equitable basis. Nullification may indeed be followed by secession in case a proposed amendment should be ratified by the sister States to such effect as to defeat the object of the Union so far as the nullifying member is concerned. The power of nullification, therefore, tends to weaken the general Government; but the power of amendment is an adequate offset. The two powers establish a system of mutual checks, in effect a system of government requiring agreement by concurrent majorities in critical issues, and as such it is the line which genuinely free institutions have followed since the Tribunate in ancient Rome. Such a system which inheres in the federal Constitution as thus interpreted, maintains the ascendancy of the constitution-making authority over the law-making: the concurring over the absolute majority. It maintains a power essential for the liberty and the general welfare to compel the parts of a society to be just to one another by compelling them to consult the interest of one another."
In a letter to Governor Hamilton Calhoun wrote, "I do not claim for a State the right to abrogate and act of the General government. It is the Constitution that annuls an unconstitutional act. Such an act is of itself null and void and of no effect. What I claim is the right of the State as far as it citizens are concerned to declare the extent of the obligation, and when such declaration is binding on them."
The Nullification theories of Calhoun were soon to be tested in South Carolina even though Calhoun was not known to the the author of the Exposition.
The campaign between Jackson and Adams was a bitter and personal one. The attacks used by both sides were brutal. Jackson was accused of being an adulterer for marrying his wife before she was officially divorced from her first husband, a murderer for killing another man in a duel over just such an accusation, and a bloodthirsty tyrant for executing deserters in New Orleans and British subjects in Florida. Adams was accused of being a pimp while serving as Ambassador to Russia. It seems that a young housekeeper in his employ carried on an illicit affair with the czar while Adams was Ambassador and Adams was accused of arranging the czar's use of the young woman.
Jackson handily won the election with Calhoun as his vice-president. Calhoun continued to try and calm the growing frenzy in the south over the "Tariff of Abominations" as it came to be called while currying Jackson's favor in appointments. Once again Calhoun soon found his carefully laid plans exposed to utter destruction due to forces outside his control.
to be continued.........
blackirish
Jackson's friend and longtime companion, John Eaton of Tennessee, was appointed as Secretary of War. Eaton had recently married young Peggy Eaton who was a recent widow. There were widespread rumors in Washington (which was after all, really a small town) to the effect that Eaton and young Peggy had started an affair previous to her becoming a widow. There were other rumors of an uglier nature that young Peggy had periodically taken lovers during her marriage and that her witty, vivacious, nature contained more than just a touch of wildness. The ladies of Washington had dubbed her "The Harpy of Degradation" and "Pothouse Peg." Peggy seemed to be a personal favorite of Jackson who liked having her around the White House and was more than a little sensitive to slights against women by rumormongers for the campaign mud that had been slung on his beloved Rachel during the campaign. Rachel had died shortly before Jackson's inauguration and he held the dim view that her mortification over the slander during the campaign had contributed to her death. When the social slights to Peggy Eaton came to his attention he reacted in typical Jackson style by angrily calling his cabinet together and demanding that such behaviour come to an end.
Unfortunately for Calhoun, his wife Floride, was one of the leading ladies of Washington society at the time. Floride, for whatever reasons and beyond the ability of Calhoun to rectify the situation, simply refused to accept such a contemptible creature as Peggy Eaton. Whether her influence could have helped in Peggy's acceptance is doubtful but she plainly didn't make any effort to help the situation and was one of the most outspoken critics of Peggy during the "Petticoat War" that followed. Calhoun, who was implicitly aware of Jackson's propensity for seeing personal insults was soon in an impossible position as far as Jackson was concerned, which undoubtedly contributed to his lack of success in influencing the patronage that he had hoped to use to stall the tariff crisis.
Jackson was aware that Calhoun was caught in a bad situation with the tariff issue and suspected that Calhoun was in favor of the nullification talk that was springing up in Washington, but he had no idea that Calhoun had actually written the Exposition upon which it was based. At a party given in honor of Jefferson's birthday on April 13 the issue seemed to come to a head between Jackson and Calhoun. During a round of toasts at the dinner Jackson raised his glass and looked directly at Calhoun before stating,
"Our federal Union; it must be preserved!"
Calhoun must have sensed that his stock in the administration was steadily dropping but he responded in kind when it was his turn.
"Our federal Union-next to our liberties the most dear! May we all remember that it can only be preserved by respecting the rights of the States and distributing equally the benefit and burthen of the Union."
If this open confrontation with the infinitely touchy Jackson was not enough to ruin Calhoun's future plans in the administration a letter that soon arrived from New York was. During the recent presidential campaign James A. Hamilton, an intimate friend of Martin Van Buren, had been involved in the campaign for Jackson. During the course of a conversation with one of Jackson's aides, the question of Jackson's intimated censure by the Monroe administration after the Seminole War had come up. Jackson had of course heard rumors that his conduct had been unofficially questioned during cabinet meetings on the subject but he was under the distinct impression that Calhoun and Adams had defended him in these meetings. Crawford of Georgia was believed to be the cabinet member who had called for censure against Jackson. In truth, the whole cabinet with the exception of Adams had disapproved Jackson's actions. Crawford had merely agreed that Jackson had exceeded his orders while Calhoun, as Secretary of War, had initially called for the arrest and court martial of Jackson. At any rate, Hamilton had offered to attempt a peacekeeping mission to Crawford on Jackson's behalf and Jackson had agreed to consider the possibility contingent on how Crawford felt about the situation. Hamilton had attempted to visit Crawford to discuss the matter but had contented himself with writing a letter asking for Crawford's views. Crawford, who had suffered a debilitating stroke during the campaign, replied in a letter in which he stated that he was perfectly willing to renew relations with Jackson and held no hard feelings over anything that had previously passed between them. The letter from Crawford went on to suggest that he had felt somewhat put out by Jackson's insinuations that he had somehow attempted to arraign him for his actions in Monroe's cabinet when it had been Calhoun who had suggested that Jackson be arrested and court martialed. This series of letters had passed in the mails in November of 1828 but Jackson himself was only apprised of their existence in November of 1829. Several days before the aforementioned dinner Jackson had overheard a conversation between Eaton and another longtime aquaintance, Major Lewis, upon the subject. When Lewis repeated what he had seen in the letter shown to him by Hamilton, Jackson became extremely agitated and denied that Calhoun had done anything but defend him in the cabinet meetings.
Lewis replied that he had seen a letter from Crawford with statements to that effect. When Jackson asked him where the letter was Lewis spilled the whole story. Jackson then insisted upon getting a copy of the letter. Lewis went to New York to get the letter from Hamilton which touched off a series of letters in which all parties that had touched the letter in question were notified and gave their permission to turn it over to Jackson. It seems that everyone involved knew such a letter would be a bombshell between Jackson and Calhoun from which their relationship would be impossible to recover. Undoubtedly, just the inference of such a letter had already incensed Jackson to the extent that he had challenged Calhoun with the toast at the recent party.
Several days after the party where the toasting incident occurred Jackson had the letter from Crawford in his hands. Jackson, ever hypersensitive to slurs upon his honor, was furious. He forwarded Crawford's letter to the vice-president and harshly requested a reply in a cover letter; "The statements and facts in this letter being so different form what I understood to be correct requires that it should be brought to your consideration…..My object in making this communication is to announce to the great surprise which is felt, and to learn of you whether all the circumstances of which you and I are both informed, that any attempt seriously to affect me was moved and sustained by you in the cabinet council, when, as is known by you, I was but executing the wishes of the government."
The rupture between Jackson and Calhoun was probably beyond healing at this point but Calhoun soon made this fact a certainty. Calhoun had long planned for the election of Jackson and his elevation within the administration. He was well aware of Jackson's statements concerning the fact that he was "too feeble" to run for more than one term. Between the tariff problems, the Eaton affair, and the machinations of Martin Van Buren to cause a rift between Calhoun and Jackson, Calhoun seemed to have suddenly realized the situation was irretrievable so he did what logical men often due when illogical facts conspire start a small fire, he accelerated it.
In a 52 page response to Jackson's letter, Calhoun proceeded to make sure that the break with Jackson was beyond repair. "I cannot recognize the right on your part to call my question in conduct". If the letter was had been designed to infuriate Jackson, it couldn't have been more successful. When Calhoun got around to the Jackson's assertion that he had been executing the wishes of the Government, he proceeded to say the worst thing possible. "If by wishes, which you have underscored, it be meant that there was any intimation given by myself, directly or indirectly, of the desire of the Government that you should occupy Spanish posts, so far from being 'informed' I had not the slightest knowledge of any such intimation, nor did I ever hear a whisper of any such before". As if to be sure that denying Jackson's right to ask such questions concerning the affair were not enough, Calhoun went on to question his motives in questioning him about the affair at this late date, "I should be blind not to see that this whole affair is a political maneuver…..and that a blow was meditated against me." Calhoun would not pointedly accuse Van Buren but he intimated that some year earlier he had been made aware of such a letter, as Jackson had sent him by "an individual from New York."
If Calhoun's reply was formed with the intention of infuriating Jackson, it was a success. Jackson acknowledged Calhoun's reply and sent him a reply. He denied questioning the Vice-president's conduct or motives, "I repeat, I had a right to believe that you were my sincere friend, and, until now, never expected to have occasion to say to you, in the language of Caesar, Et tu Brute." Jackson went on in the letter to insist that he had authority for all his actions in Florida and that he had always believed that Calhoun agreed with this view. "Your letter to me….is the first intimation to me that you, ever entertained any other opinion…..Your conduct, word, actions and letters I have ever thought to show this. Understanding you now, no further communication with you on this subject is necessary."
Jackson saw the letter and Calhoun's response as proof that Calhoun was actively engaged in scheming against him. He instantly saw the Eaton affair, and the current fulminations against the tariff as being guided by Calhoun. Jackson was convinced that much of the trouble that had descended upon his administration since its inception could be lay at the door of Calhoun who Jackson styled as, "the most profound hypocrite he had ever known."
Calhoun continued in his service as the vice-president but was never in the inner circle of the administration again. In late January of 1831 a personal reconciliation of a sort was reached when both men apparently agreed to drop the Seminole matter from all contact between them. The tentative truce was reached with the aid of Senator Felix Grundy of Tennessee and Samuel Swartout of New York. Immediately afterwards, Jackson began to get word that Calhoun intended to publish the whole correspondence that had passed between Jackson and himself. John Overton, of Tennessee, wrote Jackson that he had heard that such an event was forthcoming.
Grundy, in fact, had contacted Eaton and informed him that Calhoun intended to publish the letters of the exchange in an attempt to make sure the Jackson was aware of Calhoun's plans. Calhoun seemed to be under the impression that a public airing of the event, complete with all the letters that had passed back and forth from New York would somehow vindicate him by implicating Van Buren, who he was convinced had undermined his influence with Jackson. Grundy then made a second visit to Eaton and brought him a copy of the whole pamphlet asking Eaton to review that material and point out anything that might cause excitement or be "misconceived". Eaton read the manuscript and suggested several changes. When Grundy made ready to leave he asked if the manuscript contained anything that he felt Jackson might feel compelled to reply to. Eaton replied that he thought not. Grundy made one more request of Eaton as he was leaving, "Will you see General Jackson and explain to him what has taken place? I will see Mr. Calhoun, and if the course we have taken is approved you shall be informed."
Eaton later claimed that he did not speak to the president about the publication because "Upon reflection, I thought it improper to do so". The day following this interview, Eaton received another note from Grundy stating that "all was right……the suggestions offered had been adopted." Eaton made no response to this request.
On February 17, 1831 the Telegraph, a Washington paper edited by Duff Green, printed the whole pamphlet. The pamphlet included the letters between Jackson and Calhoun, the original letter from Crawford and a cover letter by Calhoun explaining his reasons for printing the whole pamphlet. Calhoun implied that justice required that he clear his name in the incident between him and the President; an incident that the general public was largely ignorant of before Calhoun published his manifesto.
By the end of April, Eaton and Van Buren had both resigned from Jackson's cabinet with his consent. By the end of June, Ingham and Berrien had been asked for their resignations as well. The latter two, as friends of Calhoun and the last vestiges of his influence in Jackson's administration, had resigned at the request of Jackson.
Calhoun contented himself with presiding over the Senate and rewriting his famous Exposition. The amended version attempted to claim the Kentucky and Virginia Resolutions support by explaining that the word "interpose" employed in the Virginia Resolution actually was synonymous with "veto or nullify". Calhoun continued with "This right of interposition, thus solemnly asserted by the State of Virginia, be it called what it may…I conceive to be the fundamental principle of our system, resting on facts historically as certain as our Revolution itself, and deductions as simple and demonstrative as that of any political or moral truth whatever…..I solemnly believe it to be the solid foundation of our system and Union itself." This is an interesting perspective to be sure. Especially since the author of the Virginia Resolution, James Madison so vehemently disagreed with Calhoun's assertions.
Governor Hayne of South Carolina sent Madison a letter including the Exposition and asked for his comments. Madison replied that he disapproved of any notion that a single state could nullify any statute which was not so oppressive as to absolve that state of all responsibility to the union. Referring to the debates over the Virginia Resolutions, Madison told Hayne: "The tenor of them does not disclose any reference to a constitutional right in an individual State to arrest by force the operation of a law of the US". He added, "The Constitution of the United States must be its own interpreter according to its text and the facts of the case. The charter was that of one people and could not be negated but by the whole people." Madison next stated that "the supremacy clause governed the question"; if that failed, impeachment might be tried, then amendment. Madison closed his letter with the statement that failure of these remedies would entitle a state to resort to the law of self-preservation, but that was a right the government need not respect.
In another letter on the subject Madison defined the difference in a free government and a government not free; the former is founded in compact, the parties are naturally and equally bound by it. Neither of them therefore can have a greater right to break off from the bargain, than the other or others have to hold them to it.
Finally in a March 12, 1833 letter to Virginia's Senator William Cabell Rives Madison stated that the states had transferred their sovereignty to the federal government and that the transfer was permanent; the federal government was the final arbiter of its own powers. Assuming the inerrancy of Supreme Court (thus of federal) interpretation, he said, "As this is a simple question whether a State, more than an individual, has a right to violate its engagements, it would seem that it might be safely left to answer itself."
As if to further repudiate Calhoun's theory, the rest of the states of the nation came out against his theory of Nullification as well. While Calhoun expected such a reaction from the northern states who had financial reasons for not supporting such a theory at this time, the response of the southern states in refusing to join South Carolina under Calhoun's banner held up in his Exposition was somewhat of a surprise and disappointment to him.
In the election of 1832 Jackson decided that his "feebleness" could probably stand one more term after all and was elected by a landslide with Van Buren as his vice-president. The country awaited the showdown that was sure to come over the Tariff and South Carolina's avowed intention to Nullify this act. Jackson saw his re-election as the implicit authority to stamp out the heresy of Nullification and at the same time ruin his enemy.
In a letter dated December 9, Jackson sent the following letter to Joel Poinsett who was prominent Unionist in Charleston: "The vain threats of resistance by those who have raised the standard of rebellion show their madness and folly. You may assure those patriots who cling to their country and this Union, which secures liberty and prosperity and happiness, that within forty days I can have within the limits of South Carolina fifty-thousand men, and in forty days more another fifty-thousand. How impotent their threat of resistance with a population of only two hundred and fifty thousand whites and nearly that double in blacks, with our ships in port to aid in the execution of our laws! The wickedness, madness and folly of the leaders and the delusion of their followers in their attempt to destroy themselves and our Union has not its parallel in the history of the world. The Union will be preserved."
In response to the Nullification convention which met in South Carolina the next day, Jackson issued his answering proclamation concerning the attempt to nullify the tariff laws, an excerpt of which follows; "Those who told you that you might peaceably prevent their execution deceived you: they could not have deceived themselves……Their object is disunion, but be not deceived by names: disunion by armed force is treason."
On January 16 Jackson asked Congress for the authority to use the land and naval forces to execute the customs laws. Five days later Congress returned the Revenue Collection Bill which gave Jackson the authority he sought. The stage was set for a confrontation. A confrontation that was soon to disappear in a compromise measure put forward by Henry Clay and the newly elected Senator from South Carolina, John Calhoun.
On March 2 Jackson signed the Revenue Collection Bill and the new compromise Tariff Bill on the same day. Calhoun hurried home to make the scheduled Nullification Convention in South Carolina that was set to take place on March 11. Calhoun had received the promise that South Carolina would wait until the new tariff agreements were reached to make a final decision on the Nullification Crisis. Arriving in Columbia to find the convention already in session. At Calhoun's urging, the nullification ordinance was repealed. In a last effort at defiance the convention then proceeded to pass an ordinance nullifying the Force Bill.
The nullification crisis and its implications for the south were readily apparent to Calhoun and others in the south. As Randolph had predicted many years before, Congress would eventually get around to the discussion of a subject closer to the heart of southern interests; slavery. Calhoun from 1833 onwards adopted a policy of aggression towards any attempts in Congress at even discussing the slavery question. He became convinced that the only hope for the south to maintain her "peculiar institution" was in a strong and offensive campaign against any discussion of the subject. Calhoun was one of the formulators and leaders in the battles that ensued in Congress over slavery and its extension. It was this policy of "meeting the enemy at the gate" that led to the infamous gag rules in the House. Calhoun took the lead in defending slavery as a venerable institution and urged other southerners to unite along this one issue to preserve their rights. Over the course of his career Calhoun reversed his policy on state's rights, tariffs, and the superiority of national interests over sectional interests. As if to complete his reversal on all positions he arose in the Senate on February 6, 1837 and made the following speech:
" I do not belong, said Mr. C., to the school which holds that aggression is to be met by concession. Mine is the opposite creed, which teaches that encroachments must be met at the beginning, and that those who act on the opposite principle are prepared to become slaves. In this case, in particular. I hold concession or compromise to be fatal. If we concede an inch, concession would follow concession - compromise would follow compromise, until our ranks would be so broken that effectual resistance would be impossible. We must meet the enemy on the frontier, with a fixed determination of maintaining our position at every hazard. Consent to receive these insulting petitions, and the next demand will be that they be referred to a committee in order that they may be deliberated and acted upon. At the last session we were modestly asked to receive them, simply to lay them on the table, without any view to ulterior action. . . . I then said, that the next step would be to refer the petition to a committee, and I already see indications that such is now the intention. If we yield, that will be followed by another, and we will thus proceed, step by step, to the final consummation of the object of these petitions. We are now told that the most effectual mode of arresting the progress of abolition is, to reason it down; and with this view it is urged that the petitions ought to be referred to a committee. That is the very ground which was taken at the last session in the other House, but instead of arresting its progress it has since advanced more rapidly than ever. The most unquestionable right may be rendered doubtful, if once admitted to be a subject of controversy, and that would be the case in the present instance. The subject is beyond the jurisdiction of Congress - they have no right to touch it in any shape or form, or to make it the subject of deliberation or discussion. . . .
As widely as this incendiary spirit has spread, it has not yet infected this body, or the great mass of the intelligent and business portion of the North; but unless it be speedily stopped, it will spread and work upwards till it brings the two great sections of the Union into deadly conflict. This is not a new impression with me. Several years since, in a discussion with one of the Senators from Massachusetts (Mr. Webster), before this fell spirit had showed itself, I then predicted that the doctrine of the proclamation and the Force Bill - that this Government had a right, in the last resort, to determine the extent of its own powers, and enforce its decision at the point of the bayonet, which was so warmly maintained by that Senator, would at no distant day arouse the dormant spirit of abolitionism. I told him that the doctrine was tantamount to the assumption of unlimited power on the part of the Government, and that such would be the impression on the public mind in a large portion of the Union. The consequence would be inevitable. A large portion of the Northern States believed slavery to be a sin, and would consider it as an obligation of conscience to abolish it if they should feel themselves in any degree responsible for its continuance, and that this doctrine would necessarily lead to the belief of such responsibility. I then predicted that it would commence as it has with this fanatical portion of society, and that they would begin their operations on the ignorant, the weak, the young, and the thoughtless, - and gradually extend upwards till they would become strong enough to obtain political control, when he and others holding the highest stations in society, would, however reluctant, be compelled to yield to their doctrines, or be driven into obscurity. But four years have since elapsed, and all this is already in a course of regular fulfilment.
Standing at the point of time at which we have now arrived, it will not be more difficult to trace the course of future events now than it was then. They who imagine that the spirit now abroad in the North, will die away of itself without a shock or convulsion, have formed a very inadequate conception of its real character; it will continue to rise and spread, unless prompt and efficient measures to stay its progress be adopted. Already it has taken possession of the pulpit, of the schools, and, to a considerable extent, of the press; those great instruments by which the mind of the rising generation will be formed.
"We of the South will not, cannot, surrender our institutions. To maintain the existing relations between the two races, inhabiting that section of the Union, is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both."
However sound the great body of the non-slaveholding States are at present, in the course of a few years they will be succeeded by those who will have been taught to hate the people and institutions of nearly one-half of this Union, with a hatred more deadly than one hostile nation ever entertained towards another. It is easy to see the end. By the necessary course of events, if left to themselves, we must become, finally, two people. It is impossible under the deadly hatred which must spring up between the two great nations, if the present causes are permitted to operate unchecked, that we should continue under the same political system. The conflicting elements would burst the Union asunder, powerful as are the links which hold it together. Abolition and the Union cannot coexist. As the friend of the Union I openly proclaim it, - and the sooner it is known the better. The former may now be controlled, but in a short time it will be beyond the power of man to arrest the course of events. We of the South will not, cannot, surrender our institutions. To maintain the existing relations between the two races, inhabiting that section of the Union, is indispensable to the peace and happiness of both. It cannot be subverted without drenching the country or the other of the races. . . . But let me not be understood as admitting, even by implication, that the existing relations between the two races in the slaveholding States is an evil: - far otherwise; I hold it to be a good, as it has thus far proved itself to be to both, and will continue to prove so if not disturbed by the fell spirit of abolition. I appeal to facts. Never before has the black race of Central Africa, from the dawn of history to the present day, attained a condition so civilized and so improved, not only physically, but morally and intellectually.
In the meantime, the white or European race, has not degenerated. It has kept pace with its brethren in other sections of the Union where slavery does not exist. It is odious to make comparison; but I appeal to all sides whether the South is not equal in virtue, intelligence, patriotism, courage, disinterestedness, and all the high qualities which adorn our nature.
"I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two races of different origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing in the slaveholding States between the two, is, instead of an evil, a good - a positive good."
But I take higher ground. I hold that in the present state of civilization, where two races of different origin, and distinguished by color, and other physical differences, as well as intellectual, are brought together, the relation now existing in the slaveholding States between the two, is, instead of an evil, a good - a positive good. I feel myself called upon to speak freely upon the subject where the honor and interests of those I represent are involved. I hold then, that there never has yet existed a wealthy and civilized society in which one portion of the community did not, in point of fact, live on the labor of the other. Broad and general as is this assertion, it is fully borne out by history. This is not the proper occasion, but, if it were, it would not be difficult to trace the various devices by which the wealth of all civilized communities has been so unequally divided, and to show by what means so small a share has been allotted to those by whose labor it was produced, and so large a share given to the non-producing classes. The devices are almost innumerable, from the brute force and gross superstition of ancient times, to the subtle and artful fiscal contrivances of modern. I might well challenge a comparison between them and the more direct, simple, and patriarchal mode by which the labor of the African race is, among us, commanded by the European. I may say with truth, that in few countries so much is left to the share of the laborer, and so little exacted from him, or where there is more kind attention paid to him in sickness or infirmities of age. Compare his condition with the tenants of the poor houses in the more civilized portions of Europe - look at the sick, and the old and infirm slave, on one hand, in the midst of his family and friends, under the kind superintending care of his master and mistress, and compare it with the forlorn and wretched condition of the pauper in the poorhouse. But I will not dwell on this aspect of the question; I turn to the political; and here I fearlessly assert that the existing relation between the two races in the South, against which these blind fanatics are waging war, forms the most solid and durable foundation on which to rear free and stable political institutions. It is useless to disguise the fact. There is and always has been in an advanced stage of wealth and civilization, a conflict between labor and capital. The condition of society in the South exempts us from the disorders and dangers resulting from this conflict; and which explains why it is that the political condition of the slaveholding States has been so much more stable and quiet than that of the North. . . . Surrounded as the slaveholding States are with such imminent perils, I rejoice to think that our means of defense are ample, if we shall prove to have the intelligence and spirit to see and apply them before it is too late. All we want is concert, to lay aside all party differences and unite with zeal and energy in repelling approaching dangers. Let there be concert of action, and we shall find ample means of security without resorting to secession or disunion. I speak with full knowledge and a thorough examination of the subject, and for one see my way clearly. . . . I dare not hope that anything I can say will arouse the South to a due sense of danger; I fear it is beyond the power of mortal voice to awaken it in time from the fatal security into which it has fallen."
Calhoun determined to push for southern rights in an aggressive and combative manner after his fall from power in the Jackson administration. While he never came out and openly pushed for secession, he died before the doctrine that sprang from his pen in 1828 could be subverted to justify the secession of the southern states in 1860. One may wonder what his response to the situation in 1860 might have been, but it is hard to imagine that he would not have been at the front of the battle.
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