Why was Day Three necessary?

[Exilemainstreet]

This is a question that has always bothered me. When the Confederates were established along Seminary Ridge on Day Two, what prevented Lee from decamping at the conclusion of Day Two and heading for Baltimore or DC? The federal army was to the north, so by my reasoning, there was nothing between Lee and those cities. Was there a geographic barrier that prevented swift movement, or was he afraid of being caught between federal defenders to the south, and the federal army behind him? It seems to me that he could have left the night of Day Two, even though the men would have been tired, and marched through the night, and been 10 or 15 miles away by July 3. That would have left Lee in good position to sack a city or two by July 6 or 7. Am I wrong in this reasoning, or did Lee miss a golden opportunity by staying to fight on Day Three?

[ole]

Exile:

Welcome aboard! Please take some time to go through this Gettysburg Section. Select a few threads and read them. (Don't bother reading them all -- there is at least one dealing with "Why Day Three?" I don't know that we've ever answered the question, but it has been discussed in some length.

Am I wrong in this reasoning, or did Lee miss a golden opportunity by staying to fight on Day Three?

I personally believe that Day 3 was a desperate booboo, but I'll never say WRONG to anyone who bases his legitimate questions on some real information.

ole

[OpnDownfall]

IMO the Gettysburg Campaign was misbegotten from its very inception. But that is not the point of this thread.
Day three was necessary because day two was a failure.. Lee wanted to disengage Lonstreets Corps from the southern tip of the Union Line and redeploy it, further North to make Lee;s planned strike at the Union Center (if that was his plan). But Longstreet refused, arguing that to draw back would draw a Union Counter attack on himself. Whether that was true or not, is immaterial, because it must have impressed, as Lee did not override his, Longstreet's, objections. I think military logic backed Longstreet's and Lee's decision.
Militarily, Lee was in a tight fix. His entire army was closely engaged with a bigger army, with only enough supplies and amunition for one more major engagement. Conventional military wisdom at that time assumed that an attempt to disengage would almost surely draw the AoP into an attack mode. So Lee must either defeat the AoP at Gettysburg OR attack to knock the Union forces back on their heels so that the ANV could disengage and get breathing space to make a run for it, back ot ol' virginny Both scenarios required an attack on the third day.
Washington D.C. and Baltimore were both south and east of Gettysburg (Balt. 54 Mi or D.C. 78 Mi) There was no way Lee could get a long enough start in that direction that did not have the AoP close on Lee's rear.


P.S. without his pontoon train, Lee moving towards Balt. or Wash. D.C. would have to be aware of the danger of being trapped against the Potomoc where there was no fords, or sudden rains raising the river suddenly and being trapped on the wrong side.

[J_Man0507]

I am sure that this is a topic discussed many a time, and something that many people wonder about. Not sure how much you know of the strategy discussions in the Confederate command during the battle, but it was suggested by Longstreet, several times, to go around the Union left and either find better ground to fight on, or atleast get them off of the high ground that they held. Hood wanted to take his men around the left on the second day. However, Lee was a bit....lets just say over confident. It seems that he felt that the Union was a defeated force, and that they could push them off of the Culps Hill to LRT line the next day. He had no respect for "those people." He felt that he had the superior army, and that they would be nigh on invincible. However, as was shown, superior fighting ability doesn't always hold up to superior positioning. The PPT charge was a disaster and a horrible command decision based on logistics (that is for another thread.)

Now to answer the question of why not just go south and take Washington and/or Baltimore. Lee could of, but its a matter of would he have been unopposed. I personally think that he wouldn't have been successful if he had tried to take Washington. If Lee disengaged, he would need to move fast. He would have to leave all of his wounded, and he would need to do it without being detected. This, I think, would have been impossible. The Union cavalry would have detected the movement, and it would have been noticeable if such a large force left so quickly.

Now, if Meade is smart, he will send the Sixth Corps south immediately. If he knows Washington is the objective, they would make for Westminster, MD and board trains for Washington to take positions in the forts around the city. I don't think that Lee would have had the strength to take well manned fortifications. Now, this all requires perfect timing and coordination, which was nigh on non-existent in the 1860's, so it may have turned out better for one side or the other. Is Lee tearing up tracks so that trains can't move? I wouldn't think he would have time, and he would need cavalry to screen, not raid and tear up track. I think Lee's best bet would have been moving around the left. But he was a stubborn man and made probably the worst tactical decision of his career, and tried a frontal assault over open ground, in the face of artillery on higher ground. Disaster. Gettysburg....a battle that shouldn't have been, but had big consequences.

[M E Wolf]

Dear Exilemainstreet and List Members;

From my understanding of Gettysburg, General Lee was really not operating on the best intelligence. General JEB Stuart was not feeding that intelligence back to General Lee. Not knowing Union strength and how much in reserve, he only had localized information and or those reports from various General's positions on the Confederate sides to work with.


With the first day's near success, I personally think General Lee was tempted to crush the Union Army as soon as practical. General Lee's general success up to now is taking opportunities, risks and tactics he created along with his upper level staff generals. One of the other temptations was the new appointment of General Meade on the Union's side. It takes time to reorganize a command staff and put new plans of war into motion. General Lee would probably be enticed by this Union distraction. I also believe General was very confident in his Generals. General Longstreet was not 'jumping up and down' for joy with General Lee's plan--he wanted General Lee to redeploy on better ground and in the open. The other temptation, was the near success of all the efforts of day one and again on day two. It is my belief, General Lee having punched the right, then punched the left--the center would be thin as troops would re-enforce the previously attacked. This is where General Lee made an error. General Meade was anticipating this center attack, after consulting his 'war council.' One of the many Generals--one was General Warren "savior of Round Top." He had the advantage of the heights to aid in intelligence for General Meade, as far as troops, size, placements and the like.

Two days of positive progress, would be the logic of making one more last punch into the center of Meade's line. The flaw though was Meade was prepared, the guns were in such wonderful positions as to knock rows of troops out and were coming sideways as well as frontal. Plus, the field and distance between the two armies--gave clear indications of where they were heading. This allowed time for support to be in place hidden and show a weak front as to bait Lee to continue in the center and not attack the flanks again.

I do understand there might have been many philosophies as to do what General Lee did however, I feel it was an impromptu enticement and being impatient for the Civil War to end--over confident in himself and not listen to General Longstreet, General Hood for starts out things into action that resulted in Gettysburg.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf

[ole]

Just a slight addition: To handily swing around Meade's left would have required roads that weren't there and horses that were hard put to haul the rickety wagons he had. And no army commander is going to head south with seven corps behind him.

I like Opn's theory that Lee had to damage Meade enough to make his getaway. And, if he managed through punch through, so much the better. (Although I can't figure out what he might have done had he broken Meade's line.)

ole

[Dred]

IF Meade were to act like the previous AotP commanders, Lee knew that, like his predecessors, a break in the line would scare the commander into inactivity. Lets think about it... McLellan was RETREATING thorughout the entire 7 days battles, while clearly gaining the upper hand in most of the engagments, yet still convinced he was losing. Always convinced they were outnumbered, scared to death of LEE; THE ENIGMA. It mattered little what men he had, but the psychological effect a breakthrough at Gettysburg would have had, wether Lee could realistically hold it or not, COULD have been more than enough to break the Union morale. Thousands of union soldiers running north flinging their wepons down, convinced Lee had whooped them once again? Not very difficult to imagine.

[M E Wolf]

Dear ole and List Members,

I am mindful of General Meade's 'council of war' to which the generals agreed that they had too many casualties on several Corps already as to launch an attack on General Lee.

Recognized was the 5th Corps, which saw much of the fighting the first day; the 11th Corps which was a very battered corps on Cemetery Hill and still holding and the corps that were engaged from General Reynold's corps that was now under a new command. General Warren was so exhausted as soon as his behind hit the floor he immediately went to sleep as this meeting started.

One cannot help but view that General Lee was used to the 'modus operandi' of the Union Army. Generals who weren't that agressive and yet had every advantage. What I see, is those politically appointed generals we see on both sides of the armies involved. To me, they were about as affective as air brakes on a turtle.

What I do sense, is that General Lee and General Longstreet was more cautious about dealing with General Hancock. General Longstreet was in the same general class of officers, as well as General Reynolds, General Armistead, General Grant, General Pickett and such. If I had more personal knowledge of my enemy, I be cautious--as I would know their weakness and strengths and they would know theirs.

Already, war was just as much political as it was military. General Lee's monkey on his back was President Davis; General Meade's was President Lincoln. I believe if the two presidents would have met in a pit--fought and let that decide--I think the scrap would have been on Lincoln's side--he had height and wilderness savy.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M.E. Wolf

[Exilemainstreet]

Thanks for the great, thoughtful responses. I can understand not wanting to move out on July 2 toward Baltimore and risk being trapped against a river, but it seems to me that Lee would have had the AotP on his heels regardless of the direction. In other words, if he wasn't chased and destroyed after leaving Gettysburg on July 3, why would we think he would have been chased and destroyed if he had left on July 2, and gone on to one of the cities?

I think the theory that makes most sense to me is that Lee REALLY wanted a victory, so why not try for a knockout punch on July 3?

[Dred]

Because by the end of day 3 the union was beat to snot in victory almost as much as the rebs were in defeat. If Lee tries to run on day 2, the battle fever has not worn off yet, and Meade gives chase. so much happened in between day 2 and 3 and I think the lack of a speedy pursuit was due to shell shock from the day before. If Lee leaves on day 2 there is no shell shock affect