Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
of a divided Confederate army. As OpnDownfall mentions, Lee sent an order to Ewell, up near Carlisle, to rejoin Lee and the two corps at Chambersburg. Ewell followed orders, quickly, and sent Johnson's division and the reserve artillery south on the Chambersburg-Carlisle Pike.
Then Lee changes the orders; too late to recall Johnson's division. Ewell is told to head south, east of the South Mountain, by another route.
Unintended Consequences. Ewell's Corps is divided in three parts. One part is headed down the Chambersburg-Carlisle Pike; one part is headed down other roads,east of South Mountain toward Cashtown; one part, Early's division, is headed west out of York, Pennsylvania.
Unintended Consequences. Part of Ewell's corps does not arrive on time for battle of July 1st. That was the division and artillery headed south on the Chambersburg-Carlisle Pike. They got caught in the "logjam" of two corps, Hill's and Longstreet's, trying to cross over one pike. Lee's order to his two corps to go to Gettysburg meant unintended consequences - a logjam to get his forces east of South Mountain to Gettysburg.
Lee and his staff and his generals would not get all their forces to Gettysburg at the same time, even with the relative short distance to travel. Too much of their army was attempting to get to Gettysburg over one pike.
Unintended Consequences. Lee did not fully realize the delay of sending so many troops over the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. One of the consequences of being in unfamiliar enemy country.
I understand that the way Hill's, Longstreet's, and some of Ewell's men enter field of battle by that one road did cause a logistical nightmare; but Longstreet's men did have time to be ready by early morning hours from the time lines I looked at.
I know Lee not choosing the place to pick his fight also plans into some of his poor planning.
It not just Longstreet marching on to the fields at Gettysburg but the whole behavior of the AoNV those hours following their success of July 1st,
I see Lee's only true opportunity for success at Gettysburg was those early hours on the morning of July 2nd for victory; but at last every tick of the clock after 9am on July 2nd without an attack on either end of the union lines was tick toward failure and defeat.
even if true, the lack of urgency would still be Lee's fault, for not communicating the urgency to his subordinates.
Ewell and Hill came into action as soon as Union forces were discovered and because of their immediate response, without properly surveying the ground or the opposing force (as did Lee, when he showed up)
Again, in retrospect, 'Less' urgency might have been motr correct than more.
even if true, the lack of urgency would still be Lee's fault, for not communicating the urgency to his subordinates.
Ewell and Hill came into action as soon as Union forces were discovered and because of their immediate response, without properly surveying the ground or the opposing force (as did Lee, when he showed up)
Again, in retrospect, 'Less' urgency might have been motr correct than more.
Yes, less urgency on the southern side then on the northern side. From the little, I have read Lee seemed to noticed the competence in his troops and commanders that night following the first days action.
He should have in hindsight try to change that sense of completeness in his troops and commanders.
I have read that Lee was "under the weather", so to speak. Lee was not the "Old Lee" at Gettysburg. So
many things went wrong for the AoNV. Longstreets
failure to move his division to the Devils Den and the
Round Tops fast enough only allowed the Union Army to
be more prepared when the attack started.
I have read that Lee was "under the weather", so to speak. Lee was not the "Old Lee" at Gettysburg. So
many things went wrong for the AoNV. Longstreets
failure to move his division to the Devils Den and the
Round Tops fast enough only allowed the Union Army to
be more prepared when the attack started.
Lee was sick during the battle and I believe it was one reason for his poor proformance in July 1863.
After his last meeting with Longstreet on July 2nd from what I have read he went back to his Headquaters and never left it for the rest of the day. This is curious behavior for him during a battle. He usually is out observing the battle but at Gettysburg on day two he stayed at his tent. He must have been ill.
He marched his three corps into one county, where he could not find enough supplies, and was forced to attack.
He marched his three corps into a county, where he had poor egress. A general should know what he is marching into; how he can march out.
None of the Confederate leadership realized moving to Adams County was a form of trap. The Confederate army could not take a defensive position, and await an attack on July 2. That means larger battle losses, and eventually proved, a short battle before a return to Virginia was required.
Lee already, had arrived on the battle scene in the afternoon of July 1st, in time to see 1st and 11th corps retreating through Gettysburg, towards Cemetary Hill. Lee sends word to Ewell that, he, Lee, could see the enemy retreating in confusion and appeared disorganized and that it was only necessary to press 'those people' to gain the heights; and if possible , he wished Ewell to do this.
Later in the afternoon of the 1st, Longstreet arrives with only his staff and learns Lee wants to continue the attack, especially on Cemetary Hill. Longstreet, again presses his strategic offensive/tactical defensive ideas on Lee, who states, to the effect, that the enemy is there (Cemetary Hill) and if they cannot be driven off that day, he was determined to drive them off the next day.
Whether Ewell could, actually, have taken Cemetary Hill if he continued his attack (after first having to pass through the Town itself) before dark, is debatable, but it does show that Lee certainly had a sense of urgency that Ewell and his corps commanders lacked, but, again, it is Lee's fault that they lacked this urgency.
I think this argument covers up what really happened. Mules and horses pulling Confederate wagons and artillery, only go so fast on a 25 or so mile trip to Gettysburg from Chambersburg. The quickest way to Gettysburg was over the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike. Except not quickly enough, while attempting to move two corps at once.
This theory ignores that the AoP knew Lee had two corps west of South Mountain with only one road access to Gettysburg. The AoP had the advantage of telegraph services in Pennsylvania and the spies/scouts out of Chambersburg/Gettysburg area.
It also ignores the fact, how quickly the AoP moved to Gettysburg. Or that Lee would have known the corps were headed to Gettysburg.
Lee made two mistakes. He simultaneously attempted to move two corps quickly, over one access to Gettysburg from Chambersburg.
Lee underestimated that the AoP would move, and was capable of moving its army, quickly to Gettysburg.
Meade had knowledge of Lee moving to Gettysburg. Lee could only suspect and not know what the AoP was doing.
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