Who lost Gettysburg

[nbforrest]

No set in stone plans of Lee's were changed. He had no firm plans for employing Ewell in the center or right. That's why he went to talk to Ewell, to see the feasibility of shifting the II Corps. So that wasn't really a change in plans. And his plan on July 2 wasn't changed by his corps commanders per se, but rather by Sickles. And Lee didn't exactly give in to Hood and Longstreet's urgings to go around the right, did he?
His corps commanders weren't knuckling down on Lee. Name me a time at Gettysburg when he scrapped definite plans he had made out in favor of his corps commanders' ideas.

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by ole

Lee could not wait for Meade to attack him -- not and get back to Virginia. Banking on beating Meade's attack and taking all his supplies would have been a gamble not even Lee would have risked. As it was, Lee had to live off the land on the way back -- and much of that stripped bare on the way up.

Say he beats off Meade's attack. Is Meade going to leave all his supply wagons and beat a hasty retreat to Pipe Creek? No. Meade is going to maneuver and attack again. And again. By this time, Lee's boys haven't eaten in days and are out of ammo. Union casualties are very high, but Lee's army is in a spot where it runs on empty stomachs, useless muskets, and in a fog of extreme fatigue. Sorry, Sam. I don't see it.
Ole

E. P. Alexander did see it:

"Now when it is remembered that we stayed for three days longer on that very ground, two of them days of desperate battle, ending in ... a bloody repulse, & then successfully withdrew ... & foraged succesfully for over a week ... until we could build a bridge, it does not seem inprobable that we could have faced Meade safely on the 2nd at Gettysburg without assaulting him in his wonderfully strong position. We had the prestige of victory with us, having chased him off the field & through the town. We had a fine defensive possition on Seminary Ridge ready at our hand to occupy. ... As Gen. Jackson once said, "We did sometimes fail to drive them out of position, but they always have failed to drive us.""
"I cannot believe the military critics will find any real difficulties in our abstaining from further assault on the following day."

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by nbforrest

Lee knew he had great material and he had seen his men do near impossible things before, but Lee was not a cocky man by nature. He knew the risks he was taking.

Again I'll quote Alexander:

"I think that military critics will rank Gen. Lee as decidedly the most audacious commander who has lived since Napoleon, & I am not at all sure that even Napoleon in his whole career will be held to have overmatched some of the deeds of audacity to which Gen. Lee committed himself in the 2 years & 10 months during which he commanded the Army of Northern VA."

"Then perhaps in taking the aggressive at all at Gettysburg in 1863 & certainly in the place & dispositions for the assault on the 3rd day, I think, it will undoubtedly be held that he unnecessarily took the most desperate chances & the bloodiest road."

[ole]

Originally Posted by samgrant

E. P. Alexander did see it:

"Now when it is remembered that we stayed for three days longer on that very ground, two of them days of desperate battle, ending in ... a bloody repulse, & then successfully withdrew ... & foraged succesfully for over a week ... until we could build a bridge, it does not seem inprobable that we could have faced Meade safely on the 2nd at Gettysburg without assaulting him in his wonderfully strong position. We had the prestige of victory with us, having chased him off the field & through the town. We had a fine defensive possition on Seminary Ridge ready at our hand to occupy. ... As Gen. Jackson once said, "We did sometimes fail to drive them out of position, but they always have failed to drive us.""
"I cannot believe the military critics will find any real difficulties in our abstaining from further assault on the following day."

Alexander was an optomist. The army, on the move, could forage. The army, taking a defensive position, would be stuck in place until Meade decided to attack it, limited to the supplies it had on hand. Lee was audacious, but he wasn't about to bet his army on what and when Meade might take action.
Ole

[ole]

"Then perhaps in taking the aggressive at all at Gettysburg in 1863 & certainly in the place & dispositions for the assault on the 3rd day, I think, it will undoubtedly be held that he unnecessarily took the most desperate chances & the bloodiest road."

So Alexander also thinks Lee's venture into Pennsyvania was a mistake. Does he say what Lee should have done? Or is he just lecturing from his armchair?
Ole

[larry_cockerham]

I believe there are similarities between Lee's position and Gettysburg and that of Hood at Franklin. Both had chosen a course from which there was no return. The thinnest of circumstances in the main thrust of both battles might have won the day, but the outcome would have been the same in both cases, merely shifting the inevitable to another site and and a not too distance future day. Seems to me that both generals had an inward desire to see the war end, the sooner the better.

[nbforrest]

With all due respect to E.P. Alexander, I think he's totally off base here. He just doesn't understand the strategic situation, IMO. Sitting on Seminary Ridge would not get the big offensive victory Lee needed and as I've indicated before, would be courting disaster. There's a reason Alexander was an artilleryman and not an army or corps commander. He's completely divorcing strategic and political considerations here as well as advocating a potential dangerous defensive battle that would be barren of decisive results on ground of questionable value to Lee.
Alexander quite often made good points but I'm not taking his quotes as Gospel here.

[OpnDownfall]

While it is true that given Lee's penchant for issuing orders couched in discretionary language, is it equally true that he always did not want them carried out if the one receiving those orders did not agree or doubted their applicability?
Late on July 1, Ewell says he received orders from Lee to attack Cemetary Hill, "if I could do so to advantage."
As others have noted, what would Jackson have done with that 'order', which I understand was a fair example of how Lee commanded, when communicating to his subordinates. There is no particular fault to Lee or Ewell, concerning this, merely a noting that what 'might' have been accomplished with Jackson reading that same order, was a far cry from what 'actually' happened with Ewell reading it.
Lee's command style (leaving much to the discretion of the one receiveing Lee orders) means that the success or failure his generalship depended on how good his subordinates were in decyphering how important any of his orders were. With a Jackson it worked, with Ewell and Hill it did not (a case of 2 Not being more than 1). Was Ewell at fault for not being a Jackson or Lee for not realizing that fact?

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

While it is true that given Lee's penchant for issuing orders couched in discretionary language, is it equally true that he always did not want them carried out if the one receiving those orders did not agree or doubted their applicability?
Late on July 1, Ewell says he received orders from Lee to attack Cemetary Hill, "if I could do so to advantage."
As others have noted, what would Jackson have done with that 'order', which I understand was a fair example of how Lee commanded, when communicating to his subordinates. There is no particular fault to Lee or Ewell, concerning this, merely a noting that what 'might' have been accomplished with Jackson reading that same order, was a far cry from what 'actually' happened with Ewell reading it.
Lee's command style (leaving much to the discretion of the one receiveing Lee orders) means that the success or failure his generalship depended on how good his subordinates were in decyphering how important any of his orders were. With a Jackson it worked, with Ewell and Hill it did not (a case of 2 Not being more than 1). Was Ewell at fault for not being a Jackson or Lee for not realizing that fact?

Obviously Lee did not encourage active disobedience on the part of his commanders if they disagreed with his orders. On the other hand, there are always times when a subordinate can legitimately disobey an order to gain an advantage. Lee's style covered both of these possibilities very well, I think. Blind insistence on following orders to the letter will lead to mishaps as will being too lax; Lee had a comfortable middle ground.
And I don't think Lee's style was not suited to Ewell and Hill. It worked sometimes and not at others, just like with Jackson. Jackson was just as capable of misreading Lee's intentions or even going against them, leading to fiascos. The ANV did not function any more or less smoothly post-Jackson. Of course it's pure speculation even to refute the claim, but I rather vehemently question the idea that Jackson would have seized the heights on July 1. From a tactical perspective he was a mediocre commander and there is no reason to suspect that would suddenly change and deliver a tactical masterstroke on Culp's Hill.
Lee's order to Ewell suited the situation perfectly. It would have been folly to order Ewell to send a single division forward up a hill in the dark against an unknown enemy. Ewell had good reasons not to go forward and Lee's comments match up with those reasons.

[ole]

Lee's order to Ewell suited the situation perfectly. It would have been folly to order Ewell to send a single division forward up a hill in the dark against an unknown enemy. Ewell had good reasons not to go forward and Lee's comments match up with those reasons.

Lee's order, given that he wasn't on the ground and didn't know the territory, makes perfect sense. I would fault him, however, in not making clear that he would very much like to have that hill. Is this what we're talking about when discussing Lee's ambiguous orders? And that Jackson would have known that Lee really, really wanted that hill? Even if the order only hinted at it?

Guess I'll agree that "if practicable" would mean something different to every general. Now, Grant would have said something like, "We need that hill. Take it. If you can't, and you tried, come and tell me why you couldn't and why I shouldn't send you home." (Sorry about bringing Grant into a discussion of Lee, but there is a marked difference between their orders and the translation of same.)

Ole