Lee's Plan, Day Three: What Do You Think?

[elektratig]

I don't pretend to be a Gettysburg expert, but I've read some about it. I have never, however, heard the following. Can any of you who have studied the battle comment on the following:

"Is there anything new and important to say about Gettysburg? Perhaps so. Perhaps Lee's imagination and patience did not falter after the abortive attacks on the second day. Perhaps his plan for the third day was the most brilliant of all: he just kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale. That plausible plan concerns something everyone knows -- J.E.B. Stuart's belated return on July 2 -- and something many people may not know" the action Stuart's men fought on July 3 well behind Culp's Hill. It is always assumed that Stuart just meant to disrupt the federal troops' supplies and reinforcements or harry their expected retreat. But strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Lee sent Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Seminary Ridge from the rear in support of Pickett's charge from the front. Why didn't Stuart deliver that mortal blow? Because 2,700 cavalrymen from Michigan, in fighting trim thanks to Hooker's attention, defeated Stuart's gray ghosts about four miles short of their goal. The Union general who rallied his men with the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was George Armstrong Custer."

The accompany footnote states, in relevant part, "On Lee's secret plan for the third day, see Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why It Failed (New York: Putnam, 2005)."

Walter A. McDougall, Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877 (New York: HarperCollins 2008) (emphasis added).

Have you heard this? Do you believe it?

[trice]

Originally Posted by elektratig

I don't pretend to be a Gettysburg expert, but I've read some about it. I have never, however, heard the following. Can any of you who have studied the battle comment on the following:

"Is there anything new and important to say about Gettysburg? Perhaps so. Perhaps Lee's imagination and patience did not falter after the abortive attacks on the second day. Perhaps his plan for the third day was the most brilliant of all: he just kept the fact of its failure secret out of concern for his army's morale. That plausible plan concerns something everyone knows -- J.E.B. Stuart's belated return on July 2 -- and something many people may not know" the action Stuart's men fought on July 3 well behind Culp's Hill. It is always assumed that Stuart just meant to disrupt the federal troops' supplies and reinforcements or harry their expected retreat. But strong circumstantial evidence suggests that Lee sent Stuart around the northeastern tip of the Union lines with orders to circle back west and charge Seminary Ridge from the rear in support of Pickett's charge from the front. Why didn't Stuart deliver that mortal blow? Because 2,700 cavalrymen from Michigan, in fighting trim thanks to Hooker's attention, defeated Stuart's gray ghosts about four miles short of their goal. The Union general who rallied his men with the cry "Come on, you Wolverines!" was George Armstrong Custer."

The accompany footnote states, in relevant part, "On Lee's secret plan for the third day, see Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee's Real Plan at Gettysburg and Why It Failed (New York: Putnam, 2005)."

Walter A. McDougall, Throes of Democracy: The American Civil War Era 1829-1877 (New York: HarperCollins 2008) (emphasis added).

Have you heard this? Do you believe it?

I've seen it claimed before; I have never thought it likely.

What makes far more sense is simple, normal, military tactics. Stuart is not in position to make such a successful assault -- but he is in perfect position to follow up on a successful breaking of the Federal position.

If you look at what was actually in position to resist Stuart that day, you'll see that even if he had swept Custer and the rest of the cavalry off in a rout, he would have had to charge through lots of infantry and massed artillery batteries, all in place. His cavalry would have been slaughtered if he tried. Lee may or may not have had such a plan -- but it would not have worked.

What this does look like is the prepositioning of Stuart's force for a finishing stroke in pursuit if Pickett's Charge had actually worked. Then Stuart might have fallen upon a panicked Union army attempting to retreat down the Baltimore Pike. That is classic use of cavalry in Napoleonic tactics, and Lee was very much a student of Napoleonic warfare.

Tim

[J_Man0507]

I have heard assertions to the fact that Lee had sent Stuart around to the rear in order to support Pickett's attack, which is always the way that I had seen the movement in the first place. Lee wasn't intent on disrupting supplies, I don't think; he wanted to get into the rear and hit them there at the same time as Pickett hit the front, hoping to rout the Union forces on Cemetery Ridge. However, the Union cavalry isn't the inept, ill-trained force that it had been in the first two years of the war. I think Brandy Station should have proven that already, and shown Stuart that he needed to be wary when taking on the Union cavalry. The Union troopers were now a force to be reckoned with.

[ole]

If you accept

...strong circumstantial evidence suggests ...

then I guess it could make sense. Had anyone there told the same story, I'd sit up and listen.

Lee might have felt comfortable now that Stuart was back. (We're mostly agreed that Lee was likely overconfident already.) In his eyes, on that day, he could see a possibility.

Just a thought.

ole

[Jamieva]

Lee was positioning him there so when Pickett's attack succeeded and the AoP broke and ran, the cavalry would be there to reap panic on the fleeing army. Stuart's force was not to actually be part of the attack in conjunction with Pickett.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Elektratig and List Members,

I will add to the choir voices; that I do not claim expertise` on anything Civil War.

I have consulted the Official Records of the Rebellion and Col. Walter H. Taylor's accounts in his book Four Years with General Lee-Chapter VIII which is dedicated to Gettysburg.

First, I wish to present that the Confederates had come into Pennsylvania around Gettysburg and Cashtown on October 11, 1862. General B.T. Johnson and General T. Jackson with General Stuart head of Cavalry proceeding before the main body. So, General Stuart already had a familiar understanding of Gettysburg, Cashtown and Chambersburg.

Now, Lee was heading up to Pennsylvania to the same area but, using the mountains to screen his movements. Stuart was sent by Lee with the orders of using his (Stuart's) judgment. According to Col. Taylor; it was disturbing to Lee that Stuart did not send any word as to his location, actions and most of all 'intelligence.'

Union General McClellan and Pleasonton (Head of Cavalry) as well as General Buford had previous knowledge of Stuart's travel on Stuart's skirmish in Gettysburg in October of 1862 and thus a potential route of Stuart's retreat and potential return targets on this June-July mission.

Stanton (SecretaryofWar) telegraphs all the generals in upper Maryland and around Gettysburg and vicinity; that a note was captured; first sending it to Rosecrans who was stationed in Maryland and Corps commanders Butterfield and a few others. Pleasonton aware alerts General Gregg and Kilpatrick and they are haunting the areas where Stuart raided once before. Stanton tells of President Davis' letter to Lee that he is unable to send support--pretty much telling Lee he is on his own. So, General Lee is now without support as of July 2nd-3rd.

General Stuart returns, according to Col. Taylor (AAG/CofS) to General Lee at the evening of July 2nd and had engagements. His cavalry had not been fed and had previously hard skirmishes with the Union Cavalry. By time July 3rd comes, according to Taylor; Stuart's cavalry was below strength, tired, hungry and horses not fed.

General Longstreet in his battle designs, assigned General Wilcox to support Pickett's flanks. General AP Hill was suppose to support Trimble and Pettigrew; but--he did not do so. Longstreet needed to hold some troops as to attack if the Federals came; this fell on McLaws and Hood's brigades; as they had lost half their strength on the previous day's battle.
(This is what I got in summary from Col. Taylor's accounts). Although Taylor's personal opinion was that, if McLaws and Hood's brigade had marched with Pettigrew, Trimble (Heth's), Pickett it may have been successful. But, Taylor does not say who could have served as defense to replace Hood and McLaws if they moved in with Pickett. Lee had deployed the other Corps elsewhere. And, Lee giving Longstreet the control of the charge; well--to me; the reports after the battle is what Taylor had to work with; as well as the official reports.

Taylor did mention that General Lee was confident as the progress on July 1 and 2 was built on near success. Longstreet presented his case for not conducting a charge but was overruled by Lee and Taylor said Longstreet did his duty fully; from what I gathered from reading the chapter on Gettysburg.

General Ewell was to have 'demonstrated' on the northern portion of the 'fish-hook' configuration of the Union Forces.

With Brig. General Ingalls, with 25 trains at Westminster on the Baltimore Branch; near the battlefield brought into place; Buford would later guard this with his shattered force along with artillery.

I did not find anything to support or not support Stuart being in support of Pickett's Charge -- only General Wilcox's cavalry; according to Col. W. Taylor's book Four Years with General Lee Wilcox was on Pickett's flanks

It is known that Stuart's calvary tangled with Union Cavalry, to which General Farnsworth; to which perished in the battle near Gettysburg; known as "Cavalry Field;" I will also mention that Farnsworth was on General Pleasonton's staff. So, it is possible Farnsworth was aware of Stuart's previous moves from his staff position with Pleasonton. General Killpatrick was also engaged, General Gregg and General A. Custer as well. I believe General Lee leading a separate Cavalry unit was also engaged; on the CSA side.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[OpnDownfall]

toLee's original plan for Day Three was apparenbtly to disengage Longstreet's corps from around the RT's and move it further north to support Pickett's planned assault on the Union Center. With Ewell concurrently completing the occupation of Culps Hill and securing control of the nearby Baltimore Pike. With Stuart at Hanover to support the expected breakthrough of Pickett's force.
When Lee dismisses Longstreets final plea for moving around the AoP and maneuvering them to attack the ANV, Longstreet then insists that it is too dangerous to disengage Hood and McLaws Div's and Lee reluctantly changes his plan (Day Two Redux), necessitating the early morning attack to be postponed to 10:00 A.M. By which time Ewell's battle for Culp's Hill, which has been raging since early morning, has been lost.
The New plan has Pickett reinforced by troops from Hill's corps and although the majority of the assaulting force is now to be from 2d Corps, the reluctant Longstreet remains in charge of the attack.
When Pickett cracks the Union line, Longstreet and Hill remain firmly in their places and there is no support to hold the initial penetration open and Stuart abandons the field at Hanover to the smaller Union cavalry force that fought him to a draw.
If Stuart's movement were vital to the success of the ANV's attack, he did not put up much of a fight, to remain in place to deliver the presumed surprise attack.
Personally, If I were going for a revisionist answer I like Troy D. Harman's theory that Lee's Plan for all Three Days of battle was the taking of Cemetary Hill and that Lee's planned target for Pickett was not the copse of tree's on Hancock's front by Ziegler's Grove on Cemetary Hill.

[whitworth]

on July 3rd, he failed to do. Plus his troopers and horses were in no condition to do a sustained attack.

The devil is in the details, and there probably are few modern students of the Civil War who have any knowledge of horses, the care and feeding.

Anyone else ever spend eight hours on a saddle in one day? Stuart was continually on the move since he left Virginia; had several skirmishes-Hanover and Carlisle. Few moderns would grasp the significance of that fact.

I'd recommend the Stuart OR report, with the caveat to ask yourself -how worn out are the troopers and horses - fairly frequently?

[5fish]

I do not agree with Mr. Carhart assumption of what Lee's plan was on day 3.

Whitworth is correct that Stuart's cavalry was exhausted form his mindless vanity ride. If Stuart had a major roll on day 3 he would had given Custer a better fight then he did.

There is a counter argument that if Stuarts horses were so exhausted. Why did Stuart's cavalry preform so well during the retreat of Lee's army from PA.

In the Lee's Official reports he never to hardly mentions Stuart in his reports on Gettysburg. If Stuart would have had a major role Lee would have mention it.

Some thoughts...

[OpnDownfall]

Assuming Lee is as knowlegeble about the care and feeding of horses as Stuart, it would be logical that Lee would not ask the impossible from his cavalry or that Stuart would not have informed Lee of the capablities of his force. That being the case, gaining a position where he (Stuart) could protect the left of Ewell's Corps and also be able to observe the Union rear and attack in case the Confederate assault (Pickett's Charge) was successful, would be all that could be reasonably expected from Stuart's command on the 3d Day.