Lee's caution lost Gettysburg!!

[5fish]

WE as conciser of the Civil War are fascinated by the Battle of Gettysburg for it was the turning point of the our nation Civil War.

We all know the reasons history gives for why Gen. Lee lost the Battle of Gettysburg. I over the years chose to believe the History and Military experts were correct but of late I believe these opinions are nothing but a smoke screen to the truth of why Gen. Lee failed at Gettysburg.

Let review some:

Longstreet and "the slows" for his inability to quickly follow Gen. Lee's orders. He was insubordinate at Gettysburg but Lee never called him on it. The Virginians after the war chose Longstreet as the villain at Gettysburg.

Stuart and his "vanity ride" around the AoP. A pointless ride but it did not cause Gen. Lee to lose at Gettysburg. It was only an inconvenience nothing more...

Ewell and not taking Cemetery Hill on July 1st. His Corp was not in position to take the Cemetery Hill for Early's and Rodes Division were tapped out and had to secure Gettysburg for it was crawling with lost Union troops. By the time he got Johnson and his men organized the Union position had already been reinforced by Divisions from other Union Corps.

Those are the big three reason history gives us for why Gen. Lee lost at Gettysburg.

I beg to deffer with the Historians and Military experts for I believe a decision by Lee in the opening moments of his arrival at Herr ridge sealed his fate at Gettysburg.

I will let you think for a moment: What simple decision could Gen Lee have done to seal his fate?

The decision he made make sense. It is what any good military leader would do faced with what Gen. Lee faced that day. Some would say it was a sound military decision almost standard even with today's modern army.

GIVE UP??

When Gen Lee arrived on Herr ridge he order Anderson Division to hold fast even to bivack. Gen. Anderson came looking for Gen. Lee to find out why. Gen. Lee told him that his Division was being held in reserve in case of any disaster happens

Gen. Lee made a sound decision to hold Anderson Division back and who can argue with it. I will because it what will lead to Gen. Lee's defeat...

The battle goes well for Gen Lee. Hill's two Divisions push the 1st Corp back toward Gettysburg and Cemetery Hill. Ewell's rolls up the 11th Corp and drives them back to Cemetery Hill. Once this is done Lee knows he has to clear Cemetery Hill of the Union broken army before they dig in. He knows Hill's men are finished and then he goes to Ewell and all he has left is Johnson Men but he is to far away but Gen. Lee's chooses to wait for Johnson Men. A wait that will cost him the battle and the war.

He refused to tap his reserve. The daring general chose to be cautious and not call up Anderson's division it was only two to three miles away. Anderson could have arrived on the field of battle with enough force to push the remnants of the 1st and 11th corps back to Pipe Creeks before they could dig in and be reinforced.

Lee's cautious behavior cost him the Battle of Gettysburg. His decision to hold back Anderson was right at first but when he needed man power he should have went to Anderson and use Johnson men as the reserve.

The Battle of Gettysburg was lost when Cemetery Hill was not taken on the first day and only Gen. Lee is to blame. I believe all those other reasons put forth over the years was just a smoke screen to protect Gen. Lee's image. My reasoning does not sell books for it does not make for a great story. If my reasoning was ever excepted it would dull some of the luster that surrounds the Battle of Gettysburg...


I offer this to the board....

[ole]

Avery provocative and thoughty statement, 5fish. That ought to get something going.

ole

[diddyriddick]

Interesting post, Fish. While I'm not sure that I agree with it wholeheartedly, I do believe that Lee got off easy with public opinion after the battle. We've talked at length on this forum about Early et al and their successful attempt to shift blame from Lee to Longstreet, Stuart, and Ewell.

One of the rules of warfare is to always have a reserve for emergencies. Lee was not unique in allowing for that. Moreover, I'm not sure that a single division could have pushed two corps off of Cemetary hill.

[PvtClewell]

Fish,

Actually, this ground has been explored by David Martin in his book 'Gettysburg, July 1.'

Martin writes: "Anderson's five brigades had been peaceably encamped since June 27 at Fayetteville, six miles east of Chambersburg. Soon after daylight on 1 July, Hill directed Anderson to begin marching to Cashtown....The column proceeded at a leisurely pace, and then came to a halt near Greenwood (west of South Mountain) while Johnson's division and all its trains filed onto the road on a side road from Scotland...had Johnson's division proceeded south on the eastern side of the mountains, it would have arrived on the field much earlier in the day, and the Chambersburg Pike would have been free for Anderson to use and so arrive more quickly on the field. If Johnson and Anderson had arrived at mid-afternoon instead of in the evening, they would have helped make the battle a complete victory for Lee; McLaws' and Hood's divisions, which were stacked up on the road behind Anderson, would also have arrived earlier."

Martin goes on to write: "The truth of the matter was that Lee did not wish to risk Anderson's men, who were his only fresh reserves after Johnson's division was forwarded to Ewell. After the war Anderson told Captain Louis G. Young that he had been hurrying his men to join the battle when he received a messenger from Lee to stop and go into bivouac. He was so surprised by the order that he rode to see Lee himself after he halted his men to see if the order had been relayed correctly. 'General Lee replied that there was no mistake made and explained that his army was not all up, that his (General Anderson's) alone of the troops present had not been engaged, and that a reserve in case of disaster was necessary.'

Martin then makes his own observation:
"This was the third major mistake of the evening. Even if Lee were concerned about the appearance of even more Union troops on the field, he knew that McLaws' and Hood's divisions were not far away. In addition, it was unlikely that the Yankees were going to mount a major counterattack this late in the day. Anderson should have been rushed forward to attack the western side of Cemetery Hill while Johnson attacked the northern side. This is probably what Jackson would have urged had he been present. It is also enlightening to note how quickly Meade was pushing his corps forward on several different roads, while Lee's divisions were all backed up on the Chambersburg Pike. This would enable Meade to concentrate his army quicker than Lee, and so ensure victory."

[5fish]

Interesting post, I have read books on Gettysburg but the writers mention Anderson's but given go beyond the fact his division was within easy reach of the battlefield. They never question why Lee never use Anderson division.

Lee was looking for one good division to finish the union off on Cemetery Hill. It seems he never thought about using Anderson Division. He was determined to use Ewell's men to finish off the union force.

I need to find a copy of the book by David Martin...

[OpnDownfall]

A case can be made that 'possibly' Lee reacted too cautiously to Harrison's spy report on the evening of the 28th and immediately orders Ewell to fall back on Cashtown. It probably would have been better to push Hill and Lonstreet as fast as possible from Cashtown to Gettysburg (and if he had orderd Ewell to join up with him at Gettysberg, instead of Chambersburg/Cashtown, there would have been no traffic Jam on the road from Cashtown to Gettysburg) on a single road the pace might have been a little slow, but progress would have been steady.
But after the battle was joined, (even with the traffic Jam) Lee was there firstest with the mostest and if Lee had managed to get any of his corps commanders to obey his intial orders, he could still have won at Gettysburg at least until mid-day of day 2.
Although the victory would probably have been hard fought and less decisive than desired, it was not caution in the battle itself that defeated Lee.

[5fish]

[quote]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

A
(and if he had ordered Ewell to join up with him at Gettysburg, instead of Chambersburg/Cashtown, there would have been no traffic Jam on the road from Cashtown to Gettysburg) on a single road the pace might have been a little slow, but progress would have been steady.

I don't fault Lee on his original decision hold Anderson's Div. back as reserve. As the first engagements began to come to a close and it become apparent that he needed more man power quickly to complete the victory. He ignore Anderson's Div. for some possible disaster and chose to wait for Johnson Div.

Everyone mention the traffic on he roads an jammed roads were impending Johnson progress towards Gettysburg. The impression I get is Anderson was much closer and could quickly reach Gettysburg, exactly what Lee needed..

I fault Lee for being cautious because he had taken bigger risk then going to reserve unit before like at Chancollerville. Why was he not being the daring general he has become know for? Why play by the book?

He knew he needed at least a division worth of men to complete the victory and he knew where one close was at hand.

Th risk of a disaster was greatly reduce once once his two Corps had sent the union Corps into disarray.

Why was he so cautious? Seize the day, Lee!

[PvtClewell]

Everyone mention the traffic on he roads an jammed roads were impending Johnson progress towards Gettysburg. The impression I get is Anderson was much closer and could quickly reach Gettysburg, exactly what Lee needed..

See, my view is just the opposite. My interpretation from Martin's book (see my previous post) is that Anderson halted at Greenwood 'while Johnson's division and all its trains filed onto the road from a side road from Scotland...'

To me that indicates that Anderson was waiting for Johnson's division to pass. And if that's the case, then there's no way that Anderson gets to Gettysburg any quicker than Johnson does. But without a licensed battlefield guide sitting right here next to me whispering in my ear, I really don't have a good feel for the timeline.

[OpnDownfall]

I agree with PvtClewell, it is my understanding that Gen, Anderson's command was involved in the Traffic Jam near Greemwood and did not arrive at Gettysburg until after dark.
From my search, it is unclear, to me, whether it was just the remnants of the Iron Brigade or Wadsworth's Div, (suffering approximately a 50% casualty rate, already in the days battle) I know Wadsworth protested occupying Culp's Hill, feeling he had insufficient men for the job.
Lee ordered Ewell to take Culp's Hill waits an hour and travels to Ewell's Hdqtrs to find out why he has not attacked and is informed that Ewell does not think it can be taken.
It does not seem Lee was cautious, he seems quite anxious to continue the attack until, at least, Culp's Hill has been taken. It seems to be Ewell who is too cautious, against the wishes of Lee.

[5fish]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

I agree with PvtClewell, it is my understanding that Gen, Anderson's command was involved in the Traffic Jam near Greemwood and did not arrive at Gettysburg until after dark.
From my search, it is unclear, to me, whether it was just the remnants of the Iron Brigade or Wadsworth's Div, (suffering approximately a 50% casualty rate, already in the days battle) I know Wadsworth protested occupying Culp's Hill, feeling he had insufficient men for the job.
Lee ordered Ewell to take Culp's Hill waits an hour and travels to Ewell's Hdqtrs to find out why he has not attacked and is informed that Ewell does not think it can be taken.
It does not seem Lee was cautious, he seems quite anxious to continue the attack until, at least, Culp's Hill has been taken. It seems to be Ewell who is too cautious, against the wishes of Lee.

I would like to remind that Anderson was only 2 t0 3 miles away as Lee reach Herr ridge. Lee order him to make camp unless needed... Johnson was still miles away at this time and I don't think they were using the same rode to reach Gettysburg.

I like PvtClewell don't have a map handy but Anderson was not order to the field until the next morning to take his place in line...

Lee was cautious for he never to use Anderson either alone or in conjunction with Johnson....He held on to hid reserve to long...He needed more men in the field...