Meade's Big Plan for Lee!!

[5fish]

I thought this would be interesting for everyone to read.....Meade did have a plan for Lee!!

The Pipe Creek Line

In a study of the events culminating in the battle of Gettysburg, General Meade's Pipe Creek Line is seldom given more than a footnote. Little if any consideration is given to the question of how the Army of the Potomac came to be placed as it was, in so perfect a location as to be able to advance troops to Gettysburg, and provide for them a strong fallback position, while at the same time protecting Baltimore and Washington. The answer to this question is the Pipe Creek Line.

Upon assuming command of the Army of the Potomac Gen. George G. Meade would begin to move his army north and east from Frederick to some position from which he could operate against the invading Confederate Army. The position he would find became known as the Pipe Creek Line. The purpose of this article is to take a look at Gen. Meade's Pipe Creek Line and try to answer several questions about it : </STRONG>

II. Gen. Meade's Battle Plan -
Gen. Meade went immediately to meet with Gen. Hooker to obtain intelligence, however scant, on the whereabouts of the Army of Northern Virginia, and that same day, June 28, saw the Union Army marching northeastward from Frederick. In order to hasten their passage, the soldiers in blue used every road that would take them in a northeasterly direction, the direction they had to go in order to interpose themselves between the Army of Northern Virginia and Washington. This movement resulted in five of the seven Union Army Corps being in Carroll County, Md. on the eve of the battle of Gettysburg. Although the Union Corps commanders did not know it at the time, they were heading in the general direction of a twenty mile long row of hills along the south side of Big Pipe Creek. This would later be known as the Pipe Creek Line. So great was the emergency of these moments that Gen. Meade was still in the process of formulating his plans for the Pipe Creek Line even as he directed movements of the various corps toward their intended positions along it. Events that followed on June 29 and 30 resulted in the issuance by Gen. Meade on July 1 of the order known as the Pipe Creek Circular (also called the Pipe Creek Order). The purpose of the Circular was to inform his corps commanders that the Pipe Creek Line would be the Union Army's line of defense and operations for the impending engagement, and that the Army of the Potomac was to concentrate there.

Once in position, six of the seven Union Corps would be placed on the heights just south of Big Pipe Creek. Here, they had the advantages of both high ground and good roads, giving Meade the ability to maneuver and to fight either offensively or defensively. Here also, they would be squarely across the three major routes of approach from south central Pennsylvania to Baltimore and Washington. Thus, the Pipe Creek Line fulfilled both parts of General Halleck's dual orders; it provided a strong base for operations "......against the invading forces of the rebels........", and it covered the approaches to Baltimore and Washington.</STRONG>

III. Why Did Gen. Meade Choose The Pipe Creek Line?

The Pipe Creek Line was named after a stream called Big Pipe Creek which flows generally east to west across the north central portion of Carroll County Maryland. Just east of Taneytown (pronounced Tawnytown) the creek turns southward then again westward forming a wide arc approximately 3 miles south of Taneytown . Along the south side of Big Pipe Creek is a row of hills which range in height from just under 100' to over 200' above the creek. It was along these hills that Union Army would be placed, this was the Pipe Creek Line. From its easternmost end in Manchester to the westernmost end just north of Middleburg, the Pipe Creek Line was approximately 20 miles long. The easternmost half of the Pipe Creek Line lies approximately three and a half miles south of, and roughly parallel to, the Mason- Dixon Line (about 16 miles south of Gettysburg on the Littlestown Pike).

From the area where the Confederate army was known to be, there were three possible routes of approach to Washington and Baltimore. The first, and easternmost of the three The Hanover Pike (now Md. Rte. 30) runs directly between Hanover, Pa. and Baltimore, Md. and passes through Manchester, Md. The range of hills which comprise the Pipe Creek Line runs directly through Manchester. Manchester therefore became the easternmost end of the Pipe Creek Line. Maj. Gen. John Sedgwick's 15,000 man VI Corps was the largest single corps in the Army of the Potomac, and under the Pipe Creek plan the VI Corps would anchor the Union Army's right flank in Manchester, and would block the Hanover Pike route of approach to Baltimore. The VI Corps marched from the vicinity of New Windsor on June 29, and on June 30 it reached Manchester.

The second possible route of approach for Gen. Lee was the Littlestown Pike (presently Md. Rte. 97 and Pa. Rte. 94). This was, and is, the road from Gettysburg to Baltimore, passing through Littlestown Pa., Union Mills Md., Westminster, and Reisterstown. This road passed through the heart of the Pipe Creek Line. Under the Pipe Creek Plan, Maj. Gen. Henry Slocum would command two corps; his own XII Corps and the V Corps then under command of Gen . George Sykes, totaling over 21,000 soldiers. Where the Littlestown Pike crossed the hills just south of Union Mills was a key position in the Pipe Creek Line because the Littlestown Pike was most direct route from Gettysburg to Baltimore. Once in position, Gen. Slocum would connect his right to the left of Gen. Sedgwick's IV Corps in Manchester, and would extend his left along the Pipe Creek Line westerly toward Taneytown. On June 30, Gen Barnes' Division of Gen. Sykes' V Corps had reached Union Mills, and Gen. Slocum's XII Corps was only several miles ****her north at Littlestown, Pa.

The third and westernmost of the three possible approach routes was the Taneytown Pike. The Pike runs from Taneytown directly to Westminster where it joins the Littlestown Pike then continues on toward Baltimore. To defend this route would be the strongest concentration of Union forces. Maj. Gen. John Reynolds would be in command of what Gen. Meade called the left wing. This would consist of three corps; his own I Corps, the III Corps under command of Gen. Daniel Sickles, and the XI Corps under command of Gen. O. O. Howard, totaling over 32,000 soldiers. Gen. Reynolds' headquarters would be located where the Taneytown Pike crossed the Pipe Creek ridge, about three miles south of Taneytown. On June 30 the I and XI Corps were in the vicinity of Emmitsburg (about 8 miles west of Taneytown) and the III Corps had passed through Taneytown and reached Bridgeport (about 4 miles west of Taneytown).

Under the Pipe Creek plan Gen. Hancock's II Corps would be held in reserve in the vicinity of Uniontown. Gen. Meade's headquarters, which on June 29 was located in Taneytown, would be moved to Frizzellburg which is located near the midpoint of the Pipe Creek Line. This was an ideal headquarters location as good roads connected Frizzellburg with the front line, Taneytown, and Westminster via direct routes. The artillery reserve would also be at Frizzellburg.

Topographically, the Pipe Creek Line is a natural tangle of ravines and ridges, particularly the eastern half of the line. These in themselves provided a strong natural defense rendering much of the line unsuitable for the full-scale offensive necessary to break the line and defeat the Union Army. The topography changes however in the vicinity of Taneytown. The landscape becomes broader, and the hills are not as steep making the terrain more favorable to large scale military operations. In addition there are several possible routes of approach from the Gettysburg / Chambersburg area toward Taneytown, these would have allowed the Confederate Army to concentrate there from several directions. These facts were not overlooked by Gen. Meade in his planning of the Pipe Creek Line. It was because of them that he had planned for his strongest concentration of force, three corps under Gen. John Reynolds to be positioned here. Considering the gentler nature of topography and the existing road network in the vicinity of Taneytown, it becomes easy to see how if Gen. Meade had had his way, the battle of Gettysburg might well have been the battle of Taneytown.

The Pipe Creek Line also had in its favor several tactical advantages. Its heights offered not only a formidable natural barrier, they also provided vantage points for lookout posts and signal stations. There was also a good road network immediately behind, and roughly parallel to the Pipe Creek Line. These would have allowed for rapid movement of troops and communications to various points along the line. These roads parallel to the line were intersected at fairly regular intervals by other roads, all of which provided direct links to Westminster. The City of Westminster lies about eight miles to the rear of the line and had a good road network and a direct railroad connection to Baltimore. This provided Gen. Meade with a nearby supply depot as well as a staging area for the prompt movement of troops, supplies, and materiel. Another important and sometimes overlooked advantage of the Pipe Creek Line would have been the ability of Union troops to follow up a victory in the impending battle. From the Pipe Creek Line around Taneytown, a defeated Confederate Army would likely have had to use the same circuitous route to get back to Virginia, as when it came north. The Union Army however could have moved directly west across the Catoctin Mountain (using what is today Md. Route 77) intercepting the Confederate Army in the vicinity of Hagerstown. To be able to effectively block the primary route of retreat would likely have forced a second major battle. A battle in which the Union Army would again have the advantage of good roads and favorable terrain. </STRONG>

V. The Aftermath

It was true irony that within hours of issuing the Pipe Creek Order on 1 July, events already unfolding at Gettysburg would compel Gen. Meade to countermand it by ordering a general advance toward Gettysburg. Because the issuance of the Pipe Creek Circular, and Meade's subsequent order countermanding it, were issued so closely together, and were contradictory, Gen. Meade was later criticized for being indecisive during those critical hours. It is easy to understand how the contradictory orders might indicate indecisiveness on Meade's part, but they were in fact just the opposite, they represented quick and decisive reaction to the events under way in Gettysburg.

Since the Pipe Creek Line was not specifically planned for offensive operations, charges would later be made against Gen. Meade, primarily by Gen. Daniel Sickles for what he contended was Meade's planning of the Pipe Creek Line as a fallback position (rather than as a base for offensive operations). Sickles would charge that Meade had actually designed the Pipe Creek Line in anticipation of a Union defeat, and blamed him for the apparent conflict between the Pipe Creek Order and the subsequent order to advance to Gettysburg, and for his failure to follow up the victory at Gettysburg by pursuing, and possibly destroying, the Army of Northern Virginia. Examination of those charges is beyond the purpose of this article, but any credible plan for military operations must provide for a fallback position. Therefore, criticism of Meade for providing such a position is unjustified.

The Pipe Creek Line itself and the Pipe Creek Order both provided Gen. Meade the option to assume the offensive. Even though the line was never fully developed as he envisioned, it was in fact the offensive which he later took based on the recommendation of his corps commanders. In an ironic twist to the charges later leveled at Gen. Meade, if the Pipe Creek Line would have been needed as a fallback position, Gen. Meade might possibly have been hailed as a genius for the development of his Pipe Creek plan. It is also interesting to note that on the key common element in their plans, finding favorable ground, Gen. Meade had found his, and developed a plan for its use not only before Gen. Lee had, but before the armies had actually even located each other

In reviewing maps and documents of the Union troop movements through Carroll County on the days preceding the battle of Gettysburg there are several interesting things to bear in mind. The name is used for three different towns which are relatively close to each other; Uniontown, Union Bridge, and Union Mills. These names existed for those places prior to the Civil War and are still the names of the towns. Also, there are three Pipe Creeks; Big Pipe Creek, Little Pipe Creek, and Double Pipe Creek. Little Pipe Creek joins Big Pipe Creek (near the town of Detour) and from this confluence to the Monocacy River, the stream is called Double Pipe Creek. Since these names are so similar, and the places so close together, it is quite possible that some maps and documentation might refer to specific places, yet actually mean someplace else. Considering the similarity in names, the confusion which people new to the area might have, and the circumstances they were under at the time, it is easy to understand how mistakes in location could be made.

It is well to consider that this position, so perfectly suited to its purpose, could not only be identified but a plan developed for the distribution of an entire army along the line, and the placement of several corps begun, all in the space of less than three days! The turn of events at Gettysburg on 1 July would compel Gen. Meade to abandon the line. Due to that, the efforts made by Gen. Meade, his engineers, and subordinate commanders to bring the Pipe Creek Line to life in so short a time are often unnoticed. But it is undeniable that the Pipe Creek Line plan played a significant part in the battle of Gettysburg, though it actually lived only from the time the Pipe Creek order was issued on 1 July, until the time it was countermanded, perhaps only several hours later. It was the movement of troops toward their intended positions along the Line during those last few days of June, which gave Gen. Meade the ability, albeit with some hesitation, to shift his entire army north toward Gettysburg at the critical moment.

[5fish]

Now I understand why all the books written about Gettysburg are written from the Confederate view of the battle.

I always wonder why? Because no one cares about the union view of the battle or lead up to it. All anyone cares about is why did Lee do what he did at Gettysburg?

Remember, there are two sides every battle and I argue that Meade out general Lee because they knew each other quite well. I bet he knew Lee was an aggressive person and Meade play to it.

Everyone wants to say Meade was slow maybe Meade understood he did not have to be the aggressor for he knew Lee would be more then willing to be the aggressor. He played to this aspect of Lee's personality.

Remember, Meade was at Fredericksburg and saw what Longstreet saw that warfare was changing in favor of defence.

Usually, you study why a general won a battle but with Gettysburg we study why a general lost a battle.

Everyone thinks Lee should have won Gettysburg for how could Meade beat Lee. A thought Lee never beat Meade once from Gettysburg on!!

Again: I argue that Meade simple out general Lee at Gettysburg not because he took some great risk or daring maneuver. He simple out smarted his opponent by taking his opponents strength and using it against him.

He used Lee's aggressive nature against him!!

[OpnDownfall]

Meade's plan was good but he also planted the seed of disaster. O.O. Howard on the extreme flank of the Union Army and most likely to receive special attention from Lee.

[Dred]

The Pipe Creek Line is the reason I have always maintained that Meade deserved more credit than he got. Within only a few days, he reorganized and restructured an entire army, started a vigorous pursuit of an "unbeatable" enemy force, devised a solid plan for protecting the capitol, and was able to change his plan on the fly, with great results. I still believe the only reason he is not given more credit later in the war is because Grant was with him.

[OpnDownfall]

At the time of his assumption of command, the AoP was already on the march back North. Meade found his aarmy scattered across S. Pa. with no precise knowledge of where Lee was or his objectives.
Until, definite knowledge of the location and movements of the AoNV could be obtained, it served little purpose to have your own army blundering about the countryside in the hopes they would stumble into an enemy army.
Pipe Creek was an excellent defensive position, but not perfect; as Howard and Meade would probably have learned had the Aofollowed Meade's plan.
Strategically, Meade was following accepted military doctrine, that concentrating ones army usually drew the opposing army to one. Lee could hardly have remained spread out, on the march, in the face of a concentrated AoP.
As events showed, contact with Bufords Cavalry was enough to cause Lee to fall back to the vicinity of Cashtown
To Me, the alacrity with which Meade abandoned his Pipe Creek position, indicates a less than confident commitment to Pipe Creek, by Meade. Although almost immediately sending reinforcements to Reynolds, Meade remained behind for some time, indicating to me that although not committed to Pipe Creek he was not confident that reinforcing Reynolds was right either. The saving grace of Meade, that put him far above his predecessors, was his willingness to act without taking council of his fears, as far as battle was concerned, at least.
IMO the Pipe Creek Circular was a plan of concentration, not a battle plan.

[5fish]

If lee knew Meade was consolidating his army at Pipe Creek would have turned his army towards it. The more I see this move into PA. and not having Stuart around as his eyes was the biggest issue for Lee could not plan or take the initiative. Lee never really condemns Stuart in any of his reports.

[M E Wolf]

Dear 5fish,

I think General Lee had some more feelings on a personal level with General JEB Stuart, starting way back in the regular army when Lee still in his civilian clothing had been sent in a hurry out to Harpers Ferry, then JEB Stuart came along as an 'auto instant aide-de-camp.' Colonel Lee (future Lt. Gen. Robert E. Lee) had met JEB Stuart as a cadet at West Point and as Stuart was visiting his Arlington Home, the call from the Secretary of War about "John Brown" --well, Lee brought Stuart along, as he was in uniform and needed to validate Lee, who was in civilian clothes and didn't have time to change into uniform. They were sped quickly to the hostage taking by John Brown. JEB Stuart lead the raid into the building where Lee's relative was inside as a hostage.

So, way beyond the time of the Civil War--Lee had a 'fatherly' connection with Stuart. Lee also knew how sensitive Stuart was as well.

It hurt Stuart worse by having Lee's disappointment than any bad reports and or blame by others. Stuart was ready to resign when Lee was on his case for not reporting--but, Lee knew that Stuart was not a Stonewall Jackson but, in a pinch took over Stonewall Jackson's men to carry on the fight at Chancellorsville and did well however, he realized some respect for the infantry and their commanders and knew his nitch was cavalry.

Personally, JEB Stuart needed 'attention' no matter how he got it. With Lee's gushing over Stonewall Jackson it shoved JEB Stuart back into the shadow--and when you had been a 'darling' prior to all this--its no different from any other rivalry. I think Lee recognized this and stopped trying to compare other generals with Stonewall Jackson but, this happened after Gettysburg--which was roughly two months after Jackson's death--so it was still fresh on everybody's mind. I am hopeful that Lee recognized his clouding other generals with the expectations of Jackson. Everybody had their styles in commanding--this hopefully began a change in Lee's perspective as well.

In addition, I wish to add -- that General Lee in his reports, did fault himself for the failure of the Gettysburg battle. He did so promptly--and in the field around officers and men. According to Lt. Col. Walter Clark, who was in the CSA at Gettysburg, in a North Carolina regiment--He goes on to say, in an address to Confederate Veterans, Aug. 24, 1921--That General Lee cited the true failure, was himself. He went on to state, General Lee saod that all 48 regiments, 2 battalions showed their usual gallantry. Lee said that he underestimated numbers of enemy, overestimating the extent to which enemy morale had been destroyed by the altillery and attempted the impossible. Lee further added, he was mislead by the fact the enemy artillary lead by General H. J. Hunt, who had ordered his artillery to cease fire on purpose, as to mislead, caused Lee to make a charge earlier. It was by coincidence that the Confederate artillery ceased fire due to lack of ammunition. This was supported, according to Walter Clark, by official reports by General Pendeton and General Longstreet. Lee went on to say, we charged before the enemy's morale was sufficiently shaken.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[M E Wolf]

Dear Dred,

I agree with you about General Gordon Meade. He doesn't get a lot of credit and deserves a lot. I do remember General Grant, just making Lt. General -a rank that hadn't been used since George Washington--coming out to see General Meade. Meade was all ready to be reassigned or dismissed or whatever--but, General Lee told Meade that he was needed next to Grant, as he - (Meade) had fought Lee before and--Meade knew his troops, to include the those who were at Gettysburg and forward.

Many of the corps involved at Gettysburg had been at Fredericksburg and the unnecessary slaughter and 'retreat.' It was a modus operandi that Lee counted on.

General Longstreet though began to see the change in the other side and as others would find out and in camera studies--Longstreet was way ahead of General Lee, seeing the mood and or morale changes as well as better commanders, soldiers and cavalry.

If Meade was good enough for General Grant--then that is a big flag that he wasn't some 'powder puff.'

What the sad part was, it took four years of old out of date Generals to get a clue; as to get Richmond to surrender, they had to go clamp off the James River and Petersburg. The same modus operandi General George Washington used against the British, by capturing Dorchester Heights, which caused the British to evacuate the harbor and with that evacuation, took its fleet and army to boot. [Ref. 1776 Boston]

Seeing the battle up close--while commanding companies, regiments and battalions -- you see the mistakes of the upper levels of command, especially if they dismiss observations and advice from those who are 'in the know.'

It would be interesting how the battle of Fredericksburg, Virginia would have been if they took the cow path that General W. S. Hancock found that was no deeper than 3 feet across the Rappahanock River and easy to ford across. Wouldn't have wasted time with the pontoon boats.

Meade was in the trenches like Hancock, Reynolds and a few others who would raise up in rank.

The Civil War is great about 'micro-management' and not letting the field commanders, if given the opportunity--to do what is best--regardless of action.

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully submitted for consideration,
M. E. Wolf

[OpnDownfall]

The more we delve into what happened just before the Battle at Gettysburg, I am becoming more impressed by Meade.
In one of his Orders to his Corps Commanders, Meade notes that he "...desires you to be informed that, from present information, Longstreet and Hill are at Chambersburg, partly towards Gettysburg: Ewell, at Carlisle and York; movements indicate a disposition to advance from Chambersburg to Gettysburg. General Couch telegraphs, 29th, his opinion the enemy's operations on Susquehanna are more to prevent cooperation with this army than offensive."
Considering he has only been in command of the AoP a little more than 48 hours, he already has a firm grasp of the situation that actually faces him, rather than fearful speculations about what the enemy 'might' be doing over the hill.

[M E Wolf]

Dear OpnDownfall,

Thank you for sharing Meade's Orders to his Corps Commanders and General Couch's telegraph message.

I agree, within 48 hours he already had a grasp of what faced him and what the problem solving that needed to take place.

I 'think' the use of the Cavalry also changed at this point also, if I am not mistaken OpnDownfall. The vedettes and scouts ahead of the Cavalry were the 'feelers' that started the information flow back to General Meade.

Just some thoughts.

M. E. Wolf