Confederate attack on Little Round Top

[gary]

My statement was premised on "if" the Confederates had captured LRT. As Whitworth mentioned, neither LRT nor BRT would have been a good artillery post against Meade; but its failure as an artillery post does not denigrate its strategic value. First, traffic on the Taneytown road can be interdicted from it. Even if an infantry assault wasn't mounted on that road, anyone traveling on it was exposed to fire. If you've been there, it's quite open. I cite the example of the Siege of Chattanooga by Longstreet where his sharpshooters shut down traffic along the road that followed the Tennessee River. Second, the Round Tops can be used as a staging area to attack the Taneytown or roll up the Union (former) center. Hancock's II Corps would have been flanked as did Howard's XI Corps at Chancellorsville. Once Hancock fell back, Cemetery Hill would have become a salient, exposed to fire from three sides. That too would have been untenable. Meade would have no choice but to withdraw to save his army if LRT was captured.

[Blockaderunner]

Is it possible that the Confederates did not realise how heavily wooded the rear and right of Little Round Top were? The slope of the hill facing the Confederates was clear of trees. If the other slopes had been similar, then it would certainly have been possible to get artillery batteries into position. We now know of course that would have been almost impossible, but Lee may not have known.

[ole]

Once Hancock fell back, Cemetery Hill would have become a salient, exposed to fire from three sides.

Hancock falls back because of a threat from a brigade?

We now know of course that would have been almost impossible, but Lee may not have known.

Lee didn't even know that Hood had strayed from Longstreet's orders. Lee became disturbingly detached from the goings on that day, being in contact with neither Longstreet nor Ewell. Had LRT been taken, I very much doubt that Lee would have known about it in time to make a decision one way or another.

ole

[OpnDownfall]

The Union 6th Corps was in reserve at Powers Hill, just behind Cemetary Ridge and a little N. of the RT's and Devil's Den, available to reinforce the Union Left if need be, which it did with the rout of Sickles' Corps.
Fifth Corps was just approaching the Union Lines (by forced march) from the S along the Baltimore Pike.
As Longstreet surmised, the confederate flank was too shallow. Hood stood a good chance of being taken in the rear by elements of at least two Union Corps, if he had actually overrun LRT on his way to attack Sickles rear, which was plan as Hood apparently understood it.

[whitworth]

We know the fight for LRT was a good one. But what was it's importance? If captured, the Confederates would have found it fairly useless to run up artillery to LRT and beyond, to capture the Taneytown Road and hold it.

The Army of the Potomac could stop any capture of the Taneytown Road, by the force attacking LRT, as that was where the AoP had their reserve artillery. Right behind LRT.

My view is that LRT had importance in tying up so much infantry, but was meaningless without the simultaneous capture of Cemetery Ridge, by the Confederates.

One watches the Gettysburg movie and LRT seems to have singular importance, segmented away from the rest of the battle. But larger units were fighting on Cemetery Ridge, and if that fell, Meade might have retreated with a blocking movement. Since the Confederates had no topographical maps, they were somewhat attacking blind. LRT was not an easy egress to the Union rear; LRT was not the way to bring up Confederate artillery.
In these ways the battle for LRT, a good infantry battle, seems to reach a scale of overimportance.

[OpnDownfall]

To repeat, capturing the RT's did not seem to be part of Lee's plan for the 2d day. Hood was not trying to take LRT, he was just traveling over it to get on the flank and rear of the Union Force guarding the Devil's Den area. LRT was not Hood's 'goal' he was not trying to capture it, he was trying to get over and beyond LRT to attack his real goal; the Union Force blocking his attack from the South.
LRT was more of a tactical obstacle to be overcome, than it was a strategic goal.
From the sketchy evidence available, it seem's the RT's were ignored (or forgottten) by both Lee and Longstreet in planning for the second days battle. It was only Hood's initiative in stretching (ignoring) the limits of his orders that LRT was even a part of the battle, in the first place.