What was Lee's Real Plan for July 3rd?

[whitworth]

Was Pickett's Charge really about capturing Cemetery Hill and Cemetery Ridge? Was there any other reason, Lee might have attacked Meade, where he did on July 3rd?

Lee mentioned in his OR that he was unaware that Alexander virtually ran out of artillery ammunition, when Pickett's Charge took place. He must have suspected that the inventory would run somewhat low, if he authorized such a sustained artillery barrage?

One Army of the Potomac officer might have said one of the most enlightened observations, that Lee was either going to attack or going to retreat, because of the sustained artillery attack.
Maybe Lee planned to do both, attack, then withdraw from the battlefield back to Virginia.

In fact Lee mentioned other reasons, other than the high casualty rate, as the reason for withdrawal or retreat. In fact, the casualty rate might not have altered his original plan.

Few historians fault Lee for his Gettysburg plan. Few, if any, fault Lee for coming to Gettysburg, which I think was a mistake.
Lee had one big problem, logistics. He was running short of forage for his horses and water for the horses, mules and men, if he remained in position. Lee only had enough artillery ammunition for a few days of intense battle at the very beginning.

Lee might have ordered the large artillery barrage of July 3rd to inflict some heavy damage on the Army of the Potomac. Inflict damage and make it difficult for Meade to follow up rapidly behind the ANV retreat to Hagerstown. The ANV did kill and disable many AoP horses. Lee did accomplish that purpose.

And General Lee by his artillery barrage and attack of the 3rd, did maintain his control of the Fairfield road, a road the ANV desperately needed for their retreat. Could Lee have escape as best he did with only the Chambersburg-Gettysburg Pike as a retreat route? I think not. And he would have known that, I think, after the attack of July 2nd.

Lee, I believe, knew he had to control the Fairfield Road leading from Gettysburg. A great commander would know how to get into an attack, as well as get out of an attack. I'm sure Lee gave some consideration to retreat, before it came apparently necessary to retreat by July 4th.

Maybe the AoP officer made the observation missed by historians. Was Lee going to retreat or attack, after the artillery barrage of July 3rd? In the end Lee did both, and got much of his force, as one could expect, back to Virginia.

[ole]

There are books and books speculating on that charge. I believe you have hit upon as reasonable an explanation as anyone else. When Lee couldn't shove Meade off Cemetary Ridge on the second day, he had to get out of Dodge. The only way he could hope to do that the AoP enough to make his mistake. Maybe he was hoping that Ewell could do something over on the east side.

He wasn't served well by his Lieutenants during that battle. There was virtually no cooperation/coordination from any of his Corps commanders. The only thing skillfully accomplished during the campaign was the withdrawal. On the second day, he had significant forces approaching from the south, west, northwest and north east. Had even two of them hit their objective at the same time, Meade would have been in trouble. But on that day, it seemed that not one of the four had his act together. Not one of Lee's finest hours.
Ole

[whitworth]

I doubt any of the armies could have made a co-ordinated attack over a five mile front.
General Lee did not have the advantage of the ground, and the Army of the Potomac had the superiority of the defensive artillery.

Considering how well the AoP artillery was co-ordinated, except for General Hancock's lapse by shooting all his long range artillery ammunition, Lee had a tough nut to crack.

Canister was deadly at short range and the Confederates paid a severe price at East Cemetery Hill and Culp's Hill. Union artillery was well trained, generally had sufficient ammunition and was deadly accurate compared to the Confederate artillery.

One should remember that the ANV was not well trained to go on the offensive. It fought many battles with its back to its supply lines in Richmond. Different type of combat.

Offensives need more co-ordination and require some experience to do it properly. Many fault Ewell for not attacking Cemetery Hill on the 2nd, but never consider that Corps had marched from Carlisle in a day and a half, fought in the heat of the afternoon of July 2, lost control as any fight usually did after several hours, and lacked an entire division and its reserve artillery before dark came on July 2.
All attacks are easy for the arm chair generals not on the ground.

[matthew mckeon]

Was there a recent book about Lee's plan for victory at Gettysburg?

[milhistbuff1]

Whitworth,
I also agree that concentration and battle was a mistake on Lee's part. Just as Genl. Buford blocked Longstreet for six hours at thoroughfare Gap, so should Lee have utilized the Blue Mountain passes west of Cashtown ( 8 miles west of Gburg). By using the the three remaining cav brigades to slow down the union army, it would give Longstreet and Hill time to set up and for Ewell ultimately position himself behind the AOP unable to gain the heights or retreat. What effect this would have on the war as a whole would be a horse of another color entirely.
Respectfully,
Matt