Why was Day Three necessary?

[Jamieva]

Lee's philosophy was that the AoP was there, and he wanted to smash them now, and not wait. As discussed in another topic, supplies were an issue as well.

Also I think you have to look at it from a psychological side. If there is 2 days of intense fighting, and one side leaves the battefield, how is that side generally viewed? That they have been defeated and are retreating. To fight 2 days then move away from the battlefield would not have played well if you still had hope of European help. The AoP would gain a boost of confidence they badly needed as they would feel that they forced Lee from the field.

[5fish]

I think the third day was one of about Lee's desire, pride and deportation. His goal from the time he took command of the AoNV was to smash the AoP and on the third day he saw his desire once more not being fulfilled. He had never left a field in the emeny control so his pride was wounded going into third if he chose to leave instead of staying. Lastly, he knew how desperate the confederacy was becoming and if he could just defeat the AoP maybe Britain would come to their aid or maybe force peace talks with Washington, all hinge on the AoP being smashed.

That frontal charge was desperate act of an old man who was losing everything in one battle. At the end of third day Lee suffered his first obvious defeat and all of his fears were realized by the late afternoon of July 3rd, 1863.

[J_Man0507]

I do agree that Pickett's charge was motivated by pride, though I would not go so far as to claim as desperation. I would attribute it all to foolhardy pride, and we all know that pride goeth before the fall. He had tried to take the Union line of the left and failed. He had tried to take the Union line on the right and failed. His only apparent option left was the center. Unfortunately, Lee forgot about one of his most memorable victories at the battle of Fredericksburg, where his men held the high ground, had good fields of fire and had interior lines. He failed to realize that the Union held the same position at Gettysburg that he did on Marye's Heights. He was not desperate yet. If he had made another charge after Pickett's, that I would attribute to sheer desperation. But not Pickett's charge. That was a mistake based purely on pride and overconfidence.

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members,

I am also thinking that General Lee had not fully transitioned into better communication and 'trusting' his Generals. I think back to the death of General Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson which had hit General Lee rather hard. E.g. General Jackson may have lost his left arm but, I have lost my right.'

This loss of General Jackson was approximately 2 months prior to Gettysburg. But, what has rattled around in my mind, is that General Lee having been accustomed to General Jackson exceeding the standing orders by General Lee, when he would issue them--followed by the phrase 'If practical.' With General Jackson--all things were practical and went on with things and fought for the victory. However, for other Generals--I believe this 'if practical' gave an escape if it was too much danger or risks to high. War is dangerous and risks are high. General Jackson didn't have his mind stuck on fear of death--he knew when it was time for him to go--he'd go. I am not so sure other Generals had that mindset. This hesitation and or waffling could have much to do with the lack of success as well as the lack of discipline.

I also agree with J_Man0707--General Lee forgot about the Battle of Fredericksburg, the heights and good interior lines were an advantage. To include the 'pluck' the Irish Brigade shown and the Men from Michigan.
It wasn't because General Longstreet didn't stress these very things and argued the logic of such attacks to the center line. He was there at the Battle of Fredericksburg also. The only difference, Fredericksburg had a creek to go through and Gettysburg they had the fence line.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf
Reminder -Clocks turn 1 hour forward March 9th

[J_Man0507]

You bring up a good point, M.E. It was Longstreet's very men that repelled the attack along the Stone Wall at Fredericksburg. He knew exactly what his men were being sent into, and he was adamant against it. However, he was ordered to do it, and he had to obey.

And the fences along the Emmitsburg Pike. These were not just snake rail fences, but sturdy fences with the posts mortised into the ground. One could not just tear them down and march on through; you had to climb over and reform on the other side. Much as the canal running through the field over which the Federals charged at Fredericksburg, the fence proved to be an obstacle that caused disastrous results.

[M E Wolf]

Dear J_Man0707,

I am also finding more and more information as I get involved in this wonderful site. People posing thoughts, gets me to thinking and start researching.

If we roll back a bit to the beginning of the Civil War cavalry tactics, they were fairly uniformed regardless of sides. However, I am surprised to find that Native American Indians had been joining on both sides however, the Cherokee's were a bit behind, as their original Chief was taken prisoner and paroled in Washington, DC and he 'changed loyalty sides' to serve for the Union. This, from what I understand, is where Stand Waite, who was a Colonel at the time, for the Confederates took over all of the Cherokee Nation, as Chief Ross was out of territory and out of power.

But, from what I gather--Confederates had 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles lead by Col. John Drew. (The wealthest Cherokee Indian). This 2nd Cherokee Mounted Rifles was formed after the Battle of Pea Ridge, in Arkansas March 7-8, 1862. However this unit defected to the Union, in Kansas and joined the Indian Home Guard.

The Delaware Indians (State of Delaware), along with Creek, Seminole, Kickapoo, Seneca (Gen. Ely S. Parker, highest ranked Indian-a General was a Seneca Indian), Osage, Shawnee, Choctaw and Chickasaw Tribal Nations immediately joined the Union. The Native American Indians (herafter referred to as NAI), formed the 1st and 2nd Indian Home Guard. National Archives picture supplied for the Internet site, showed NAI sharp shooters at the Battle of Fredericksburg: www.nativeamericans.com/CivilWar/htm or --enter question in browser, 'Did any Indians serve in the Civil War?' and this site popped up.

Now a Brig. General Stand Watie is responsible for a lot of guerilla warfare, was in charge of 1st and 2nd Cherokee Cavalry, which created Indian Cavalry Brigade, battallions of Creek, Osage and Seminole NAIs.

I can't help but think these guerilla tactics didn't rub off on General JEB Stuart and other Cavalry commanders. On the Union side--I'm sure they also had these tactics that rubbed off on them. But, it took time and getting over the 'better than thou attitude' of formal military training. The Wilderness (both battles) was in the middle of thick brush, brambles and wouldn't bend to lines of soldiers mashed together to mash the enemy.

I am sure they were excellent scouts.

But, I also recall, that General Marion, Revolutionary War 'hero' used guerilla tactics to harass the Redcoats/British. This comes from being around NAIs and hunting tactics.

I also have noticed, there are many foreign language troops. If the commanding officer was killed--if their aides and sequencial officers didn't speak 'German' for example--you'd be lost for sure. I think this is where Col. J. Lawrence Chamberlain would have come in handy, as he was fluent in many languages. I think this also would have hampered fluid obedience to orders from the top Generals. Translation issues and a bit skewed understanding of them perhaps?

Just some thoughts.

Respectfully,
M.E. Wolf

[J_Man0507]

M.E., you bring up another good point about Cavarly tactics in the civil war. However, I think this is grounds for another thread. Sooooooo, I think I shall start one in the general discussion forum!!!

[5fish]

In lee's last report on Gettysburg this is what he wrote:

"These partial successes determined me to continue the assault the next day."

He thought his army was semi-successful after the second day. He referring to Longstreet and Hill on day two. He does not mention Ewell action at all except were his corp travel too.

I have read if Lee left you out of a report that was worse then leaving you in for doing bad. He does not imply Stuart had done anything wrong in the report.

He leaves out Ewell action does this implies he is faulting Ewell's action during Gettysburg for the defeat.

Was Lee fooling himself thinking day two at Gettysburg was semi-successful to justify another assault?

[M E Wolf]

Dear 5fish,

I believe leaving Ewell out was a big snub. Wasn't Ewell who failed to take the Little Round Top and Big Round Top that wasn't occupied but was occupied when the Confederates reappraised taking it? In the movie Gettysburg the scene where the General upset requested a transfer out of Ewell's command? This tactical misjudgment was no doubt a big part of not taking the opportunity to gain good ground.

I do believe General Robert E. Lee was trying hard to end the war. His army wasn't in good shape although, their spirits good. However, when you cannot equip, feed and maintain horses in your Army--it's abilities are ever more decreased and forces to go back to home ground.

General Early's attempted attack on Washington, from the north--by way of Silver Spring, Maryland (Montgomery County); on Fort Stevens --they were tired and hungry, so when entering a mansion--they went hog wild with liquor and were so snookered they were to drunk to continue the march so they had to sleep it off. In the meantime, the Union were informed and the defenses of Washington were up and ready for a brawl.

Early was defeated and withdrew.

Personally, I think General Lee preferred to fight in a place to permit a quick retreat by rail, by water and or by 'ground' back into the home ground. The distance traveled wasn't completed to their original destination so--it would be a thought--fight miles sooner than later.

However, General Buford's videttes were the first to make the location of battle determined.

I still think General Lee should have listened to General Longstreet and redeploy as to get into a better tactical situation. Not a test of wills and or resolve.

That said -- I do have to applaud the Confederates as an army--they always were under-dogs when it came to total number strength. What they lacked in numbers (soldier wise), the made up with clever minds and quick minds.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M.E. Wolf

[OpnDownfall]

I am sure Lee, would have forgotten Fredericksburg, for many reasons, not the least of which was he, had Longstreet to remind him.
From Lee's viewpoint, Day two was a day of lost opportunities. He could not get his Corps commanders coordinated for the attack and even then, his forces had gotten penetration of the Federal Lines on Cemetary Hill and Cemetary Ridge (before having to retire), and partial occupation of Culp's Hill.
To Lee, the day came within an Ace of winning the Day, to a fighter like Lee these could be seen as signs of future success, not failure.