Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
Lee is very conscious of being in enemy territory and is concerned with his Wagon Trains and keeping his Line of Communications open and secure. If the ANV is defeated or even has to halt its movements for any length of time, retreat is almost inevitable. Lee and south cannot afford to Lose the Army of Northern Va.
At the same time, Lee, for whatever reasons(and they are many and varied) has invaded the North and cannot be seen retreating without battle.
IMO, Lee is basically looking for a fight. He knows that to realistically, accomplish any of his major goals of the Pa. Campaign, he will have to meet and defeat the AoP in a relatively short time (he cannot remain in Pa. indefinitely Pa. and yet at the same time he cannot be seen to retreat without some kind of trial of strength, with Union forces.
The first concrete news of the presence of Union forces near Gettysburg, cause Lee to immediately call his advance forces to fall back on their LOC and concentrate with him at Cashtown (His first concern is his line of retreat to the Valley and Va).
It is during this fall back (retreat) that a major battle at Gettysburg is precipitated.
Without cavalry, Lee probably assumes that the AoP will move as slow as it always has before and if it is then maybe, he can concentrate his Army quickly enough. which, in fact. he is already in the process of accomplishing, it may be possible that the AoP can be defeated in detail before it can unite.
The fact that Lee, apparently, gave no real thought to the RT's in his plan for the 2d day's battle and his line of attack all seem to indicate, he did not know the Union left extended as far South as it actually did. Indicating, to me, that Lee did not think he was facing the entire AoP (which was basically true until late afternoon of trhe 2d day, but probably was still more than Lee anticipated).
Lee almost always favored a flanking maneuver when on the offensive so moving Longstreet to flank the Union Left, was characteristic of Lee.
Longstreet's plan, as already pointed out by others, was moving the entire ANV around the entire AoP and lure the Union forces to attack at a disadvantage. Lee, on the other hand, was executing athequick destruction of a portion of the AoP before it could be joined by the rest of it's army (probably the first of a series of short, sharp battles as the ANV defeated the AoP in detail.
Lee made a faulty command decision, based on faulty assumption, aggravated by a, almost, total lack of reliable intelligence gathering.
P.S. Longstreet's proposed maneuver, would have been extremely dangerous, where the chances of many things going wrong strongly outnumbered those going right.
If Lee's plan was based on faulty assumptions, so was Longstreets, except, Lee's mistakes resulted in a retreat, a failure of Longstreets plan could easily have resulted in the loss of the ANV.
I agree with your latest post in regard to Lee and Longstreet; but the "Post Script;" has my thoughts about Longstreet's spy "Harrison" to whom Longstreet deployed as to get the facts and look at all the tactical advantages for attack as well as defense.
I have also been under the impression, that Longstreet used scouts as well as pickets, vanguards and 'Grand Guards'--who would have, I would think--probed from all directions--especially the 'flankers' who's duty is to scout and report back.
I personally don't think that just Lee and Longstreet were dealing with faulty information but, the entire Confederate Army in Gettysburg and vicinity were; as JEB Stuart was late in his arrival with current information which was more northern as he was ahead of the turn and not at Lee's flank or in the rear. Infantry cannot extend itself as 'flankers, scouts and grand guards,' to which cavalry can do much better--more mobile and higher in the saddle can see further.
The best analogy I may have; is a trucker's blind spot in the passenger side mirror--where a car can be there and even looking in the mirror; its not able to pick up a car in this blind area. Lee's army on the higher elevations perhaps, unable to see Meade's Army in the blind spot on his right--aided by another series of lower ridges from the mountains. The cavalry 'if' they were on the flank might have been able to pick this up.
Now, that said--General Stuart being out and about--I am wondering if there were detached brigades of cavalry at Lee's disposal--why didn't he use them if he did have them.
The 1862 Army Officer's Pocket Companion--A Manual for Staff Officers in the Field; usually deploys cavalry when on a marches, to have them in several key spots, front, rear, sides and middle of the armies-- The idea is to have cavalry be the 'feelers' as they march -- Stuart took several however, its troubling to think some brigades of cavalry wasn't at Lee's disposal. The way the 'manual' has illustrated they're positioned around the army and some within it. For an analogy- a way exagerated and extended mini-van- at the two front fenders, back fenders, door post on a 4 door; rear and front center and cavalry sitting in the front seat and the back seat of a 3 seated mini-van.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
Now, that said--General Stuart being out and about--I am wondering if there were detached brigades of cavalry at Lee's disposal--why didn't he use them if he did have them.
Lee had seven brigades of cavalry for the Gettysburg Campaign.
Stuart only took three of them on his ride.
One was with Ewell, up near Harrisburg.
One was out to the west of Lee's main force to forage and protect that flank.
Beverly Robertson had two, assigned to protect the rear and flank of Longstreet and A. P. Hill as they marched north.
The problem in many ways is Robertson he was either totally unsuited for a cavalry command or inept in a dangerous way. His performance at 2nd Bull Run caused Lee and Stuart to decide it was imperative that he be assigned to a training command in NC before they crossed the Potomac on the way to Antietam. They tried like crazy to keep him there, but D. H. Hill played the "Old Army Game" so well they couldn't get the reinforcing cavalry from NC without also taking Robertson.
However, he was the senior of the cavalry brigade commanders except for Hampton. Stuart either had to remain behind, or leave Hampton behind, or to bring Robertson with him to keep him from assuming command in his absence. This has led to much criticism. Longstreet said he assumed Hampton would be left and was surprised when he was not.
Unfortunately, Stuart couldn't get along with Jones and wanted three good brigades for his mission. He left Robertson behind with Jones, and Robertson was in command. Stuart wrote extremely detailed orders on what Robertson was to do. This was not Stuart's practice, so it looks like he was trying to make it impossible for Robertson to mess it up. Unfortunately, Robertson did, waiting way too long to move north. Had he followed the written orders, Robertson and Jones with two brigades would have been up where Lee could have used them about July 1.
Tim
__________________ "Let us, then, consider all attempts to weaken this Union, by maintaining that each state is separately and individually independent, as a species of political heresy, which can never benefit us, but may bring on us the most serious distresses."
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney of South Carolina, 1740-1824, Revolutionary War soldier, one of the authors of the US Constitution in 1787, speaking at the South Carolina Ratifying Convention in 1788.
I was thinking the other day on this. Longstreet did all he could to try and convince Lee not to attack the round tops, and instead try and flank the union right and get between the and DC. It always seemed to me that Lee acted very uncharacteristically in his insistence to attack, and unwillingness to be persuaded otherwise. It got me to thinking, did he just not trust Longstreet enough to pull it off? Jackson had talked him into making daring sweeping movements very similar to this, and with great success on numerous occasions. This is kind of a what if, but also a why not question. Do you think Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, having already had so much of his trust? Longstreet replaced Jackson as Lee's most trusted General, but did he really trust him as much as he did Jackson? I propose that he did not, and that Jackson would have been able to convince Lee, especially so soon after the success of his massive flanking attack at Chancellorsville.
Please do not succomb to the Conventional Wisdom surrounding General Longstreet. His is much maligned by history. The myth makers don't like to talk about him because of what it does to their darlings.
Gen. Lee called him "his old war hosrse" for good reason.
I was looking at the "What If" section of the forum the other day and noticed a rather interesting proposition.
Did you know that Gen. Longstreet was not in favor of the invasion in the first place? It is true. He advocated a much more conservative course.
Why had the ANV ought to invade the North? The South was not trying to conqurer the North. They were just trying to seperate themselves from the North. Why did they have to push the issue?
It appears through the main objective of General Lee was to take his army, as to draw the Union forces out of the battle weary Virginia territory, to which the Union forces would be drawn away 'en masse' in pursuit. In looking into these Civil War manuals about 'tactics on marches,' the one who causes another to react; controls the defensive posture of the other.
Since General Lee aimed to 'destroy' in detail the Union Army, to which President Jefferson Davis had a letter prepared to be put into Lincoln's hands 'when/if' the Union Army was destroyed--and continue with the winning modus operandi of the Confederate Army, under General Lee --
I believe it wasn't entirely an movement to 'just' invade the North --it had purpose as to destroy the Northern Army on their own soil--a mental and or emotional destruction/humiliation on their home ground; which would affect civilian and civilian governmental behavior.
Having so many battles on Virginia's soil -- it was so battle weary the land could not support Lee's army or any other armies there--Where, Union had good flow of support, e.g. food, feed for horses, supplies, munitions, etc., Virginia did not have that as there were 'infightings' going on-especially within the states with the Confederate Government. This is why the railroads and waterways were hotly defended yet, the Union was able to harass these to which delayed the supplies. In these regulations I purchased--its evident that the 'intent' is that the army controls the supplies and not vice versa, by having supplies delayed as to force their army idle until they are 'refitted' and able to move.
As for General Longstreet not in favor of going into the North; that is a fact. But, regardless of Longstreet's personal feelings -- like all good soldiers--you follow the orders as completely as if one agreed to them fully. In addition, it is also well known that Longstreet was 'the master' of the 'defensive' -- to which his creative mind and vision of tactical defenses would no doubt be demanded upon if there was opposition, to which I like to believe General Lee would want Longstreet near him as his truthfulness-- regardless, would be honest and not to make Lee 'feel' better. [Say things to humor Lee instead of giving real numbers, real facts, real battle concerns, e.g. Longstreet's concerns about flanks before the 'infamous' charge of Pickett's. Lee agreed with Longstreet and made changes then and there.] Longstreet from the first 'spat' at Gettysburg wanted to 're-deploy.' Lee saw it as 'giving up the field' which he had never done--old habits not willing to change to new situations and forcing himself to fight on bad ground.'
As for Longstreet being under 'character' assassination-- General Early and a few others were the ring-leaders; to which distracted everybody from his own screw ups but; it was proven that Early was involved in the corruption of the lottery he was in charge of and died before Longstreet.
And, though I can understand loving General Lee so much, that he is seen as unflawed and a saint; it is fact that General Lee took the blame for the failure at Gettysburg. He had every opportunity to 'fry' those who failed him. I think what I love most about Lee--as a leader, he didn't blame others when he screwed up--he took responsibilities for his command style, orders and effects. Up to Grant's placement in 'Chief of all Union Armies'--every one of them made excuses or blamed others.
General Early couldn't even attack Washington City (Washington, DC) right--he had every opportunity to invade Washington but, his troops got so drunk that they couldn't even walk with a stagger, thus delayed him a full day as to sleep it off--giving the city time to mount a very strong defense at Fort Stevens. The 'Home Guard' of Washington, wasn't all that strong if they had not delayed. However, they got re-enforced by the Alexandria, Arlington and Fairfax infantry and cavalry.
I also offer for consideration -- that the Army under Meade really wasn't changed due to Meade, with his new orders and the like--he had his new position only three days. But --the Army had changed by time Gettysburg came about. It was growing up and tossing the political appointed 'generals' to whom couldn't fight themselves out of a wet paper bag. This change, for me-- is just as important as the lack of change by the Confederates, which Lee was comfortable in using--as he had no need to change prior to Gettysburg.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
It is my understanding that, in general, Lee was no great believer in the veracity or reliability of spies and tended to heavily discount their reports.
Longstreet's corps was not in position on Seminary Ridge until well after dark on the evening of the 1st. So it would seem that Longstreet did not have time to really implement any of his usual scouting schemes, whatever they were.
Although Longstreet did send out scouts during that first night and early morning, it is not clear whether he was scouting to find where Union forces were located, for a later attack or where they were not, for a path around the Union Army, to implement his proposed march around the AoP. In the event, I believe Longstreet used his scouts reports in attempting to convince Lee to try his, Longstreet's, flaniking maneuver. So I am assuming his scouts found where the AoP was not, rather than detailing where it actually was.
To Lee, Time was gold; it was precious and had to be used wisely to get the most out of what was available.
The fact that General Lee had other Generals at his disposal and I would think, if they had been using similar Army regulations, to which most were familiar with in the US Army prior to the 'rebellion,' -- The Regulations are rather clear about having flankers, guards, vedettes, scouts and constantly feeding their commanders with information, to which bumps it back up to General Lee.
Now, I do realize this thread was focused on General Longstreet. His Corps as you well stated was not brought up yet--what about the other Generals at General Lee's disposal? What about the use of his cavalry?
General Ewell had the opportunity, to which General Gordon and Tremble were most upset for not taking the opportunity to at least--scout it and collect information, what was General AP Hill or Early doing? What about these General's -generals in charge of the divisions under them--
Hind-sight, is wonderful - to which General Heth's Corps made contact with General Buford's Cavalry in his probing the area. General Hill dismissed Heth, giving an excuse that Heth was 'amplifying' the facts--yet, if General Hill would have ridden and seen for himself; he may have changed his tune. And, what about all the brigade commanders, company commanders that were available for detached assignment to scout-probe; and from my understanding of the Army Regulations of 1861; there are pioneers who charged with moving obstructions out of the way from the main body--and the advanced guard is to be up with them. All for the purposes of recon--
The added concerns that General Hood expressed; about his assignment as well as what his scouts had provided him; concerning the area of Devil's Den and the Round Tops; yet-- no matter how Longstreet offered Hood's assessments--Lee remained fixed and unmovable; to which Hood under protest went on and got stuck in Devils Den and loss the use of his arm and his boys took a lot of hits.
I am just not comfortable to blame Longstreet in full detail for any and all failures that he was not capable of management himself; or being over ridden by the Commanding General. Generals can warn, caution and the like but, it boils down to the Commanding General being the one responsible. But, there were many out and about to which, I would think--could have provided reconnoissance for Lee.
Those on night guard/picket/vedette duty should have been able to report on fires, smoke and or noises.
I am awaiting for Trice/Tim to respond about that CSA officer that General Stuart had to micro-manage (CSA Cavalry); I think his future comments would be very worthwhile and add to the thread.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
The problem is that considering the results of Day 1, Lee's plan is fine, he's going to strike the Union left with Longstreet the following day. The problem is that Longstreet is slow getting it off, Sickles is interposing his corps, Lee is unyielding, and yet Hood is still feeling for the Federal extremity (essentially disregarding the orders).
Lee's original plan for the 2d day was a major effort by Ewell to take Culp's Hill and Cemetary Hill. It was only after being informed by Ewell's Div. Commanders (with Ewell's concurrence) that Gen. Lee's plan was unacceptable and must be changed, did Lee (reluctantly) change the Center of Gravity of his offensive to Longstreet's Corps.
Lee was displeased at the time already wasted trying to get his commanders to obey his orders and IMO Longstreet's obdurance and further foot dragging did not bode well for another last minute change of plan that necessarily, would have further delayed his (Lee's)determined intention to engage the AoP at the earliest possible time.
It is interesting, I think, that Lee seemed malleable as clay in the hands of his subordinates, Except his determination to attack as Soon as possible.
P.S. Longstreet was no more responsible for the debacle at Gettysburg than the other confederate corps and div. commanders (including those of the cavalry and artillery) most of whom had decided that they knew better than Lee, how the battle was to be fought and Lee, for whatever reason(s), allowed them, to a large extent, to have their way.
I do wonder (outloud in text form), if the infamous "Pickett's Charge" under the direction of General A. P. Hill would have been different; as two of his Divisions were connected to one Division- Pickett's.
I would think if Lee saw Longstreet's lack of fire in this charge to the center of the Union forces on Day 3; I ponder if A. P. Hill would be a better choice and yet -- Lee knowing all the qualities of his Corps Commanders; must assume based on Lee's successes--he put the best where it was needed the most.
Now, as far as your post-script OpnDownfall -- I don't know anybody who doesn't feel like they know better than their parents/supervisors/officials - [Huge Grin-its natural!] That said, if Lee allowed himself to be puddy and allowed his command have their way --then it is his fault in allowing discipline to faulter so badly. But, I can understand that having nobody to fill the slots of commanding officers --Lee did his best to make out of his many lemons--lemonaide. I am sure Lee's silent struggle with his health didn't help either.
However, the loss may have come as a wake up call for Lee to cinch up the discipline or re-evaluate his commanders.
But, I do notice when Longstreet did seperate from Lee a short time; going to Tennessee, Longstreet remained very successful. To me this is a 'diagnostic' of the commander - does he win no matter who is his superior. In recalling Longstreet to Lee's call for assistance -- I do believe he recognized the strengths and weaknesses that would help him (Lee) to accomplish his quest. The real failure of the Confederacy wasn't the soldiers and leaders -- it was the lack of support, e.g. food, grain, clothing.
Just some thoughts.
Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf
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the flanking movement Longstreet desired .... 
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