AoNV Lack of Urgency Led to Defeat!!

[OpnDownfall]

The only Confederate soldier in a real hurry, seems to have been Lee.
Misinformed or guessing incorrectly, Lee was apparently, unaware of the exact location of the Union Main Line or Resistence, howeve, the afternoon was advancing rapidly and it is doubtful, IMO, that Lee would have called off his carefully(?) planned attack at that late hour.
It is unlikely that Lee would have countermanded his own plan of attack, without first going and seeing for himself if Hood or McLaws were not, again, just reluctant commanders dissatisfied with his orders. Longstreet's attack is well behind schedule already and to revamp and redirect a major assault would almost certainly delay the attack until the next day; the 3d.
If the attack had been delayed, Sickles, would have followed Meade's orders to fall back to his original lines on Cemetary Ridge. Meade only allowed Sickles to remain in his exposed position because of Longstreet's attack. (At 4:00 in the Afternoon)
If, as is likely, Lee's attack is further delayed until the 3d, reinforcements from V Corps and the rapidly approaching VI Corps would have made any chance of real success by further attacks on the Union Left, highly problematic.
Thus even if, Lee did reorder his attack (which, under the circumstances then, I doubt) it would not have increased his chances of success at Gettysburg.

[5fish]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

The only Confederate soldier in a real hurry, seems to have been Lee.
Misinformed or guessing incorrectly, Lee was apparently, unaware of the exact location of the Union Main Line or Resistence, howeve, the afternoon was advancing rapidly and it is doubtful, IMO, that Lee would have called off his carefully(?) planned attack at that late hour.
It is unlikely that Lee would have countermanded his own plan of attack, without first going and seeing for himself if Hood or McLaws were not, again, just reluctant commanders dissatisfied with his orders. Longstreet's attack is well behind schedule already and to revamp and redirect a major assault would almost certainly delay the attack until the next day; the 3d.
If the attack had been delayed, Sickles, would have followed Meade's orders to fall back to his original lines on Cemetary Ridge. Meade only allowed Sickles to remain in his exposed position because of Longstreet's attack. (At 4:00 in the Afternoon)
If, as is likely, Lee's attack is further delayed until the 3d, reinforcements from V Corps and the rapidly approaching VI Corps would have made any chance of real success by further attacks on the Union Left, highly problematic.
Thus even if, Lee did reorder his attack (which, under the circumstances then, I doubt) it would not have increased his chances of success at Gettysburg.

The sense I get is that Mclaw and Hood wanted to either redirect or call off the attack. Longstreet was behaving usual during this whole time and refused to at least redirect the attack. He never informed Lee condition had changed and the attack needed to be rethought.

The attack was late like I have noted, once past 9am the chance of any attack succeding was poor.

[cw1865]

Hood redirects anyway, instead of going straight up Emmitsburg Rd he tries to hook around Sickle's left and goes up Little Round Top. Hood intuitively senses that his attack is aimed at the Federal flank and conducts the assault accordingly.

[whitworth]

In Retrospect, we have the advantage. All kinds of theories can be made in retrospect, even by armchair generals, about a lack of Confederate urgency.

One thing Lee did not know. He was unaware where the AoP was and had no idea how fast or if the AoP would come to Gettysburg.

If the AoP would even come to Gettysburg.
Meade didn't have to send all those corps to Gettysburg. Gettysburg was a small unessential town with no strategic value.

Meade had several reasons he moved some corps to Gettysburg. He knew Lee was with two corps west of South Mountain, near Chambersburg. Meade moved troops to Gettysburg, to perhaps trap Early east of South Mountain. Meade also thought Confederate cavalry, at a minimum, would discover the move, and force Lee to recall Ewell's Corps that was threatening on the Susquehanna River. Meade knew where Lee's Corps were; Lee had no knowledge of where the AoP Corps were. Meade had the information of spies/scouts and the telegraph that sent messages to Baltimore and Washington. Lee in Chambersburg, had no cavalry scouts or easy access to Early's division, near York, with both of his two corps.

Lee was totally unaware that the AoP was spread so, that it could quickly move to Gettysburg. Meade had spread his army corps out to defend in Maryland. When the decision was made to move the corps to Gettysburg, there were a number of roads the AoP could take. They weren't all stacked up on one road.

For me, the only logical reason for Lee to move to Gettysburg was to protect Early's division and to get in position to defend. A defense of Early proved unnecessary and moving to Gettysburg proved disastrous. Adams County and Gettysburg was a poor place for an army short on forage to consolidate. Adams County was small and had few farmers, compared to the huge number of Confederate horses/mules that needed forage. In effect, Lee had taken an army with an oversupply of horses for such a county as Adams.

The good reason for the Confederates going to Gettysburg, became a bad reason. Meade got his corps up too quickly for the July 2nd battle. Lee had to attack because he was boxed in an area with a too limited supply of forage and water. He had to attack and get out of the area.

[5fish]

Armchair generals, we may be; but are you having fun, I bet you are!!

[ole]

Things are beginning to come into focus. Gettysburg was the only place, if you skip Chambersburg, to concentrate his total force. Two of his corps were on one road. As pointed out, Meade had several roads to travel on, hence, could move much faster. It looks more and more like the invasion was either a dumb idea or poorly executed. Or both.

ole