A three pronged attack on Day Three?

[whitworth]

Unfortunately this author never studied horses. Both rider and horse were spent by the time Stuart got his cavalry on the right flank of the AoP, on the third day.

Poor Stuart was left in Virginia, to move last of the large Confederate units. Stuart was blocked at the Bull Run Mountain gaps. He had to travel more and use up his cavalry's energy.

Stuart went to York and Carlisle, because that was where Lee intended to send his army in the original orders. Ewells Corps did arrive there. But orders were changed by Lee, and Stuart never learned of them until the battle in Gettysburg started.

Stuart did the best he could with what he had left and available. His horses and troopers were physically spent by July 3. And no Lee plan could overcome that fact.

[ole]

Whitworth is quite correct in bringing in the subject of horses. Horses were originally valued because they could run or do a fast walk for quite a while longer than a man could. But they do have limitations.

The horse needs food regularly. It can get as foot weary as the grunt. If he doesn't get it in adequate supplies, it, like the soldier, begins to get weaker. Keep on that course and the horse, becomes useless. Although you might get the soldier to march an extra mile, the horse would simply lie down and die.

Mounted infantry and cavalry were subordinated to their mount. You didn't eat until your horse had been cared for.

Riding or drafting, horses were very important to an army. It don't move without reasonably healthy horses.

And horses ain't rabbits. They didn't magically reappear annually. I've often wondered how in the billy blue world the forces could possibly find remounts.

ole

[cw1865]

Originally Posted by whitworth

His horses and troopers were physically spent by July 3. And no Lee plan could overcome that fact.

Isn't Federal firepower the difference on the calvary battlefield?

[samgrant]

Originally Posted by cw1865

Isn't Federal firepower the difference on the calvary battlefield?

For me that suggests a new question:

Aside from the number of soldiers available on the respective sides, how did the number of weapons and ammunition available to each side compare? (Day 1, 2, and 3).

(I think I read somewhere that Herman Haupt, alert to the situation, quickly began preparing for a rail link to Gettysburg, in order to resupply, if necessary, and/or to efficiently evacuate the wounded.)

[ole]

For a try at an answer to your question, Sam:

Lee's supply was tenuous, at best. The Union supply although perhaps funneling through a bottleneck, was virtually unlimited. He could not have been without ammo for more than a few hours under an imaginable circumstance.

You mentioned Haupt. An unsung hero. If he'd have had to build a railroad to Gettysburg, he'd have done it within a few days. What an amazing asset!

ole

[J_Man0507]

Indeed, Haupt was amazing when it came to getting supplies to the AoP. His orchestration of a rail link was key I think.

On the ammunition point, you are quite right that the supply of arms and ammunition was very important. Lee was operating far from his supply bases in Virginia. Meade was much better supplied, the closest rail head being Westminster, Maryland, if I remember right. Meade could have a constant stream of ammunition and other supplies coming to him, while Lee would eventually run out.

I think it is also a matter of the quality as well. Confederate ammunition, especially when it came to artillery, was vastly inferior. Their shells had a horrible tendency to go off too soon, too late, or not at all. Bad fuses makes for poor artillery support. Its a good part of the reason that E.A. Porter's artillery didn't do as much damage as it could have on the Third Day.

Also, interior lines. The AoP was set up so that it could move men and supplies rapidly to any endangered portion of the line. The AoNV had its supplies far back, and the artillery could not replenish their limbers without holding off for an hour or so on their suppressing fire. Hence the charge goes in without artillery support. Supply was very critical to the Union victory at Gettysburg.

[ole]

Aptly put, JMan. Although nothing can work out perfectly, Meade had a decided edge on the supply side. Lee had some rickety wagons; Meade had Haupt.

ole

[whitworth]

BG Rufus, chief quartermaster, Army of the Potomac was in charge of getting supplies to the AoP for the Battle of Gettysburg.

HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC, July 1, 1863.
General M. C. MEIGS, (Received 7 P.M.)
Quartermaster- General, U. S. Army:
Since my last dispatch, the enemy has appeared in force near Gettysburg, and is driving in our cavalry pickets. It is presumed he will attack us in pitched battle very soon.
We have plenty of supplies, I think, to answer until after the bat-tle, and we can then better tell where we want to receive them. Our teams are now all ordered on the railroad between Union Bridge and Westminster. None go to Frederick. Please, therefore, send the forage to Union Bridge, but defer sending anything at present to
Frederick.
Matters will culminate here very quickly, and, we doubt not, vic-toriously for us. Do not regard me as undecided at all about sup-plies. I think we have enough until after a fight, but I make requi-sitions by orders.
RUFUS INGALLS,
Brig. Gen., Chief Quartermaster, Army of the Potomac.

[ole]

Thanks for that post, Whitworth. It certainly draws a sharp contrast between Federal, rear echelon competence, and the dolts who were in charge of CSA supply.

Who'da thunk, "don't send anything yet" would make such an impression?

ole

[whitworth]

When I first started studying horses and the Civil War, I was surprised there were no large written accounts by any historian.
Horses were like the tanks and supply vehicles of WWII. Without them, your army could go nowhere.

Here is one rather obscure report from a Confederate artillery commander reporting on the Gettysburg campaign. Of course, it's not about the battle, but the condition of the horses due to the campaign. The campaign truly devastated the Confederate horse supply.


Artillery Battalion.
CAMP NEAR GORDONSViLLE, VA.,
August 2, 1863.
I regret to state that, owing to the jaded condition of the horses, which had been but scantily supplied with forage since July 1, dur-ing all of which time they had not received a single feed of corn, I was forced to abandon two rifled pieces belonging to Captain [J. W.] Lewis’ battery on the night of the retreat from Maryland. Every effort was made to bring them off, but being the rear of the artillery, and before my arrangements could be completed, which were made with all possible dispatch, the enemy’s cavalry charged and took them, together with 6 men and spare horses which had been sent back for the purpose of bringing them off.

I regret to state that the losses which my battalion has incurred during the recent campaign are especially heavy in horses, those now remaining being for the present almost totally unserviceable. It is my opinion, however, that with a short respite I will soon be able to
report them as serviceable. I would respectfully state that, at the time of leaving Fredericksburg, their condition was generally bad, in consequence of the hardships they had encountered during the past winter, together with what they had gone through during the spring campaign.

JNO. J. GARNETT,
Lieutenant- Colonel, Commanding Artillery Battalion.