Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
The battle of Gettysburg comes down a lack of urgency on evening of July, 1 and a matter of timing on the morning of July, 2.
By the evening of July 1, Lee had consolidated his three corps at Gettysburg. Longstreet still had Pickett's Div. coming up but for the most part the AoNV, except for its cavalry was on the field of battle.
The union forces were still coming into Gettysburg piecemeal on July 1 and July 2.
The AoNV from the evening of July 1 until late morning on July 2 had a great advantage over the union army entering the battle piecemeal.
A fatal mistake of Lee's army was it lack a sense of urgency after the success of the first day on July 1. While the union army was digging in and racing troops toward Gettysburg's, the confederate army just made camp.
If the AoNV would have had the same sense of urgency as the union army its forces would have been in position to engage the union forces by the morning of July 2.
Note: Culp's Hill was not occupy until late at night by union force on July 1. If Ewell or Lee had a sense of urgency they could have occupied the hill earlier in he evening making cemetery hill worthless.
Note: If Longstreet had not allowed Hood's and McLaw's Div. to make camp just a few miles short of where Lee wanted on the night of July, 1. They would have been in position on the morning July, 2 to take LRT and the Devils Den before the union forces had occupied them in force.
Due to a lack of urgency by the confederate army on the evening of July 1 sealed their defeat on July 2 and the death of their nation.
One can argue that the battle of Gettysburg was over by 9am on the morning of July 2 because by that time the union army occupied LRT and Devils Den with comparable numbers to the attacking confederate numbers.
One can argue that if Ewell had moved his forces into position in the morning of July 2 and attack Culp's hill he could had carried the hill and held it. By the time he did attack a carried the hill the union had more then enough forces to drive him off the hill.
A lack of urgency cause the south to be unable to take advantage of having their forces consolidated before the union forces were.
Maybe complacency and over confidence is what kill the AoNV in PA. on those days in July, 1863.
Lee got his army strung out on the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. He attempted to move two corps, Hill and Longstreet, one division of Ewell's Corps, plus its reserve artillery, over a road going through the gaps in South Mountain. It was a logistics nightmare. A classic case of a movement through enemy territory, the unknown and the unforeseen.
Buford knew that fighting west of Gettysburg on July 1, was like corking the neck of a bottle. Lee was unable to get all three corps to Adams County, on that date, to overwhelm the AoP.
I admitted that Lee was not able to bring his whole army to engage the union army on July, 1st but by late evening all three corps were in the field.
If one looks at the time line from the ending of hostilities on July 1st until the mid-morning hours of July 2nd, Lee and an the AoNV had an advantage and let it slip away.
If one reads the confederates after the first day of fighting for the most part set pickets and set up camp for the night. There was no movement or urgency to prepare for the next day's battle by the AoNV.
Culp's Hill was the true lynch pin the the union line the back way in to the union's position and Ewell again chose not to take initiative for he did have fresh brigades that could have occupied the hill before the union.
I wonder if Lee, Longstreet, Ewell ever realized the advantage and opportunity that slip away the night and morning.
I do not believe it was a lack of urgency. Without recon knowing the concentration of troops, I'm to believe Lee was hesitant about "taking the hill if practical". I believe the lack of recon affected much of the decision making of this battle.
tacitus seems to have hit it. Lee knew there was a hill over there that might prove valuable, but he never set foot on it. It's axiomatic that, when a battle is pending, you want the high ground. Thus, take that hill "if practicable."
Lee was audacious, but not reckless. Ewell had hands on. Lee deferred the decision to him. Lee couldn't know just how hugely that hill would figure into the subsequent days. As tacitus said, it wasn't a lack of urgency, it was a lack of certainty.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
"I admitted that Lee was not able to bring his whole army to engage the union army on July, 1st but by late evening all three corps were in the field." 5fish
Only part of Longstreet's Corps was near Gettysburg on the early evening of July 1, and that was only one division, near Marsh Creek. Not all his divisions were up on the morning of July 2.
Even part of Ewell's Corps, Johnson's division and his reserve artillery came up too late to participate in the fight of July 1.
None of Longstreet's Corps came up in time to fight on July 1. That was the problem with Lee attempting to move more than two corps over one narrow road - the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
Longstreet noted in his report that Pickett was doing rear guard duty at Chambersburg; a brigade was at New Guilford; only one division reached near Gettysburg on July 1, at Marsh Creek at early dark.
Part of Hood's division didn't get up near March Creek, until around mid-night, the morning of July 2.
Report of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding
First Army Corps.
..."On the next day[July 1], the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett’s division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law’s brigade, left by Hood on picket at New Guilford. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson’s division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws’ division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood’s division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o’clock at night..."
In retrospect, it can be argued that 'less' urgency might have been better.
The AoP was always the larger army, yet Lee was pushing his smaller army into a direct confrontation with that larger army, not only piece-meal (from the NE, N and NW) but also, due to Lee's and stuarts mishandling of the cavalry, with no real idea of the size or disposition of the approaching AoP.
"I admitted that Lee was not able to bring his whole army to engage the union army on July, 1st but by late evening all three corps were in the field." 5fish
Only part of Longstreet's Corps was near Gettysburg on the early evening of July 1, and that was only one division, near Marsh Creek. Not all his divisions were up on the morning of July 2.
Even part of Ewell's Corps, Johnson's division and his reserve artillery came up too late to participate in the fight of July 1.
None of Longstreet's Corps came up in time to fight on July 1. That was the problem with Lee attempting to move more than two corps over one narrow road - the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.
Longstreet noted in his report that Pickett was doing rear guard duty at Chambersburg; a brigade was at New Guilford; only one division reached near Gettysburg on July 1, at Marsh Creek at early dark.
Part of Hood's division didn't get up near March Creek, until around mid-night, the morning of July 2.
Report of Lieut. Gen. James Longstreet, C. S. Army, commanding
First Army Corps.
..."On the next day[July 1], the troops set out for Gettysburg, excepting Pickett’s division, not yet relieved from duty at Chambersburg, and Law’s brigade, left by Hood on picket at New Guilford. Our march was greatly delayed on this day by Johnson’s division, of the Second Corps, which came into the road from Shippensburg, and the long wagon trains that followed him. McLaws’ division, however, reached Marsh Creek, 4 miles from Gettysburg, a little after dark, and Hood’s division got within nearly the same distance of the town about 12 o’clock at night..."
You bring up an aspect of my observation. Longstreet allowed Hood and Mclaw to make camp before they reached their place in the battle line.
If Longstreet had demanded it, they would have been in position and be ready at first light but instead they weren't. All due to the commanders of the AoNV lack of urgency.
Marsh Creek is what about three or five miles from where Mclaw and Hood were to be place in the line of battle. At that distance they could have march to there place in the line of battle and still by rested at sunrise on July 2.
I'm afraid I might be beginning to agree with you 5 fish.
ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Whitworth is correct, McLaws Division did not reach Marsh Creek until 'after' Dark on July 1st with Hood not arriving until around Midnight (minus Picketts Div) and according to Longstreet, his artillery was still in Greenwood and did not even begin it's movement forward, until 2 A.M. on July 2d.
Few generals of that era initiated (or even contemplated) major night attacks; not even Lee.
The late arrival of Longstreet was caused by bad staff work by Lee and, perhaps, Ewell. Lee and Longstreet left Chambersburg the morning of June 30. That night, they camped overnight at Greenwood, 10 miles east of Chambersburg. On the morning of July 1st the last Div. of Hills Corps had passed thru Greewood to be followed immediately by Longstreets Corps as ordered by Lee. A short distance out of townthey ran into Johnson's div of Ew3ell's corps, cutting into thier line of march from another dirt road angling in from the NW. Johnson was pursuing Lee's orders of June 29 to return to Chambersburg and was coming down the Carlisle Pike towards Chambersburg. On the road Johnson received Lee's change of orders, shifting the objective to Cashtown. In changing his line of march he cut in front of Longstreet's corps just outside Greenwood, effectively blocking the only road to Cashtown. Lee ordered Longstreet to halt to give Johnson the right of way. Unfortunated, he did not know that behind that division was the complete wagon trains of both Johnson And Rodes Div's plus Johnson's Artillery.
It is true that Longstreet did not push beyond Marsh Creek, but the reason was not the lack of urgency, but another of Lee's decision making mistakes.
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AoNV Lack of Urgency Led to Defeat!! 
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