Pickett's Charge-Smoke-Deabilitating or Not?

[.Ol'WarHorse]

Many of you know that the prelude to Pickett's charge was a Artillery barrage by 150 Guns on to Cemetary Ridge. The blast was so epic, it could be heard in Harrisburg. This attack was carried out by Colonel Edward Porter Alexander. Up until now, I thought the reason this attack was so unsuccesful in clearing Cemetary Ridge of the Yankees was because of smoke. The smoke from the barrage would have caused poor vision, which in turn would cause many of the Confederate Artillery to miss the mark of the Angle, either overshooting or undershooting.

Now that I have read further, I am a tad skeptical. I am because of Coushing's battery.(sp?) He had 6 guns in his battery placed on Cemetary Ridge, four of which were destroyed in the barrage. Most of the horses on the ridge were decimated aswell, not to mention Coushing was hit twice. When being relieved of his duty because of his wounds, Coushing refused to vacate the field. He instead, asked to move his guns closer to the Angle and resume fire.

Now the question remains, was it valor of men like Coushing that thrwarted the E. Porter Alexander's artillery barrage, or was it the smoke that delt the fatal blow?

[ole]

Forget the smoke, Hoss. It was no worse at Gettysburg than it it was in every battery that ever laid down a barrage. You shoot, there's smoke, it either blows away or it doesn't. You takes what you gets.

ole

[timewalker]

Further, Confederate artillery was notorious for shooting high. The artillery barrage failed in part because the shots went over the main Union line and into the rear areas. So it was actually the smoke from the return fire on the Union guns which blocked the view. You would have that in every artillery duel.

Further, due to a fire at, I believe, the Tredegar Iron Works, a large portion of the Confederate artillery shells came from a different source and they were poorly fused, resulting in an even less effective bombardment.

[5fish]

I will have to reread this part in history. As I have read in the past the smoke form both adulteries did give or help give Porter a false impression his artillery had been successful.

If I remember, the union artillery commander over on cemetery ridge stopped firing sooner then Porter to save ammo. His stopping before Porter this also added to Porter's false sense of success.

Don't whole to it...my memory does fail me at times.

[richard]

What were they using, more smooth bore than rifles or about even. The smooth bores usually did fire high. With a Griffen rifle, if it was consistantly high, then the gunners were at fault.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Ol'WarHorse,

From what I gather there were several ingredients being mixed per se which involved the artillery prior to Pickett's Charge.

Because of the good aim of the Union guns, the ammo train had to be pulled back, lengthening their time to load up the caissons, bring them back up as well as to replentish the fuses. Having a limited amount for one good fight per se; to replentish the CSA cannons took too much time from the original plan.

Another account of the artillery, on the Union side; there was a wise plan by pulling back batteries out of danger into the slope; not too far but, hidden behind the slope. These guns silent, according to what I read and understood; it was to deceive the CSA thinking they were suffering from an exhaustion of ammo.

When Anderson's batteries fell silent as the charge began; this lull allowed the Union to remove disabled guns for fresh pieces; and to move the pieces all along the wall, angle and ridge and charged/loaded and ready to fire. The pieces on Big Round Top and Cemetery Ridge were in such a position as to hit into the flanks but, not until those CSA troops entered into the 'frame' of aim and target range.

The lay of the land really helped the Union. General Buford did a wonderful job in this regard, as did his artillery; holding until General Reynolds could come up and engage with his troops. The hill location on the side; allowed balls to skip and destroy troops like bowling pins.

I am also under the impression that the answering cannons of the Union were supported by the reserve; and the second wave per se was silent once they saw the CSA troops come out of the woods. This would give time for the Union to recalculate their aim and targets; reserve were hidden due to the drop of ground. What was at the wall was just half strength of what was present. They waited until the Infantry could do repeated volleys as to drop men before they reached the wall.

If anybody has time to waste; do read the artillerist official reports on the battle of Gettysburg. Facinating!

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[PvtClewell]

In 1999 and 2000, Richard Rollins wrote a three-part series on the artillery at Gettysburg for North & South magazine.

One of those issues (January 2000, Vol 3., No. 2) dealt with ordnance in which Rollins notes that as much as 80 percent of the Confederate timed fuses were defective the first two years of the war, and much of that ordnance was still in use at Gettysburg. That partially explains some of the apparent 'overshooting' by Confederate gunners, even though in many battles prior to Gerryburg they often outdueled Yankee gunners. Still, at Gettysburg, hundreds of unexploded shells were found after the battle on Cemetery Ridge.

In the April 2000 (Vol. 3, No. 4) issue, Rollins notes that Confederates, despite some successes, did not have much training in long-range firing. Rollins writes: 'The Ordnance Department in Richmond could not produce enough ammunition to allow the gunners to practice firing.' Rollins then quotes E.P. Alexander: 'The great majoritiy of the batteries took the field without having ever fired a round in practice,' he said, 'and passed through the war without aiming a gun at any target but the enemy. The order to "save your ammunition" was reiterated on every battlefield...'

That's astounding to me.

I often thought the artillery bombardment was not thoroughly planned, but Rollins notes that the planning for the artillery bombardment began on the evening of July 2 and lasted, on and off, for upward of eight to 10 hours with each gun placed precisely for a reason. And I didn't know this, according to Rollins:

"The placement of the guns was accorded such importance that at one point Lee personally examined the ground with Longstreet. They walked forward to the edge of an apple orchard very close to the Emmitsburg Road where they were observed by two of the most forward positioned skirmishers from Humphreys' (Barksdale's) brigade. The privates were astonished to see their commanders 'on foot, no aids (sic), orderlies or couriers, 15 or 20 steps apart, field glasses in hand."

Wow.

Also, the artillery was supposed to advance with the infantry.

Rollins writes (September 1999, Vol. 2, No. 7): "One of the most important parts of the plan for the Confederate artillery on July 3 has ben generally overlooked by Gettysburg historians. General Robert E. Lee clearly stated that a crucial assignment of the artillery was to go forward with the infantry and take an offensive role in the charge. Virtually everyone of the important participants in the planning of Pickett's Charge who left an account noted it as part of the plan, and all stressed its importance. As Lee put it: 'The batteries were directed to be pushed forward as the infantry progressed, protect their flanks and support their attacks closely.'

A total of 164 guns out of 246 available participated in the bombardment, meaning for one reason or another, 82 Rebel guns were not engaged, a significant number, I think.

Still, the bombardment silenced 34 Union guns, according to Rollins. What the Confederates didn't know was that 81 Union pieces, part of the Federal Artillery reserve, were 10 minutes away. And they also didn't know that Meade had 13,500 troops behind the ridge to counter a breakthrough.

Rollins writes in conclusion that "...it was not just incorrect elevations, or even simply Confederate shortcomings, that resulted in the outcome of Pickett's Charge with which we are familiar. The failure can be traced to three general factors. (1) Southern industry failed to produce modern weapons with reliable ammunition in sufficient quantities. (2) by July 3, 1863, the North's industrial might has produced a decided advantage in materiel. (3) The competition to identify natural and human resources, transform them into implements of warm and deliver them to the proper place at the right time, had essentially been resolved in favor of the North." (April 2000)

Rollins also writes: "The artillery plan for Pickett's Charge was the most complex ever designed by General Lee. Even after it failed, he continued to believe that it was the best plan he cold have devised... Despite careful planning the artillery failed to achieve its objective. The generally accepted explanation, that they fired high, is a massive simplicity that has arisen over time. The complex reality of the plan has been blurred into folk-tale and legend. Amidst smoke, fear and excitement, a variety of factors led to failure, in turn acusing the failure of the infantry assault."

Sounds reasonable to me.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Private Clewell,

I can agree with your post.

I am also of the belief that earlier in the Civil War, those munitions, fuses and such; that were stolen from the US Arsenals, Forts and facilities; were as reliable as they would ever find. The pieces captured in various earlier campaigns were probably used up by time Gettysburg rolled around.

Union also had problems with manufacturing defects--not just the CSA. However, the ability to produce more munitions, fuses, etc.; gave the percentage to the advantage of the Union.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[ole]

Awesome, guys. This is going to take a while to sort through.

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

We, (in general) should not forget about captured guns and cassions that were usually nearby. Not all battery crews could spike the guns, destroy their ammunition before being swamped by enemy's charges into the guns.

Further consideration, should be -- that former US Army members of artillery would know how to enable an enemy's guns; and vice versa; as cannons had but few variations to it. So, even if a gun was spiked; it would be fixed in time. If not, it would be melted down and form a new cannon.

Artillerists being so fond with their guns-- Ol'WarHorse; I can picture Cushing/Coushing's desire to take the rest of the guns forward and exact some damage in response for knocking out his cannons/guns/rifles.

I think if in his position, I would do the same. I would know that one cannon ball, one shot and or one canister would wipe out more men than one soldier could. It would be the risk I would take--save men by putting artillery in and blast until one couldn't blast any more.

Can replace guns/artillery--can't replace a good batch of fighting troops.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf