Observation on some Union Generals at Gettysburg

[ole]

Indirect fire would require a spotter telling the gunners where they were hitting. There might have been a bit of that, now and then, but it doesn't seem to have been a major part of any artilllery assault I can think of.

Was the reference to indirect fire the raking of rear areas by the Confederates? Indirectly, they did some damage back there but, technically, that's not indirect fire.

ole

[cw1865]

I forget exactly, it was at the beginning of the tour covering events of the first day, so wherever the artillery was. from what I could see there was a pretty decent line of sight. But he made it out to be more than 'collateral indirect fire' - ie. you just happen to hit something out of your LOS, he said they were trying.

[Lefty]

Perhaps you're referring to the early AM Federal artillery barrage directed towards MD Steuart et al above Pardee's Field on 3 July?

That was one of the first instances of infantry spotting for artillery in the ACW. The 20th CT in particular was utilized and suffered a few friendly-fire casualties as a result. As was indicitive of how there monument was unvieled on it's dedication in 1885. The unveiler, a Pvt. Warner, had lost both arms from friendly fire during the barrage.

[whitworth]

The major problem with the Confederate barrage is it didn't do its job of destroying much of the AoP artillery on Cemetery Ridge.

Quite a number of AoP officers observed separately, that the Confederates were firing too high and long. The Confederates did more damage to rear echelon troops and their equipment, than they did to the artillery and infantry on the line on Cemetery Ridge.

The Reserve artillery got hit and had to move further away. Quite a number of horses were also killed at Meade's own headquarters, from the barrage.

I began to believe within the last couple of years, that the artillery barrage had as much to do with Pickett's Charge, as it did with the withdrawal of Lee's troops back to Virginia.
I think Lee intended to have a small reserve of long-range artillery left, so that another attack was out of the question. That the Army of Northern Virginia was going to withdraw no matter what Pickett did.

At the end of Pickett's Charge, AoP artillery had as many operating cannon as they did before the charge, on the line facing the Confederates, with over 4000 rounds of ammunition, within close distance.

With the use of most of their offensive long-range artillery, the Confederate offensive was over. Lee, I believe was buying space along his right flank, so he could leave via the Fairfield-Emmitsburg Pike. I believe Lee knew he had to stun the AoP and preserve that pike for his troops.

Lee may have feared that the AoP might attack his right flank and deny him access to that road. On the morning of July 3rd, Lee only had one major access road to withdraw his army and that was the narrow and slow Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike.

No historian, I've read, ever thought that Lee might have considered the necessity of retreat, before July 3, and that Gettysburg was not a good place for Lee's three corps.

But Lee in his OR clearly recognized the problems of his army at Gettysburg because of supply limitation, and the problem of egress or withdrawal.

Meade clearly had Lee in a good place, and Meade had the supplies to remain on the defensive. Lee was entirely out of offensive artillery ammunition, in effect, on the afternoon of the 3rd. Lee had been forced to commit to the attack; Meade merely had to blunt the attacks and inflict great punishment on Lee's infantry. Which he did.

From the civilian scouting reports, Meade would have know the shortfall in forage for Lee's horses and mules. Meade would have known that time was on his side and not on the side of the Army of Northern Virginia.

[J_Man0507]

Originally Posted by whitworth

Quite a number of AoP officers observed separately, that the Confederates were firing too high and long. The Confederates did more damage to rear echelon troops and their equipment, than they did to the artillery and infantry on the line on Cemetery Ridge.

It wasn't necessarily the fact that the Confederate artillery was firing long, it was the fact that their ordinance was defective. The fuses in the shells and the case shot either went off too soon, too late, or not at all. That is why so many shells went over the Union line at the Angle and around the Copse of Trees. Now, plenty of shells found their marks among men and the batteries positioned there, from what I have read of the third day. But that is where the genius of Henry Hunt comes into play, with the fact that the artillery reserve was close enough to get into position and there was plenty of ammunition to keep the cannon supplied. The Confederate artillery could not say the same.

[ole]

J_Man: I knew from your first post that you were going to be a thinking addition to this board. Thank You.

As you are new and maybe haven't dug back through all the archives, I can resurrect this thought. Draw a horizontal line on your far living-room wall. (Figuratively!) Go to the other end of that room. That line is your target. Some of your gunners are going to be able to drop a shot occasionally on that line. That occasional shot is nowhere near enough to pound the line into extinction--given the backup Hunt had available.

But their gunners are not that much better than yours so you end up trading ineffective shots until you run out. But. They do not. Ooooops! Now, they haven't used a single stick of cannister--and they have guns to fill in whatever gaps you got lucky with. Longstreet was right (if you believe Shaara): "No 15,000 men can take that hill."

ole