the flanking movement Longstreet desired...

[Dred]

I was thinking the other day on this. Longstreet did all he could to try and convince Lee not to attack the round tops, and instead try and flank the union right and get between the and DC. It always seemed to me that Lee acted very uncharacteristically in his insistence to attack, and unwillingness to be persuaded otherwise. It got me to thinking, did he just not trust Longstreet enough to pull it off? Jackson had talked him into making daring sweeping movements very similar to this, and with great success on numerous occasions. This is kind of a what if, but also a why not question. Do you think Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, having already had so much of his trust? Longstreet replaced Jackson as Lee's most trusted General, but did he really trust him as much as he did Jackson? I propose that he did not, and that Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, especially so soon after the success of his massive flanking attack at Chancellorsville.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Dred,

In looking at the correspondences of General Robert E. Lee and the recollections of his son, to whom first served as a private in the artillery; Lee's son in a summary, mentioned that General Lee's favorite general was "John Bell Hood" aka "Sam." According to Lee's son -- Lee trusted Hood.

That said, these little 'tags' General Lee applied to various generals; General Jackson might have been his 'arm' or 'muscle' but, Stuart was his 'eyes' and "Longstreet" his support and carrier (My Old War Horse).
Being an equestrian--this term in our circles is the highest compliment of a horse--as they are steady, reliable, carry long hours, cool under fire, in the excitement of battle they're just involved yet, with horse sense--great caution for their safety and it is their rider's safety as well.

Each general had mistakes in their commands--nobody is perfect but, I think General Lee got too confident in his own mind and perhaps felt pressured to make choices without the 'eyes' of his army, the total impact of Jackson's absent from the field and or command, wasn't really felt or tested yet--so; he wasn't accustom to the new 'rank' and 'leadership' structure as to use it wisely. I think Jackson umbrella leadership hid the flaws of Early, AP Hill and Ewell. It wasn't important when Jackson was alive as he was so 'large' in a great many aspects of command--Jackson didn't rely on Ewell, Hill or Early--they depended on him. They weren't the caliber of a corps commander Jackson was--and Jackson didn't train them or share his battle plans. Jackson was sly in that regard--as not to be called on his mistakes as Jackson could excuse it on contingencies. Whereas, Longstreet seemingly, in his style--had the commanders be more responsible for their own brigades and regiments and their reports on their status, inspections and their own experiences--he drew from that and made his decisions and tactical plans based on what General Lee had planned. When General Longstreet was so seriously wounded in the neck, not that far from where Jackson was shot by his own men; Longstreet being shot by his own CSA forces--like Jackson had to be a 'flash back' for Lee. His two arms--Jackson and Longstreet--can loose one but two? Ouch --But, with Longstreet's commanders--they carried the fight without Longstreet and didn't digress in their performance; as they were not so dependent on the man-Longstreet--just Longstreet's training.

But, regardless of how Lee's men and supporters think of 'the General'--Lee admitted his error in judgment and perhaps that alone--taking responsibility like a man does--was more endearing to the common soldier than anything else; with a magical quality about him. Remember, in the beginning Lee was dubbed 'Old Granny.' I think Lee lived through Jackson--perhaps the flaw, when you personally and emotionally invest in someone and when they're dead or gone--it is hard to switch into a new 'body' to live through, especially when they have always been there from the start.

Now, that said -- I think General Longstreet had more affection than he may have manifested. Being close to Lee's camp; its my belief, supported by reading the official correspondences between them; verses Jackson's --
Longstreet seemed to have a 'son' relationship with Lee. I believe Lee was fatherly to Longstreet. Both were quiet like--few words but, when they did speak--it was volumes. Lee was the 'father' of the Confederate Army. The many recollections of Lee doing little 'touching' things--like putting his raincoat over a sleeping staff officer, asleep on his horse when, in truth--he should have been awake. He had a way of making soldiers and officers feel that they really mattered and he really cared--and I believe it was his nature to be so. I think nobody wanted to disappoint General Lee but, it had a flaw--and that is, often other generals would not tell the truth of how bad things were as to spare Lee's feelings--when Lee should have been told the truth as to have a honest assessment of his troop strength and the positions held at Gettysburg. General Lee is ultimately responsible. Just as Grant was, and all the ones who proceeded him in commanding the entire army. I am constantly reminded of the parallel to the affections of General Lee of both armies really, is as much of an impact on the affections of HRH Princess Diana "The People's Princess" -- that affection world wide; is the impact of the affections for General Lee--flaws overlooked but, it was the 'person' that was the power behind the admiration.

I do believe General Lee was very aware about General Longstreet's loss of hearing but, it wasn't until the death of Longstreet's children and the need for General Pickett, to bury his children as he, Longstreet was required to be with Lee. Perhaps Lee felt guilty, sorrowful and--maybe shared a common misery of loosing dearones--bonded them. The loss of able commanders I'm sure cause Lee concern--he cared about people and those under him cared about Lee. The Union Army didn't have a wide swatch of admiration for any one General, other than their division, corps, regiment and or battalion commanders; as there were so many chiefs and not enough consistancy.

In addition, I proffer this -- General T. Jackson was not in the position of great failures as he was assigned to the eastern theater for the most part and in Virginia. Should "Stonewall" have been in other theaters, I am not so sure he would have had the many successes. But, that is a 'what if.'

Longstreet, despite Bragg--was successful which to me; gives me thoughts that no matter who was chief in the army; Longstreet could survive and thrive off of Lee's coat tails. It was Lee who summoned Longstreet back. Perhaps this break was much needed--to see clearly without the shadow of Longstreet's command/fighting abilities to see how wretched his commanders were. Although the relationships were strained after Gettysburg; the reports reflect that Lee valued Longstreet that much more.

Once General Grant understood, the threat wasn't the CSA, Jeff Davis and such--it was General Lee the man, who was the power/force behind the life of the CSA army; then everything developed into what took place. I'm sure the CSA recognized that for the Union, the power/force behind it was Lincoln--not so much because he was a President--it was the 'man' that touched lives and made them feel that they mattered.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[Dred]

M.E. Wolf,

Great post, as usual! I had to mull it over a bit to dissect the info but I get what you are after now. It wasn't a trust thing. If anything Lee seems to have trusted Longstreet more, if not equally. Different command styles does not make him less of a general than Jackson. If Longstreet couldn't have convinced him, Jackson probably couldn't have either. Thanks for the input!

Dred

[timewalker]

I have often wondered about Longstreet's desire to go around the flank fo the Union army at Gettysburg. It always seemed to me easier said than done. It was one thing for Jackson, in his home country and with only a portion of the army, to move around Hooker's flank at Chancellorsville. It would have been quite another for Lee, with the entire AoNV to move around Meade's flank at Gettysburg, in enemy territory, with his cavalry not recovered from its disastrous ride around the Union army and with a long train of wagons. If Lee tried to move around the Union flank as Longstreet suggested, could it have been done? Would he not be exposing his trains to attack by Union cavalry or infantry? Meade was no Hooker. He does not seem to be one to freeze in the face of the enemy and passively allow Lee to march around his flank. All in all, it seems to me an attempt to march around the flank would have been a very risky affair and could only have been done if Lee could have successfully fooled Meade into staying in place while Lee stole the march on him.

[ole]

Another re-opening of the flanking movement?

You vets, feel free to correct my speculation here. I don't think such a movement would be undertaken by a corps. Too risky! A division, maybe.

A lightning sweep, if successful, would cause enough consternation to enable other divisions to follow. But the sweep, as discussed, wouldn't be aimed at Washington or Baltimore -- with seven Federal Corps on the ground, stretching the supply line so far would have been everso rash.

But a sweep around Big Round Top might have affected the battle itself. Maybe. Maybe not. We do have to remember that it was not McClellan in charge.

ole

[J_Man0507]

Very true ole. Not sure on this, but I think a division is what Longstreet wanted to send around the Round Tops. I thought he had wanted to send Hood around to flank the hills. I could be wrong on that, but I think that that would have worked. Not a 100% sure fire bet, but it could have. Lee still doesn't have the cavalry to screen such a manuever and the Yanks have cavalry a plenty. There is also one whole corps on the Union side not engaged at all in the battle that could be brought to bear on any such maneuver.

As for the relationship between Lee and Longstreet, I think during Gettysburg, it was a bit strained. Lee had just lost Jackson, arguably his most aggressive corps commander and a man he trusted highly. Jackson was very offensive minded; strike hard and strike fast. Longstreet, on the other hand, was very defensive minded, which was the right mindset to have if you were the south. He understood they didn't have the manpower to continually slug it out in epic battles. They were the yin and yang for General Lee, and losing Jackson threw that contrast off big time. But Lee trusted Longstreet, but he knew what he wanted, and that was a victory on Northern soil, and I don't think he was willing to wait another day for it. And it ended up costing him.

[timewalker]

I can see sending a division around the southern union flank, but it was my understanding this was not what Longstreet wanted. He wanted to swing the whole army around the Union flank, take up a blocking position between the AoP and Washington and wait for attack on ground of his own choosing.

It seems as if we are talking about two different flanking movements, here. One where Longstreet wanted to take the whole army around the flank, and another where he wanted to send a portion of his force around the flank as part of the attack up the Emmetsburg Pike. Is is possible this was a cause of confusion at Gettysburg? Longstreet wanted, as part of his offensive/defensive strategy not to attack the Federals but to interpose the army between Meade and Washington and wait for attack. He argues this to Lee - "the way is open, let's go around the flank" - who rejects it.

Lee orders Longstreet to attack up the Emmetsburg Pike. Hood argues that as part of that attack, his division should sweep around the flank. Longstreet, stung by Lee's refusal to follow his advice, refuses permission for any movement around the flank even as part of the attack Lee actually ordered even though Lee did not mean that a move by a part of Longstreet's command around the immediate Union flank as opposed to a grand swing by the army far around the Union flank, was impermissable.

Or am I reading this wrong? I know part of Longstreet's denial to Hood was that it was getting late he did not have time to send Hood around the flanks. The attack had to go in.

[larry_cockerham]

Sweeping the entire Conferate army around the Round Top would have taken considerable on site logistics, something of which I question if these guys were capable. Lee was focused on attacking the middle of the line, breaking it in half. Timing, concentration of men, and some luck with the cannons might have brought that about with a loss of lives even greater than the tragic reality. Not doing so, in Lee's mind, probably would have been seen as backing away from a challenge, a concept alien to his nature. Hood rejected the same or similar advice at Franklin a year and a half later, with much the same result.

[Dred]

Originally Posted by ole

Another re-opening of the flanking movement?

Well it kind of took on a life of its own, which I figured it would, but I only needed one question answered lol. I wasn't so much concerned with the flanking movement itself, but rather with the question was there any general that could have convinced Lee to do it.

[trice]

Originally Posted by Dred

I was thinking the other day on this. Longstreet did all he could to try and convince Lee not to attack the round tops, and instead try and flank the union right and get between the and DC. It always seemed to me that Lee acted very uncharacteristically in his insistence to attack, and unwillingness to be persuaded otherwise. It got me to thinking, did he just not trust Longstreet enough to pull it off? Jackson had talked him into making daring sweeping movements very similar to this, and with great success on numerous occasions. This is kind of a what if, but also a why not question. Do you think Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, having already had so much of his trust? Longstreet replaced Jackson as Lee's most trusted General, but did he really trust him as much as he did Jackson? I propose that he did not, and that Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, especially so soon after the success of his massive flanking attack at Chancellorsville.

Personal opinion: nope.

Longstreet's July 2 proposal is to do nothing on July 2 and fight the battle, if any, on some other day. The attack that did take place started late in the afternoon; any attempt to get around the Round Tops to the South would have used up all the daylight. Lee, having already been disappointed by Ewell and Hill, was in no mood to see more delay. He thought he needed to strike the AoP before they were all up.

In addition, he had somehow received a report from a staff officer recon that the Union flank did not extend anywhere near as far as the Round Tops. No one has ever figured that one out; the area the staff recon supposedly went through was filled with Union troops when they went. Still, it was the information Lee had at the time.

So Lee was already frustrated with the non-responsiveness and excuses of his officers when he turned to Longstreet, determined to make something happen that day (not tomorrow) and had bad information about the Union position. Whether we talk about Longstreet or Jackson, they would have needed something definite to offer to convince Lee to let that day pass without taking action. Longstreet didn't have it (for good reason, his troops were just arriving and he had no different info than Lee did). If Jackson had been alive, he might have been more active in determining what was what on July 1-2 than Hill and Ewell were -- but that's a stretch.

So, IMHO, no difference unless somebody can produce better data for Lee.

Tim