Gettysburg and Confederate Supplies

[whitworth]

OpnDownfall, your comment that Lee first wanted that part of Ewell corps near Carlisle to come directly to Chambersburg, on the Carlisle-Chambersburg Pike is important.
Lee's two corps in the Chambersburg area were west and screened by South Mountain. In fact one of Ewell's Division started the march before Lee changed orders. That is why when Ewell arrived at Gettysburg, by a more direct route, he lacked an entire division and his reserve artillery.

I've wondered why Lee shortened the distance to the Army of the Potomac, without cavalry. Perhaps he feared that Early's division and Stuart's Cavalry, if not already cut off, might get cutoff in the next couple of days by the Army of the Potomac. Perhaps he crossed through the South Mountain gap, to get closer to Early's hung out division in the York area,and perhaps closer to Stuart, whose orders were to guard the right flank of the army in the area of York.

Once Lee crossed through the gap, he had to proceed to Gettysburg, blind, in that he had no suitable cavalry to scout ahead. Fighting from Cashtown was tactically impractical, with one egress and a mountain at his back.

Lee had underestimated the Army of the Potomac. He underestimated the decision and time when that army would cross the Potomac River.
He seems to have ignored the fact that the AoP was probably getting tracking information on the ANV movement, before it entered Pennsylvania.
If Lee crossed the South Mountain gaps to save Early, he certainly erred in estimating the time Early would get east to Gettysburg. Early got to Gettysburg before Lee did; one day ahead of when Longstreet's corps did.

Lee seemed to have no knowledge of the egress available to his army, until he crossed into Adams County. All of a sudden his army was also short of supplies; something he did not realize the day of the crossing of South Mountain.

[OpnDownfall]

It is my understanding that Lee finally recieves intelligence on where the AoP is and discovers it is probably much closer and further West than he anticipated. The ANV is strung out from Chambersburg to near Harrisburg. Logically the first item of business is to reassemble the Army, which Lee does, immediately ordering all units to assemble in the Cashtown area.
Cashtown, I understand, masks the Cashtown Gap through which Longstreet's and Hill's are in the process of passing through (impeded by a massive traffic jam of Lee's supply trains).
Lee was very sensitive to the safety of his supply lines (and possible lines of retreat). With two of his three Corps held up at the Cashtown Gap, Cashtown is the logical choice to assemble his Army until he can ascertain the exact location and size of the approaching Union forces and then plan whether to fight or retreat as circumstances dictate.
Hill already through the Gap and assembled furtherest East, is notified to scout for signs of any Union activity, which gets passed down to Pettigrew's brigade. Who discovers a Union Cavalry Division just West of Gettysburg, obviously screening a much larger Union Force. (it was being covered by a whole cavalry division) The next day Hill takes his whole division out to get the final piece of the puzzle.

[whitworth]

Few if any will say that Lee made mistakes in going to Gettysburg.

Many of the Confederate generals, if not most, were accused over the years of making serious errors. All the ANV corps commanders, some division commanders and brigade commanders were given poor appraisals over the years. But never Lee.

Lee never made a mistake, even if his army had to fight a disasterous assault on July 2nd and 3rd.

I believe Lee went to Pennsyvania, because he knew the Confederates were losing the war.
He took his undersupplied army, spreading them out because he had little faith, that even Ewell's Corps would find adequate supplies in the field.
When an army cuts themselves off from supplies as Lee did, that is serious high-risk strategy. Sherman did it in Georgia, but Sherman didn't have an army near to block his way. Lee knew he would have a trailing Army of the Potomac, with advantages in their "home" territory.

I think many waste their time touring the "important places" near Gettysburg. The place on every itinerary above all is the South Mountain gaps that Lee had to cross before he got to Gettysburg. When he reached Cashtown, his army had only one egress from Adams County. Lee was in a bad place, and when he found the AoP in Gettysburg, Lee had to fight and assault the Union lines. Lee with few supplies available in Adams County, had to break out and get more available egress back to Virginia. It was even more important than a great victory. The life of his army was at stake.

And to say Lee didn't walk into a mistake, would take a great stretch of the imagination.

[OpnDownfall]

I think the consensus of opinion on this board, is that Lee did indeed seriously mismanage the battle at Gettysburg. (Beginning with his being in Pa. in the first place)
Surprisingly, after Lee began his movement into Pa. Lee never really knew where the AoP was until the evening of June 28th. With 2/3's of his cavalry available Lee had to locate the opposing army by a report of a spy.
In his battles in Va. Lee almost always knew the location and movements of the AoP and always had a plan formulated before initiating his movement. Everything was hit or miss in Pa. because Lee did not really know the location of the Union Army nor its movements.
With 20/20 hindsight it is easy to see how Lee lost the battle, but Lee's ambivalence about 'why' he was invading Pa. is less easy to discern.

[whitworth]

Based on his experience, Lee, I think, would have seen the possibility of the surrender of Vicksburg in its siege situation.

While the war ended in 1865, the Confederacy had already seen partial defeat, in their loss of territory by the time of mid-1863.

In many ways, due to supply shortages, the deficit number of soldiers, and the amount of money the U.S. was spending to continue the war, militarily, Lee did not have a lot of choices.

I don't think having his army in trenches in Virginia, while the Army of the Potomac fired off artillery salutes for the capture of Vicksburg, appealed to him.

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Surprisingly, after Lee began his movement into Pa. Lee never really knew where the AoP was until the evening of June 28th. With 2/3's of his cavalry available Lee had to locate the opposing army by a report of a spy.

He doesn't know specifically where the 11th corp of the AoP might be, but he knows the AoP is going to come and he knows generally where they will be. The fact that he learns the info through a spy is inconsequential, he now knows what he needs to know; notwithstanding that on the 1st day, the Confederacy is there with more soldiers and essentially wins the first day, its the AoP that is out of position.

[whitworth]

Actually Lee learned of the AoP crossing of the Potomac River, only three days later. I think his major apprehension was that the AoP knew he had split his corps and where they were. The Union forces had control of telegraph in their territory, and messages from scouts were sent from Harrisburg, to Baltimore and Washington. The Union knew that Ewell had forces near Harrisburg and York. That two Confederate corps were west of South Mountain, near Chambersburg.

The AoP had the advantage. Their tactics could be based on good intelligence. Lee had no idea where the AoP was headed. One thing was sure; Lee had one division alone near Wrightsville, Pa., on the Susquehanna River. Could it get cut off, before it reached Ewell's Corps or Lee's two corps near Chambersburg?
Lee did not go to Gettysburg because it was an important logistics location. He went, I believe, for two reasons.
He could get closer to Early's division coming from York and Wrightsville. He could consolidate his entire army quicker, by moving the two corps in Chambersburg, east of the South Mountains. Moving to Gettysburg would provide egress, back to Virginia, although more distant to Virginia.

Unfortunately for Lee, the AoP got enough corps into Gettysburg, for a blocking move. Lee had gotten to Gettysburg, too late to totally control enough access roads back to Virginia.
Lee had sufficient ammunition for one good fight and enough forage to last for that one fight. The fact the Confederate army had to attack meant a short fight of a few days, and many casualties. And it meant a fight on strategically unimportant ground.

It was a good ground for the AoP. A good place to burn up the limited ammunition of the ANV; a good place to run the Army of Northern Virginia out of forage and start to deplete their horses and mules.

[Dred]

Originally Posted by cw1865

He doesn't know specifically where the 11th corp of the AoP might be, but he knows the AoP is going to come and he knows generally where they will be. The fact that he learns the info through a spy is inconsequential, he now knows what he needs to know; notwithstanding that on the 1st day, the Confederacy is there with more soldiers and essentially wins the first day, its the AoP that is out of position.

If any other corps besides The Flying Dutchmen had showed up, it is quite likely he would not have won even on the first day.

[OpnDownfall]

The fact that Lee learns of the presence of the AoP through a spy, is an indicator that his Cavalry is not where it is needed.
The lack of sufficient supplies and forage for the ANV. if it ever came to a halt of any length of time, precluded Lee from fighting the Strategic Offendsive, tactically defensive war that Longstreet then and others now favored. (Lee knew this even if Longstreet, did not)
Lee's aggressiveness was the required answer to his problem of being in Pa. without sufficient supplies in the first place.
Lee's best chance to overcome his many disabilities during this campaign, was to concentrate quickly and defeat the AoP in detail before it could concentrate. Due to his miishandling of his cavalry, Lee still did not know the exact location or dispositions of the Union Army and was forced to make the assumtion that the AoP would still be as slow afoot and road bound as of old. Thus making it possible for a rapid closure on Gettysburg by his own three corps on what he guessed would only be a part of the AoP.
Because of the bungling of the cavalry operations Lee was flying blind and when he stumbled into the AoP his lack of supplies forced him to try for a quick fix for all the problems that accrued to him for being in Pa. with no particular strategic plan for being there in the first place.

[whitworth]

in enemy territory.

For Lee everything had to go right. It didn't. Stuart had to defend the backdoor gaps for Lee. He only had a small window to leave Virginia and arrive in Pennsylvania, as the last large unit moving north.

Two unplanned events happened that Lee and his generals did not suspect.
One was the fact the AoP would cross the Potomac River, near Leesburg, before Stuart got started.
The second fact, was Stuart was attempting to move though gaps in the Bull Run Mountains and all gaps were blocked by Union troops the day Stuart started.

Lee's plan for Stuart went wrong from the very first day.

Lee had no backup plan. His army was strung out in Pennsylvania and he had no cavalry backup to detect the AoP move north of the Potomac River.
Lee recovered in time and got much of his army together by July 1. However his movement through the gaps in South Mountain, meant his two corps from Chambersburg, would not arrive together on July 1st.
Lee had enough troops up on the first to defeat two AoP corps. However, he had too few troops to capture Cemetery Ridge and Cemetery Hill, on that same day. Ewell was short one of his three infantry divisions and his entire reserve artillery. These latter units were slowed down in crossing through South Mountain gaps, with Hill's and Longstreet's Corps.

Lee had enough troops to win on the 1st of July, but not enough troops to win the defensive places that the AoP occupied for July 2nd and 3rd.