Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
I think it is conventional wisdom of most CW historians that if any of Lee's original orders had been followed through on, including Pickett's Charge, that Lee would have won at Gettysburg.
The most notable feature of Hill at Gettysburg was his sitting on his hands during the three days of battle. During the battles themselves, Hill (and Lee, for that matter) was almost totally invisible. He could just as easily have been in Cashtown as Seminary Ridge.
What is notable most, concerning Gettysburg, is that the slippage in Lee's command style was almost total during the battle. The 'Seven Days' may have been comparable, but there, Lee won a great victory in spite of that slippage, including his Malvern Hill fiasco, in seven days. While at Gettysburg including the Pickett's Charge' fiasco, he lost the battle in only three days. Why?
I think it is conventional wisdom of most CW historians that if any of Lee's original orders had been followed through on, including Pickett's Charge, that Lee would have won at Gettysburg.
The most notable feature of Hill at Gettysburg was his sitting on his hands during the three days of battle. During the battles themselves, Hill (and Lee, for that matter) was almost totally invisible. He could just as easily have been in Cashtown as Seminary Ridge.
What is notable most, concerning Gettysburg, is that the slippage in Lee's command style was almost total during the battle. The 'Seven Days' may have been comparable, but there, Lee won a great victory in spite of that slippage, including his Malvern Hill fiasco, in seven days. While at Gettysburg including the Pickett's Charge' fiasco, he lost the battle in only three days. Why?
Short answer? Because he was up against Meade and not McClellan. Tactically, McClellan won pretty much each one of the Seven Days battles. Lee suffered greater casualties and did not win the field. But McClellan convinced himself he had lost and so retreated. Meade didn't. He stood.
Lee was Lee. People might fault his command style, but it was part of what made him successful as well as contributed to his failures. As long as he had competent subordinates, his command style generally worked. Give general direction and let the Corps commanders carry them out as they saw fit. In a way, Lee seems to have departed from this a bit at Gettysburg in being more specific with Longstreet than usual.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
If the difference between victory in the Seven Days and defeat at Gettysburg was indeed the difference between McClellan and Meade (and I do not necessarily, disagree with that assessment) then, it seems that Lee, because of his command style, Should have failed at Gettysburg; As he Should have at the Seven Days (Only the Complete Ineptitude of McClellan saving Lee)
It is another interesting thought that Lee may in fact have been a good Army Commander, whose 'genius' lay in his opponents.
If the difference between victory in the Seven Days and defeat at Gettysburg was indeed the difference between McClellan and Meade (and I do not necessarily, disagree with that assessment) then, it seems that Lee, because of his command style, Should have failed at Gettysburg; As he Should have at the Seven Days (Only the Complete Ineptitude of McClellan saving Lee)
It is another interesting thought that Lee may in fact have been a good Army Commander, whose 'genius' lay in his opponents.
Indeed, Lee should have also failed at Antietem and Chancellorsville, but for the ineptitude of his opponents. McClellan waited 18 hours before moving on the "lost order" and once the battle was joined, he kept a large part of his force out of the fight. Hooker stole the march on Lee at Chancellorsville, got on Lee's flank with 70,000 men, and then "lost confidence in Joe Hooker." In both cases, it could be argued that Lee won because of his opponent, not because of his tactical prowess (although I will grant him technical prowess). As for Fredricksburg, I doubt anyone will argue that it did not take a genius to win that battle. Burnside was a complete idiot to attack as he did once he did not have the pontoons needed as soon as he reached the river.
Now, at Chancellorsville once Hooker stopped Lee did show tactical prowess in beating him. And at Second Manassas/Bull Run he did a brilliant job against Pope. Although in both cases, he was up against a mediocre general who, in either case, could have tounced Lee severely with the right moves. Lee was audacious and it paid off.
Finally, with regard to the Wilderness Campaign, Lee did a good job anticipating Grant's moves, but his whole command structure changed with losses to his best Corp and Division commanders.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
"I was thinking the other day on this. Longstreet did all he could to try and convince Lee not to attack the round tops, and instead try and flank the union right and get between the and DC. It always seemed to me that Lee acted very uncharacteristically in his insistence to attack, and unwillingness to be persuaded otherwise."
I've seen the suggestion for Lee, per Longstreet, to get between the AoP and Washington, but I've never seen one concrete suggestion, how it would be done and what routes Lee would take. How would Lee move his army? What roads would Lee take? When would he do this? When - in Gettysburg?
Most historians, I note, have ignored R.E. Lee's own report on Gettysburg and why he attacked. Lee also had serious road problems, with such a large army and such a long supply train of wagons.
Most historians ignore that the ANV had a limited amount of artillery ammunition and rifle ammunition. How close would one want Lee to get to the Union supply depots in Baltimore and Washington?
Anyone aware what R. E. Lee said about laying siege to the United States capital? Probably not! It would seriously interfere with a lot of unfounded speculation.
Without any infantry training, most students of the Civil War have to depend on historians, many of whom have little background in the military.
If I can pinpoint some errors of students of the war, it is in logistics and how the armies were supplied.
Many, too many, have never read Lee's reports and letters, and never seem to have read a book by a historian who discussed what Lee wrote. There are too many Civil War books to give a definitive answer on what all the historians wrote or missed, but from the posts it seems Gettysburg is totally lost in myth.
And too many students attempt to grab victory from the jaws of defeat. Too much credit for the abilities of the Army of Northern Virginia and much too little in what the Army of the Potomac was attempting at Gettysburg and successfully accomplished.
Lee found himself in a bad place in Gettysburg and the AoP exploited that fact on July 2 and 3rd. It was a great fight; too bad much of it is laid up in myth. Meade found the Achilles heel of his enemy and he exploited it.
Of course, for many, the Army of Northern Virginia had no weaknesses and should never have lost at Gettysburg. And over the generations, many have attempted to make true what never happened.
The Army of the Potomac made the Army of Northern Virginia lose. For some that is an intolerable fact, over 100 years later.
Last edited by whitworth : 05-09-2008 at 07:56 AM.
Plus, a flank attack on the Union army was very characteristic of Lee. It was Marching Around the Union Army and luring it to attack him, that was Uncharacteristic of Lee's generalship.
The Army of the Potomac made the Army of Northern Virginia lose. For some that is an intolerable fact, over 100 years later.
Reminds me of Pickett's quote when asked why the AoNV was defeated as Gettysburg. "I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it."
I have to agree. Most of the speculation I have seen regarding Lee's actions often assumes that the AoP simply sits still and waits for Lee to do whatever he wants.
Armchair generals talk strategy. Real generals talk logistics. Major generals and above talk politics.
__________________ "There must be more historians of the Civil War than there were generals figthing in it... Of the two groups, the historians are the more belligerent." David Donald, Lincoln Reconsidered (1961)
Last paragraph had me laugh so hard, I nearly fell from my chair--Timewalker!!!. (LOL) But, it is so true!
Personally, I like digging in the events, official reports, correspondences, reassignments, the Army Regulations a month prior to a major battle. At times there is an undercurrent that really moves an army into a direction that is vague yet--aimed into a course of action.
Whitworth, I agree with your posting as well. It is difficult to see, some 'favored' side or person suffer loss and or being 'picked on' per se. Yet, with all these battles won or lost, it really boils down to circumstances of how things lead up to the battle itself. The supporting elements prior to a battle/skirmish/action, etc. In this case at Gettysburg, it was General Buford and his cavalry that spotted the opportunity and made use of 'good ground' seeing all of the advantages for others to use as to permit the best chances to win. Buford held his ground until General Reynolds came and all of the troops of his holding on in support with Buford--until General Meade, Hancock and so many others came as to create a place to make a stand.
Things like how long a soldier was to walk, time set to rest, the march order, how many roads or columns they could use, cavalry breaks for watering and feeding horses, adjusting saddles and bridles; the artillery horses needing their water and feed, adjusting harnesses, rearranging teams, not to mention checking for lost shoes, replacing shoes, swap out lame horses for sound ones; the wagons following carrying the general's office, Corps office, paperwork, books, pens, ink, etc; food for the troops, extra ammunition, guns, clothes, hospital items, tents, cots, lanterns, fuel for lanterns, baggage, etc. All that had to come with any body of troops on a march. Then, most had at least one milk cow, livestock to be food for soldiers in the future days. It is so easy to forget the sheer length of a march; and just in regulations alone--it is amazing if organized.
For those 'veterans' out there --to add one's own personal perspective, such as a veteran of an Infantry--although modern, it would be still the knowledge of experience that would add handsomely to the discussions like this.
And, as much as I admire General Lee --I don't hold him on saint level. Brilliant yes--but, I have yet to see a brilliant person flawless in judgment-- General Lee's arm was not twisted in staying and fighting from day one (1) or all the way through. Even if he retreated, he was so trusted--I'm sure he could have chosen better ground and then fight and things may have been different but, it wasn't that way-- History is past, it is wonderful to study it and learn to see what might have been, what was, and learn what came from it.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
[Contemplating on affixing seatbelts on my office chair so falling from it may be prevented]
His two corps had come in on a narrow road to Gettysburg from Chambersburg. Many of his wagons were backed up, even during the first days fight.
Lee discovered that his army was short of supplies, the first day into Adams County, which meant Lee had no prior knowledge of the situation his army would find itself on July 1, until July 1.
Lee had no control over the Emmitsburg or Taneytown Road. Few notice that Lee had to fight for access to the Fairfield road. No general could string out wagon trains in the face of the enemy, undamaged, and egress by way of the Fairfield road.
Lee was forced to either defeat the AoP on Cemetery Ridge or blunt any counterattack on Lee's right flank. Only after Lee guaranteed his access to the Fairfield road, did Lee retreat. In his retreat, Lee uses two egresses from Adams County. One was the Fairfield road and the other was the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
Lee said in his report, "to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous." At the time, on July 1, there was only one egress back to Chambersburg, and as he concluded, that Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike was not enough. He knew the delays that he would see, in the face of the enemy on his tail. One egress was not enough, so said R.E. Lee.
In Lee's successful retreat, his army used two roads out of Adams County. One was the road that was secure on July 1, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. The other egress road was the Fairfield Road gained after two days of attack on the nearby Cemetery Ridge. Lee had blunted the AoP ability to launch an immediate counter-attack on July 4, and he preserved his second egress road, the Fairfield road. Under cover of darkness and during the rains, Lee made his escape, directly to the Potomac River, by two roads.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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The flanking movement Lonstreet desired.... 
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