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Was the axis of the en echelon attack of longstreet to be East, towards Cemetary Ridge or NE Along Emmitsburg Rd?
Lee in his OR stated "Longstreet was was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in."
Lee informed Longstreet (after observing Sickle's advance) that the Peach Orchard was the major target against which the attack should be directed. The question is; was this a change in the original plan or was he merely re-emphasizing where the main attack was to be directed as originally planned?
Long after the war McLaws remembered meeting Lee before daybreak on the 2d day and Lee personally showd him (McLaws) on a map that he wanted McLaws command to attack astride a rd passing near the Peach Orchard (Emmitsburg Rd?).
Even If Cemetary Ridge was the target, why the hurry to attack along the front, when of his most successful attacks were on the flanks or rear of the enemy lines. Were the Round Tops included in the original plan of attack? If Not, why not?
Was the axis of the en echelon attack of longstreet to be East, towards Cemetary Ridge or NE Along Emmitsburg Rd?
Lee in his OR stated "Longstreet was was directed to place the divisions of McLaws and Hood on the right of Hill, partially enveloping the enemy's left, which he was to drive in."
Lee informed Longstreet (after observing Sickle's advance) that the Peach Orchard was the major target against which the attack should be directed. The question is; was this a change in the original plan or was he merely re-emphasizing where the main attack was to be directed as originally planned?
Long after the war McLaws remembered meeting Lee before daybreak on the 2d day and Lee personally showd him (McLaws) on a map that he wanted McLaws command to attack astride a rd passing near the Peach Orchard (Emmitsburg Rd?).
Even If Cemetary Ridge was the target, why the hurry to attack along the front, when of his most successful attacks were on the flanks or rear of the enemy lines. Were the Round Tops included in the original plan of attack? If Not, why not?
As far as Lee knew, the Union line did not extend as far as the Round Tops. There had been a small recon (2 or 3 staff officers) out that way early on the 2nd. The information they brought back simply seems wrong.
Lee thus would have thought an attack coming up the Emitsburg Road from the Peach Orchard would have been coming in on the Union flank. This was not true, but it would fit what Lee was told early that morning.
In this respect, Lee should have waited a day. He could have brought Pickett up and did the 'column' style assault at one portion of the line, say in conjunction with Anderson's Division to give the assault the reserves necessary, not only to split the federal line, but hold it as well. This is assuming the rest of the line was assaulted en echelon.
Another alternative would be to swing Pickett wide around the CSA right flank, cut the Taneytown road? The result would be to pen the AOP between the Baltimore Pike and Cemetary Hill. Plausible?
Respectfully,
Matt
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
Last edited by milhistbuff1; 10-14-2006 at 11:51 AM.
Matt:
Waiting a day would have resulted only significant fortification. The success Longstreet did have was due, in large part (after discounting Sickles), to the shuffling of Union troops -- not being quite set for an assault.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
If Lee had been able to get Longstreet to attack on time (which would have been long before Sickles made his movement). Longstreets attack would then have been seriously disrupted by the presence of Sickles on his right flank.
Sickles may have prevented a serious Confederate debacle on day 2 rather than day 3?
What I don't understand is why Lee would be so blind as to deprive the 1st corp of his Engineering expertise (20+ yrs in federal army) when on foreign ground. Surely his trust in Longstreet wasn't it entirely?
Concerning the En echelon discussion, was Sedgewick's corp or elements of Sykes ie Burbank and Days bde and Crawford's division in a position to flank Hood in turn?
Respectfully,
Matt
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
Now I'm going to have to look it up, but if I'm not in a senior moment right now, it seems that the area Sickles was to occupy (from LRT to join the III{?} Corps to the north) was being used as an encampment of another unit (part of the XII Corps?). Sickles moved into the area, didn't like it, and set about making preparations (getting approval) to move nearer Emmitsburg Road.
At the time, there was no Union force on the Round Tops. Lee's plan for Longstreet was to sweep the area between the Emmitsburg road and Cemetery Ridge, angling toward the Ridge with Hood to do the honors in beginning the roll-up of the Union left on Cemetery Ridge. Had Longstreet jumped off at the early hour "suggested," it may have been fairly easy to roll up the Federal flank. (I say "may have," because Sickle's assigned position wasn't as bad as he thought it to be.)
If Sickles hadn't moved, we would know the truth of that parenthetical supposition. But he did move. And Longstreet still hadn't started his attack. If Hood knew of Devil's Den, he didn't didn't expect much resistance there.
When Longstreet was ready to make his move, Sickles had disrupted the expectations. Longstreet (in a snit according to at least one historian I've read) insisted in conforming strictly to Lee's instructions. Devil's Den, the Wheatfield, and Joshua Chamberlain were engraved in history.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Even after 140+ years, much of the data here is still in doubt and contradictory.
For example, no one really knows when Longstreet first met Lee that morning. Longstreet himself gave 3 very different accounts that vary the time considerably. Studying his statements and that of others, you can make a case for any time at all between about 5:30 AM and 9:00 AM, with most historians feeling it was probably somewhere near 7:00 AM or so.
I mention that only to show how difficult it is to pin down the timing of movements and the concepts of "slow" and "fast" here.
I know a retired colonel who is a Licensed Battlefield Guide at Gettysburg. He has walked this ground many times and studied everything he can on it. He would tell you that Longstreet's movement was not particularly slow at all, and that he might have moved into position 20 or 30 minutes faster. (I think he's too conservative on his estimate, but then he knows more of the details than I do ...)
Also, IIRR, early in the day Lee was still trying to get a straight answer out of Ewell/Early and A. P. Hill on whether or not they could attack on the left. It was only after determining that, and learning the results of the staff officer recon to the right, that Lee determined to order Longstreet's attack.
Geary's Division of 12th corp was originally there but was returned to Culps Hill in order to prevent George Sears Greene's Bde from being forced to defend the union right flank alone.
Tim,
Historian Glen Tucker in High Tide at Gettysburgmakes the argument that Longstreet was sloppy when choosing the route and unnecessarily delayed the attack by 2.5 hours. what are your thoughts? everyone feel free to chime in as well.
Respectfully,
Matt
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
Last edited by milhistbuff1; 10-14-2006 at 11:52 PM.
Historian Glen Tucker in High Tide at Gettysburgmakes the argument that Longstreet was sloppy when choosing the route and unnecessarily delayed the attack by 2.5 hours. what are your thoughts? everyone feel free to chime in as well.
His lengthy countermarch didn't help much, either.
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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