Why was Day Three necessary?

[ole]

To Lee, the day came within an Ace of winning the Day, to a fighter like Lee these could be seen as signs of future success, not failure.

Double-dog amen! Although he did get a pair, an ace high would have been nice.

ole

[5fish]

[quote=ole;83040]

ole


To Ole and Onp...

I don't see day two as nothing but a man going for a straight and got junk...

Even if Lee pushed the union off Little Round Top, Longstreet had nothing in reserve to followup with so it would not have been exploited.

Hill again one brigade breaks through but nothing to follow up with it... a lost moment maybe..

The most successful one on day two was Ewell and Lee doesn't even mention anything about Ewell on day two.

I jest don't see what you guys and Lee see all I see is a lot of dead men and nothing to crow about...

I see Lee exhausting his Army but I truly do not think he would have attack LRT if he knew they were occupied in force. I think he would have called off the attack and moved the army...

I read his reports and I sense a men justified why????

[OpnDownfall]

Lee, is engaged with the entire AoP, the climactic battle, that some believe, he was seeking. Maximum effort is called for and Lee IMO is prepared.
Due to circumstances, that I am sure he considerd beyond his control, opportunities have been lost.
From the record, the RT's had little significance to the Confederate high-command, except for Hood. Lee considered Cemetary Hill, as the decisive point of the battle. Take, Cemetary Hill and the Union Line is dominated and Meade must either retreat or retake the Hill immediately by attacking from the tactical disadvantage (knowing Meade, we can assume he will retreat)
It was Hill's and Ewell's responsibility to see their attacks were properly supported, not Lee's, that is why IMO he would consider one more strong attack would succeed if he could get his Corps Commanders properly coordinated and dekuvered a full blooded assault at what he considered the weakest point in the Union Line.
Meade, although correctly anticipating the location of Lee's attack, in fact, did very little to reinforce the area beyond warning Gibbon that the attack would be on his front. Probably because, the Union 's left was still closely engaged with Longstreet's corps and Culps Hill had to be attended, requiring a reinforced corps in the end and although fairly confident of the location, Meade did Not Know for sure, so could not cover the exected attack at the expense of other parts of his line, if he guessed wrong.
Lee plan was Pickett's Charge, preceded by a powerful artiller barrage and coordinated with Ewell's attack on Culp's Hill and everyone else alert to followup or take advantage of Union missteps.
Again, coordination broke down, because as soon as it grew light Union forces launched a powerful attack to regain all of Culp's Hill and again due to delays with the main attack, the fight for Cul's Hill was over before Pickett launched his attack.
Like Days One and Two Lee was done in, by his inability to get his corps commanders with his plan and although this was mostly Lee's fault, it does not negate the fact that the plan, if executed as planned, had a good chance of success, but Lee could not have known before hand that, once again, his senior commaners would still not be able, for whatever reasons, to get on board with Lee's original plans.

[ole]

Even if Lee pushed the union off Little Round Top, Longstreet had nothing in reserve to followup with so it would not have been exploited.

Little Round Top was not part of Lee's plan; he may even have been unaware of action there.

ole