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So might we imply that you think Lee wanted to end the warone victor or another, and rolled the dice by invading Pennsylvania, and hoped that would settle it?
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Yep, that's my theory.
__________________ Ancestors in US Army: 13th TN Cav; 10th TN Cav; 3rd NC Inf
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Lee was quite sensitive to his line of retreat, in case he had to fall back.
When Heth's men stumbles into the AoP on the 29th and 30th Hill's and Longstreets Corps' are still debouching thru the Cashtown Gap. Not knowing the strength or exact location of the Union forces, Lee decides to concentrate in the Cashtown area (we have already discussed the traffic jamb of the wagaon trains). But, in fact, (inadequate as they may be) Lee cannot afford to lose all, or any significant part of his wagon train (especially in enemy territory). In the straited condiditions of the confederacy, they were almost irreplaceable, timewise, if not in numbers.
Lee was indeed as worried about his wagons as he was about his LOC, in fact, they may have been one in the same to him.
Not entirely off topic, but I understand that a new "Retreat from Gettysburg" is due out in May. This one is by Wittenburg, Petruzzi, and someone else, whose name I forgot.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Lee was quite sensitive to his line of retreat, in case he had to fall back.
When Heth's men stumbles into the AoP on the 29th and 30th Hill's and Longstreets Corps' are still debouching thru the Cashtown Gap. Not knowing the strength or exact location of the Union forces, Lee decides to concentrate in the Cashtown area (we have already discussed the traffic jamb of the wagaon trains). But, in fact, (inadequate as they may be) Lee cannot afford to lose all, or any significant part of his wagon train (especially in enemy territory). In the straited condiditions of the confederacy, they were almost irreplaceable, timewise, if not in numbers.
Lee was indeed as worried about his wagons as he was about his LOC, in fact, they may have been one in the same to him.
I can see that wagons as one of those over looked items when people study the civil war. They were the trucks of their day.
The logistics of moving an army back in 1860's without modern vehicles and communications is sorely underappreciated.
Study the topographical map of the Gettysburg area.
Study the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
It's one thing to retreat facing a fairly undamaged Union army; quite another after inflicting three days of losses.
What access areas, out of Gettysburg, do you think were a sure thing on July 1, for the Confederate army?
5fish, perhaps you started reading too many of Lee's dispatches and reports. Lee was rather bluntly honest. He could get an idea across with one sentence. Some not so favorable for the neo-confederate reader to accept. Lee never said victory was certain; in fact he warned of failure repeatedly.
Lee wrote Ewell nine days before Gettysburg, saying he was unsure if the army could live off the land in Pennsylvania, due to supply shortages. "There may be enough for your command, but none for the others."
The Army of Northern Virginia was clearly deficient in supplies; Lee minced no words on the subject.
Study the topographical map of the Gettysburg area.
Study the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
It's one thing to retreat facing a fairly undamaged Union army; quite another after inflicting three days of losses.
What access areas, out of Gettysburg, do you think were a sure thing on July 1, for the Confederate army?
5fish, perhaps you started reading too many of Lee's dispatches and reports. Lee was rather bluntly honest. He could get an idea across with one sentence. Some not so favorable for the neo-confederate reader to accept. Lee never said victory was certain; in fact he warned of failure repeatedly.
Lee wrote Ewell nine days before Gettysburg, saying he was unsure if the army could live off the land in Pennsylvania, due to supply shortages. "There may be enough for your command, but none for the others."
The Army of Northern Virginia was clearly deficient in supplies; Lee minced no words on the subject.
Whitworth,
My argument is Lee sights his wagons for why he stayed an engage the union army.
Lee logic sounds good on the surface until you think about his retreat from Gettysburg.
He argues the wagons made it difficult to move or disengage from union army; but he disengages from the union and retreats even thou his army now hobbled by the engagement at Gettysburg.
You can not have it both ways.
My point is: Lee is disingenuous about the wagons remark in report. If he wanted to, he could have moved his army and not engaged the union army holding a superior position and fight another day.
Now comes the questions:
Why does Lee sight the wagons?
What is Lee hiding?
Who is Lee covering for?
If Lee doubted that there was an insufficiency of supplies in Pa. to support his army, Before the invasion even began, then one of the major reasons for being in Pa. in the first place, was eliminated even before he started his campaign.
It does explain, why Lee brought his entire supply train on the invasion, even though it seems to have been planned mainly as a raiding expedition.
The wagons were essential. His army, so long as it was moving could mostly exist on the provender of the countryside. Once it stopped, it was all but finished because the supply line (some would call it his "line of communication") was far too long and rickety to actually provide sustenance.
Lee took a desperate, audacious shot at bringing the AotP to a conclusive battle -- the Austerlitz Chimera. He had a slim chance of pulling it off, but it was a fair maybe for a commander overseeing his command's demise. When all else fails, charge!
The AoNV had done a fair bit of damage to the AotP at Fredericksburg and Chancellorsville. It had the initiative -- something Lee always capitalized on. Next move? Do it again. Bring the AotP into a final, conclusive battle. Worth a shot, right? What else could he do? Leave his army to simply subsist off the depleted Virginia countryside? And wait for the next Yankee move?
That is not Lee.
Just a thought.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
It seems that Lee had three reasons for the Pa. Campaign, To draw the AoP from Va. soil, To subsist his (Lee's) army on the supplies garnered in northern and/or defeat a northern army on it own soil, to encourage foreign recognition of the confederacy.
Logically, the first two are really unrealizable, without the third motive (defeating the AoP) occurring first. By 1863, it should have been clear, that Lee would not be left free to roam across Pa. at will, taking what supplies as he wished, without a strong reaction from All Union forces in and around Pa. How much time did Lee think he needed to accomplish any of those goals?
If Lee recognized that there was not sufficient supplies to be gathered on his invasion route, for even 1 Corps, much less 4 (counting cavalry) then it seems that Lee's 'real' (and perhaps, only) purpose was to find and defeat the AoP as soon as possible, despite his officially declared other reason(s). In which case, Cavalry was of first importance, which, due to Lee's loose system of command, he lost control of at the very begiining of the invasion (exacerbated, by Lee's mishandling the 2/3's of Stuarts corps still available to him)
It does seem that Lee was much more adept at responding, boldly, to the initiatives of others, rather than in sitting down and planing, bold, initiatives on his own.
As the history books seem to indicate; Lee's Gettysburg (and perhaps, Antietam) Campaign(s) were misbegotten from their inception.
Lee was looking at one option: gain a major victory. All other reasons fall conveniently into a nice justification for invasion. If he had pulled it off, his generalship would be more highly honored than it is. Unfortunately, he didn't or couln't. Just how he managed to keep the war going for another year escapes me. At Gettysburg (and Vicksburg) it was all over. The fat lady had finished her aria.
I tend to fault Lee for not cashing in his chips right then. But I have to admire him and his men for hanging in there, against impossible odds.
A significant American, definitive moment.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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