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So, Whitworth, the urgency was there; just not the means to translate that urgency into any more effective action than was actually accomplished by the AoNV?
If true (and I think so) then Less urgency was required, not More.
"You bring up an aspect of my observation. Longstreet allowed Hood and Mclaw to make camp before they reached their place in the battle line."
What battle line. One found in the dark? One has to consider the "hiking" of one day's marching. Armies didn't get flown in on helicopters.
I will clarify to the right of Anderson Div. on the night of July 1ST. Hood and Mclaw did march a great distance but they had time to be where Lee wanted them to be by morning of July 2nd.
The distance from where they made camp and where they should have been was from 3 to 5 miles away.
If there had been a sense of urgency they would have been in place well before sunrise.
The fact is the AoNV moved lethargically after the first day of fighting.
Well, due to Lee's reluctance to make his corps and division commanders obey his orders, one can certainly question how urgent Lee 'really' was concerning his plans.
Apparently, Lee talked with Ewell on the evening of the 1st and/or early morning of the 2d (does anyone know exactly this/these conference(s) took place?) and Lee apparently had it explained to him by two of Ewell's Div. commanders, Rodes and Anderson, (I think) that it was totally out of the question for an early morning attack, with Ewell concurring with his subordinates.
Lee accepts that he cannot override Ewell and returns to his hdqtrs to revamp his plan of attack ariybd 9:00 A.M.. and Longstreet complains that the final decision and plans for his, Longstreet's, attack are not completed and issued until 11:00 A.M. Even then, Longstreet does not begin his attack until 4:00 P,M. Lee remains impatient but refrains from hurrying any one up.
Again, either Lee is too urgent or not urgent enough, the army is not so much at fault, as it is Lee.
And wjhy can't he override Ewell?? Lee was the commander and Ewell the subordinate if memory serves me correctly. Maybe I'm remembering it wrong??
__________________ "In mortal combat, a man may and will become so infuriated by the din and dangers of a bloody fight that his heart will turn to stone and his every de sire [be] for blood."
John Hadley, 7th Indiana after the battle at Port Republic
If I remember correctly as well, Longstreet's attack is delayed because nobody scouted the road that McLaws and Anderson were to take to get into position, and their first path would've revealed their movements to the AoP, so they had to re-trace their steps and take another road further back to get in position.
Whatever sense of urgency existed in the ANV seems to have been concentrated in Lee, who, for whatever reasons, failed to communicate that urgency (however much that was) to his subordinates and thus, his army.
However, it can be argued that Lee's sense of urgency was in getting his army concentrated as soon as possible, to prevent his being defeated in detail by the sudden, and apparently, unexpectred arrival of the AoP.
A general on the offensive, usually tries to begin and continue his offensive as early as possible (preventing the opposing general from regaining the initiative by attacking first, IF they are so inclined; Meade wasn't, but Lee did not know that).
Others have described Lee's urging attacks at Gettysburg on the 1st and 2d day's were his natural response to percieved success in battly by pressing attacks that seem to be succeeding or to take a vital strategic or tactical vantage point and was not actually exhibiting any more of a sense of urgency, than he habitually did in other battles. So, in fact, there was not unusual sense of urgency to be communicated to his subordinate commanders and that the failures of various commanders over the entire battle, were simple, unconnected, happenstances, that are present in all battles of any war (aggravated, by Lee's hands-off approach to commanding his army)
I am not completely persuaded by that argument, but it could actually be true.
I have notice no one mention that both Hood and Mclaw ask for clarification of their orders, once they saw the ground they were to occupied, was already in union hands. They both ask for clarification more then once.
Hood and Mclaw did not want to attack LRT or the Devils Den, but Longstreet refuse to alter the orders form Lee.
A note: Longstreet never informed Lee that the union had occupied LRT and Devil's Den in force. The argument goes if Lee knew that LRT and Devil's Den were already in union hands Lee would have called off the attack. Remember, the last thing Lee knew was that LRT and Devil's Den were unoccupied or lightly occupy; so the fiasco of the second day can be laid at Longstreet's feet.
If Lee would have been informed the situation had changed on the field and called off the attack Gettysburg would have ended on July 2nd. 1863. By the end of the day with Stuart arrival, Lee could have marched his army to the Schuylkill river.
Correct 5fish. When McLaws and Hood got in position and realized the III Corps was not in the position they were told they would be, they asked for clarification of the orders and to have the attack plan re-done.
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AoNV lack of urgency... !! 
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