Who lost Gettysburg

[whitworth]

By mid 1863, the war was lost for the Confederacy. There was no show of power and how the Confederacy could win.
Logisically, the ANV had no business operating in Pennsylvania. Lee even voiced concern that PA would not supply even Ewell's Corps.
Meade had to make serious errors to lose the Pennsylvania campaign. Meade did not have to win. He merely had to grab onto the ANV and run them out of supplies. Meade trapped the Confederates in a good place, where there were far too limiting forage supplies and water. Meade forced Lee to attack, because Lee did not have ten days to lay up in Adams County. Lee had two choices -retreat or attack. Meade would have supplies to last more than ten days, with his supply line coming from Westminster, a rail line connected with Baltimore. At Gettysburg, Lee was in Meade's wheel-well. Meade had the advantage of resupply. Lee was cut-off from Virginia supplies.

Vicksburg was lost. The Confederacy had no way to keep up the logistics of Pemberton's army at Vicksburg. The Confederacy was logistical unable to send or supply additional troops from Virginia.
The Union army also had tactical control of the Mississippi with its fresh water navy. No army could capture Vicksburg without control of the Mississippi and a source for resupply.

The Confederacy had lost much of its territory because of the water highways used by the Union steamboats, iron clads and supply boats, which took control of adjacent lands next to waterways. Fort Henry, Fort Donelson, Nashville, Memphis, and Vicksburg were all lost because of the U.S. ability to bring their superior fresh-water navy into the battle.

If one looks at the decided advantage the United States had with its naval forces, on the navigable streams of the west, one can ask the unanswered question - why the Confederacy thought they could win after secession.

[OpnDownfall]

Essentially, Lee lost the battle by his inability (for whatever reason) to exercise effective command and control of his senior officers and thus his army.
He had three days to remedy the problem and it is unclear that he was really aware of the problem, much less that he attempted a solution.

[william42]

IMHO, Lee's foray into the North that culminated at Gettysburg was an attempt to resupply his army with livestock, food, wagons, and everything else the Southern army could find to help support it, and send it due south.

After the ANV passed through, the residents in southern Penn and Maryland remember seeing thousands of horses, wagons, etc, heading south, back down the same roads, towards Virginia. By this stage of the war the ANV could no longer depend on Virginia or any other southern state for supplies.

Also, I believe that Lee and Davis still thought, or at least desperately hoped, that a victory in the North would finally bring foreign assistance to the Confederacy.


Terry

[brigance]

I agree with most of what you're saying. Lee did need to take the ANV out of Virginia to allow it to recover from a rough winter and spring. I think that this was a large reason for the Penna. Campaign, but I think the biggest reason was to get the Army of the Potomac out into the open where Lee could destroy it. The previous two campaigns helped him to believe that it was not only possible, but highly likely to meet with success.

[william42]

Posted by Brigance
I think that this was a large reason for the Penna. Campaign, but I think the biggest reason was to get the Army of the Potomac out into the open where Lee could destroy it. The previous two campaigns helped him to believe that it was not only possible, but highly likely to meet with success.

Well, that's possible I suppose, but Lee didn't fare that well at Antietam. If Mr. Hill hadn't arrived when he did I believe it could have been a disaster for the ANV. My own opinion is that Lee thought the Penn invasion was a gamble that could possibly turn the tide, temporarily, if things went in his favor. I'm not really convinced that he thought victory was highly likely. As I said, that's only my opinion.


Terry

[whitworth]

continuing along with your ideas, I think Lee thought the Army of the Potomac could not shift their supply line very quickly into Pennsylvania, leaving it as vulnerable as the ANV.

Within days, the Quartermaster Corps of the Army of the Potomac was shifting from supplying the army in Virginia to the lines in Pennsylvania.
It is probably one of the great feats of the war, a great feat of planning for supply, and one that is least known about the famous Battle of Gettysburg.

*******
HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1863.
General M. C. MEIGS, (Received 7 P.M.)
Quartermaster- General, U. S. Army:
Since my last dispatch, the enemy has appeared in force near
Gettysburg, and is driving in our cavalry pickets. It is presumed
he will attack us in pitched battle very soon.
We have plenty of supplies, I think, to answer until after the bat-
tle, and we can then better tell where we want to receive them. Our
teams are now all ordered on the railroad between Union Bridge and
Westminster. None go to Frederick. Please, therefore, send the
forage to Union Bridge, but defer sending anything at present to
Frederick.
Matters will culminate here very quickly, and, we doubt not, vic-
toriously for us. Do not regard me as undecided at all about sup-
plies. I think we have enough until after a fight, but I make requi-
sitions by orders.
RUFUS INGALLS,
Brig. Gen., Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

[nbforrest]

In hindsight, I don't think the South had a chance of winning in 1863, or even in 1861 for that matter. However, I think it involves too much Monday morning quarterbacking to be in disbelief that the South thought they could win. Things that are obvious in hindsight aren't easy to tell at the time. Humans are above all emotional and quick to act so it's not surprising that war fervor erupted.
I disagree that Lee should have stayed out of Pennsylvania. However tiny of a chance the South had for a victory, a big win on Northern soil was the only way to get that. If nothing else rounding up PA cattle and raiding about the countryside was a darn better morale booster for the South than retiring back to the Rappahanock and surrendering the initiative.

[nbforrest]

Originally Posted by OpnDownfall

Essentially, Lee lost the battle by his inability (for whatever reason) to exercise effective command and control of his senior officers and thus his army.
He had three days to remedy the problem and it is unclear that he was really aware of the problem, much less that he attempted a solution.

I disagree somewhat. Clearly everything did not "come together", as it were, regarding the ANV's command system in the past, but I'm not sure Lee lost control of his officers. Lee was able to concentrate his scattered forces quite quickly after a major engagement he did not know about erupted and smash up the Federals on the first day. In a remarkably short turn around time he was able to orchestrate a major assault the next day from widely scattered forces. The failure of the assault can be abscribed to the Yanks than to a failure of Lee to control his officers. The failure of Ewell to vigorously press his assault and Longstreet's lack of celerity legitimately raise the issue if Lee's fairly "hands off" style was a wise one. Overall, I think it was a very effective system that inevitably failed at times. Lee had to trust his corps commanders or nothing would get done. And I do not think Ewell did as badly as he is so often made out to have done. Longstreet was indeed slow, but what could Lee have done to change that? Not much. Or how could Lee have anticipated Sickles moving forward? He couldn't have, really.
And I think people miss a major point sometimes...Lee's idea that the Union center was weaker on July 3 than the flanks was entirely correct. While obviously not weak enough, the vast majority of fresh or relatively fresh Union troops were on the flanks.

[samgrant]

I'll say Lee was ultimately responsible, as he said so him self.

Several reasons:

1) I think it was part 'hubris' in that his army's offensives had always been triumphant.

2) His command structure, which had been radically altered with the death of Jackson at Chancellorsville. His Corps commanders were not equal to the task.

3) His lack of specific orders and coordination of troops. He often used the vague "if practicable" in his orders which he and Jackson may have had an implicit understanding, but apparently this type of order may have confused Gen. Ewell, etc. (Contrast to Grant's unambiguous orders).

4) Tactically, as forces were already engaged, Lee made serious mistakes, as Alexander explains:

"the difficulty in securing concentration of effort over long lines. ... it should be stated not as a difficulty but an impossibility. Our line was like a big fishhook outside the enemy's small one. Communications between our flanks was very long - roundabout and slow while the enemy were practically all in one convenient sized bunch. ... Our only hope was to make our attacks simultaneous. But that the thing which always looks beforehand very simple & easy, & always proves afterward to have been impossible, from one or a hundred possible causes."

4a) Lee could have established a 'mirror' position on Seminary Ridge (Alexander also mentions this option), while not as commanding as the Union position, and dared Meade to attack (which in light of the political situation of the time, might have been wise ?) To my mind, this would have been the option most likely to give Confederate sucess.

[ole]

To my mind, this would have been the option most likely to give Confederate sucess.

Lee could not wait for Meade to attack him -- not and get back to Virginia. Banking on beating Meade's attack and taking all his supplies would have been a gamble not even Lee would have risked. As it was, Lee had to live off the land on the way back -- and much of that stripped bare on the way up.

Say he beats off Meade's attack. Is Meade going to leave all his supply wagons and beat a hasty retreat to Pipe Creek? No. Meade is going to maneuver and attack again. And again. By this time, Lee's boys haven't eaten in days and are out of ammo. Union casualties are very high, but Lee's army is in a spot where it runs on empty stomachs, useless muskets, and in a fog of extreme fatigue. Sorry, Sam. I don't see it.
Ole