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Civil War History - Gettysburg Forum Gettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!

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  #31  
Old 05-10-2008, 12:20 AM
M E Wolf's Avatar
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Dear List Members,

I am wondering if any of you, have realized that the CSA forces; especially under General JEB Stuart had been to Gettysburg, PA before - Date: October 9-12-1862? Stuart had been all around this more 'famous battleground of July 1-3, 1863; under General Lee's orders.

[Reference: Official Records of the Rebellion]-
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XIX/2 [S# 28]
OCTOBER 9-12, 1862.--Stuart's Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania.
No. 1.--Report of Maj. Gen. John E. Wool, U. S. Army, commanding the Middle Department.
HEADQUARTERS EIGHTH ARMY CORPS,
Baltimore, Md., October 14, 1862. [Excerpt]-3,000 rebel cavalry, and a section of artillery, under the command of General Stuart, were in possession of Chambersburg; [excerpt]-On the way I received a telegram, informing me that the rebels had gone to Emmittsburg; [excerpt]-I at once proceeded to Hanover Junction, where I arrived about 4 a.m., and where I met my troops ordered from Baltimore. These I immediately set in motion for Gettysburg, where they arrived about 1 p.m., and headed off' the rebel cavalry, previous to which the advance of?he rebels had been attacked by some of the Home Guards, when they retreated, leaving 5 prisoners in the possession of the Home Guards.; [excerpt]-The rebels went to Emmittsburg, and from there to Waynesborough, and were proceeding toward Boonsborough, when, on being informed of the advance of Pleasonton, they changed their course and proceeded with all haste to the Potomac, in a more easterly direction, and, as I was informed, by telegraph from Major-General McClellan, in the following language, viz:
General Pleasonton, who was in pursuit of the rebel cavalry, reports that they have been driven back into Virginia, crossing the Potomac near the mouth of the Monocacy, and having marched 90 miles in the previous twenty-four hours, while Pleasonton, in pursuit, marched 78 miles in the same time. JOHN E. WOOL, Major-General.
Maj. Gen. H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief.
-------------------------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XIX/2 [S# 28]
OCTOBER 9-12, 1862.--Stuart's Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania.
No. 6.--Report of Brig. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton, U.S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
Camp near Knoxville, Md., October 13, 1862.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report the movements of my command in pursuit of the rebels who recently made a raid to Chambersburg, Pa.
On Saturday morning [October 11], at 4 o'clock, I received my orders to start with my command, and soon after I was en route to Hagerstown, where I arrived at about 11 a.m. Receiving information there that the rebels were moving in the direction of Mercersburg, I started with my command toward Clear Spring, on the Hancock road, to intercept them, and had proceeded some 4 miles when I was ordered to halt, by dispatch from headquarters, and await further orders.
About 1.30 p.m. I received orders to move to Mechanicstown, via Cavetown and Harmon's Gap, sending patrols to Emmittsburg and Gettysburg to obtain information of the enemy. I executed these orders, and arrived at Mechanicstown about 8.30 p.m., from which point I sent out scouts in the direction of Emmittsburg, Taneytown, Middleburg, and Graceham, and picketing all the roads in that vicinity. [Excerpt]-My advance squadron had not proceeded more than 1½ miles from the Monocacy when they discovered a body of cavalry moving toward them, dressed in the uniform of United States soldiers. The officer in command of the squadron made signal in a friendly way, which was returned, and the parties approached within a short distance of each other, when the officer commanding the opposite party ordered his men to charge. They were received by a volley from the carbines of my men, and some skirmishing took place, when the enemy brought up a superior force and opened with a couple of guns, which forced my men to retire. [excerpt]-
A. PLEASONTON,
Brigadier-General, Commanding.
General R. B. MARCY,
Chief of Staff, Army of the Potomac.
---------------
O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XIX/2 [S# 28]
OCTOBER 9-12, 1862.--Stuart's Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania.
No. 8.--Report of Col. Richard H. Rush, Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry.
HEADQUARTERS SIXTH PENNSYLVANIA CAVALRY,
Camp near Frederick, Md., October 13, 1862.
GENERAL: I have the honor to report that, on Saturday morning, at 6.30 o'clock, your note, requiring me to scout the country north of Frederick, to gain intelligence of the force and movements of Stuart's cavalry, was at once executed by my sending four small companies (140 men) toward Emmittsburg and Gettysburg. They left my camp by 8 a.m. No information or rumors of the enemy could be obtained by them between this place and Emmittsburg, which point they reached at 4 p.m. They then Pushed on toward Gettysburg, scouting well to their left, and had not left Emmittsburg an hour when information was brought them from the rear that the advance guard (about 400 strong) of the rebels had charged into Emmittsburg and held the place. The rebels threw out pickets and covered all the roads about Emmittsburg, thus entirely cutting off all communication between my pickets and myself. All the couriers sent to me, to apprise me of the presence of the rebels, were turned back until after midnight. [Excerpt]-At 6.30 p.m. on the 11th your note of 2.30 p.m. of the 11th was received, directing me to extend my scouts toward Gettysburg, &c., and informing me that Stuart had left Chambersburg in the morning on the Gettysburg road; also that General Pleasonton was to be at Mechanicstown, and to communicate with him, &c., and to call on the First Maine Cavalry if I wanted more force, &c. [excerpt]
I regret very much that this second raid has been so successfully accomplished by Stuart's cavalry; but, with the small and crippled force at my disposal near this town (but seven companies, of about 275 men), it has been impossible for me to do more than I have done to check this unfortunate raid.
RICHD. H. RUSH,
Colonel Sixth Pennsylvania Cavalry, Lancers.
Brig. Gen. JOHN BUFORD,
Chief of Cavalry, Headquarters Army of the Potomac.
------------------------
Observation & Comments-I do believe in having General Pleasonton involved in Stuart's raid prior to June 30th's crossing of Lee's Army with Stuart in advance- Lee had previous recon info from Stuart--knowing weaknesses and strengths for battle long before July1. General Buford would probably be very aware of this as well, having these 'exchanges' of orders and inter-military correspondences. Certainly would give me an idea of an exit route that worked for the enemy previously. General Stoneman also would have been aware--he was stationed in Maryland that was too late to support the incident in October.

O.R.-- SERIES I--VOLUME XIX/2 [S# 28]
OCTOBER 9-12, 1862.--Stuart's Expedition into Maryland and Pennsylvania.
No. 17.--Report of Maj. Gen. J. E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Division.
HEADQUARTERS CAVALRY DIVISION,
October 14, 1862.
COLONEL: I have the honor to report that, on the 9th instant, in compliance with instructions from the commanding general Army of Northern Virginia, I proceeded on an expedition into Pennsylvania with a cavalry force of 1,800 and four pieces of horse artillery, under command of Brigadier-General Hampton and Cols. W. H. F. Lee and Jones. This force rendezvoused at Darkesville at 12 m., and marched thence to the vicinity of Hedgesville, where it encamped for the night. [Excerpt]-Striking directly across the National road, I proceeded in the direction of
Mercersburg, Pa., which point was reached about 12 m. I was extremely anxious to reach Hagerstown, where large supplies were stored, but was satisfied, from reliable information, that the notice the enemy had of my approach and the proximity of his forces would enable him to prevent my capturing it. I therefore turned toward Chambersburg. I did not reach this point until after dark, in a rain -[excerpt]-Next morning it was ascertained that a large number of small-arms and munitions of war were stored about the railroad buildings, all of which that could not be easily brought away were destroyed, consisting of about 5,000 new muskets, pistols, sabers, ammunition; also a large <ar28_53> assortment of army clothing. The extensive machine-shops and depot buildings of the railroad and several trains of loaded cars were entirely destroyed. From Chambersburg, I decided, after mature consideration, to strike for the vicinity of Leesburg as the best route of return, particularly as Cox's command would have rendered the direction of Cumberland, full of mountain gorges, particularly hazardous. The route selected was through an open country. Of course I left nothing undone to prevent the inhabitants from detecting my real route and object. I started directly toward Gettysburg, but, having passed the Blue Ridge, turned back toward Hagerstown for 6 or 8 miles, and then crossed to Maryland, by Emmittsburg, where, as we passed, [excerpt]-A scouting party of 150 lancers had just passed toward Gettysburg, and I regretted exceedingly that my march did not admit of the delay necessary to catch them. Taking the road toward Frederick, we intercepted dispatches from Colonel Rush (lancers) to the commander of the scout, which satisfied me that our whereabouts was still a problem to the enemy. [excerpt]-We seized and brought over a large number of horses, the property of citizens of the United States. The valuable information obtained in this reconnaissance as to the distribution of the enemy's force was communicated orally to the commanding general, and need not be here repeated J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, Commanding Cavalry.
Col. R. H. CHILTON,
Assistant Adjutant-General, Army Northern Virginia.
-----------
Indorsement.]
HDQRS. DEPARTMENT OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
October 18, 1862.
General S. COOPER,
Adjutant and Inspector General :
GENERAL: In forwarding the report of Major-General Stuart of his expedition into Pennsylvania, I take occasion to express to the Department my sense of the boldness, judgment, and prudence he displayed in its execution, and cordially join with him in his commendation of the conduct and endurance of the brave men he commanded. To his skill and their fortitude, under the guidance of an overruling Providence, is their success due.
I have the honor to be, most respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
--------------
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Camp near Winchester, Va., October 8, 1862.
Maj. Gen. J. E. B. STUART,
Commanding Cavalry, &c. :
GENERAL: An expedition into Maryland with a detachment of cavalry, if it can be successfully executed, is at this time desirable, You will, therefore, form a detachment of from 1,200 to 1,500 well-mounted men, suitable for such an expedition, and, should the information from your scouts lead you to suppose that your movement can be concealed from bodies of the enemy that would be able to resist it, you are desired to cross the Potomac above Williamsport, leave Hagerstown and Green-castle on your right, and proceed to the rear of Chambersburg and endeavor to destroy the railroad bridge over the branch of the Conococheague. Any other damage that you can inflict upon the enemy or his means of transportation you will also execute. You are desired to gain all information of the position, force, and probable intention of the enemy which you can, and in your progress into Pennsylvania you will take measures to inform yourself of the various routes that you may take on your return to Virginia.
To keep your movement secret, it will be necessary for you to arrest all citizens that may give information to the enemy, and should you meet with citizens of Pennsylvania holding State or Government offices, it will be desirable, if convenient, to bring them with you, that they may be used as hostages, or the means of exchanges, for our own citizens that have been carried off by the enemy. Such persons will, of course, be treated with all the respect and consideration that circumstances will admit. Should it be in your power to supply yourself with
horses or other necessary articles on the list of legal captures, you are authorized to do so.
Having accomplished your errand, you will rejoin this army as soon as practicable. Reliance is placed upon your skill and judgment in the successful execution of this plan, and it is not intended or desired that you should jeopardize the safety of your command, or go ****her than your good judgment and prudence may dictate.
Colonel Imboden has been desired to attract the attention of the enemy toward Cumberland, so that the river between that point and where you may recross may be less guarded. You will, of course keep out your scouts to give you information, and take every other precaution to secure the success and safety of the expedition. Should you be led so far east as to make it better, in your opinion, to continue around to the Potomac, you will have to cross the river in the vicinity of Leesburg.
I am, with great respect, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General.
---------------
General Jeb Stuart issued then his "Orders 13." which the afore listed documented events took place in October of 1862. Seven months prior to the Battle of Gettysburg; July 1-3, 1863.

Union Army was under General McClellan in October of 1862, other than Buford, Wool, Pleasonton, Stoneman; there wasn't any other familiar with the behavior of Stuart's cavalry.

This may have been Stuart's excuse for going beyond reach as to feed General Lee the needed information about the June-July Union movements; and --clearly the Union Cavalry was in inferior numbers in October. This too, may have lulled Lee into a false sense of security as well--knowing that the escape route, worked for Stuart in October and could do the same in July.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
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  #32  
Old 05-10-2008, 12:38 AM
M E Wolf's Avatar
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Dear List Members;

Here is what General Robert E. Lee's son wrote; in which he published some of Lee's personal letters and correspondences. Focused on Gettysburg--I have extracted these lovely pieces.

General Lee writing;
"The consequences of war are horrid enough at best, surrounded by all the ameliorations of civilisation and Christianity. I am very sorry for the injuries done the family at Hickory Hill, and particularly that our dear old Uncle Williams, in his eightieth year, should be subjected to such treatment. But we cannot help it, and must endure it. You will, however, learn before this reaches you that our success at Gettysburg was not so great as reported—in fact, that we failed to drive the enemy from his position, and that our army withdrew to the Potomac. Had the river not unexpectedly risen, all would have been well with us; but God, in His all-wise providence, willed otherwise, and our communications <102>have been interrupted and almost cut off. The waters have subsided to about four feet, and, if they continue, by to-morrow, I hope, our communications will be open. I trust that a merciful God, our only hope and refuge, will not desert us in this hour of need, and will deliver us by His almighty hand, that the whole world may recognise His power and all hearts be lifted up in adoration and praise of His unbounded loving-kindness. We must, however, submit to His almighty will, whatever that may be. May God guide and protect us all is my constant prayer."
----------
In 1868, in a letter to Major Wm. M. McDonald, of Berryville, Clarke County, Virginia, who was intending to write a school history, and had written to my father, asking for information about some of his great battles, the following statement appears:

"As to the battle of Gettysburg, I must again refer you to the official accounts. Its loss was occasioned by a combination of circumstances. It was commenced in the absence of correct intelligence. It was continued in the effort to overcome the difficulties by which we were surrounded, and it would have been gained could one determined and united blow have been delivered by our whole line. As it was, victory trembled in the balance for three days, and the battle resulted in the infliction of as great an amount of injury as was received and in frustrating the Federal campaign for the season."

-------------
In these letters, it could have been easily been written as to whom Lee was placing responsibilities for not giving a full blow to the enemy. He did not and he died with that knowledge; and yet--there were many to whom may have not joined that joint blow--lot of egos and personality conflicts to go around under Lee's nose.

I do realize that when on the march to Gettysburg, he was concerned for his captured son--this would be very distracting I'm sure as a parent; as well as the desire to comfort his relatives.

In leadership style -- The modern Army identifies three -- I believe Lee was one who delegated. But, when he suddenly changed his style, with Gettysburg --this could have caused an 'collateral effect' to which once delegated to a commanding officer the 'command' --to linger could put subtle doubt of the plan. Otherwise, there would be no need to be there. Let the division corps commanders work in their ways to accomplish the mission.

There must be a gentle reminder, that Lee had been ill and perhaps, his heart was giving him irregular beats. Being like a 'father' to the Army -- he loved the Army as it loved him --pre-occupation with his health, his blood family, his uniformed family and knowing no relief was to come as, the other sections of the army were slugging it out with General Grant at Vicksburg.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
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  #33  
Old 05-18-2008, 04:54 PM
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Default In 1863

the Union forces had spies and scouts observing the large Confederate army in and near Chambersburg and Gettysburg.
The Union had the advantage of the telegraph, that could inform the AoP of the location of the ANV in Pennsylvania, within a day.

Meade did not make some surprise move to Gettysburg. He certainly moved the Corps faster, due to information that Lee was attempting to lead two corps across the narrow Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. Lee was no longer in operation in the protective cocoon of Richmond. It seems from history books and the Gettysburg movie, that Lee was surprised the AoP had crossed the Potomac River. Didn't he really give any consideration to scouts and telegraph. A rider merely had to get to a telegraph office to pass the information on to Washington and Baltimore and then on to the Army of the Potomac.

Lee paid a high price for the rain. It meant rivers could not be forded by artillery and supply wagons. It meant that the Pa. barns would have less hay in storage. Moldy hay will kill a horse or mule. Lee came from Virginia with an inadequate supply of forage. He wouldn't find it in Pa; much less in fact. It was also not the harvest time for corn. Practically none would be found in barns in June. The farm animals would be feeding in the fields by then.

Lee had to expect the worse of the AoP move into Pennsylvania. Military dictum says to never underestimate the enemy. Surely Lee did with the Army of the Potomac in June 1863.
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