Observation on some Union Generals at Gettysburg

[whitworth]

Some observations on commanders of the Army of the Potomac at Gettysburg

Dan Sickles never commanded a corps in the Army of the Potomac after Gettysburg. And Sickles had all the political pull any civilian general ever had, to get some command.

Howard survived the Civil War in command. This was his real historical strength. But at Gettysburg he was seen by Meade as untested in higher command and a commander of a suspect corps. On the first day, the XI Corps was directed by Howard and Schurz, another well-connected political general. Schurz pushed his corps through Gettysburg to stop Ewell's entire corps. Someone's brain was not working at its highest possible level.

Howard and Schurz had no plan to withdraw, if necessary. Of course, if Ewell's much larger corps is coming, Howard and Schurz should have planned for withdrawal, from the first. The resulting fiasco of a retreat, through Gettysburg proves their incompetency. Plus, Howard threw Doubleday "under the bus", as a corps commander.

I think Howard, in command after Reynold's fell, erred by not holding most of the XI Corps in a defensive position on Cemetary Hill and Ridge, then pushing forward a skirmish line, and planning for Doubleday's Corps to withdraw.

Slocum commanded a corps following after the XI Corps, into Gettysburg. I would not blame any commander for not following part of the XI Corps into Gettysburg and north, to take on Ewell. I don't think the entire XI Corps could have taken on a corps their own size, let alone Ewell's bigger corps. I'm sure Slocum and his staff said basically, that whomever the XI Corps faced, they'd come "tumbling back in a hurry."

Hancock was not that superb at Gettysburg. His corps used up its entire long-range artillery ammunition, before Pickett's Charge. And Pickett's Charge came right at Hancock's II Corps, as we all know.
And I've wondered for some years, if Hancock ever pressed for a court of inquiry or court-martial against a Reserve artillery officer, who disobeyed and ignored Hancock's command to continue firing before Pickett's Charge. Wonder what still lies hidden in the National Archives. I'm sure Hancock complained to Meade, himself.

[J_Man0507]

The thing with Hancock is that his most superb actions, I think, were on the second day of fighting, over on the left near the Round Tops. I think that Hancock did his best commanding over there, putting troops in where they needed to be and getting the men to hold. On the third day, Hancock was out for a part of the fighting. And as to the long range ammunition, but it also has to be understood that they were receiving the charge, so long range ammunition wasn't as important as canister was, plus the artillery reserve was very close to the front in the case of Union forces, as compared to the Confederates, who had their reserve trains as close as a mile back. While I wouldn't call him the most instrumental general of the battle, I would rank him in my top five for the battle. He did a competent job, saying that the ground was good to fight on and that they held the high ground, and he knew where to put troops when they were needed there.

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Dan Sickles never commanded a corps in the Army of the Potomac after Gettysburg. And Sickles had all the political pull any civilian general ever had, to get some command.

Personally I am a big Sickles fan. I do understand the criticism of his decision to go into the Peach Orchard, but I just find the man's life fascinating.

The things that you mention about Howard, Slocum, Sickles, et al. are all true, they all do make mistakes, but note that the mistakes are 'aggresive' in nature. They're going to where the fighting is.

But please don't confuse this with being a defense of Howard, man should've been shot after Chancellorsville. But please lay off Sickles!

[whitworth]

"but it also has to be understood that they were receiving the charge, so long range ammunition wasn't as important as canister was,"

The Confederacy was starting its move, much further than 400 yards from Hancock's defensive line. There was more than enough distance for Hancock's Corps artillery to use long range artillery ammunition at Gettysburg.

In fact, Gettysburg on July 3, was one of best times, in the Civil War, to use artillery ammunition, long range and cannister against attacking infantry.

The Reserve artillery, next to Hancock's Corps, fired both long range and cannister at the Confederates, during Pickett's Charge.

[J_Man0507]

Whitworth, thanks for the correction there bro. I was trying to make a distinction between the CSA arty and the Union arty. What I was trying to get at was the fact that the CSA was using all of their long range ordinance, but short range was practically useless to them because they were supporting the charge. Now there were a few batteries that moved up, but the whole purpose from what I gathered had been to support the charge from range.

The Union artillery would be able to effectively use all of their ordinance. They would use their long range (shell, case shot and solid) and then when the enemy came within 150 yards or so, they could switch to short range (cannister), something that the CSA couldn't do. So what I was trying to get at and meant to say, the Union arty was able to effectively use all of their ordinance, whereas the Confederates still had canister, but they couldn't use it. So that is what I was trying to get at. Hope that clarifies things!

[cw1865]

With the Confederate artillery barrage, any element of surprise is completely lost. Hindsight being 20/20 I guess the only way you would be able to have surprise is if you attacked just before dawn.

[Dred]

I don't believe surprise was ever in Lee's intentions with Pickett's charge. As you said, a 2 hour Artillery barrage would pretty much give it away. According to Lee, they MUST have been week in the center, reenforcing the flanks for 2 days. And he is right, they should have been... except for the fact that the union's interior lines were so good they could get any number of troops back and forth with realative ease. This he did not count on. The only surprise on the union side was that Lee was actually going through with a frontal assault on a fixed, well manned, and distant position.

[cw1865]

Well, its true, if you let off a massive cannonade I suppose you are clearly announcing your intentions. I ahd just seen some WWI footage where they discussed how the prepatory bombardment was rarely effective in punching a hole in the trench lines and that later in the war the Germans used infiltration tactics to surprise the enemy more. I was just saying that, and again hindsight is 20/20, that they may have had a better chance if they actually surprised the Union center....

[J_Man0507]

Throughout the use of artillery, bombardments had always been used to soften up a target. It is still done to an extent today, though with bigger artillery pieces and shells that can hit almost exactly where the person commanding the battery wants it to hit, they are becoming much more effective in war.

But in the Civil War, especially the battle at Gettysburg, mass artillery bombardments, while giving away a coming assault, were in a sense necessary. It would keep the enemies heads down, it would give the enemy artillery something else to fire at besides the oncoming troops, and it would cause some damage to the target. Think hypothetically for a minute. If Alexander had had good ordinance, with a ready supply of long range ammuntion nearby, there is a much greater chance that the PPT charge could have succeeded. The Union would have had to focus on two immediate dangers: long range artillery raining down shells and oncoming infantry. The barrage before the charge did a great deal of damage to the batteries on Cemetery Ridge. If not for the interior lines and a ready reserve of artillery, there would not have been such a substantial amount of artillery to defend the Angle as there was. So while a massed barrage does give it away, it was a useful tactic to have when making a mass charge. Charging across over a mile of open ground, weeeeeeelllll, thats a different story.

[cw1865]

When I was at Gettysburg I was told that Gettysburg was the first battle which utilized indirect fire without clear line of sight. Is that really true? You would think at some point a Napoleonic battle would've featured it, even if only by accident?