Lee's Excuse--Those Wagons---

[larry_cockerham]

Originally Posted by ole

Spot on, Opn!

Lee was looking at one option: gain a major victory. All other reasons fall conveniently into a nice justification for invasion. If he had pulled it off, his generalship would be more highly honored than it is. Unfortunately, he didn't or couln't. Just how he managed to keep the war going for another year escapes me. At Gettysburg (and Vicksburg) it was all over. The fat lady had finished her aria.

I tend to fault Lee for not cashing in his chips right then. But I have to admire him and his men for hanging in there, against impossible odds.

A significant American, definitive moment.

ole

I'll pretty much second the preceeding posts. Did you fellas consider that during the first two days of the battle, there was a bunch of boys back in the woods working on wagons? I'll bet they (they wagons) were in better condition upon their exit than on arrival. Far fewer passengers and lighter loads, too. Lots of lead and armament left on the battlefield.

[ole]

I really don't like to cross the grain of the Sage of Nashville, but those wagons headed south were crammed with wounded men. The unfortunate cargo may not have been as heavy as cannonballs or barrels of salt pork, but the suffering had a weight of its own.

ole

[william42]

The wagons excuse is new to me, though I'm not doubting 5fish. It's just that I had not heard of it before. And 5fish is right in saying that Gen. Lee was forced to retreat with all those wagons anyway, after the battle at Gettysburg, so the excuse seems kind of flimsy. One of Lee's main goals in invading the North was to round up supplies - wagons, horses, food etc, and send them south into Virgina. Pennsylvanians, Marylanders, and northern Virginians saw wagon after wagon, horses by the hundreds, and everything else that could be used by the ANV heading south for two weeks straight after Lee's army passed through their areas heading north.

The question of why Lee could not "see the writing on the wall" after Gettysburg, has bothered me for a long time. It seems that a sensible man, such as Lee, would have taken under consideration the condition of his army, his equipment, etc. and questioned the viability of his force as performing anything more than a defensive fight until the bitter end. Also there was the Southern population and land that had taken it on the chin for almost 4 years by then.

I can't get into his shoes but maybe, as a professional soldier, he felt compelled to carry out his Commander in Chief's orders, as a matter of military protocol. In that case I would fault Jeff Davis for not ending the war sooner.


Terry

[whitworth]

Here is what R.E. Lee actually said about his wagons and supplies in his Gettysburg OR.

"It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable
issue..."

"to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous."

Lee was recognizing an error he had made, was overlooked, or was never seen by Early and his division on a previous visit to Adams County.
Also, Lee had no expectation the Army of the Potomac would arrive in time and attempt to block his advance at Gettysburg.
On the first day, Lee had only one route out of Gettysburg, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. He knew how long it was going to take to move three corps back to Chambersburg. He was still attempting to move two corps over this road. In fact now he had most of Ewell's Corp to think about logistically and how to move that corps, if necessary. Lee could never move three corps back over this narrow route, back to Chambersburg,with a relatively undamaged enemy army on his heels. At this point, his judgment, I believe, was correct.
Lee had made a serious error. He moved three corps into one confined area, with only one egress out of the area. Lee had violated a military principle -how do you go in; how do you get out. Lee had failed to realize what a mistake it was to move three corps east of South Mountain, with a blocking army on Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill.

We know that when Lee did retreat, he used two roads - one through Fairfield and the other -the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
A great difference occurred from the 1st of July to July 4. The Army of the Potomac had taken a good beating, and had lost many a soldier and horse.
Militarily one cannot compare the circumstances of Lee's actual retreat and the one he would have made on July 1-2.

Another Error -

"the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops."

R.E. Lee did not know this fact on June 30, or he never would have moved to Gettysburg at all. Even with victory on the 1st, Lee saw he had placed his army in a bad place, "for collecting supplies." His horses and mules couldn't last long without forage and the supply of water from mainly the too few wells, for such large trains of horses/mules.
With inadequate supplies and no easy egress away from Gettysburg, Lee had to attack. The supplies would not be found in Adams County. He had to attack, not just to injure the AoP, but so he would have, at least, an additional way out of Adams County.

[william42]

Whit, thank you for the detailed analysis. The situation seems a bit clearer to me now but I still have a couple of questions that I'm a bit fuzzy on.

Militarily one cannot compare the circumstances of Lee's actual retreat and the one he would have made on July 1-2.

On July 1 or 2nd would Lee have used only the Chambersburg-Gettysburg pike for a retreat? Or could he also have used the Fairfield road as well, or was the Fairfield road open only due to the battle.

And would Lee have erred so badly had he been able to utilize Stuart's fresh intel? (I know that's a hypothetical that's difficult to address but I wanted to see what your answer might be.)

Thanks,

Terry

[5fish]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Here is what R.E. Lee actually said about his wagons and supplies in his Gettysburg OR.

"It had not been intended to deliver a general battle so far from our base unless attacked, but coming unexpectedly upon the whole Federal Army, to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous. At the same time we were unable to await an attack, as the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops. A battle had, therefore, become in a measure unavoidable, and the success already gained gave hope of a favorable
issue..."

"to withdraw through the mountains with our extensive trains would have been difficult and dangerous."

Lee was recognizing an error he had made, was overlooked, or was never seen by Early and his division on a previous visit to Adams County.
Also, Lee had no expectation the Army of the Potomac would arrive in time and attempt to block his advance at Gettysburg.
On the first day, Lee had only one route out of Gettysburg, the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. He knew how long it was going to take to move three corps back to Chambersburg. He was still attempting to move two corps over this road. In fact now he had most of Ewell's Corp to think about logistically and how to move that corps, if necessary. Lee could never move three corps back over this narrow route, back to Chambersburg,with a relatively undamaged enemy army on his heels. At this point, his judgment, I believe, was correct.
Lee had made a serious error. He moved three corps into one confined area, with only one egress out of the area. Lee had violated a military principle -how do you go in; how do you get out. Lee had failed to realize what a mistake it was to move three corps east of South Mountain, with a blocking army on Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill.

We know that when Lee did retreat, he used two roads - one through Fairfield and the other -the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
A great difference occurred from the 1st of July to July 4. The Army of the Potomac had taken a good beating, and had lost many a soldier and horse.
Militarily one cannot compare the circumstances of Lee's actual retreat and the one he would have made on July 1-2.

Another Error -

"the country was unfavorable for collecting supplies in the presence of the enemy, who could restrain our foraging parties by holding the mountain passes with local and other troops."

R.E. Lee did not know this fact on June 30, or he never would have moved to Gettysburg at all. Even with victory on the 1st, Lee saw he had placed his army in a bad place, "for collecting supplies." His horses and mules couldn't last long without forage and the supply of water from mainly the too few wells, for such large trains of horses/mules.
With inadequate supplies and no easy egress away from Gettysburg, Lee had to attack. The supplies would not be found in Adams County. He had to attack, not just to injure the AoP, but so he would have, at least, an additional way out of Adams County.

Whitmore,

I like William42 like what you have done but again Lee used the same roads to retreat on that he could have used to move his army and avoid this coming Waterloo.

A hungry army up until Gettysburg area the army was living off the fat of the land. A army does not starve in a few days. Lee could have moved to better grounds especially once he realized Meade being to cautious.
Remember, Sherman had to weather some hungry days in his march to the sea. Lee could have weather a few hungry days in PA.

Except for the part about the favorable first action, I think Lee is looking for why he stay beyond just his blood lust for a fight.

[OpnDownfall]

If we take Lee's words in his Report at face-value, he seems to say that he unexpectedly ran into elements of the AoP and that the restricted area in which he would have to fight a battle, forced him to consider the danger to his wagon trains, in deciding on whether to fight the Union Army or not.
Lee implies that he has no easy way to extricate his wagons And Army, from their exposed positions that his plan (or lack,thereof) his led them. In fact, he seems to admit that he was forced to fight a battle, not of his choosing, Nor it's time or place.
By marking his wagons as the catalyst for his decision to fight at Gettysburg, the logical implication can be drawn that if his wagons were secure, he would not have fought at Gettysburg, in that context, he does seem to say it was his worry over his wagons, that led him to fight when and where he did.

[ole]

Golly, gentlemen. An excellent and informative exchange. My thanks.

ole

[M E Wolf]

Dear List Members;

I am not positive if it will be useful however, I restored an authentic 'Banner' wagon circa 1870 which is as close to a surry but, without the fringe top. The axle was metal, to which leather bearings had to be renewed about every 500 miles as it would become compressed. These axles had to be greased rather often, the debri would be trapped in a notch at the 12 o'clock position and this caused the smooth operation of the wheels, hubs resting on the 6 o'clock position with grease the only lube. It had square nuts, to which were friction kept. The threads would go in the counter direction of the wheel as to keep it tight...to back up three lengths of the vehicle; the nuts would turn and loosen--thus could loose a wheel. This is one reason for a 'culdesac' so that there would be no need to reverse the wagon/buggy/carriage. The 'turn under' wasn't found in draft wagons and sharp turns could tip it over. So, often there would be rollers on the box of the wagon as to warn the driver the turn was too sharp. The wheels are all made concaved --like a dish ). This permitted the spokes to handle the stress, and such wheels couldn't handle a slant ground for long as the load shift per square inch would increase. Loads were best taken directly up and down hill, otherwise a spoke would crack and might destroy a wheel entirely. The frames of the wagons vary however the axle is bowed also--as to concave and flatten in the direction of the load to bare it. The metal frame would encase the wood axle's bottom and support the springs. The 'brakes'--they were never able to hold like an emergency brake. The horse's took the whole load to brake--this is why the wheel horses were the most powerful as to stop the load. Brakes could grab the wheel and slow it but, it could never stop the buggy/wagon/carriage. It usually was for unhitching/hitching teams. Blocks were more wise to choose from.

The wagon/carriage jack --not much different from the old fashioned car jack. It was a plate that would be adjusted by a ratchet system and then place on the metal bar closest to the hub. Then pull the handle down the pad would lift the wheel up about 2 inches. One could take off the wheel/replace the wheel, etc. Lowering, just lift the handle up. It was easy to fit into the trunk/boot of the carriage/buggy. The wrench was a box wrench with a crescent on the other end. It was fashioned as to go into the hub area and reach the recessed nut. The other side, was able to adjust the carriage bolts if necessary.


I briefly was a member of the American Driving Society (horse).

I would think, other than food, military supplies, gear, cook's wagon--the other wagon would most likely be transporting iron to make horse shoes, nails, blacksmith supplies. It takes approximately 1 hour to shoe a horse with an experienced blacksmith; to put shoes on four hooves. I highly doubt if there were any mass production of horse shoes (or keg shoes) and only a couple of sets in each size would be made. It took my blacksmith two hours to make custom horseshoes from raw bar iron.

Just some thoughts.

Sincerely,
M. E. Wolf