Civil War History - Gettysburg ForumGettysburg! It's not just a National Park. It's a Civil War Battlefield. For some it's historic and storied past are almost an obsession! All related discussions are welcome here!
After Chancellorsville, R.E. Lee was getting good intelligence that many regiments in the Army of the Potomac were getting discharged. These were the six month and 2 year units. Lee knew the AoP would be smaller and an advantage for the Army of Northern Virginia in an invasion of Pennsylvania.
But did Lee err? Did he forget about the logistics of the Union army? Did he realize that AoP would have to supply less shoes, less wagons, less rations, less horses and mules, previously needed for the departed soldiers?
One of Lee's great surprises was how fast the Army of the Potomac got to Gettysburg, unincumbered, as they were, by many short-term units. The Army of the Potomac was a leaner and experienced army. Lean but too large for the Army of Northern Virginia to push aside.
Aside from discharge happenstance, Lee may not have expected a better army, a better prepared and easier supplied army, that he would have to face at Gettysburg.
Whitworth, perhaps it is true that Lee didn't expect the Army of the Potomac to be a better army when he faced them again in the North. But I am rather certain that he never underestimated the Union logistics and management along those lines. And I do not believe he ever underestimated the Union soldiers in the ranks. He did however very likely overestimate his own men in the ranks, but that can be expected- they had never failed him. And he certainly didn't expect to fight on Northern soil on ground not of his own choosing. Where Lee won his victories and had the decided edge was against the Union commanders. He sure did have their number, but at the same time experienced, trained, and proven officers were moving up the chain of command and by this time (Gettysburg) the AoP was a thoroughly veteran and professional army. Lee recognized the fact well enough when he said at one of the later Union command changes that he regretted these changes as he understood the former commanders so well and that sooner or later a general would come to command whom he didn't understand. Even still, he seemed to understand Grant well enough, but by then, Grant had too many tools in hand to not win.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
Excellent observations gentlemen. Thank you. Gettysburg was indeed a turning point even if the tide had started receding by then.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Did Lee really understand Union army logistics? I have some doubts. He certainly thought if he had captured Harrisburg and destroyed the railroad bridge, it would cause great damage to the U.S. war effort.
By then the U.S. had military construction crews that could rapidly replace bridges and rails.
Going to Pennsylvania meant the Union forces had to switch gears and start sending supplies north from their warehouses in the D. C. and Baltimore area. Lee certainly thought he would have more time in Pennsylvania, than he actually did. Was this a product of Lee not anticipating the movement of the Union army, well supplied by rail from Baltimore?
We must remember Lee went to West Point before the railroads became an important transportation supply link. Surely Lee had no great expertise in industry. Lee spent much of his career in places heavily dependant on wagon and mule transportation, like Texas, and in a small army before the war, that survived on meagre supplies.
The Confederacy never could create a comparitive railroad transportation network that was capable of waging a long war. It could never produce both iron sheathing for ironclad vessels and supply enough iron rail to keep its railroads running efficiently. What of this did Lee know before the war?
Early in the war, Lee seemed to think and conveyed that idea, that Wheeling, Virginia, nestled between Ohio and Pennsylvania, was defensible. I have serious doubts this Lee knew modern logistics and where Wheeling was really located in a modern war with railroads.
He certainly thought if he had captured Harrisburg and destroyed the railroad bridge, it would cause great damage to the U.S. war effort.
And it would cause great damage; that was Lee's intent. He wanted to do what damage he could while North so he could gather supplies and disrupt things a bit. He knew he could not stay North for an extended time, just long enough to disrupt things a mite, gather supplies for his army, whup the Army of the Potomac if it should get too close, then head back home.
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Lee certainly thought he would have more time in Pennsylvania, than he actually did. Was this a product of Lee not anticipating the movement of the Union army, well supplied by rail from Baltimore?
I think this is more a product of his absent cavalry and lack of intelligence through that arm and his knowledge that General Hooker and the AoP would be hamstrung by the frightened muggetywumps at Washington and their requirement to shield the Capital. He also 'read' his man and did not figure Hooker to impede him before he could gad about Pennsylvania and address his supply shortages. In this he read his man wrong and didn't dream that Hooker could have been so close to him. But in that too, he was ill served by his cavalry and had no knowledge of Hooker's rapid movement.
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Early in the war, Lee seemed to think...
It may be as you say Whitworth that Lee needed to learn the magnitude of the North's advantages in railroads and its uses. But he knew well enough how the Army worked and how well organized it was, as well as the caliber of men running the Army's infrastructure. He knew also he was not so blessed in the Confederacy. However Lee was a quick study and I would hazard to put forward quickly adapted to the new facts. He saw well enough that he didn't capture starving Union soldiers dressed in rags and ill equipped, or unfit nags, or second rate artillery pieces. Everything he saw from the North indicated a well regulated and adjusted military, questionable only in the judgment of its highest commanders and counsel.
He certainly knew his time North of the Potomac was limited and that he had to do what he could while there. But again, it looks to me that it was other considerations than a misunderstanding of Union logistics that were more factors to his discomfiture there.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
I do not accept the idea that Lee misread USA capabilities, although he was most certainly jolted when he found that army interposing itself (however unintentionally) between himself and Ewell's Corps. As Ed mentioned, that was a function of Stuart's absence -- Lee was reduced to fumbling about.
I'm thinking he just wanted to go North and break some stuff and requisition horses, wagons, food, fodder, and anything at all useful. Perhaps he had in mind a little confidence-shaking to go along with the requisitioning and breaking, but I think the bottom line lies closer to idea that he had to get out of Virginia for a few weeks to give Viginia farmers a chance to harvest something.
If he has to get out of Virginia, he might as well see if he can get the AoP out in the open where he has a chance to whack some of it. That would at least be better than sitting around and eating up whatever crops were planted that year.
He got the jump on Hooker and moved masterfully into rich farmland. Then things started to come apart. Stuart was off somewhere. Imboden was late relieving Pickett, his army was strung out beyond reasonable expectations of concentration, and there's Buford, and then those Black Hat fellas, and then the whole durn AoP.
Bad luck in wagon loads, not necessarily mistaken perceptions.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
On the move to Pennsylvania, the Army of Northern Virginia got bad intelligence and assumed too little about AoP capabilities. That means R.E. Lee was part of this mis-assessment.
Most will repeat the well worn phrase that Stuart was at fault for not arriving on time. That he rode around the Union army.
My first retort is - you never read Stuart's OR on Gettysburg. It's amazing how many historians failed to read Stuart's OR. In many ways, the Stuart OR was an excellent defense against any court of inquiry into his actions, "actions" that were never questioned in any Confedrate court of inquiry.
Lee actually misused his cavalry, because he assumed Stuart, who was the last major unit to leave Virginia, would arrive quickly to protect Ewell's right flank. Lee, Longstreet, Mosby and Stuart, all underestimated the Union army. All seemed to assume that Stuart could easily pass east through the Bull Run Mountains on his way to Pennsylvania. Didn't happen! The Army of the Potomac had the gaps blocked from easy access.
Most historians who blame Stuart never heard of Hopewell Gap, Throughfare Gap or Glasscock Gap. Most historians do not know why these gaps were important in the last days of June, 1863 and why Stuart was delayed. But then much of what happened before July 1 was not important to the Gettysburg historians.
Whitworth:
It is well that you should defend Stuart against popular condemnation. It's a lot easier to blame him and Longstreet for the Gettysburg disaster -- and that's essentially the way it was handed down.
I've long believed that Bobby Lee overestimated his chances (which equals underestimated his opposition). I give him a pass on that. After all, he'd been kicking the AoP around for more than a year (Antietam/Sharpsburg included) and had no reason to believe he couldn't do it again. What kind of intelligence operation would it take to advise him that the chaff was gone and he would be facing hard kernels? I suspect the only kind of information sought at that time was how many, which way, and who's in command -- which he belatedly did get.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Stuart erred in not passing on to Lee the new proficiency of the Union Cavalry, most likely in doubting their capacity. But they hit him hard at Brandy Station and blocked his intelligence gathering efforts in the passes. He too liberally interpeted Lee's orders and allowed himself too much l-a-t-i-t-u-d-e (why is this a bad word??!!) in getting to Ewell's flank in Pennsylvania, and in failing to provide an adequate network of relaying proper and timely information to Lee- a paramount responsibilty of his service. He judged rashly and foolishly in thinking to deliver a lesson and comeuppance to these Federals who dared show him up!
Mosby and Stuart's men left to guard the passes and rear of the army let down Stuart in not actively taking up this responsibility which should not have been necessary to explain to them. Grumble Jones, an otherwise excellent officer, seemed to sit back and relax once out from under Stuart. Beverly Robertson was a trained Old Army cavalryman who should have proven to be more than negligible, which pretty much summarizes his service in the Confederate Army. The usually expedient Mosby was unable to get accurate and up to date reports through, perhaps being a result of the interruption in the proper chain of command, a failing unusual to the intelligent and resourceful irregular.
But as Whitwirth and Ole note- it was primarily Lee himself who bears the burden for these accumulations of failure. He still had with him after the departure of Stuart and his best troops on his wild goose chase 4 brigades of cavalry, yet he did nothing with them. He sent no orders to them or requests for intelligence or just a staffer to see what's agoing in a particular quarter. Isn't that a mite strange? Operating in enemy country with an enemy army somewhere about charged with keeping him at bay, with numerous, aye, countless outlets in enemy country for the enemy to know all about him and his dispositions. Yet it does not strike Lee as unusual that no reports of enemy activity are coming to him. He just cannot understand how Stuart could fail to provide this information even after it becomes apparent to him that this is indeed the case. And he still does nothing about it. And he will still attack and take on the Union Army on limited intelligence and then fatefully on a field of his enemy's choosing. Longstreet was right in wanting to up and get the **** out of there. Longstreet saw Lee's decision here as incomprehensible, as many of us do now. This is certainly a factor of Lee's failure to adequately gauge his enemy, to underestimate him, and to a certain degree of desperation.
__________________ 'It is the soldier, not the reporter, who has given us freedom of the press. It is the soldier, not the poet, who has given us freedom of speech. It is the soldier, not the campus organizer, who has given us the freedom to demonstrate. It is the soldier, who salutes the flag, who serves beneath the flag, whose coffin is draped by the flag, who allows the protester to burn the flag'
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