Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
Vehement, or not, the question is not whether Jackson would have succeeded in taking the position (Cemetary Hill, accordidng to Ewell) but, whether he would have 'tried'? (There are good arguments on both sides as to whether he would have succeeded.)
Would a failed attack on the evening of the July 1 had a catastrophic effect on the ANV position? Would losing Cemetary Hill, have had a catastrophic effect on the AoP position?
With Jackson, Lee's style of command was adequate for great victories; was it adequate for such, without Jackson?
I understand, after Gettysburg, Lee was much more precise in the wording of his orders, if this is so then it lends credence to the argument that Lee (or at least his style of command) was who (what) lost Gettysburg.
Vehement, or not, the question is not whether Jackson would have succeeded in taking the position (Cemetary Hill, accordidng to Ewell) but, whether he would have 'tried'?
Nothing in Jackson's war record would indicate a tactical sagacity that he would have seen the need to push up the hill. He had balked at times when the need to attack was much more pressing, and those were times that Lee had given him specific orders. I don't think Jackson had any special talent to divine Lee's intentions.
Would a failed attack on the evening of the July 1 had a catastrophic effect on the ANV position? Would losing Cemetary Hill, have had a catastrophic effect on the AoP position?
Had the only fresh division on the field, Johnson's, been smashed in an attack on Culp's or Cemetery Hills, Lee's position indeed would have been tenuous, given what the commanders on the field knew at the time. Assuming the hills were captured, the AOP was in position to counter attack or fall back to a nice safe defensive line at Pipe Creek or elsewhere. Either way, Lee loses strategically.
With Jackson, Lee's style of command was adequate for great victories; was it adequate for such, without Jackson?
Jackson was not the reason Lee won great victories; Lee was. Jackson put in some great performances, but the ANV post-Jackson was prevented from gaining a great victory due to the strategic circumstances, not Jackson's absence. To chalk up the lack of offensive victories on the ANV's part in 1864 to the nonexistance of a Lee/Jackson team is a logical fallacy.
I understand, after Gettysburg, Lee was much more precise in the wording of his orders, if this is so then it lends credence to the argument that Lee (or at least his style of command) was who (what) lost Gettysburg.
I personally have not seen evidence to support this. I suspect that it could be argued either way given the vagaries of debating the meaning of orders, and debating the use of qualifiers at that. I don't think Lee changed his system after Jackson. He had generally solid corps level leadership; no need to change.
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
"when Lee and Davis decided that the war in the West could 'best' be won in Va."
I would disagree with this statement. Because the war in the west was lost in the west, not because of what Lee and Davis "decided."
The war in the west was lost because the Confederacy could not logistically win in the east in Virginia and simultaneously win in the west. By mid-1863, the Confederate logistics system was falling apart.
Once Grant cut the Confederate supply line at Vicksburg, it would end in a seige. Every trained West Pointer knew that. It was a given. Every astute West Pointer in the service in the late 1850's or in a major 1860's command, would have been familiar with the Delafield Commission Report on the capture of Sevastapol in the Crimean War.
Lee could no more afford to send any troops west from Virginia, or even supply them getting and staying there. By mid-1863, the United States could bring more troops and more supplies to any critical point, where the Confederate government could not match. I think it was only coincidental that the Confederate armies in the east and west could suffer defeat, at the same time, due partly to severe logistical shortages.
Ref: The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession (Texas a & M University Military History Series) The Delafield Commission and the American Military Profession (Texas a & M University Military History Series) by Matthew Moten.
whitworth I agree. Here is what my great-grandfather at Vicksburg had to say when the city fell. He was well aware they would be persuing General Johnston and capture Jackson. His regiment, 35th MA, led the charge into the evacuated city of Jackson. The Confederacy was done in the West and knew it. The Confederacy was done in the East also, but most did not know it yet. From his diary.
"July 4th. Our glorious Fourth. It is doubtless to most of our nation a sad and mournful day. Our country still in the midst of a sad Civil War and which for two years has been almost seemingly fruitless. To human view final victory and success are yet afar off. This I feel this morning, but now later in the day with Vicksburg captured it seems as though the day when we can take up our homeward march with the rebellion crushed is drawing near. The news had come to us at noon that Vicksburg had surrendered with General Pemberton, 27,000 prisoners, 280 guns with small arms and it is difficult to describe the joy with which the news was received in the camp. We had counted upon nothing of note to occur by which we might celebrate the day, but with such news it could scarcely be otherwise than a “glorious Fourth.” Another cheering surprise also greeted us, viz. a mail, our back mail from June 8th. Oh! How joyful was it received-men danced and capered like children, all could now say, “Ain’t this a glorious “Fourth” as letters and papers in abundance were distributed. Received 6 letter and 3 papers, 2 letters from Abby, 1 from Nellie, 1 from O. F. Bryant, 1 from W. H. C., and 1 from L.A.T. A little shadow was cast over our enjoyment of the day as orders came in the afternoon, “ready to march at a moments notice with 6 days rations.” With the capture of Vicksburg before us we could march feeling that we were at last really making progress in crushing the “Rebels” even upon “4th of July.” Marched at 6 o’clock. Left our campground literally covered with newspapers the product of the day’s mail, which we were obliged to leave behind unread. Made 5 miles dust awful were completely grimed with it and sweat and looked more like walking meal bags than soldiers in blue. Bivouacked in a wood. Passed numberless deserted camps recently occupied by Western troops. All seem now to be on the move. Doubtless plans are laid to catch General Johntson and his army. Picked two quarts of blackberries this morning going about two miles from camp. Had a 4th of July dinner of them and pork, hard tacks and tea. Believe this to be the first 4th I ever spent away from home. Had many imaginings as to how my folks were spending the day.
__________________ "Those who forget to remember the past are condemned to repeat it", George Santayana.
Freddy:
An outstanding piece of history! Thank you so very much! Do you have more of your ggfather's letters to share? What a treasure!
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Nothing in Jackson's war record would indicate a tactical sagacity that he would have seen the need to push up the hill. He had balked at times when the need to attack was much more pressing, and those were times that Lee had given him specific orders. I don't think Jackson had any special talent to divine Lee's intentions.
nbforrest: I am personally very happy that you're back with us. You post good stuff. We need that.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Whatever his sagacity, Jackson had an eye for terrain and Cemetary Hill was the key to the Union position. Lee recognized it, Ewell apparently, did not. Is there really doubt that coming up on Cemetary Hill that Jackson would not have seen it's importance and that if he did, he would Not have made a maximum effort to capture it? Does one really doubt that there was a difference in what maximum effort meant to Jackson as opposed to what it meant to a Ewell?
There are many who do indeed believe that the death of Jackson was the death of the ANV's ability (if not Lee's) to wage successful offensive campaigns.
P.S. In fact, Davis did send reinforcements from Lee to Bragg (too late to send them to Pemberton) After Gettysburg. Did Bragg decide to go onto the offensive 'because' of assurances of reinforcements from the East? If so, then the Victory at Chickamauga, was due directly, in more ways than one, to reinforcements from another theater of operations. That Chattanooga was not taken was more likely due to the inadequacy of Braxton Bragg; rather, than inadequacy of transport, a normal feature of all confederate campaigns.
Whatever his sagacity, Jackson had an eye for terrain
I don't think his war record supports this claim.
and Cemetary Hill was the key to the Union position. Lee recognized it,
The issue is not that Lee did not see that the hill was important, but rather that he was not sure it could be taken that night. Hence his discretionary orders.
Ewell apparently, did not.
Again, Ewell thought he could not take the hill, not that it was unimportant.
Is there really doubt that coming up on Cemetary Hill that Jackson would not have seen it's importance and that if he did, he would Not have made a maximum effort to capture it?
Yes, absolutely. Look at Jackson's record. Nothing to suggest he had an unusual eye for terrain for tactical advantage.
Does one really doubt that there was a difference in what maximum effort meant to Jackson as opposed to what it meant to a Ewell?
Yes, absolutely. Both men had days where they hit hard and did great and days when they were listless and did not.
There are many who do indeed believe that the death of Jackson was the death of the ANV's ability (if not Lee's) to wage successful offensive campaigns.
There are indeed many people who think that, but having a crowd does not constitute a defense of the claim. Grant was the reason for the ANV's lack of a major offensive, not the loss of Jackson.
P.S. In fact, Davis did send reinforcements from Lee to Bragg (too late to send them to Pemberton) After Gettysburg. Did Bragg decide to go onto the offensive 'because' of assurances of reinforcements from the East? If so, then the Victory at Chickamauga, was due directly, in more ways than one, to reinforcements from another theater of operations. That Chattanooga was not taken was more likely due to the inadequacy of Braxton Bragg; rather, than inadequacy of transport, a normal feature of all confederate campaigns
Longstreet was not going to be able to change the course of the war in the west, as was demonstrated. Bragg knew he needed to go on the offensive, with Longstreet or not. He tried to even before Longstreet arrived (McLemore's Cove/Dug Gap/Davis Crossroads)
__________________ Up men, and to your post! And let no man forget today that you are from old Virginia!
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