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Ed, Ole, Whitworth,
You echo my own feelings on this matter most clearly. Did Lee ever offer any explanation as to why he left B H Robertson guarding the passes so needlessly those four days? secondly did he ever say why it never occurred to him to switch imboden's 2100 man brigade from the Cumberland flank to the Philidelphia side? (R. E. Lee's Civil War, Bevin Alexander pp 182-3 ftnotes and text)
Respectfully
Matt
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
One of the great false impressions is that Stuart was suppose to screen for Lee's whole army. That is false. There was no way Stuart could screen and cover Lee in Chambersburg and move and cover Ewell's right flank. One can attempt to be in one place; one can never cover both places on horseback.
On June 28, Lee was with Hill and Longstreets Corps in Chambersburg. Ewell's right flank, Early's division, was in York and the Wrightsville area. Stuart was unexpectedly delayed by the Army of the Potomac at the gaps in the Bull Run Mountains. Once delayed on June 25, Stuart had no way to travel to southern PA and screen for Lee and get to Early near York. It's an impossibility to do with horses.
Once Stuart got jammed at the Bull Run Mountains moving east, Lee had too few cavalry to do all the tasks required. Jones and Robertson were left at the Blue Ridge gaps as a rear guard. Imboden had been ordered west to destroy the B&O railroad and forage. Lee sent cavalry with Ewell's main body of his corps, capturing Mechanicsburg and skirmishing near the banks of the Susquehanna River, across from Harrisburg. White, led a small cavalry unit east with Early to York and Wrightsville on Susquehanna River, south of Harrisburg.
Lee never planned on a delay by Stuart, so he was effectively out of cavalry on June 28th, just as he decided to push two whole corps on the narrow gapped Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike towards Gettysburg. Two corps without a cavalry screen. That's why Buford fought infantry, instead of cavalry, at Gettysburg on July 1. Lee had not anticipated problems. Offensive actions always bring problems and no army moves perfectly, especially when as divided as the Army of Northern Virginia was.
In effect, Lee had his army do too much. He had Stuart act as a rear guard in the Blue Ridge Mountains. He expect Stuart to move east and north quickly, with no delays coming, due to the Army of the Potomac.
Lee held up with his two corps at Chambersburg, waiting to move either to Ewell near Harrisburg or Early near Wrightsville. Because Stuart was delayed by the AoP, White's cavalry had to remain with Early, arriving on the battlefield on July 1, the same day as Hill's infantry.
Lee had gambled that Stuart, who was last to leave Virginia, would not get delayed and move to Pennsylvania within two days. Lee greatly underestimated the Army of the Potomac. That army sent corps across the Potomac River, its namesake, on the very day Stuart was started his trip east to the Bull Run Mountains, some thirty miles and more south of the river.
In the position Stuart held on June 25th, there was no way Stuart would have known of the AoP crossing. In fact, Lee must not have had any scouts/spies on the north side of the Potomac River, ready to move north and inform Lee. Harrison, Longstreet's spy, had been in Washington and was not intended to be a spy detecting a Union army crossing. It is puzzling that no Confederate spy was stationed between the Potomac River between the ferry crossing near Leesburg and modern Frederick. None that I ever read of, or of a spy that was situated or assigned to watch in that area.
Once Stuart was delayed in the Bull Run Mountains, Lee had no tangible plan to detect the Army of the Potomac's crossing of the Potomac River on June 25th. The Army of Northern Virginia was moving in the dark, literally. The Army of the Potomac was moving without the Confederate knowledge.
Lemme guess: **** equals heck. Flock? I give up.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
I agree about the result, but Lee had no supply lines to guard after the last ANV infantry marched passed, as Ole has often pointed out, what Lee had, he had with him. As far as Imboden is concerned, why destroy the western portion of the B&O? it would've been abolutely foolish for Lee to concentrate on the west when the crucial rail links were along the coast from Boston to NYC to Philly, thence to, Baltimore-DC. That was the AOP supply line for any northern operation. In addition the majority of Northern industries were either along or on RR lines connecting to this 'corridor'. That of course was the area he would need to interdict and advance along in order to scare the North enough to pressure Lincoln and Meade into a mistake and/or a fight they would lose.
with all due respect,
Matt
__________________ Great-Great Grand Nephew of George H. Pfau, 4th NJ Vol Infantry
milhistbuff1, your question why Imboden went where he did, is better directed at Gen. R.E. Lee. Imboden followed the orders given by Lee on the march to Pennsylvania.
Information on Imboden is in Lee's Gettysburg OR.
[I could insert two paragraphs from Lee's report, but this site seems to not accept any copy and paste. The Imboden reference can be found on pages 305 and 307, Series 1, Vol. 27. 2nd Part.]
Ed, Ole, Whitworth,
You echo my own feelings on this matter most clearly. Did Lee ever offer any explanation as to why he left B H Robertson guarding the passes so needlessly those four days? secondly did he ever say why it never occurred to him to switch imboden's 2100 man brigade from the Cumberland flank to the Philidelphia side? (R. E. Lee's Civil War, Bevin Alexander pp 182-3 ftnotes and text)
Respectfully
Matt
Matt,
Stuart left Robertson with a very clear set of orders on what to do, as well as "Grumble" Jones for advice if needed (not that Stuart liked Jones, just that he recognized his ability):
=====
HDQRS. CAV. DIV., ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
June 24, 1863.
Brig. Gen. B. H. ROBERTSON,
Commanding Cavalry:
GENERAL: Your own and General Jones' brigades will cover the front of Ashby's and Snicker's Gaps, yourself, as senior officer, being in command.
Your object will be to watch the enemy; deceive him as to our designs, and harass his rear if you find he is retiring. Be always on the alert; let nothing escape your observation, and miss no opportunity which offers to damage the enemy.
After the enemy has moved beyond your reach, leave sufficient pickets in the mountains, withdraw to the west side of the Shenandoah, place a strong and reliable picket to watch the enemy at Harper's Ferry, cross the Potomac, and follow the army, keeping on its right and rear.
As long as the enemy remains in your front in force, unless otherwise ordered by General R. E. Lee, Lieutenant-General Longstreet, or myself, hold the Gaps with a line of pickets reaching across the Shenandoah by Charlestown to the Potomac.
If, in the contingency mentioned, you withdraw, sweep the Valley clear of what pertains to the army, and cross the Potomac at the different points crossed by it.
You will instruct General Jones from time to time as the movements progress, or events may require, and report anything of importance to Lieutenant-General Longstreet, with whose position you will communicate by relays through Charlestown.
I send instructions for General Jones, which please read. Avail yourself of every means in your power to increase the efficiency of your command, and keep it up to the highest number possible. Particular attention will be paid to shoeing horses, and to marching off of the turnpike.
In case of an advance of the enemy, you will offer such resistance as will be justifiable to check him and discover his intentions and, <ar45_928> if possible, you will prevent him from gaining possession of the Gaps.
In case of a move by the enemy upon Warrenton, you will counteract it as much as you can, compatible with previous instructions.
You will have with the two brigades two batteries of horse artillery.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
J. E. B. STUART,
Major-General, Commanding.
[P. S.]--Do not change your present line of pickets until daylight to-morrow morning, unless compelled to do so.
=====
How Robertson could act as he did with those orders in hand has always confused me.
As to Lee, the best explanation I have ever heard is that when Lee thought cavalry or intelligence, he thought "Stuart". His tiny staff, or Lee himself, just dropped the ball on using the cavalry that was available while Stuart was separated. Meanwhile, Robertson was ... being Robertson.
The whole campaign was ill starred from its inception in Richmond by Davis and Lee with advice from Longstreet. It is from these mettings that Longstreet acquired the conviction that Lee was committed to the strategic offensive by invading the North but to fight any major battles on the tactical defensive.
The stated reasons for the Invasion seems to have been a mish mash of varied reasons, any one (or a few of) was even then very unconvincing. I Cannot help feeling that the unstated reason was to scotch any attempts to send Lee or a part of the AoNV west in order to revitalize the war in the West by sending with it needed most, major reinforcements (most importantl, break Grant's siege at Vicksberg) Apparently Lee felt that a major invsion of the North in the East would, some how, compensate for any set backs in the West.
As stated by others on this thread, it is inconcieveable that based on the past record, Lee and the AoNV would Not be suffering from a "Victory's Disease". Despite his becomming demurrals, Lee would have been less than human if he did not believe in his hear that he could not defeat a Meade.
The AoP never marched as far or so fast as it did getting to Gettysburg, except perhaps, the final run down of Lee from Petersburg to Appomattox.
IMO Lee never thought he was facing the entire AoP even on the 3d Day.
Given his study of the sluggishness of the AoP on the march, Lee could be forgiven for doubting that they would march fast even if they could.
OpnDownfall: First of all, welcome to civilwartalk. You haven't officially announced yourself in the meet'n'greet area, but your posts indicate that you will be a major player. That's soooooo welcome!
Quote:
I Cannot help feeling that the unstated reason was to scotch any attempts to send Lee or a part of the AoNV west in order to revitalize the war in the West by sending with it needed most, major reinforcements
I've never heard this slant. Wow! A whole 'nother thought!
Quote:
IMO Lee never thought he was facing the entire AoP even on the 3d Day.
This one you're required to defend. You're saying that on July 3rd Lee was unaware that 7 Union Corps were kinda scattered all over that rise there?
So glad you're aboard. Looks like you have some good stuff to offer.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
That is the point, no one (even historians) knows for sure what Lee knew or when he knew it. It is the majority opinion of most observers that this was Lee's worst fought battle, but If one assumes he did not think he was facing the bulk of the AoP at Gettysburg, then many of his actions and orders become a bit more explicable. (Keeping in mind Lee's previous experiences of almost unrlieved success against the AoP and its' various commanders, mainly by outsmarting the commanders and out marching the army)
As an example, on the second day, was Longstreet to attack paralell to the Emmitsberg Rd., or perpendicular to it? The Peach Orchard and Wheat Field in front of Cemetary Ridge is higher than Cemetary Ridge directly behind (that is why Sickles favored moving forward to occupy those positions), did Lee assume the Peach Orchard was the terminus of the AoP left flank? (Longstreet resisted Hoods pleas to extend the attack to include the Round Tops, because he was insistent that Lee's orders be obeyed to the letter)
It does seem than the main reason Lee was unable to establish real control of his corps commanders, was that they felt Lee did not know the real situation on their individual fronts. They may have been right.
Very interesting observations. On the 2nd, wasn't Longstreet to attack en echelon? Krick attributes Longstreet's insistence on the letter of Lee's orders to a snit he was nursing at the time. Don't know how true that is (Krick can be vicious on the subject of Longstreet), but thought I'd throw it in.
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
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Lee's misuse of cavalry 
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