A three pronged attack on Day Three?

[whitworth]

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF NORTHERN VIRGINIA,
Culpeper Court-House, July 24, 1863.
Mr. PRESIDENT:


We are in great need of horseshoes, having been able to procure none on our expedition, and our constant motion preventing their manufacture from iron that fell into our possession, more than half the cavalry is dismounted, and the artillery horses and wagon teams have suffered equally...

Manassas Gap.
Very respectfully, your obedient servant,
R. E. LEE,
General,

*****

General R. E. LEE, RICHMOND, VA., July 28, 1863.
Comdg. Army of North. Virginia, Culpeper Court-iThuse, Va.:
GENERAL: Yours of the 24th and 27th have been received.
The horseshoes you want were sent to you, but I am informed the first lot went to Staunton, and would only reach you after being brought back.

JEFFERSON DAVIS.

[J_Man0507]

You can't fully knock the Confederate supply chain. While they did have alot of incompetents, Gorgas, the man in charge of munitions, did a superb job of supplying the Confederate armies with weapons and ammunition. Even though that ammunition wasn't the best, he is up there with Rufus Ingalls in my book as one of the best in the quartermasters corps of either army.

[FSPowers]

After further study, I'm beginning to wonder if the AofP line could not have been broken, no matter what Lee did.

[milhistbuff1]

I think not, the napoleonic Pont en feur or bridge of fire, was ineffective given the terrain and condition of the forces necessary to make the breakthrough.

Maneuver was the key. A (temporarily) feigned withdrawal might have brought meade down from the fishhook line, giving Lee an opportunity to use something he had plenty of, canister. In a defensive role, Pickett, Heth, and Pender would have been far more useful.

Historical events suggest this to be one of the more beneficial choices for Lee by the evening of July 2nd. When General Farnsworth charged into Law's shattered brigades, they were, in turn slaughtered. Imagine if Lee enticed Sedgwick or some of the weaker corp off the hills S& E of town.

Such action would have drawn Meade South and West away from the Railroads and closer to friendly CSA territory.

[whitworth]

The problem I see is the Confederates had problems of attacks in depth. Plus on the attacks of the 2nd and 3rd, Army of the Potomac artillery helped stop the attacks, as well as the infantry.
Once Confederate infantry made their move on the attack, Confederate artillery was unable to fire over their heads, in most cases, because of its poorly manufactured artillery ammunition.
At some point, Confederate infantry, on the attack, had to face not only Union infantry, it had to meet their superb artillery. Major McGilvery performed great defensive work with his artillery. Despite the fact he disobeyed a direct order of a Corps commander on the use of artillery, he was promoted to Lieut. Colonel shortly after the Gettysburg battle. AoP artillery played a significant role in stopping Confederate attacks on July 2 and 3rd. Like General Greene, many historians forgot or ignored their contribution.

[OpnDownfall]

It is my understanding that Cathcarts theory, is that Cemetary Hill was Always Lee Target for all three days.
That through bad staff work and Lee's inability to coordinate the actions of his corps commanders, the battle ended in failure.
The book, claims Lee saw Cemetary Hill as the lynch-pin to the Union defense, because it dominated the entire Union Line to the Round Tops.
On Day Two, Lee was still determined to take CH and the Peach Orchard was targeted as a fire base from which to supress Union Artillery on and around Cemetary Hill as Hood and McLaws attacked (guiding on the Emmitsburg Pike) CH And the left flank of the AoP on the way. (Being as how Lee or Longstreet apparently did not really know where the Union left was, even this plan was problematic)
On the Third Day, the theory is that Lee wanted to withdraw Longstreet and reassemble further North, Not to attack the precise center of the Union Line on Cemetary Ridge, but, once again, Cememtary Hill, when Longstreet, in effect, refuses, Lee has to cobble together another corps sized attack force made of elements of two different corps, during which, due to slippage by the staff (compounded by Lee's continued refusal to hold a council of war and sticks to his habit of command by remote control) the exact point of attack is lost sight of, by everyone except, possibly Lee.
That is roughly the theory, as I understand it. It has problems, but IMO it tends to better explain some of the mysteries of Lee conduct of this particular battle.

[whitworth]

Stuart got delayed for several days and that meant he pushed his forces to get to Pennsylvania. He saw a number of skirmishes, particularly at Hanover and Carlisle.

By the time Stuart arrived at Gettysburg, his horses and men were not prepared for such an attack in the AoP rear.

Gettysburg: Day Three

by Jeffry D. Wert.



Wert had several footnotes from cavalrymen in the fight on July 3rd, saying that they were not fit for battle, due to their hard ride to Pennsylvania.

[5fish]

[quote=whitworth;78757]Stuart got delayed for several days and that meant he pushed his forces to get to Pennsylvania. He saw a number of skirmishes, particularly at Hanover and Carlisle.

By the time Stuart arrived at Gettysburg, his horses and men were not prepared for such an attack in the AoP rear.

Gettysburg: Day Three

by Jeffry D. Wert.

I too have read that Stuart's cavalry was in bad shape before it left on its ride into PA. and by the time he got to Gettysburg his horse were in poor shape.

It is amazing how well Stuart's cavalry perform during the retreat with those exhausted horses.

[ole]

Exhausted 5fish? How about near dead?

Although it doesn't look it, a horse is a fragile animal. If it's going to work all day, it needs a good feed of grain -- with plenty of water -- followed with a long night of rest. It can survive quite well on a pasture if it is not worked.

And there are the odds to contend with. Not all horses are equal. If you make a long ride out with 1000 horses, you're not going to have near that many after three days and, after a week, you have a lot of cavalrymen wearing out their own boots leading the horses rather than killing them.

Cavalrymen were to take care of their horses before they took care of themselves. But without wagons with grain, some of everyday will be taken up foraging for shoes and grain -- or more horses. More riding.

A worn-out horse can be brought back to serviceability with proper diet and care. But a horse can in no way be considered smart. It will work until it dies. In a long ride like Stuart did, and the drive Lee made, I'll assume a great many Pennsylvania and Maryland horses made the trip back.

ole

[timewalker]

Shelby Foote, in "Stars in Their Courses" is quite hard on Stuart. His Grand Review wore out his horses and men prior to the Battle of Brandy Station and may have led to his being surprised at that battle. Then, Foote theorizes, Stuart was getting so much bad press after the Battle of Brandy Station that he ignored his orders from Lee to support Ewell in order to make another showboat grand ride around the Union army. The problem was the Union army got in his way and he was forced to ride ****her and harder, and fight more, than he intended at the start. Foote is pretty caustic about Stuart finally riding in with his troopers who were so spent they were falling asleep over fences, and presenting Lee with 125 wagons of by now marginal usefulness. His anecdotes of how tired and footsore the troopers were makes painfully clear that Stuart was probably in no position to so much once he reached the field at Gettysburg.