Who lost Gettysburg

[nbforrest]

I'll say Lee was ultimately responsible, as he said so him self.

I agree. The army commander is always responsible.

Several reasons:

1) I think it was part 'hubris' in that his army's offensives had always been triumphant.

Lee knew he had great material and he had seen his men do near impossible things before, but Lee was not a cocky man by nature. He knew the risks he was taking. He wasn't thinking he was going to steamroll George Meade.

2) His command structure, which had been radically altered with the death of Jackson at Chancellorsville. His Corps commanders were not equal to the task.

Lee was absolutely right to add a third corps. Two corps were way too unwieldy. As the war progressed Lee had to divide his army more and more, showing the wisdom of breaking up two giant corps. And Hill and Ewell were not as bad as they are often made out to be. Both performed adequately at Gettysburg overall.

3) His lack of specific orders and coordination of troops. He often used the vague "if practicable" in his orders which he and Jackson may have had an implicit understanding, but apparently this type of order may have confused Gen. Ewell, etc. (Contrast to Grant's unambiguous orders).

And look at the differences. Let's look at say, Grant's unambiguous orders to Warren at Spotsylvania. The V Corps was cut to pieces to no purpose because of insistence on following ironclad orders. Lee knew better than to send Ewell on a fool's errand up a hill at night to get his division massacred. Lee conversed with Ewell and was given the best information Ewell had at the time.

4) Tactically, as forces were already engaged, Lee made serious mistakes, as Alexander explains:

"the difficulty in securing concentration of effort over long lines. ... it should be stated not as a difficulty but an impossibility. Our line was like a big fishhook outside the enemy's small one. Communications between our flanks was very long - roundabout and slow while the enemy were practically all in one convenient sized bunch. ... Our only hope was to make our attacks simultaneous. But that the thing which always looks beforehand very simple & easy, & always proves afterward to have been impossible, from one or a hundred possible causes."

This quote does not support tactical mistakes beyond that it implicitly questions why Lee fought at Gettysburg at all, and if this is what the usually astute Alexander is driving at, I respectfully disagree. Lee saw his chance for a big win on Northern soil, a situation that might never come around again, and he took that chance, however slim, and fought it out.

4a) Lee could have established a 'mirror' position on Seminary Ridge (Alexander also mentions this option), while not as commanding as the Union position, and dared Meade to attack (which in light of the political situation of the time, might have been wise ?) To my mind, this would have been the option most likely to give Confederate sucess.

This would have been courting disaster. Why would Lee assume a defensive position in plain sight of the AOP directly open to massed Union artillery fire, and then wait? A line on Seminary Ridge would have had flanks resting in the air and could have been turned easily. Combined with a lack of a supply line, why would Lee invite a smashing attack on a Missionary Ridge-esque line? Plus, this would leave the Harpers Ferry/Middle Department troops free to shut the door on his escape route.

[OpnDownfall]

Lee did not lose 'control' of his officers, he lost 'effective' control, in that he could not get them to execute any of his original orders or plans of battle. Settling for second best over what he considered the better plan(s), because his senior commanders did not approve of them or found them too difficult or was confused.
I can agree that maybe, there was little he could have done, during the three days of close action, to remedy the situation, but, IMO, that is the reason that it was Lee, who lost the battle.

[william42]

Was Pickett's charge a bold or foolhardy move for Lee? I remember watching Ken Burns' film on the Civil War, where Shelby Foote said that "Lee's blood was up", or something similar, that morning of July 3rd. I took that to mean that Lee was perhaps more emotional than usual, perhaps diminishing his capacity to use his usual sound, rational powers of assessment and judgment.

From that comment and from what I've read it seems to me that at that moment, perhaps Lee's judgement was not what it ordinarily was. Perhaps there was more of an emotional factor at play with him at that time, maybe partly desperation, realizing that the charge would perhaps be the last chance for victory in the North.

I've read accounts where the author's have said it was an unwise move, and should have been postponed or cancelled altogether, or a different plan of attack implemented.


Terry

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Lee did not lose 'control' of his officers, he lost 'effective' control, in that he could not get them to execute any of his original orders or plans of battle. Settling for second best over what he considered the better plan(s), because his senior commanders did not approve of them or found them too difficult or was confused.
I can agree that maybe, there was little he could have done, during the three days of close action, to remedy the situation, but, IMO, that is the reason that it was Lee, who lost the battle.

But aren't those the vagaries of war? A commander's plans almost never actually go according to plan. The ANV just had a bad spell of this at Gettysburg. But how weren't his commanders executing his orders? Ewell did not violate Lee's intentions to any great extent. I think Lee needed to re-evaluate operations on the Confederate left, although I think he was correct in aiming his main effort on his other flank. Ewell's major failing was convincing Lee to keep the whole II Corps on the left rather than supporting Lee's desire to shift some of Ewell's men toward the right or center. Ewell's concerns for his flank were not inappropriate but I think that decision is one of the overlooked mistakes and both Lee and Ewell bear responsibility for that. Anyway, Longstreet did what he was supposed to, he just took an awful long time to do it. There wasn't really anything Lee could do to speed up the July 2 attack, hence his reluctant agreement to let Longstreet wait for Law to come up. Again, both Lee and the corps commander bear the blame. In hindsight things would have probably been better had Lee gone with his gut instinct at Gettysburg on several occasions but I can also support Lee for trusting his corps commanders' observation of the situation.

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by william42

Was Pickett's charge a bold or foolhardy move for Lee? I remember watching Ken Burns' film on the Civil War, where Shelby Foote said that "Lee's blood was up", or something similar, that morning of July 3rd. I took that to mean that Lee was perhaps more emotional than usual, perhaps diminishing his capacity to use his usual sound, rational powers of assessment and judgment.

From that comment and from what I've read it seems to me that at that moment, perhaps Lee's judgement was not what it ordinarily was. Perhaps there was more of an emotional factor at play with him at that time, maybe partly desperation, realizing that the charge would perhaps be the last chance for victory in the North.

I've read accounts where the author's have said it was an unwise move, and should have been postponed or cancelled altogether, or a different plan of attack implemented.


Terry

In eariler times I would have dismissed the July 3 attack as foolish, as most people are inclined to do. Upon continued study, I have come to agree with Lee's decision to attack on July 3. He surely knew that an offensive opportunity in the North was not coming along again...he had to grasp at even the slightest chance. The July 3 attack was not the best planned assault ever and had almost no chance of success...but I see why Lee made the attack. So, in a sense, Lee was desperate for victory. While always a bold general, under different circumstances he may not have been willing to smash up so many brigades in a desperate bid. But I disagree with the suggestion of some authors that Lee's judgment was somehow impaired.
I suspect the root of that line of thinking likely comes from Longstreet's absurd comment about Lee being "excited and off his balance" and that "he labored under that oppression until enough blood was shed to appease him." That would be silly if it weren't so malicious. Incidentally, it's partly because of statements like that that my past admiration for Longstreet has soured to distaste...but that's another discussion, I suppose.

[OpnDownfall]

The question is, did the changes Lee made to his original plans help or hinder his goal of defeating the AoP?
It is impossible to Know if his original plans would have been any the more successful, but we know for sure that the changes forced upon him by the reluctance of his senior commanders were in fact unsuccessful, in accomplishing Lee's goal of defeating the Union Army.
In this respect, if in no other, Lees' allowing himself to be effectively overruled by his corps commanders led directly to three days of ultimate failure. Leading to my conclusion that Lee lost the battle at Gettysburg.


P.S. One of the distinquishing characteristics of military 'genius' is knowing when (and/or how) to override faltering or pessimistic subordinates, commanding them to victory in spite of themselves.

[william42]

Forrest, I agree that Lee had to make that charge on July 3rd. That's why he came up to Pennsylvania when it all boils down. He needed a victory, and that charge would probably be his last chance.

But I've always wondered about the "Lee's blood was up" claim, which implied to me that perhaps his judgment was faulty that day, and perhaps an attack or charge from another angle or different time might have proven more successful. But if it were true, I mean about this supposed emotional aberration, then that would mean that Lee lost his cool in what could perhaps be the most important moment of his military career, and his life, for that matter. And I don't think Lee was likely to do that. Maybe a lesser commander, but not Lee. Just my opinion.

I can't believe he'd fight the good fight all this time up to Gettysburg, out-manuevering, out-smarting his enemy, then drop the ball on July 3rd because his "blood was up". Doesn't make sense.


Terry

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by william42

Forrest, I agree that Lee had to make that charge on July 3rd. That's why he came up to Pennsylvania when it all boils down. He needed a victory, and that charge would probably be his last chance.

But I've always wondered about the "Lee's blood was up" claim, which implied to me that perhaps his judgment was faulty that day, and perhaps an attack or charge from another angle or different time might have proven more successful. But if it were true, I mean about this supposed emotional aberration, then that would mean that Lee lost his cool in what could perhaps be the most important moment of his military career, and his life, for that matter. And I don't think Lee was likely to do that. Maybe a lesser commander, but not Lee. Just my opinion.

I can't believe he'd fight the good fight all this time up to Gettysburg, out-manuevering, out-smarting his enemy, then drop the ball on July 3rd because his "blood was up". Doesn't make sense.


Terry

I agree completely. Lee was a human and made mistakes but I'd have to see some evidence that Lee was agitated or unsettled enough at Gettysburg that it affected his judgment. Lee was about as cool a commander as you can get.

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

The question is, did the changes Lee made to his original plans help or hinder his goal of defeating the AoP?
It is impossible to Know if his original plans would have been any the more successful, but we know for sure that the changes forced upon him by the reluctance of his senior commanders were in fact unsuccessful, in accomplishing Lee's goal of defeating the Union Army.
In this respect, if in no other, Lees' allowing himself to be effectively overruled by his corps commanders led directly to three days of ultimate failure. Leading to my conclusion that Lee lost the battle at Gettysburg.


P.S. One of the distinquishing characteristics of military 'genius' is knowing when (and/or how) to override faltering or pessimistic subordinates, commanding them to victory in spite of themselves.

Firstly, I think we all agree that Lee bears the ultimate responsibility for defeat at Gettysburg. He accepted that responsibility. Our conversation here has clearly (and likely inevitably ) turned into a discussion of Lee's generalship. The only major change I can think of once the battle opened was Ewell convincing Lee to keep the II Corps on the left. And that may not even have been a "major" decision. Every other change to Lee's plan were the natural result of changing circumstances.
A great general also must be willing to listen to his subordinates who likely know the situation better than himself. To repeat my earlier example, at Spotsylvania Grant knew that the V Corps could punch through the Confederate left and ignored Warren's pleas that Grant did not understand the situation. It's a two way street and a dangerous one at that.
Lee sitting in front of Culp's Hill as night settled, hearing Ewell's report of his minimal force available to attack and to Ewell's report of Union forces on his flank...it would have been rash of Lee to ignore all of that and brashly throw his men forward blind.

[OpnDownfall]

We are not discussing Lee's generalship during the war, merely his generalship up to and including the Battle of Gettysburg.
The reasons for Lee's changing his plans (right or wrong) are immaterial to this discussion. The question is; how much did those changes affect the outcome of the battle? Did the battle turn on them, if it did, then whether his reasons for those chanes was faulty (or not) has no bearing on determining if those changes affected the outcome of the battle.
It is not as if, he had no plans and the decision making for his army devolved onto his corps commanders, as a result, unless one cares to argue that Lee Did, in fact, let command devolve to his corps commanders by giving them implied veto over his plqans.
He had plans, but allowed himself to be convinced that the corps commanders knew better than he, concerning what was required for success (or at least had not the confidence in his own judgement concerning the matters, to overrule his subordinates judgements).
The reason's for changing his plans may have been perfectly logical and reasonable under the circumstances at the time, but they did affect the outcome of the battle and Lee was directly responsible for those changes.


P.S. Even IF Grant made the same mistake, what are we saying; "Well Lee why did you do that?" "Well Grant did it too."