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I just read Lost Triumph- Lee's real plan at Gettysburg and why it failed by Tom Cathart. In the book, he advances his theory of the plan for Day Three.
The Pickett-Pettygrew-Trimble charge on Cemetery Ridge was not supposed to be the only attack on that day. Why would Lee send 12,000 to 15,000 troops and leave the other 50-odd-thousand idle?
The theory was that in coordination with the attack on the Federal center, Ewell would launch a 10,000 man attack on Culp's Hill. At the same time Jeb stuart would take his troopers in a wide arc around the Federal right. After detaching 1000 mounted infantrymen, under Jenkins, to hit Culp's Hill from the rear, Stuart would then hit the Federal center from the rear, helping the main attack to split the Federal line. The Confederate forces at Culp's Hill would then roll up the northern half of the Federal line and then force the southern half to either retreat or face destruction.
This plan was stopped by Federal cavalry under Custer at what is now called East Cavalry Field.
This theory was endorsed by James McPherson, who wrote the Forward.
Any thoughts? I found this theory interesting.
__________________ F. S. Powers
Union Ancersor: Pvt Arnuah Norton, 60th Ohio. (G-G-G Grandfather) Died at Salisbury NC, November 3, 1864
Confederate Ancestors: Captain Thomas A. Morrow, 29th Texas Cavalry (G-G-G- Uncle) and 2LT George W. Morrow, 31st Texas Cavalry (G-G-G Grandfather). Both survived the war
I just read Lost Triumph- Lee's real plan at Gettysburg and why it failed by Tom Cathart. In the book, he advances his theory of the plan for Day Three.
...
Any thoughts? I found this theory interesting.
Very early on the 3rd, the Union counter-attacked on Culp's Hill and drove the Rebels out. That ended any realistic hope that Ewell's Corps would do much that day.
Longstreet's Corps had 2 divisions on the right which had fought a brilliant action starting at 4 PM on the 2nd, with heavy casualties. Without reinforcement, it would be unrealistic to expect a major effort there without heavy reinforcement.
Lee had already used 8 of his 9 infantry divisions in the first 2 days. (The Federals knew this, and it was a major source of cheer to the council of war Meade held over the night of July 2-3.) Lee does not have very much strength for wide-ranging thrusts. He took his single fresh division and put it in for a thrust at the center, reinforced by 2 divisions that had (he thought) seen relatively light action on the 2nd.
Lee apparently did not realize how roughly those 2 divisions were treated in the battle. A. P. Hill is virtually missing from the records on those days and seems to play little part in running the battle. As a result, Pickett's Charge was probably not as strong as Lee intended.
Stuart's cavalry was not strong enough to have a decisive effect. Their movement is aimed for the Union retreat route, and has to be a deep movement because of the Union presence on Culp's Hill, behind it and over towards Wolf's Hill. There are plenty of batteries and Union infantry in this area, in addition to the cavalry Stuart did run into.
Lee's plan comes down to this: break the center, then order the rest of the line in. If this is successful, Stuart is in perfect position to slice into the chaos of the Union rear and cut their retreat in the chaos. If by some miracle Pickett's Charge had worked, I think a very large portion of the AoP would be destroyed.
But the odds of a successful penetration were very low, and there was no real reserve to reinforce the penetration if it occurred. This was normal in Confederate battles. When they could break the enemy, they usually had to put in their last men, and rarely had the reserve needed to exploit success.
Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.
An interesting theory.
__________________ F. S. Powers
Union Ancersor: Pvt Arnuah Norton, 60th Ohio. (G-G-G Grandfather) Died at Salisbury NC, November 3, 1864
Confederate Ancestors: Captain Thomas A. Morrow, 29th Texas Cavalry (G-G-G- Uncle) and 2LT George W. Morrow, 31st Texas Cavalry (G-G-G Grandfather). Both survived the war
Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.
An interesting theory.
It is an interesting theory. It only works if Pickett's Charge penetrates through the Union center and a follow on attack breaks the Union line completely.
Stuart's force is simply not strong enough to have a decisive effect on its own. There are too many Union troops, including far too much artillery, on and behind Culp's Hill for a close-in flanking maneuver to work. If he had gotten around/past/trhough the Union cavalry, Stuart still can't get into the area immediately behind Culp's Hill/Cemetery Hill. He certainly doesn't have the force to take Culp's Hill, either.
Part of the problem there is that the Union had already retaken Culp's, driving Johnson off it early in the morning. If Ewell/Early had managed a different result up there, things might have been a bit better for Stuart. But there is a lot of excess Union artillery and infantry sitting back there on the 3rd, and any move to penetrate through it will be very bloody and likely fail.
OTOH, if you imagine a successful Pickett's Charge with a wavering Union center, you can then picture Lee acting like Wellington at Waterloo, waving the whole line forward in a do-or-die moment. Maybe the Union line cracks. Maybe, just maybe, they run for the rear.
That would be very bad for the Union. The wagons for all the Corps and the Artillery Reserve are out there behind the "fish-hook". They'll jam the roads and make retreat a disaster. If Stuart can come down on the Baltimore Pike, he's in perfect position to do what cavalry is supposed to do: ride over panic-stricken retreating enemies, cut their retreat, surround them. Most of the AoP might have ended up in the bag.
The problem isn't the theoretical possibility of that. The problem is that the Union position was too strong and the Confederate strength inadequate to make such an attack have a good likelihood of success.
never had to face rifled muskets and rifled artillery.
Lee lost on the third day, because his artillery was unable to drive off AoP artillery and infantry on Cemetery Ridge.
Lee could not penetrate the AoP line.
Any penetration was going to get driven back, because the ANV was out of long-range artillery ammunition on Seminary Ridge and could not support any lodgment of its infantry.
Stuart's cavalry was spent on the long trip into Pennsylvania.
Lee totally underestimated the defensive ability of Meade's army on Cemetery Ridge and Cemetary Hill, plus his ability to support with the 6th Corps.
Which actually explains the view that modern weapons will overcome the tactics popular at the time.
At the time of Lee's time as a student at West Point, Napoleon had not been dead very long and his tactics were required reading. Students had to learn French in order to read the books available at the time.
When Stuart was a student, Lee was the Superintendent. The application of Napoleonic tactics was still en vogue.
The arrival of rifled muskets and cannon would force the change in tactics, but the commanders, most of then taught at West Point and learned in Napoleonic tactics, would be slow to adjust.
My intention is to present the theory, I'm not sure myself if this would have worked, even with the ANV at full strength.
__________________ F. S. Powers
Union Ancersor: Pvt Arnuah Norton, 60th Ohio. (G-G-G Grandfather) Died at Salisbury NC, November 3, 1864
Confederate Ancestors: Captain Thomas A. Morrow, 29th Texas Cavalry (G-G-G- Uncle) and 2LT George W. Morrow, 31st Texas Cavalry (G-G-G Grandfather). Both survived the war
...then was the day the opportunity for victory was really lost? But if we decide Hood didnt have time to actually envelope the Union flank at LRT, and the outcome stayed as it was...perhaps then the 3rd day should have been one of manuever resulting in or 4th or 5th day? Sounds to me like the prevailing thought...and I agree...the odds of success on just about any attack option left to Lee on day 3 was simply a fanciful wish?(Sorry, Mr. Mod..I know this sounds like it should be in the what if, but I am still trying to galvanize years of research into this battle with this very topic! I cant let loose the idea the ANV should have one this one!)
If all that is so...Mr. McPherson endorses the idea, and actually, I have myself for sometime...would it not justify there was more than Custer's actions near Sailors Creek that day at Appomattox when Little Phil bought the surrender table for Libbie and said, "There are few men in this army who have done more to bring it to victory than your husband?" Sounds like perhaps the Union command thought this was the case! BTW...Great post, Sir!
Just because you write a blurb or intro doesn't mean that you love the idea. Suspect if you read McPherson's intro, you'll see a lot of fluff and weasel words about how valuable such research is--never saying, "By George, this guy has nailed it!"
Carhart gets a lot of flack for flights of fancy. Haven't read it myself, and I might eventually get it, but haven't experienced serious cravings yet. Heard a bit too much about it from people I respect to get excited.
That said, Custer did turn in a pretty darned good performance as a battle leader that day. (Also heard that it wasn't his idea; nevertheless, you can't fault the man for that thundering charge.)
Ole
__________________ I never knew a man who wished to be himself a slave. Consider if you know any good thing that no man desires for himself. A. Lincoln
Carhart, in explaining his reasoning, suggested that both Lee and Stuart were implementing tactics from Napoleon's campaign. The "plan" for Day Three seemed to be derived from tactics used in the Battle of Castigilone, August 5, 1796. First a mass artillery attack, then a ground assault, followed by a cavalry sweep around the enemy right and into the rear. The theory here is that Lee wanted to recreate the same conditions at Gettysburg as Napoleon did at Castigilone. Both Lee and Stuart were at West Point and would have received heavy exposure to Napoleon.
I'm under the impression that military history was not included in the cirriculum then as it is today. NPS Ranger Donald Pfanz (Fredericksburg-Spotsylvania National Battlefield Park) was the first one to tell me this. Then I read it in Jamieson's Attack and Die - about the only use I got out of that book too.
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A three pronged attack on Day Three? 
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