Who lost Gettysburg

[whitworth]

Many a student of the Battle of Gettysburg will name off by rote memory, the likes of General Stuart, General Hill, General Ewell, General Rodes, General Pickett, and some other lesser names.

Some maintain that General Robert E. Lee was the finest general that ever served an army. Never made a mistake. Never made an error.

Sometimes I wonder how such a fine general could have appointed and maintained such a roster of generals and officers in his army, that many say, with rote memory, were highly incompetent.

[gary]

Lee lost it. The Lost Cause myth advocates like Early put the blame on Longstreet but Lee said it himself, "It's all my fault."

[william42]

This is a book review but I thought it might go well with this thread.








A decision that turned Gettysburg battle
By Thomas J. Ryan
Published March 31, 2007

THE BATTLE BETWEEN THE FARM LANES: HANCOCK'S RIDE SAVES THE UNION CENTER JULY 2, 1863

By David Shultz and David Wieck, Ironclad Publishing, $19.95, illustrated, 301 pages

Interest in the Battle of Gettysburg, the bloodiest engagement of the Civil War, has continued to expand over the years.

Though general histories about the battle are popular, there also has been a demand for more in-depth research. In 1989, Morningside Press of Dayton, Ohio, began to fill this need by publishing Gettysburg Magazine, which deals exclusively with the encounter in south central Pennsylvania in July 1863. David Shultz and David Wieck have joined other authors who recently have taken this effort one step further in their detailed study of what occurred in a limited area of the battlefield within a few hours.

"The Battle Between the Farm Lanes" is the story of how one person with grit and passion, in this case Maj. Gen. Winfield Scott Hancock, can change the momentum of a battle. It also poses the question of whether the storied 1st Minnesota was the regiment Hancock had in mind as the unit that "charged a rebel regiment" and prevented it from breaking through a gap in the Union lines during the afternoon of July 2. The fourth in Ironclad Publishing's "Discovering Civil War America" series, this book combines history with a tour that guides readers over the ground where the action took place.

The driving forces behind scholarship of this type are organizations such as the online Gettysburg Discussion Group and Military History Online, as well as the Gettysburg Foundation and the Gettysburg Battlefield Preservation Association, whose members intensely analyze the battle and provide support and encouragement for safeguarding Gettysburg's heritage. In this study, Mr. Shultz and Mr. Wieck seek answers to some of the questions that remain about the battle.

Of the book's 20 chapters, the first 10 set the stage for the dramatic attempt to stem the Confederate tide as Hancock desperately rallied the remnants of Union infantry and artillery to plug a strategic gap.

In the early morning of July 2, Hancock's 2nd Corps had marched up the Taneytown Road to the outskirts of Gettysburg. The corps deployed on the forward and reverse slopes of Cemetery Ridge south of Cemetery Hill in accordance with a sketch drawn at the direction of Maj. Gen. George G. Meade, commander of the Army of the Potomac. As the troops deployed, Confederate artillery and skirmishers west of the Emmitsburg Road opened fire on their positions.

In the early afternoon, when Maj. Gen. Daniel Sickles unexpectedly and without orders decided to move his corps from Cemetery Ridge west toward the Emmitsburg Road, Hancock's left flank became uncovered. Hancock tried to shore up his position with reserve artillery to reduce this unanticipated vulnerability. By midafternoon, Confederate Lt. Gen. James Longstreet launched an attack on the Union left, rolling up Sickles' exposed divisions.

Hancock, meanwhile, decided to hold his position on Cemetery Ridge at all costs to prevent the enemy from getting into the rear of the Union Army. He was acutely aware of a 300-yard gap in his lines caused by troop redeployment in an attempt to salvage Sickles' deteriorating situation. As Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill's corps joined Longstreet in the attack, Hancock anxiously looked about for available forces to fill the yawning gap. With Sickles wounded and out of the picture, Hancock had to assume the burden of countering the Confederate advance.

The authors use the last 10 chapters to describe the outcome of this crisis. The action is fast-paced as the tension builds. One heroic deed after another on the part of Union and Confederate officers and their men fills these pages. Shirking and cowardice on the part of others is evident. Hancock orchestrates the frantic movements taking place between the Hummelbaugh and Trostle farm lanes -- a distance of just about 1,000 yards.

Artillery fire at close range intensified the deadly combat. Casualties mounted, and both sides captured numerous prisoners. In addition to attempting to close the gap and defend the farm lanes that led to the army's rear, Hancock had to halt the rout of Sickles' men; many were retreating in panic through his lines.

This book describes in detail the fighting between the farm lanes and how Hancock directed the 1st Minnesota and other units to plug the gap in the Union lines that Confederate Brig. Gen. Cadmus Wilcox's brigade was attempting to breach. Hence the question about which of these units Hancock was trying to identify after the battle because he thought it had performed so valiantly. The authors address this at the end.

The combat took place within the space of a couple of hours. In the aftermath, blue- and gray-clad casualties covered the field. Hancock somehow survived the carnage despite being in the thick of the action.

Reading this book will generate a desire to visit the area between the two farm lanes with terrain features such as Plum Run, various knolls and ravines, the so-called Low Rough Ground, and other landmarks. The nine-stop tour guide follows the action around this hallowed ground. Viewing the battle scene up close is an eye-opening experience that provides a greater appreciation for how the topographical peculiarities influenced combat decisions.

Before reading the "Battle Between the Farm Lanes," it would be good to read a general history (e.g., Stephen W. Sears' "Gettysburg") and a work on the events of July 2 (e.g., Harry W. Pfanz's "Gettysburg: The Second Day") in order to better understand the activities of numerous military units and personnel.

Because maps are not included in the history segment, the reader will want to have Battle of Gettysburg maps available, such as those published by Trailhead Graphics or the Gettysburg Foundation. The maps in the tour guide segment are useful but are not keyed to the historical text and lack the desirable level of detail.

The spe******t will applaud this book, and the general reader also will find the story compelling, particularly Hancock's determination to gain victory in the face of great odds, a victory the Union Army sorely needed. As Jeffry D. Wert aptly wrote in the foreword to this book, "Gettysburg brought redemption for the Army of the Potomac. Hancock and the Second Corps shouldered a crucial role in the engagement's outcome."

Thomas J. Ryan of Bethany Beach is president of the Central Delaware Civil War Round Table.


http://washingtontimes.com/functions...0-092431-3945r



Terry

[samgrant]

An axiom of war: the advantage of 'interior lines".

A. P. Alexander, puts it: "the difficulty in securing concentration of effort over long lines. ... it should be stated not as a difficulty but an impossibility. Our line was like a big fishhook outside the enemy's small one. Communications between our flanks was very long - roundabout and slow while the enemy were practically all in one convenient sized bunch. ... Our only hope was to make our attacks simultaneous. But that the thing which always looks beforehand very simple & easy, & always proves afterward to have been impossible, from one or a hundred possible causes."

See Chapter II (11) of Alexander's Fighting for the Confederacy. (Better yet, read the whole book!)

[whitworth]

Hancock's Corps was important at Gettysburg, inspite of Hancock's less than stellar performance as a Corps commander.
Hancock had his Corps artillery fire all its long range artillery ammunition, prior to Pickett's Charge. It was fortunate that the other corps on the line had reserved some ammunition for Pickett's infantry charge.

Hancock also attempted to order the Reserve artillery on Cemetery Ridge, outside his command, to expend their artillery shells. The Reserve artillery, under Lieut. Col. Freeman McGilvery, had 39 cannon waiting on Cemetery Ridge, for infantry movement. It was more than 2nd Corps Infantry, that stopped Pickett's Charge.

Hancock would relate that his artillery was silent as Pickett's army marched across the open field. Of course, Lee would relate how Pickett was receiving long range artillery fire.
General Hunt believed that Pickett's Charge would have evaporated if Hancock had not expended all his long range artillery shells.

Hancock would complain that he lacked enough ammunition. Of course, it was his corps that left half its ammunition wagons behind.

[OpnDownfall]

'Who' lost (or won) the Battle of Gettysburg, is not in question, most debates rage around what, where, when and how, the battle was lost (or won).
For a long time I thought Lee's invasion of Pa. was a last ditch effort to win the war, but now have concluded that it was 'mainly' a last ditch ploy to keep Lee and/or part of the AoNV from being sent West. With little regard to the, practical, strategic (or even tactical) gains to be expected from that invasion.
Although Lee lost the battle of Gettysburg, it can be argued that the battle was lost at Richmond, when Lee and Davis decided that the war in the West could 'best' be won in Va.

[Chuck58]

I'm going to commit a sin and couch my reply by saying that it's clear I'm not in the league of any of you guys when it comes to Civil War history. When I joined this forum, I thought I knew a fair amount. I quickly realized, I know almost nothing - so, I've spent most of my time here reading and keeping my mouth shut.

This thread though, I think I can comment on. As much as I respect RE Lee, I think he is primarily responsible for the loss at Gettysburg. Lee was very good as a defensive tactician. The times the ANV went offensive, it didn't fair as well.

I think what cost the ANV Gettysburg was failure to occupy the hills, where they could have conducted their usual fine defensive fight. Whether that was Lee's fault or failure by his Corps commanders to obey orders, I don't know.

Did Lee order occupation of the high ground? If not, it was the single major oversight, in my opinion, that lost him the battle. If he did, and if there's evidence that he did, the loss could be attributed to those beneath him.

In either case, Gettysburg was the wrong battle at the wrong place for the Army of Northern Virginia. I think they'd have been better served by breaking contact and choosing their own ground to make the fight. That was a choice Lee made, and ultimately it cost him.

[nbforrest]

An army commander is always responsible for the outcome of his army's actions...so yes, Lee "lost" the battle, but that also implies he made some great error that botched the whole thing, and I don't think he did. I can't think of a single officer that I would even attempt to pin a majority of the blame on. In some battles, perhaps it could be argued that a single action decides the fate of the conflict. However, at Gettysburg, like most battles, it was a gradual accumulation of mistakes that led to defeat. Moreover, I think the question of who lost it for the South is very easily answered: the Army of the Potomac! Given the circumstances, it's not surprising that Lee did not win at Gettysburg. In fact, it would have been downright amazing had he been able to smash Meade at Gettysburg.

[ole]

Well said, nb. It's also good to see you back in the saddle.
Ole

[william42]

Posted by Chuck58

I'm going to commit a sin and couch my reply by saying that it's clear I'm not in the league of any of you guys when it comes to Civil War history.

Chuck, you don't have to be an expert to post on the board. Very few of us have the knowledge that a few of these folks here have. I learned that quite early on.

You know enough to post here. That's clearly evident.

I'm doing a series of temp jobs for a few days at a time for Adecco, while looking for FT perm employment. Every time I train in at one of these places, the trainer, trying to be nice, says to me, "Now, don't feel stupid if you make a mistake." I always tell them. "Thank you, but feeling stupid doesn't bother me. I'm quite used to it. It's a very familiar feeling."


Terry