Gettysburg-the Forgotten Artillery

[whitworth]

For the Confederates, Gettysburg was a tactical error. It was a great battle; important to remember. But the Confederates should never have come to Gettysburg.
For the first two days, the Army of Northern Virginia was the hunter; on July 3 the Confederates became the hunted. Little did Lee know that his army would walk into an ambush. Hidden on Cemetery Ridge were 39 cannon of Lt. Col. Freeman McGilvery's Reserve Artillery. Lee's artillery failed to damage this force and for that matter most of the artillery on Cemetery Hill, Cemetery Ridge and Little Round Top. Confederate artillery failed in its barrage.
Then Picketts division formed for battle and made several oblique movements right in the face of McGilvery's artillery. It was a turkey shoot, where the turkey gets tied to a log and loses much freedom of movement.

For many, McGilvery's batteries never existed; never plowed shell and canister into the Confederate ranks as it crossed the open fields of Gettysburg on that July 3rd.
Many historians could not fault Robert E. Lee. Recognizing the action of the Army of the Potomac artillery on July 3rd, would recognize the slaughterhouse of an attack against Cemetery Ridge.

The Army of the Potomac was greater than General Lee and the Army of Northern Virginia imagined. It was a Grand Ambush.

[william42]

But the Confederates should never have come to Gettysburg.

I think if General Lee had had his 'druthers he would have never gone to Gettysburg in the first place, but as has been mentioned before, he and the Confederacy desperately needed a huge win by this stage of the game, and he really had no choice in the matter. He needed a victory in yankee territory, which he hoped would demoralize the north, take away their will to fight, and possibly invite foreign assistance. To fail would pretty much sound the death knell for the Confederacy, and many people have characterized the defeat of Lees army at Gettysburg as the tolling of that bell.

But he had to at least try. It was a last ditch effort, a gamble, that he knew could not be avoided, but also probably knew could very likely fail. He was between a rock and a hard place, so to speak. It was not a stupid move, based on impulsiveness, without serious thought, IMO. I think Lee thought it out as best he could, given the options he had left. There was more than just a little desperation involved too. The chips were down. A successful invasion of the north could pay off handsomely for the Confederacy. How could he not invade the north when the possibility of victory and ultimate Southern independence would be so much closer than if he had chosen to stay in Virginia, fighting a defensive war, ending in a stalemate siege like Petersburg, where the most he could claim was that he was still holding out. That could have been his rationale, or part of it. I don't know. In the end that's how it turned out - the siege of Petersburg, but how would Lee have felt, with his army in those trenches at Petersburg, if he had not taken that chance to win at Gettysburg? I don't know. I'm just speculating . As it turned out of course, the invasion north failed, but I don't fault Lee one bit for trying. I think it was a very bold, gutsy move, that he really would rather have avoided, if he'd had his 'druthers.

TW

[whitworth]

Lee totally underestimated the time the AoP would arrive at Gettysburg. Lee totally underestimated when the AoP would first cross the Potomac River. Lee advanced over South Mountain without a good intelligence report on the AoP moving to Gettysburg or the lay of the land past the mountain pass in South Mountain. It was a bad place to take horses.

Lee was aware as early as 1862 that the war was a longshot, as long as the war continued. If Lee was first rate; his logistics was fifth rate. Nothing like a gifted general saddled with a poor supply system.

Lee made several gambles on July 3. He assumed that his artillery would have a telling effect on the AoP on Cemetery Ridge. It failed miserably.

Lee did not anticipate a great defense in depth and a refurbished AoP artillery command. The AoP artillery was not commanded, in large part, the way it was at Chancellorsville. Alexander was greatly confused why certain batteries withdrew cannon. The new artillery system beat the Confederates and greatly reduced the number of infantry that came near the AoP infantry lines. Pickett's Charge was reduced by both artillery and infantry. It was not just infantry against infantry.

[nbforrest]

I agree that Lee was making a huge gamble, pretty much a last ditch gamble. To understand that, at least for me, has softened my own criticisms of Lee's actions at Gettysburg.

Regarding McGilvery's guns, hadn't the Rebs already been tipped off to their presence due to the July 2 fighting? Once Sickles had been driven back, McGilvery put together a pretty strong gun line on the southern reaches of Cemetery Ridge. I don't know how well informed Lee was of that fact, but the Rebs had already been on the receiving end of Union guns in that area. Considering that Lee initially wanted to send McLaws and Hood in on Pickett's right, I'm sure that he knew that there would be something around where McGilvery was.

Respectfully

[whitworth]

Moved his artillery into position on Cemetery Ridge, just before dawn on the third of July.

McGilvery noted that the Confederate artillery barrage was shooting high and striking beyond his artillery. None of his 39 cannon were struck.

Pickett walked into view of an undamaged, well supplied, artillery. McGilvery noted that he had oblique shots on the massed confederate troops, causing significant damage.

It's apparent from many reports, that the Army of the Potomac started firing on Pickett's Charge, long before he came into musket range. That the AoP long range artillery played an important role in what happened to the attack of July 3rd. General Hunt had the artillery, in addition to McGilvery's Reserve Artillery, all set to destroy any Confederate attack. If Hancock had not used up all long range artillery, preceding the Charge, would we look at this battle much differently today.